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Human languages are not just tools for transmitting cultural ideas, they are 
themselves culturally transmitted. This single observation has major implications 
for our understanding of how and why languages around the world are structured 
the way they are, and also for how scientists should be studying them. Accounting 
for the origins of what turns out to be such a uniquely human ability is, and should 
be, a priority for anyone interested in what makes us different from every other life-
form on Earth. 
The way the scientific community thinks about language has seen considerable 
changes over the years. In particular, we have witnessed movements away from a 
purely descriptive science of language, towards a more explanatory framework that 
is willing to embrace the difficult questions of not just how individual languages are 
currently structured and used, but also how and why they got to be that way in the 
first place. Seeing languages as historical entities is, of course, nothing new in 
linguistics. Seeing languages as complex adaptive systems, undergoing processes of 
evolution at multiple levels of interaction however, is.
Broadly speaking, this thesis explores some of the implications that this perspective 
on language has, and argues that in addition to furthering our understanding of the 
processes of biological evolution and the mechanisms of individual learning 
required specifically for language, we also need to be mindful of the less well-
understood cultural processes that mediate between the two. Human 
communication systems are not just direct expressions of our genes. Neither are 
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they independently acquired by learners anew at every generation. Instead, 
languages are transmitted culturally from one generation to another, creating an 
opportunity for a different kind of evolutionary channel to exist. It is a central aim 
of this thesis to explore some of the adaptive dynamics that such a cultural channel 
has, and investigate the extent to which certain structural and statistical properties 
of language can be directly explained as adaptations to the transmission process and 
the learning biases of speakers. 
In order to address this aim, this thesis takes an experimental approach. Building on 
a rich set of empirical results from various computational simulations and 
mathematical models, it presents a novel methodological framework for exploring 
one type of cultural transmission mechanism, iterated learning, in the laboratory 
using human participants. In these experiments, we observe the evolution of 
artificial languages as they are acquired and then transmitted to new learners. 
Although there is no communication involved in these studies, and participants are 
unaware that their learning efforts are being propagated to future learners, we find 
that many functional features of language emerge naturally from the different 
constraints imposed upon them during transmission.
These constraints can take a variety of forms, both internal and external to the 
learner. Taken collectively, the data presented here suggest several points: (i) that 
iterated language learning experiments can provide us with new insights about the 
emergence and evolution of language; (ii) that language-like structure can emerge as 
a result of cultural transmission alone; and (iii) that whilst structure in these systems 
has the appearance of design, and is in some sense ‘created’ by intentional beings, 
its emergence is in fact wholly the result of non-intentional processes. Put simply, 
cultural evolution plays a vital role in language. This work extends our framework 
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I have learned two very significant things over the course of completing this 
doctorate: 
1. There is always something more exciting to do than sit down to write your 
thesis. For that I thank my wonderful friends and family (you know who you 
are), without whom I would have gone mad years ago. 
2. There is never anything more important to do than sit down to write your thesis. 
For that I thank my amazing supervisors, Simon Kirby and Mónica Tamariz, 
without whom I would also have gone mad years ago. 
This project, like many projects, was begun by a good idea: why don’t we turn a 
simulation into an experiment? As much as I would be honoured to have thought 
up this good idea by myself, there is something quite satisfying about the fact that I 
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regulations set out by the board of examiners. I wanted to do a computational 
model of language evolution. The rules said I had to do an experiment. “No, no, 
no!” I said. I wanted to study language evolution! But I had to do an experiment. 
Cue awkward silence. Commence scratching heads. Pause to let disappointment 
drain away. Language evolution. Experiment. Want. Need.
Oh. 
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[I]t cannot fail to occur to us as an interesting question, by what 
gradual steps the transition has been made from the first simple 
efforts of uncultivated nature, to a state of things so wonderfully 
artificial and complicated. Whence has arisen that systematical 
beauty which we admire in the structure of a cultivated language; 
that analogy which runs through the mixture of languages spoken 
by the most remote and unconnected nations; and those 
peculiarities by which they are all distinguished from each other? 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! — Dugald Stewart (1858)
When we see structure in our surroundings, it is only natural to question the origins 
of that structure. In spite of its early date, the quote by Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) 
that begins this chapter anticipates many of the challenges still faced by modern 
linguists today. How do we explain the ’systematical beauty’ that we see in the 
structure of language?  How are we to reconcile both the similarities (’analogy’) and 
the surprising amount of variation (’peculiarities’) exhibited amongst the languages 
of the world? As one would expect, there have been many attempts at addressing 
Stewart’s questions1  over the intervening years, yet they still remain as open to 
debate today as they were 150 years ago.  This thesis focuses only on the question of 
the origins of structure in language. In short: why is language structured the way it 
1
1 The sentiments echoed in this quote are not just those of Dugald Stewart himself, but were 
also shared by his contemporary, the great economist Adam Smith (1723-1790), whose 
memoirs Stewart was collecting. 
is, and not some other way?  It turns out that the answer to this question might also 
shed light on the other features of language that puzzle us. 
1.1! Background
Although communication systems are abundant in nature, one of the things that 
makes humans different from other animals is that we use language for more than 
just communication (Dennett, 1995; Jackendoff, 1996; Tomasello, 1999; Lupyan et al., 
2007). Not only this, but language itself has some unique properties not found in 
other systems. In particular, human language is both open-ended (allowing infinite 
expression of an unlimited set of concepts) and highly variable (Hurford et al., 1998; 
Evans & Levinson, 2009; Fitch, 2010). If language is the trait that separates us from 
other animals, then in order to understand what makes us human, we need to 
understand language (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003). However, in order to fully 
comprehend a complex phenomenon like language we need to understand it from 
many different perspectives. It is not enough to simply know how it works, we also 
need to understand how it came to be that way. In other words, we need to 
understand how it evolved. 
This is not a trivial exercise. Language is both a behavioural skill rooted in human 
biology and a cultural entity. This means that when it comes to the topic of 
‘language evolution’, we could be referring to: (i) the evolution of the mechanisms 
responsible for language, or (ii) the evolution of languages themselves. In actual 
fact, we are concerned with both, all of the time. Although this thesis primarily 
concerns itself with trying to explain language evolution in the sense implied in (ii), 
I hope to argue that insights gained from this area can actually help us to identify 
where we should be focusing our attention on in terms of explaining (i). 
The actual study of human language has had a long history. As a result, the way that 
the scientific community thinks about language has undergone considerable 
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changes over the years. Explanations attributing language to the work of some 
divine creator have made way for accounts focusing on understanding language in 
functional, cognitive and behavioural terms. Of particular significance to the work 
presented here is the increasing movement within mainstream linguistics away 
from a purely descriptive science of language, towards a more explanatory 
framework that is willing to embrace the difficult questions of not just how 
individual languages are currently structured and used, but also how and why they 
got to be that way in the first place. From being a niche field a decade or two ago, 
evolutionary linguistics is now booming (Zuidema, 2005).
Part of the reason for this is because it is still easy to appreciate Dugald Stewart’s 
fascination with the mystery of language. The puzzle he sets out has not received a 
completely satisfying explanation since most theories tend to view language as a 
phenomenon entirely encapsulated within the individual speaker-hearer (e.g. 
Chomsky, 1975). Explaining how language evolved in this view amounts to 
explaining how the brain mechanisms that support language evolved (e.g. Pinker & 
Bloom, 1990). This underplays the important role of cultural and social interaction 
between populations of speaker-hearers. One important observation to be made is 
that languages are not just tools for transmitting cultural ideas, they are themselves 
culturally transmitted (Brighton et al., 2005). This fact has interesting implications; 
namely that the process of cultural transmission has an explanatory role to play in 
the emergence of key structural features of language (Anderson, 1973; Hurford, 
1990; Kirby, 1999).
1.2! Thesis Aims
This thesis takes seriously the idea that processes of cultural transmission can 
explain the emergence of some (perhaps all) of the key structural properties, such as 
compositionality, duality of patterning, systematicity and possibly recursion, that 
underlie the features of language like open-endedness and variability mentioned 
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earlier (see §2.1). One of the major contributions that it makes to the field lies in 
offering up a new experimental methodology to test claims made about the cultural 
transmission of language. To date, most of what we know about the cultural 
evolution of language has come from mathematical models and computer 
simulations (e.g. Hare & Elman, 1995; Batali, 1998; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Steels, 
2003; Brighton et al., 2005; Griffiths & Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007). What makes 
the work presented here unique is that it involves obtaining empirical results from 
populations of human learners, via an experimental paradigm known as human 
iterated language learning. Here, artificial languages are transmitted between 
learners under controlled laboratory conditions, allowing researchers to track the 
changes that take place over time.
One of the central themes which runs throughout what follows is that it is time to 
start studying language evolution in the laboratory like this. However, this is not to 
say that there is no room for existing methods of investigation. On the contrary, if 
we want to make progress in understanding a phenomenon as complex as this, we 
actually need a greater degree of synthesis and communication between 
practitioners of different empirical approaches. One factor which is already 
apparent in the literature is that there seems to be a divide between computational/
mathematical models and other kinds of empirical research. This division does not 
solely exist within the relatively small field of language evolution. The same 
situation exists amongst researchers interested in cultural evolution more generally. 
In this quote from Barrett et al. (2002), we could easily replace the word ‘culture’ 
with ‘language’ to make this point:
“The last few decades have seen the development of two quite 
independent paradigms in the evolutionarily-informed study of 
culture. One of these has focused on building mathematical 
models of the process of cultural transmission (in effect studying 
inheritance mechanisms); the other has had a more empirical 
focus, being principally concerned with the adaptiveness of 
culture.” (p351-352) 
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Barrett et al. (2002) suggest that the reason for this split is in part due to the fact that 
both strands pose very different research questions. However, they also attribute a 
degree of blame for the lack of integration to the fact that computational and 
mathematical modelling still remains mysterious and poorly understood outside of 
those practising it. Nevertheless, much can be gained by bringing these two 
different approaches closer together. The experimental framework presented in this 
thesis represents an explicit attempt to do just this. To describe them as experiments 
inspired by computational models of iterated learning is an understatement: they 
are more like actual simulations of iterated learning instantiated in humans, rather 
than artificial agents.
This makes the experiments themselves somewhat unusual when compared to the 
standard (i.e. non-iterated) experiments that we often see in psychology. Just to give 
one example, whereas in most experiments the performance of each individual 
participant on a given task is measured as a data point, here a data point 
corresponds to an individual language that has been passed between many 
participants. This makes these kinds of experiments relatively expensive to conduct: 
in order to demonstrate significance we must recruit many more participants per 
condition. Although I hope to show that this endeavour is worthwhile, and that 
human iterated language learning experiments are an invaluable method for 
gaining insight into how the very act of learning affects the structure of systems for 
future learners, I also hope that this work goes on to inspire more realistic 
computational and mathematical models of the process.
In short, the theory that I will be testing is that language adapts. More specifically, 
language adapts to suit the conditions under which it is transmitted. As with any 
kind of problem to be solved, there are often multiple solutions. Variation in 
language arises because there are many ways in which a language can be structured, 
all of which are equally well adapted to the task of being transmitted. The fact that 
languages are culturally evolving systems can thus explain why they are open-
ended and variable. Notice that so far we have not made any mention of 
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communication. This is deliberate. Although language gives all the appearance of 
having been designed for communication (e.g. Pinker, 2003), I will take the 
somewhat unusual approach of investigating the extent to which linguistic 
structures that are communicatively useful could have arisen without it. If it turns 
out that communication is not required in my experiments to get these structures to 
emerge, this does not prove that language evolution necessarily happened in that 
manner. However, it would require us to think more deeply about the possibility.
Another issue I will be exploring which tangentially relates to this concerns the 
nature of the mechanisms responsible for evolutionary change. Language, unlike 
the Scott Monument, was designed without a designer. Although in a sense it was 
created by intentional beings, it was not the intention of those beings to create it 
(Keller, 1994). Croft (2000) agrees, and makes a useful distinction between what he 
calls intentional changes (where a speaker has some other goal in language use in 
mind, and produces some unforeseen innovation along the way) and nonintentional 
changes (where a speaker has no goal in mind at all but introduces a change as a 
consequence of the act of production or comprehension itself). I will show some 
examples of empirical studies which, by this definition, explore the intentional 
design of communication systems in the laboratory (§3.2.4), but argue that we also 
need to investigate the possibility that structural features of language could also 
have emerged through more nonintentional processes.
To summarise, this work addresses the following questions:
1. Why is language structured the way it is and not some other way?
2. How does the process of cultural transmission give rise to language structure?
3. Can features of language structure which appear to be designed for 




The basic methodology of the experiments is based on an agent-based 
computational simulation of cultural transmission, known as the iterated learning 
model (Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Brighton et al., 2005), and involves the transmission 
of small artificial languages between human learners. Participants are recruited and 
told they must learn how to speak a newly discovered alien language. During 
training, they are shown images (meanings) of different coloured shapes engaged in 
some kind of motion, along with a written description (signals) showing how the 
alien would refer to that particular image. After training, their knowledge of the 
alien language is tested by showing them each meaning in turn and asking for the 
correct signal. Whatever is produced as output in this final test then becomes the 
new training data for the next participant. This process iterates to form a linear 
diffusion chain of learners, each of whom have unknowingly acquired their 
language from the previous participant.
The first experiment looks at what happens when learners are only given partial 
access to signals and meanings during learning, whereas the second experiment 
looks at what happens when this restriction is lifted. The third experiment explores 
what happens to the languages when we make an invisible modification to the 
process of transmission, such that only unambiguous signals get transmitted to 
future participants. The fourth study builds on this, and looks to see what effect 
increasing the amount of training has. The fifth study is somewhat different to the 
previous four in that it does not involve the transmission of meaning-signal pairs at 
all. In this final study, we try to get a better look at how sequence learning 
constraints may influence things, by focusing on how signals evolve in the absence 
of any meanings.
Each experiment can be seen to stand alone, operating to investigate its own 
particular hypotheses. However, they have also been designed with specific 
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contrasts in mind. Within the four main experiments, three conditions are examined. 
Experiments I and II differ only in terms of whether or not participants have access 
to the full language during learning; Experiments I and III differ only in terms of 
whether or not unambiguous signals get passed on to learners; and finally, 
Experiments III and IV differ only in terms of the amount of exposure to training 
items that learners receive.
 
1.4! Thesis Road-Map
In Chapter Two we take a closer look at language and the key approaches that have 
been taken to explain its emergence. In particular, it presents an account of iterated 
learning -- the process of cultural transmission at work in language -- and 
summarises the key findings to have emerged from computational and 
mathematical models of the process in language, and in different domains. It will 
then move on to explore some of the literature on cultural evolution more generally. 
In particular, it looks at some of the more influential theoretical accounts, the effect 
that the direction of cultural transmission has, and finally, reviews some of the 
experiments that have been done to explore the mechanisms and dynamics of 
cultural evolution in both humans and non-humans. 
Chapter Three also reviews literature, but this time focuses specifically on attempts 
to empirically investigate language origins in humans. Its main purpose is to 
motivate the design of the current methodology. It reviews the current approaches 
to explaining language emergence, both inside and outside of the laboratory, and 
argues that although language arises through the actions of intentional beings, it has 
not been intentionally designed or created in any way. In order to isolate and better 
understand this unintentional aspect of language emergence, we need an 
experiment design that does not involve intentional communication between 
participants. The details of this design are then laid out ahead of the actual 
experiments themselves.
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The first set of results are reported in Chapter Four. In this chapter we look in more 
detail at one of the key parameters from the iterated learning models discussed in 
Chapter 2 -- the transmission bottleneck. The first and second experiments test out 
predictions made by the computer simulations, and find that although the main 
findings associated with iterated learning studies -- that languages evolve to become 
easier to learn and more highly structured -- are replicated in human learners, there 
are some interesting differences.
These differences are further explored in Chapter Five, where we focus in on the 
natural tension that exists between learnability and expressivity. The third and 
fourth experiments are outlined here, showing that when we add in a pressure for 
greater expression of the meaning-space, we start to see signs of compositionality 
emerging in the languages. Techniques are introduced which allow us to precisely 
quantify the emergence of this compositional structure, and which enable us to see 
how cultural transmission amplifies local structural regularities in the input and 
allows them to accumulate over time.
Chapter Six takes a very different approach, and asks the question of whether we 
can try to isolate the effects of some of the learning biases that are at work in the 
minds of participants. It introduces several modifications to the experimental 
methodology designed to eliminate other biases, one of which entails the complete 
removal of meanings.  The results of this study show that even when there are no 
pressures upon signals to adapt to express structured meanings, signals 
nevertheless begin to show signs of structure as a result of the sequence memory 
constraints of the learners.
Finally, Chapter Seven returns to some of the key themes expressed throughout the 
thesis and attempts to link them to some of the wider issues within the field of 
evolutionary linguistics. It presents a brief summary of the major points emerging 
from the five studies, and contends that the key contribution of all this work lies not 
9
just in the lessons we have learned from the various experimental manipulations 
that have been explored, but in the development of the experimental methodology 
itself. It stresses the significance of cultural transmission in the process of language 
evolution, and suggests that the next challenge facing the field lies in explaining 




Language and Cultural 
Evolution
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first chapter has set the scene for thinking about language as an evolving 
system in its own right, and given an overview of the general direction of the rest of 
this thesis. The rest of this chapter outlines in more detail some of the reasons we 
might be interested in studying language, and in particular, the origins of language, 
before moving on to explore some of the ways in which the topic of language 
evolution has been approached recently. It briefly introduces the reader to the 
iterated learning framework, which forms the theoretical backbone of the thesis, and 
then moves on to explore work undertaken in the field of cultural evolution more 
generally. It presents a very brief overview of the main theoretical approaches, 
before finally exploring some of the experimental work undertaken using both 
human and non-human participants.
2.1 Some Facts about Language
Language defines us as a species
Language is often credited with being the behavioural trait that defines us as a 
species. There are perhaps two main reasons for this assertion. The first is to do with 
the special role that it seems to play in our lives. We use language. A lot. And not 
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just for simple communication. We use it during cognition (Dennett, 1995; 
Jackendoff, 1996; Clark, 1998), for co-ordinating joint actions (Clark, 1996), when 
constructing a theory of mind about others (Tomasello, 1999), for maintaining social 
bonds (Dunbar, 1996), and for categorising objects in our world (Vygotsky, 1962; 
Lupyan et al., 2007), to name just a few. If other species are using their 
communication systems for all of these extra purposes, there is surprisingly little 
evidence for it.
The second reason for claiming our linguistic abilities separate us from other 
creatures relates to the properties of language itself. We are not just different from 
other animals in how we use our communication system, we differ in how that 
system itself works. If we focus on the features that all human languages share with 
one another, and then look to find correlates to those features in other 
communication systems in nature, we can identify the similarities and differences. 
Although many of these proposed ‘design features’ are shared with other species, 
some appear genuinely unique to humans (Hockett, 1958; Hockett & Altmann, 
1968). 
Language is open-ended and variable
Of all the features claimed to be universal and unique to language, two seem 
particularly striking: unlike other natural communication systems, human 
languages are, (a) open-ended, and (b) highly variable. It turns out that even 
explaining these two traits presents us with some interesting evolutionary problems. 
If we begin with the open-endedness of language, we can easily understand how a 
system which is capable of expressing an unlimited set of concepts might be useful. 
The ability to communicate a novel thought, in a novel context, perhaps to a novel 
interlocutor, using a novel packaging of signals, is not to be sniffed at. If I were to 
wish you ‘sweet elbowy lamb dreams’, you might think I was behaving strangely 
but you would nevertheless understand the basic message. This is in spite of the fact 
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that you could not possibly have heard that particular sentence before, may never 
have met me, and are entirely removed from the context of the utterance1. 
The open-endedness of human language is a result of the way that it is structured. 
In particular, all languages exhibit duality of patterning  (meaningful units are 
created by the reuse and recombination of smaller meaningless units), 
compositionality (more complex meanings are created by the structured ordering of 
meaningful units), systematicity (there is a structure-preserving relationship 
between signals and meanings), regularity (relationships between signals and 
meanings, and other structures at higher levels, are expressed reliably and 
unambiguously) and possibly recursion (rules of language can be self-referencing, 
allowing for complex embedding and hierarchical ordering of clauses)2. These 
structural properties are universal, perhaps even definitional, of language. Without 
the property of compositionality for instance, we could not interpret the meaning of 
novel sequential arrangements of words even if those words were familiar, and if 
the relationship between signals and meanings were unsystematic and irregular, we 
could not make generalisations over utterances and apply them to new situations. 
These structural properties are more than just a bag of neat linguistic tricks - they 
are integral to explaining how humans have managed to survive in almost every 
habitat on earth (Hurford et al., 1998; Fitch, 2010), and build the technology required 
to escape the confines of our planet (Kirby & Christiansen, 2003). In contrast, even 
though many animals are capable of complex thought and reasoning, they are still 
restricted to more limited domains of expression (Hurford, 2007; Fitch, 2010). So 
whilst Vervet monkeys can famously differentiate between different types of 
predators and make alarm calls accordingly (e.g. Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990), they 
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1 For the curious, the context here is craving lamb codillo before bed time, and sadly nothing 
to do with falling asleep trying to count sheep who are jostling each other. 
2 The issue of whether recursion is present in all languages is a contentious one. See Everett 
(2005), Parker (2006), and Luuk & Luuk (2010) for the argument against, and Fitch et al. 
(2005), and Hauser et al. (2002) for the argument for.
cannot create novel alarm calls for new predators (even though they can perceive 
them), or use their existing calls for novel purposes (other than triggering a flight 
response). Given the obvious utility and adaptive value of a system capable of 
unlimited expression, why has this trait not evolved in species other than our own? 
Moving onto the inherent variation in language, we find that it goes beyond the fact 
that there are some 6,000 or so different languages existing in the world today3. 
Variation also exists within the same language community, both synchronically in 
the form of different dialects, and diachronically in the form of different historical 
variants. Even if we focus down to the level of an individual speaker, we find 
immense variation in the choice of particular words, phrases, intonation patterns 
and pronunciation of phonemes, based on any combination of social, contextual, 
emotional and articulatory factors operating at any given moment. In short, 
variation exists at all levels of organisation within language, across languages, and 
at both the population and individual level (Evans & Levinson, 2009). 
Again this presents us with a problem: having this much variation in language 
entails that language must be learnt, and biologically speaking, learning is a costly 
process. Indeed, we see that while many species have offspring who are capable of 
walking and catching themselves a good meal within minutes of being born, human 
infants are entirely dependent on their parents for survival, and do the majority of 
their development outside of the womb. Before they start learning how to walk, 
babies are learning how to talk, devoting the majority of their cognitive resources to 
this one task. Obviously, we know that learning, and social learning in particular, 
brings other benefits that must outweigh these costs (Barrett et al., 2002). However, it 
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3  Although this in itself is highly unusual if we are drawing comparisons with animal 
communication systems,  which tend to be innate and therefore uniform across all members 
of the same species (Evans & Levinson, 2009). A rare exception to this pattern are the systems 
of some species of song-birds, seals and cetaceans who learn their songs culturally from 
conspecifics, which often results in geographical variation in the structures of songs sung by 
members of the same species (Marler & Tamura, 1962; Doupe & Kuhl, 1999; Rendell & 
Whitehead, 2005). 
has been suggested that humans are doing something special when it comes to 
learning language.
Language acquisition is automatic
Although language is an incredibly complex system, with many intricate context-
dependent rules and exceptions, infants seem to acquire it effortlessly. In fact, by the 
age of four, all healthy children will have mastered the basic structures of syntax 
(Bates et al., 2003), and all without taking advantage of any direct instruction or 
correction by their caregivers (Hirsh-Pasek et al., 1984). There are many well-attested 
developmental patterns within language (Pinker, 1994). For instance, it has been 
shown that the order that children acquire certain bound morphemes in English is 
the same across learners, and that this is unrelated to the frequency with which 
those morphemes appear in the speech of caregivers (Brown, 1973; Slobin, 1982). 
Similar findings are found in the development of phonological (Locke, 1983), 
syntactic (Ingram, 1989) and semantic (Johnston, 1985) aspects of language as well. 
This is interesting, and when combined with data from cross-linguistic studies, 
which indicate broadly uniform developmental sequences across different 
languages and cultures (Brown & Hanlon, 1970; Slobin, 1982), suggests that these 
patterns cannot be explained by the linguistic environment alone. However that is 
not to say that the linguistic environment is not important. There is strong evidence 
for a critical period in language acquisition -- a certain ‘window of opportunity’ 
where learning language is possible, thought to last between infancy and puberty 
(Lenneberg, 1967). If learners are deprived of input during this time period, they 
will not go on to develop full linguistic competence (Curtiss, 1977; Skuse, 1984).
These three facts combined -- that language acquisition proceeds reliably, exhibits 
universal developmental patterns, and that there is a critical period for it -- has led 
most, if not all, researchers to the conclusion that there is some innate component 
constraining the acquisition process, even if it is not specific to language (e.g. Elman 
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et al., 1996). Given the fact that attempts to teach human language to non-humans 
have all failed (Fitch, 2010), it also seems reasonable to conclude that this innate 
component must also be somehow specific to humans, even if it is more the result of 
quantitative rather than qualitative differences in cognition (Hauser & Fitch, 2003; 
Hurford, 2004). However, as the qualifications in the previous two sentences 
suggest, there is still scope for much disagreement as to what this innate 
contribution might be, what the role of learning is, and what kind of evolutionary 
mechanism(s) are responsible for it. 
2.2 Key Approaches to Language Evolution
Before we can explain how language evolves, we need to be able to explain what it 
is and how it works. Broadly speaking, two different approaches have been taken to 
explain language, and as a result, its evolution. Each differs to the extent that it sees 
language as being the end-product of specialised cognitive machinery, and also to 
the importance to which it ascribes processes of cultural transmission. This section 
explore these two stances in more detail.
2.2.1 The Direct Appeal to Biology
The first approach, taken by some to be the ‘standard’ or orthodox evolutionary 
view (e.g. Kirby et al., 2008b), is to suggest that the structure of human language can 
be explained by a direct appeal to biology. At its heart, this approach rests on the 
claims originating with the linguist Noam Chomsky concerning how children 
acquire language. According to Chomsky (1959; 1965; 1980), language learning is 
constrained by an innately-specified language acquisition device (LAD) which 
shapes the kinds of hypotheses the child is willing to entertain about language, and 
ultimately guides them to the correct grammar. As the LAD is as much a part of our 
biology as, for instance, the human eye, we can account for its evolution in the same 
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way: by treating it as an adaptation (in the case of language, for communicating 
propositional meanings), brought about via processes of natural selection (Pinker & 
Bloom, 1990; Pinker, 2003).  
The Nativist Position
This idea encapsulates a very specific notion of innateness. This is reflected in the 
terms used by theorists to describe what is going on. Humans, it is said, are in 
possession of an ‘innate module’ (Fodor, 1983), a ‘language instinct’ (Pinker, 1994) or 
a ‘faculty of language’ (Chomsky, 2002). What unites all subscribers to this kind of 
nativist view is a single shared tenet: that the primary determinant of language 
acquisition is a body of innate knowledge specifically pertaining to language4. 
Under this view, universal structural properties of language are seen as the direct 
expression of the genes - they appear in language because of constraints from our 
innate learning mechanisms (Fig 2.1). Whilst languages themselves may vary, the 
fundamental ways in which languages are organised do not, because they are 
genetically determined. Although nativists recognise the crucial role that linguistic 
input plays in triggering this process and interacting with the information held 
within the LAD, what ultimately causes language to exhibit the hallmark structural 
features that it does can only be explained by understanding what children are born 
with and bring to the task of learning. 
Why might we want to make such a strong (and as we shall see later, controversial) 
claim? The first reason is that an innate  LAD can help us explain the reliability, 
uniformity and universality of acquisition discussed earlier. Language seems to 
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4  Chomsky has recently clarified his position with regards to the faculty of language, 
distinguishing between the faculty of language in the broad sense (FLB), which contains 
cognitive mechanisms that are either not specific to humans or not specific to language, and 
the faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN), which contains only cognitive 
mechanisms specific to both humans and language (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002). I am 
only referring to FLN here, although it is important to remember that the contents of FLB 
can also be explained by a direct appeal to biology.
unfold in predictable stages, much as other instinctual behaviours in the animal 
kingdom do. The second is more technical, and relates to the argument from the 
poverty of stimulus (Chomsky, 1965; Wexler, 1991). Nativists have traditionally 
approached the issue of language learning as a problem of grammar induction: 
given a set of data, the child’s learning task amounts to reconstructing the grammar 
responsible for generating that data. The problem with this however, is that the 
stimulus data a child observes will underdetermine this grammar every time. In 
other words, there is not enough evidence in the primary linguistic data available to 








Fig 2.1: The nativist position with regards to explaining the appearance of universal properties of 
linguistic structure. It is claimed that there is a direct link between an individual’s cognitive 
machinery and structural patterns seen in the world’s languages. Based on Kirby, Smith & Cornish, 
(2008).
Pullum & Scholz (2002) surveyed the language acquisition literature and compiled a 
list of six frequent claims made by researchers concerning the properties of the 
child’s learning environment (see Fig 2.2 below). The basic facts here are not in 
dispute, however there are still significant disagreements as to how we should 
interpret them. The property of POSITIVITY has perhaps created the most debate. 
The data the child is exposed to is not only finite, idiosyncratic and incomplete, but 
it also consists only of positive examples of legitimate sentences. This makes it 
compatible with an infinite number of different hypothetical grammars, which in 
turn makes the task of converging upon the single correct grammar that produces 
that data, and only that data, akin to finding the needle in the proverbial haystack 
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(Gold, 1967; Hendriks, 2000). Without evidence of what is ungrammatical in the 
language, how is the child supposed to discard incorrect hypotheses?
Obviously, if children can only entertain hypotheses about grammar that are 
licensed a priori by some innate and specialised language acquisition mechanism, 
then this problem is solved. In this way researchers can also address the continuity 
problem: not only can they account for how language is acquired (children are 
biologically constrained to only look for certain types of grammar), but also why it 
is that human languages occupy just a small subset of those that are logically 
possible (languages all have similar underlying structural properties because they 
are created by humans who all have the same set of biological constraints) (Crain & 
Pietrosky, 2001).
Figure 2.2: A list of claims frequently made by language acquisition researchers concerning the 
properties of the child’s learning environment. These claims are not disputed in themselves, but their 
interpretations are still the subject of much discussion. Taken from Pullum & Scholz (2002:13).
Language: a Naturally Selected Biological Adaptation
Pinker & Bloom (1990) have argued that we can explain the evolution of language in 
the same way we would explain the evolution of any organ in the body: as an 
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adaptation. They go on to argue that the evolutionary process responsible for this 
adaptation must be natural selection.
“Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a trait 
should be attributed to natural selection: complex design for 
some function, and the absence of alternative processes 
capable of explaining such complexity. Human language 
meets these criteria.” (Pinker & Bloom, 1990:707)
Language undoubtedly holds the appearance of design. For Pinker & Bloom, this 
design clearly relates to the function of communicating propositions through a serial 
transmission channel. Obviously this process did not happen overnight, and neither 
did language as we know it spring out fully formed in one go. At some point we 
must explain how language arose out of non-language. According to Pinker & 
Bloom (1990), and later Pinker (2003), natural selection is a viable solution to this 
problem of emergence as long as any small ability to communicate was slightly 
advantageous. In the same way that the eye developed gradually -- at first just as a 
few cells capable of perceiving light and dark that might have allowed an organism 
to perceive when a predator was close-by, before later being able to differentiate 
separate frequencies of light, which may have helped an organism to avoid 
poisonous foods -- so too did language evolve. In increments.
 
This theory still contends that the proximate cause of the structural properties we 
see in languages in the world lies in specialised cognitive machinery, but adds to 
this the claim that what ultimately causes it is biological evolution under natural 
selection for communication. This yields the following set of relationships between 
language, learning, and evolution (Fig 2.3). As we can see, this modifies the picture 
in Fig 2.1 only slightly.
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They go on to argue that the evolutionary process responsible for this adaptation must be 
natural selection.
“Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a trait should be 
attributed to natural selection: complex design for some function, 
and the absence of alternative processes capable of explaining such 
complexity. Human language meets these criteria.” (Pinker & Bloom, 
1990:707)
Language undoubtedly holds the appearance of design. For Pinker & Bloom, this design 
clearly relates to the function of communicating propositions through a serial transmission 
channel. Obviously this process did not happen overnight, and neither did language as we 
know it spring out fully formed in one go. At some point we must explain how language 
arose out of non-language. According to Pinker & Bloom (1990), and later Pinker (2003), 
natural selection is a viable solution to this problem of emergence as long as any small 
ability to communicate was slightly advantageous. In the same way that the eye 
developed gradually -- at first just as a few cells capable of perceiving light and dark that 
might have allowed an organism to perceive when a predator was close-by, before later 
being able to differentiate separate frequencies of light, which may have helped an 
organism to avoid poisonous foods -- so too did language evolve. In increments.
 
This theory still contends that the proximate cause of the structural properties we see in 
languages in the world lies in specialised cognitive machinery, but adds to this the claim 
that what ultimately causes it is biological evolution under natural selection for 
communication. This yields the following set of relationships between language, learning, 
and evolution (Fig 2.3). As we can see, this modifies the picture in Fig 2.1 only slightly.
Fig. 2.3: The orthodox evolutionary view in full. Universal properties of linguistic structure are directly 
caused by the nature of our individual cognitive machinery. This machinery in turn, is the result of 
biological evolution, which is under natural selection for enhanced communication. Re-drawn from Kirby, 











Fig. 2.3: The orthodox ev lut onary view in full. Universal properties of linguistic struc ure are 
directly used by the nature of our individual cognitive machinery. This machinery in turn, is the 
result of biological evolution, which is under natural selection for enhanced communication. Re-
drawn from Kirby, Smith & Cornish (2008). 
There are basically three ways in which this idea has been challenged. The first is in 
terms of whether language really is an adaptation for communication or not. Dunbar 
(1996) and Miller (2000) both support the adaptationist stance, but disagree as to 
what the primary function of language was when it evolved. There are two options 
here. Either language evolved for something other than communication, and is still 
used for that other function, or it could in fact be an exaptation: an adaptation for 
something else that has since been ‘borrowed’ and further tweaked to suit a new 
purpose (Gould & Vrba, 1982).
What other purpose could language (or its precursor) have served? Dunbar (1996) 
sees language primarily as a method for instilling social bonds, what he refers to as 
‘social grooming’. The argument here is that as group sizes increased in our 
hominid ancestors, one-on-one manual grooming, a main-stay in primate social 
interactions, became impractical. Vocal gestures, unlike physical gestures, can 
proceed in a one-to-many fashion. As such, language might have evolved to replace 
manual grooming and maintain social contracts between individuals. Miller (2000) 
on the other hand, agrees that language is a biological adaptation, but disagrees 
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both with the function and the evolutionary mechanism responsible. For him, the 
pre-cursor to language was an integral part of the courtship process between early 
humans, and therefore language is at least partially the result of a process of sexual 
selection. Both of these accounts have been criticised individually5, but a common 
complaint with them both is that neither explains exactly why features of language 
seem so well designed for communication and not any of the other alternative 
functions proposed (e.g. Pinker, 2003). They do, however, serve to highlight the 
range of alternatives that could be considered even when we adhere to the simple 
idea that language need only be understood in biological and adaptationist terms6.
Another way that Pinker & Bloom’s idea has been challenged relates to the 
relationship between the innate learning mechanisms and the properties of 
language shown in Figs 2.1 and 2.3. The orthodox account assumes that the link 
between, on the one hand, the cognitive machinery in an individual learner’s brains, 
and on the other, the behaviour that that machinery manifests at the population 
level, is a direct and transparent one. But what if it is not?  Kirby (1999:19-20) refers 
to this issue as the problem of linkage:
“The innatist approach links universals to acquisition, so that 
constraints on cross-linguistic variation are the direct 
consequence of constraints on the acquisition (and mental 
representation) of language.[...]To be completely explicit, we 
can formulate the following problem: 
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5 Nakamura (2000) has called into question Dunbar’s (1996)  assertions that verbal grooming 
is inherently more efficient than manual alternatives, whereas Miller’s (2000) claims have 
been challenged on the grounds that it predicts elaborate but ultimately meaningless 
signalling displays - not compositional syntax (Pinker, 2003).
6 There have been non-adaptationist theories put forward to explain language evolution as 
well -- most famously Chomsky (1988), Piatelli-Palmarini (1989) and Piattelli-Palmarini & 
Uriagereka (2004). All of these theories adhere to the nativist position, but caution against 
assuming language was naturally selected ‘for’ anything. A full discussion of these other 
theories is outwith the scope of this review, although see Gould (1997) for a general 
discussion on the merits of non-adaptationist explanations for human evolution.
The problem of linkage. Given a set of observed constraints 
on cross-linguistic variation, and a corresponding pattern of 
functional preference, an explanation of this fit will solve the 
problem: how does the latter give rise to the 
former?” (emphasis original)
In other words, we need to be able to account for exactly how patterns of neural 
activity actually wind up as patterns of linguistic behaviour (Kirby, 1999; Kirby et 
al., 2004)7. 
The final criticism is also related to this. As Pinker & Bloom state themselves, the 
compulsion to accept an explanation involving natural selection holds only as long 
as there are not, in fact, ‘alternative processes’ that could explain the appearance of 
design. As Kirby (2000) claims, and indeed, the next section will discuss, there is an 
alternative process capable of explaining the appearance of design in language -- 
and it also has the added advantage of solving the problem of linkage for us.
2.2.2 Language as a Complex Adaptive System
The nativist explanation of language -- and more recently language origins -- has 
been the dominant approach in both linguistics and cognitive science for many 
years. However, it is not the only approach. The poverty of stimulus argument, 
which forms the cornerstone for acceptance or rejection of the proposal, has been 
increasingly under attack, with neither side managing to produce conclusive 
evidence for or against (Pullum & Scholz, 2002). Some claim that the poverty of 
stimulus argument is tautologous, and question whether we can view language 
learning as a strictly-rational process of grammar induction at all (e.g. Tomasello, 
1995; Hendriks, 2000; Tomasello, 2004), whilst others argue that nativists are over-
stating the paucity somewhat, or question the claims that general-purpose learning 
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7 Strictly speaking this should be considered a critique of the nativist position in general 
rather than one levied specifically at Pinker & Bloom (1990).
mechanisms really do all that badly with sparse input data (Marcus, 1993; Elman et 
al., 1996; Cowie, 1999; Gomez & Gerken, 2000). 
Given that we might also have doubts concerning the problem of linkage between 
the structure of a language learner’s cognitive machinery and linguistic behaviour 
at the population level (§2.2.1), what are we left with? We must still account for the 
facts we have learnt about language acquisition, comparative studies of animal 
communication systems, and the underlying similarities between different 
languages. The alternative suggestion is to rethink what we mean by the term 
‘innate’ (c.f. Elman et al., 1996). 
Clearly there is something special about human biology. There is a good deal of 
evidence to suggest that we have undergone many physiological changes or pre-
adaptations for language, most notably our transition to bipedalism (which allowed 
for greater breath control), and alterations to our vocal tract and perceptual systems 
(Hurford, 2003). However, increasingly, and for the reasons specified above, 
researchers have been reconsidering whether the cognitive mechanisms that 
underlie language learning, processing, and use, really have to have been specially 
developed for language.
Many of those who subscribe to this belief take a complex adaptive systems (CAS) 
view of language. That is, rather than seeing language as the sole result of a 
psychological process ongoing within the individual, they see language as an 
emergent phenomenon, arising as the result of a series of many local interactions 
between speakers that give rise to more complex behaviours at higher levels (Gell-
Mann, 1992; Holland, 1995; Hashimoto, 2002; Brighton et al., 2005; Christiansen & 
Chater, 2008; Beckner et al., 2009). This approach tends to rely less on the notion of 
cognitive mechanisms specific to language, and recognises that languages 
themselves are adaptive systems capable of undergoing their own form of (cultural) 
evolution. This next section explains this position in more detail.
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Three Complex Adaptive Systems
The field of linguistics has long recognised that languages are historical entities that 
change over time. However, attempts to integrate diachronic linguistics with more 
synchronic approaches have not always been successful. One of the advantages of 
taking a CAS view of language, is that it can lead to a natural coming together of 
these two sides of the same coin. Essentially, we can see language as the result of the 
interactions between three different adaptive systems, each of which operates over a 
very different time-scale (Kirby & Hurford, 2002). Figure 2.4 shows some of the 
possible interactions between these different systems. 
Figure 2.4: Language is the result of three complex adaptive systems. According to this perspective, 
interactions between the different systems are important.  A few of these possible interactions are 
shown here. Biological evolution gives rise to phylogenetic changes which provide a platform for 
learning; this creates a set of learning biases which in turn largely influence what can be acquired 
ontogenetically; this in turn affects which features of languages persist culturally, and what kinds of 
glossogenetic changes occur; these emergent structural features finally feed back into biology, by 
influencing the selection pressures on the evolving speakers of that language. Taken from Kirby & 
Hurford (2002).
At one level, we have phylogeny, which relates to the biological evolution of the 





system operates over the time-scale of the evolution of the species, and provides 
learning biases which go on to interact with the next system, ontogeny. Ontogeny 
relates to the development of the capacity for language within an individual -- in 
other words, language acquisition. Learning is itself an adaptive process, with 
operates over the life-time of the individual learner. It is influenced by biological 
learning biases, but also goes on to influence our third system, dubbed glossogeny 
(Hurford, 1990). Glossogeny is a process relating to the way that languages 
themselves adapt and change over a historical time-scale, which we can think of as 
equivalent to the ‘lifetime’ of a specific language. Adaptive changes at this level are 
influenced as a result of learning undertaken not just by one individual, but by 
many. The resulting structures that emerge go on to further influence the evolution, 
by providing selection pressures for learning biases that better accommodate these 
emergent features of language.
Cultural Transmission: The Missing Link?
We learn language by observing the linguistic data produced by others. This alone is 
enough to make language a cultural system. The real question is not about whether 
this cultural system exists, but about whether it contributes anything to the process 
of linguistic emergence. In other words, does cultural transmission actually change 
the story presented in Fig. 2.3 in any significant way?  As Kirby et al. (2008b) 
acknowledge, it could well be the case that all cultural transmission does is act as a 
passive conduit, linking the cognitive learning biases in our heads to the linguistic 
structures in the world as a mere intermediary step. However, it could also be the 
case that processes of social interaction and cultural evolution actively generate 
structure, and provide us with a way to bridge the  gap between individual-level 
cognition and population-level behaviour and solve the problem of linkage once 














Figure 2.5: Solving the problem of linkage. DESCRIPTIVE BLURB REQUIRED. Redrawn from Kirby, 
Smith & Cornish (2008) with permission.
Fig. 2.5 shows how this fits in with our previous diagrams. EXPLANATION OF GRAPH. 
The next section poses the following question: what is the exact mechanism responsible for 
bridging this gap between individual minds and population behaviours?
2.3 Iterated Learning: A Mechanism of Cultural 
Transmission
There is something special about the way in which language is acquired. Language 
learning involves learners learning from other learners. More formally, this process has 
been referred to as iterated learning. 
“Iterated Learning is a process whereby somebody acquires a 
behaviour via observing someone performing that behaviour, who 
themselves acquired it the same way.” (FindREF)
It is important to note at this point that iterated learning is a domain-general process and 
not unique to language -- it can apply to other domains of learned behaviour (Brighton, 
THESIS), and is not a process which operates exclusively in humans (Feher et al., 2009). It 
also makes no specific claims about the particular population structure learners are 
configured in -- it applies equally to inter-generational and intra-generational interactions 
Figure 2.5: Solving the problem of linkage. Processes of social interaction and cultural evolution are 
thought to have a constructive role to play in explaining how we get from learning biases in 
individual brains, to linguistic behaviour in populations. Redrawn from Kirby, Smith & Cornish 
(2008) with permission.
Fig. 2.5 shows how this fits in with our previous diagrams. Here we see that the link 
between our cognitive lear ing biases and universal proper ies of linguistic 
structure are mediated by processes of social interaction and cultural evolution. By 
studying these processes in more detail we will gain insight as to what, if anything, 
they can contribute to our understanding of where structure in language comes 
from. One type of cultural transmission mechanism in particular is thought to be 
capable of bridging this gap between individual minds and the behaviour of 
populations. T e next secti n xamines this mechanism in more detail.
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2.3 Iterated Learning: A Mechanism of Cultural Transmission
There is something special about the way in which language is acquired. Language 
learning involves learners learning from other learners. More formally, this process 
has been referred to as iterated learning. 
“Iterated learning is a process in which an individual 
acquires a behavior by observing a similar behavior in 
another individual who acquired it in the same way” (Kirby, 
Cornish, & Smith, 2008: 10681)
It is important to note at this point that iterated learning is a domain-general process 
and not unique to language -- it can apply to other domains of learned behaviour 
(Brighton, 2003), and is not a process which operates exclusively in humans (Feher 
et al., 2009). It also makes no specific claims about the particular population 
structure learners are configured in -- it applies equally to inter-generational and 
intra-generational interactions between learners (see §2.4.3 and §3.4.1 for more 
details). Finally, it should be remembered that it is just one of just a number of 
mechanisms of cultural transmission, such as imitation or teaching8, albeit the one 
most relevant to language.
The fact that there is feedback or interaction between the learner and what is being 
learned does make it different from many other types of observational learning that 
we engage in however. We can think about this in the following way. Learning a 
language is not like learning how physical objects move in the world. This is 
because the properties of the aspect of the physical world that we learn about when 
we learn how objects move, have been entirely constrained by processes external to 
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8 Like both of these mechanisms of cultural transmission, and unlike for example,  emulation 
or stimulus enhancement,  we will see over the course of this thesis that iterated learning is 
also capable of giving rise to cumulative cultural evolution. For more information on the 
differences between imitation, teaching, stimulus enhancement and emulation in more 
detail, see Tomasello (1999). See also §2.4.4 for more discussion on the cumulative nature of 
human culture.
our cognitive system.  The properties of language on the other hand, are actually 
determined by the learning efforts of previous learners -- which, to the extent that 
learners have similar learning biases, means that an initial intuition that a learner 
might have about how a particular linguistic structure works will most likely be 
correct (Christiansen & Chater, 2008). Interestingly, arguments of this type turn 
poverty of stimulus claims on their head. As Zuidema (2003:58) puts it: 
“[L]earners are only presented with targets that other 
learners have been able to learn. [...] The poverty of the 
stimulus is now no longer a problem; instead, the ancestors’ 
poverty is the solution to the child’s.”
This is just one of the interesting implications that studies of iterated learning as a 
cultural transmission mechanism reveal. The rest of this section focuses on the 
conceptual framework for understanding iterated language learning more 
specifically, and then explores some of the main findings to have emerged from 
research into iterated learning using computational and mathematical models. 
Iterated Language Learning
How does iterated learning apply to language? It was in fact Chomsky (1986) who 
argued that language exists in roughly two forms – E-Language ('external' language, 
represented in the world by actual utterances, and a property of populations of 
speakers/hearers) and I-Language ('internal' language, represented in the minds of 
speakers as a pattern of neural connections, and a property of an individual 
speaker/hearer). Language induction involves the transformation of E-Language 
into I-Language, as each learner induces their own mental representations of 
language on the basis of exposure to the ambient language surrounding them. On 
the other hand, language production involves the reverse mapping, as agents use 
their internal representations to create new utterances, which creates the external 
language for the next generation to learn from. 
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When this process of induction and production iterates across several learners, each 
learning from the output of the previous generation, it becomes an (iterated 
learning) model of language evolution (Hurford, 2000).  This process is schematised 
in Fig. 2.6 below. Because of the way that this framework attempts to explicitly 
understand the link between individual learners and properties of language, it 
directly speaks to the issue of the problem of linkage (Kirby et al., 2004). 
model of language evolution (Hurfor , 2000). This process is schematised in Fig. 2.6 
below. Because of the way that this framework attempts to explicitly understand the link 
between individual learners and properties of language, it directly speaks to the issue of 
the problem of linkage (Kirby et al., 2004). 
I-Language I- Language
E-Language E-Language
Induction Production Induction Production Induction
Figure 2.6: The transformation of I-Language into E-Language over successive generations or interactions. 
Each learner induces an internal mental representation of language (I-Language) by observing utterances 
that are publicly represented in the external world (E-Language). Learners then become speakers, and 
produce new utterances, possibly changing the content of E-Language in some way. When this process 
iterates it becomes an evolutionary system. Redrawn from REF(????).
In this account, the role of previous language users is crucial. The process of iterated 
learning is imperfect: as information is transformed between the different domains during 
induction and production, there is a chance that small linguistic changes will be 
introduced9. These changes are not simply errors that the next learner will ignore or 
correct. In most cases these errors will be indistinguishable from non-errors, and will go on 
to influence the linguistic system of future learners accordingly.  As Brighton (2003:35) 
puts it: “language reflects the accumulated residue of the effects of learning and 
production of preceding agents.”
The Iterated Learning Model: Some Examples
As stated in the previous chapter, the majority of work investigating the process of iterated 
learning, particularly in relation to language, has focused on building computational and 
mathematical models of it. Many of these computational simulations are agent-based 
models, which explicitly attempt to simulate both the cognitive processes of individual 
agents, as well as learning interactions between different agents. What differentiates these 
models from others investigating language evolution is the fact that there is no genetic 
9 See Hoeffler (THESIS) for an interesting discussion about loci for the introduction of changes in the 
transmission cycle in more detail.
Figure 2.6: The transformation of I-Language into E-Language over successive generations or 
interactions. Each le rner induces an internal men al representation of language (I-Language) by 
observing utterances that are publicly represented in the external world (E-Language). Learners then 
become speakers, and produce n w utter ces, possibly changing the content of E-Language in some 
way. When this process iterates it bec me  an evolutionary system. Re rawn from Kirby (2001) with 
permissi .
In this account, the role of previous language users is crucial. The process of iterated 
learning is imperfect: as information is transformed between the different domains 
during induction and production, there is a chance that small linguistic changes will 
be introduced9. These changes are not simply errors that the next learner will ignore 
or correct. In most cases these errors will be indistinguishable from non-errors, and 
will go on to influence the linguistic system of future learners accordingly.  As 
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9 See Hoefler (2009) for an interesting discussion about loci for the introduction of changes in 
the transmission cycle in more detail.
Brighton (2003:35) puts it: “language reflects the accumulated residue of the effects 
of learning and production of preceding agents.”
The Iterated Learning Model: Some Examples
As stated in the previous chapter, the majority of work investigating the process of 
iterated learning, particularly in relation to language, has focused on building 
computational and mathematical models of it. Many of these computational 
simulations are agent-based models, which explicitly attempt to simulate both the 
cognitive processes of individual agents, as well as learning interactions between 
different agents. What differentiates these models from others investigating 
language evolution is the fact that there is no genetic evolution involved, and agents 
are not rewarded in any way for successful communication.
A typical simulation consists of one or more learning agents, one or more teaching 
agents, a meaning space consisting of a shared set of concepts an agent can talk 
about (usually represented by a vector, real number, or a logical proposition), and a 
signal space which is initially empty. An agent is selected to be a teacher and 
randomly chooses a sub-set of meanings to express from the meaning space. If they 
do not already have a signal for a given meaning, the agent – who is equipped with 
the ability to produce a string at random – will create one. These signal-meaning 
pairs produced by the teacher are then given as training data to the next learner 
agent, which uses this to develop its own representation of the data using some kind 
of induction mechanism, and the cycle repeats. 
Over the years, various parameters have been explored: different types of 
production and induction mechanisms (Batali, 1998; Kirby, 2000; Brighton, 2002; 
Tonkes & Wiles, 2002), different structures and sizes of meaning-space (Batali, 1998; 
Kirby, 2002b; Teal & Taylor, 2000; Zuidema, 2003; Kirby, 2007), and different 
population structures (Batali, 1998; Livingstone & Fyfe, 1999;  Kirby, 2000; Batali, 
2002; Smith & Hurford, 2003; Vogt, 2007) to name just a few. One of the most robust 
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findings however, seen in every condition tested so far, is that the resulting 
languages created by the agents become easier to learn over time. The key 
parameter responsible for this result is known as the transmission bottleneck. 
Deacon (1997:110) was one of the first to put words to this phenomenon in recent 
literature: 
“Languages are social and cultural entities that have evolved 
with respect to the forces of selection imposed by human 
users. The structure of a language is under intense selection 
because in its reproduction from generation to generation, it 
must pass through a narrow bottleneck: children’s minds.” 
In order to survive to be present in the external pool of language – or in other words 
– in order to be transmitted and stand a chance of becoming part of I-Language in 
the future, it must be learnable (by humans or simulated agents). There are several 
ways in which this learnability can emerge in the models. In the simplest case, a 
signal can survive the transmission bottleneck by becoming more generalisable. One 
of the ways in which this can happen is by becoming compositional; structured in 
such a way that the total of the meaning of the phrase is a function of the individual 
meanings of its constituent parts and the formal way in which it is arranged. As 
already discussed in §2.1, this feature is a key hallmark of natural language, and one 
which is largely responsible for the kind of open-ended generativity lacking in 
animal communication systems. 
The way that generalisable utterances encourage their own survival lies in the fact 
that a compositional element can appear in multiple contexts, maximising its 
chances of being acquired (e.g., Kirby, 2000). When such a system emerges, it is not 
necessary to hear every possible utterance in the language, as the regular structure 
present in those utterances that were heard provides the learner with a method of 
reliably inferring the structure of those utterances that were not heard. For example, 
a child hearing ‘red lorry’, ‘yellow lorry’ and ‘red car’ could infer that there might 
be something called a ‘yellow car’ out there in the world on the basis of making a 
generalisation about the structural relationship between colour adjectives, vehicular 
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nouns and their respective referents. They do not need to hear ‘yellow car’ paired 
with an actual referent to use or understand it. 
 
A second way in which a signal can survive the bottleneck is by ensuring that it is 
used frequently enough to guarantee that the learner will hear it and need to acquire 
it. This insight is sufficient to explain another universal aspect of natural language 
structure: the presence of irregularity (Kirby, 2001). It is an interesting fact that in 
every language where there exist irregular forms, these forms tend to correlate with 
frequency of use in everyday speech. Thus for English, the top ten verbs are also all 
irregular (Francis & Kucera, 1982). In his model, Kirby (2001) manipulated the 
frequency with which certain meanings were sampled from the meaning-space, 
such that some were much more frequent, hence more likely to pass through the 
bottleneck, than others. What he found strongly mirrored the distributional patterns 
of irregulars in real languages: those meanings that were infrequent tended to be 
compositional, whereas those that were frequent were not. The message here is that 
we can learn idiosyncratic forms as long as they appear often enough in our input.
  
These models provide a proof of concept for the idea that language can adapt itself 
in response to the way in which it is culturally transmitted, and that some important 
structural features can emerge as a result of this dynamic. This perspective sees 
language itself as an evolving organism, capable of adapting to the environmental, 
social and cognitive pressures of its users. Whilst biological evolution has provided 
us with the necessary physiological pre-adaptations and much cognitive machinery 
for language (Hurford, 2003), it is not the sole adaptive mechanism at work. What 
gets acquired by one generation determines the data that future generations will use 
to construct their own language. 
This has the advantage of taking away some of the explanatory burden from 
biological evolution – helping to account for some of the discrepancies involved, 
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such as the incredible speed at which language is thought to have emerged10 – 
whilst simultaneously incorporating our intuitive understanding of language as a 
cultural process. The key message to take home (Kirby, 2002a:27) is that: “(b)efore 
seeking a biological or functional explanation for a particular feature of language, or 
appealing to direct coding in an innate acquisition device, we should be aware of 
what we might be getting 'for free'”...via the mechanisms of cultural evolution. 
In addition, one of the nice features of these models is that they do not commit us to 
any specific visions of how cultural evolution proceeds. So whether we view 
cultural evolution as a process whereby individual units of language get 
preferentially replicated (Blackmore, 1999; Croft, 2000; Aunger, 2002), or a process 
whereby the entire system is independently reconstructed anew at each generation 
(Sperber, 1996) is not important. Similarly, whether we choose to think of the 
learning biases as being language-specific or domain-general does not matter at this 
stage. The important thing is that iterated learning through generations can allow 
language to change, evolve and adapt culturally.
2.4 Cultural Evolution
Languages are undoubtedly culturally transmitted. The main aim of this thesis is to 
show exactly how this fact can actually explain why languages are structured the 
way that they are. We must start with the observation that language is not the only 
thing to be socially transmitted or evolve culturally in this way. Beliefs, skills, music, 
social attitudes, political systems, customs, architecture, religion, the rules of chess, 
fashion, mythologies, art and technology are also examples of things which arise 
and change over time as a result of cultural evolution. The diversity of behaviours, 
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10  For views exploring this and other problems facing natural selection in explaining 
language evolution alone see Hurford et al (1998),  and commentaries accompanying the 
publication of Pinker & Bloom (1990).
and in some cases, material artefacts that get classified as being ‘cultural’, or indeed, 
as forming ‘culture’ itself, is bewildering. 
In a now famous survey, conducted in 1952, Kroeber & Kluckhohn examined the 
anthropological literature and found well over a hundred different definitions for 
culture alone. This has led to considerable divergence within the scientific 
community, with some studying culture-as-a-product (the customs, artefacts, 
behaviours and beliefs held by specific cultural groups), and others studying 
culture-as-a-process (the general mechanisms and adaptive dynamics that underlie 
this appearance of cultural products). Attempts have been made to bridge these two 
approaches. For instance, Richerson & Boyd (2005:5) define culture as follows:
“Culture is information capable of affecting individual’s 
behavior that they acquire from other members of their 
species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social 
transmission.”
By defining culture simply as information affecting behaviour, and jointly specifying 
the process by which it is acquired, they manage to bring together many of the 
different phenomena we would like to label as culture or cultural. This definition 
will also be adopted for the rest of the discussion here. 
Obviously we know that language is not acquired through teaching or imitation. In 
fact, the previous section (§2.3) put forward the basic mechanism by which we see 
languages being culturally transmitted -- iterated learning. In this chapter I will be 
arguing that the fact that language is a relatively well-understood phenomenon 
makes it an ideal candidate for understanding processes of cultural transmission in 
general. However, that does not mean that researchers in language evolution should 
feel free to ignore the abundance of work undertaken by those investigating cultural 
evolution, thinking it only loosely relevant. On the contrary, even those studies that 
focus exclusively on teaching or imitation of non-linguistic behaviours in other 
species, can bring us closer to understanding what is essential for iterated learning, 
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or language, or both. In particular, we will find towards the end of this chapter that 
the methods used by researchers to test predictions made by various cultural 
evolutionary theories will be of direct use to us here. 
In some ways, linguists have been rather slow on the uptake. Research has been 
going on for a number of years investigating the relationship between language, 
culture and human cognition, but has largely gone unnoticed, perhaps because it 
has been deemed as fitting outside the bounds of proper linguistic enquiry. There 
are three main areas that have been explored: firstly, that complex language may 
have been a pre-requisite for complex culture; secondly, that evolving complex 
language may have actually enabled us to have more complex thoughts; and finally, 
the observation we have already noted concerning the fact that language itself arises 
as a result of a cultural process. The next section explores these three ideas in a little 
more detail.
2.4.1 The Relationship Between Language, Culture and Cognition
Language enables culture
Language is used to transmit cultural content in the form of ideas. Its capacity to do 
this has led evolutionary biologists John Maynard Smith & Eörs Szathmáry (1995; 
2000) to conclude that complex societies with language represents the latest in a 
series of eight major evolutionary transitions in the history of life11. Each of these 
transitions typically involves some kind of aggregation (smaller entities coming 
together to form larger entities), division of labour, a change in the replication 
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11 The first was the transition of replicating molecules to populations of molecules housed in 
cellular compartments;  followed by the emergence of chromosomes from independent 
replicators; the transition from RNA to DNA; prokaryote cells to eukaryote cells; asexual 
cloning to sexual reproduction; single-celled organisms giving way to plants, animals and 
funghi; solitary individuals to colonies of individuals; before finally, the transition from 
primate society to human societies, which is heralded by the emergence of language 
(Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1999).
mechanism (after a transition, smaller entities that could once replicate 
independently can only do so as part of a larger whole), and the creation of new 
methods of information transference. The claim is that with the emergence of 
language, a whole new system of information transmission and replication 
appeared - one which, like DNA before it, supports unlimited heredity12, and that 
this is what marked the transition from primate societies to human societies 
(Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 2000). Language can therefore be seen as a powerful 
new evolutionary force in the world, giving rise to culture.
This latter point has been echoed by primatologists: one of the reasons why we have 
complex culture and our nearest primate cousins do not, is because only we have 
complex language (Boesch & Tomasello, 1998). Being able to encode information 
linguistically has been argued to make social learning more accurate, which is a 
necessary precondition for the emergence of cumulative cultural evolution and 
stable traditions (Sperber, 1996; Cavalli-Sforza, 2000; Atran, 2001). However, it is 
clear that not every culturally transmitted skill requires language. Shennan & Steele 
(1999) have argued that the manual skills required to generate stone tool technology 
could have been acquired simply through observation and without language. 
Similarly, Gil (2008) has questioned the argument that we needed complex grammar 
in order to acquire complex skills, such as building a boat and sailing it. 
Language enables certain kinds of cognition 
Perhaps then the value of language does not lie directly in what culturally acquired 
information it can transmit, but in the way it helps augment human cognition? One 
suggestion is that language gives rise to second order cognitive dynamics which 
help us make inferences about the world and ourselves – basically, the ability to 
evaluate our thoughts and plan our actions (Clark, 1998; 2006). Language from this 
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12  Whereas DNA provides unlimited heredity to express biological information, language 
provides a system of unlimited heredity to express cultural information – ideas, beliefs, and 
skills etc.
perspective can be seen as a tool (part of our ’extended mind’), allowing us to freeze 
thoughts as objects which can then undergo scrutiny by the thinker, and more 
importantly, by other hearers. This has led some to argue that without language 
there are whole domains of abstract human concepts which could not exist, such as 
kinship relations, hypothetical situations, and ‘reasons’ for certain actions 
(Jackendoff, 1996). Similarly, the notion of a ’week’ (Pinker and Jackendoff, 2009), or 
even numbers (Hurford, 1987; Wiese, 2004) appear to rest upon language.
The claim is that simply having a mechanism by which we can transmit our 
thoughts and ideas to other people has fundamentally changed the way we think. 
Recent research has even shown that language can change the way our visual 
system works (Meteyard et al., 2007; Winawer et al., 2007; Lupyan, 2010), can 
influence our spatial reasoning abilities (Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005), and affects 
how we categorise novel objects (Vygotsky, 1962; Schyns et al., 1998; Lupyan et al., 
2007). Understanding the extra-communicative roles that language may play in 
cognition may go on to help constrain theories of language evolution in useful ways 
(Lupyan, 2010).
Language is a product of the cultural process 
This idea of language as a carrier, or vehicle for cultural information is not new. 
However, there is another sense in which we can see language and culture 
interacting; language conveys information about its own construction. That is to say, 
not only does language transmit culture, but it is itself also culturally transmitted 
(Brighton, Smith & Kirby, 2005; Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). Children acquire 
language based on the previous output of the language learning of others, and this 
makes it a fairly unusual system (Zuidema, 2003). In a sense, it is equivalent to 
being able to infer the recipe and baking instructions of a cake, just by looking at it. 
Interestingly enough, language is not the only system to have this property. It seems 
indicative of any traits that are acquired via a process of iterated learning. For 
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instance, music and certain types of whalesong and birdsong also appear to cue 
their own construction in this way (Rendell & Whitehead, 2005; Feher et al., 2009). 
Given that language is relatively well understood phenomenon, and humans are 
easy to run experiments on, this means that language can provide an excellent 
testbed for theories of cultural evolution more generally. It is to these theories that 
we now turn. 
2.4.2 Theories of Cultural Evolution
Explicit parallels were drawn long ago between biological and cultural evolution 
(particularly, language evolution) by Darwin and his contemporaries: 
The formation of different languages and of distinct species 
… are curiously parallel … As Max Müller has well 
remarked : ‘ A struggle for life is constantly going on 
amongst the words and grammatical forms in each language. 
The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantly 
gaining the upper hand, and they owe their success to their 
inherent virtue. ’ (Darwin 1871:91) 
Nevertheless, although we see the seeds of both disciplines emerging at the same 
time in history, the study of mechanisms of cultural evolution has lagged behind 
our understanding of the mechanisms of biological evolution by some magnitude 
(Mesoudi et al., 2006b). There are many reasons for this, not least the fact that the 
field most closely associated with the study of culture -- anthropology -- has been 
strongly divided over whether something so rich and complex can be reduced to 
simple processes of cause and effect. Whilst many biologists would disagree with 
the implicit assumption that evolutionary theorising amounts to a reductionist 
explanation of a complex phenomenon (many biological processes are clearly more 
than the sum of their parts), others point out that some degree of reductive logic is 
no bad thing. To use the analogy developed by Dennett (1995), scientific theories 
that posit an over-abundance of cranes tend to explain whatever phenomenon they 
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are attempting to explain, whereas theories resting on a single skyhook explain 
nothing.
Universal Darwinism
What are the parallels between biological and cultural evolution? For some, this is 
the wrong question to be asking. Instead, we should be concerning ourselves with 
understanding what general processes underly all forms of evolution. This quest to 
develop a general theory of evolution has been termed ‘Universal 
Darwinism’ (Dawkins, 1976; Dennett, 1995; Hull, 2001). In short, evolution is to be 
understood as involving three ingredients: variation, inheritance, and competition 
for survival. Any system where there is inherited variation of fitness is therefore an 
evolutionary one. Under this basic rubric, we can see that culture fulfills these 
criteria: we find variations between cultural traits, these cultural traits are passed on 
from person to person, and not all cultural traits can be expressed at once in an 
individual -- there is therefore competition between variants, not only within each 
individual, but between different population groups (Mesoudi et al., 2006b).
Conceptual work linking Darwinism to culture has also been done by Mesoudi et al. 
(2004). Working directly from the text of Darwin’s Origins of Species (1859), they 
suggest that a number of analogies can be found that go deeper than this. For 
instance, they point to shared features like convergent evolution, the presence of 
vestigial traits, the accumulation of modifications over time, the existence of 
adaptations and maladaptations, and similarities between the geographical 
distributions of species and the geographical distributions of certain cultural traits.
In spite of many similarities, there are differences to bear in mind. For instance, in 
some sense, any kind of cultural evolution is ultimately dependent on biology. This 
is true not only from the point of view of the mechanisms underlying cultural 
evolution requiring a biological explanation for their origins, but also from the point 
of view of cultural traits themselves. If a behaviour is maladaptive from the point of 
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view of biology, that behaviour will not survive very long (Boyd & Richerson, 2005). 
For instance, Stone et al. (2007) discuss the case of the Albigenses, a religious sect 
that existed in Southern France in the 12th and 13th century. They believed that in 
order to attain pure spirituality one must abstain from marriage and reproduction 
entirely, and that since their material body was merely a cage for their soul, those 
Albigenses that wanted to attain perfection encouraged starvation and suicidal 
practices amongst themselves. Clearly it is easy to understand why this sect no 
longer exists today. 
One particular issue that has received a lot of attention over the years is the units of 
selection debate: does culture consist of discrete units like memes (Dawkins, 1976; 
Blackmore, 1999), culturgens (Lumsden & Wilson, 1981), or linguemes (Croft, 2000) 
that get preferentially replicated in some way, or is cultural transmission more a 
process of complete reconstruction (Sperber, 1996; 2000; Atran, 2001)? If there are 
units of inheritance, at what level does selection operate?  On the units of inheritance 
themselves, or on the individual possessing that trait, or even at the level of the 
cultural group that shared a trait?  Although it is a divisive issue, which for some 
rules out any meaningful comparison between biological and cultural evolution 
(e.g. Bloch (2000) or Kupar (2000)), there is in fact little need for us to settle these 
issues immediately in order to develop testable theories. Whilst the general 
consensus seems to be that we should remain slightly cautious when making 
analogies with biological evolution, researchers have pointed out that Darwin 
himself was unaware of the precise mechanisms of inheritance when he developed 
his theory of natural selection (Aunger, 2000; Mesoudi et al., 2006b). 
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If it turns out that there is no such cultural equivalent to a phenotype or a genotype, 
or that some cultural traits are directed towards a specific goal13, then it is not a sign 
that culture is not ‘evolutionary’ (Mesoudi et al., 2004). The whole idea behind 
Universal Darwinism is that biological evolution is only one type of evolutionary 
process. We should in fact predict that cultural evolution will have major differences 
to biological evolution. To summarise, all evolution requires is heritable variation of 
fitness. That is not to say that our understanding of biology is not relevant to our 
understanding of culture. As we shall see, even if we were to completely ignore any 
parallels between the mechanisms of biological and cultural evolution, it turns out 
that most theories of cultural evolution can be divided along the lines of how closely 
the process itself actually interacts with biological evolution. That is, any 
mechanisms of cultural evolution are enabled by biology at some level (Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005). Therefore we need a rudimentary understanding of how genetic 
transmission works even for this14. 
Evolutionary Psychology
Commentators classify evolutionary psychology (EP) as a theory of cultural 
evolution because it attempts to explain human behaviour as the result of processes 
of evolution (e.g Barrett et al., 2002; Nettle, 2009). The EP approach links social and 
cultural behaviours tightly to biological underpinnings, with an emphasis on 
explaining variation in behaviours (“evoked culture”) as the result of evolved 
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13 This is a common criticism to be levelled at theories of cultural evolution. As humans are 
intentional beings, capable of planning their actions and innovating solutions to problems, 
the claim has been made by many that cultural evolution is the product of intentional 
design, and therefore fundamentally different to processes of biological evolution (e.g 
Hallpike, 1986; Pinker,  1997; Bryant, 2004). We will explore this issue in more detail in 
Chapter 3, but for now it suffices to say that the extent to which cultural evolution is directed 
or not is on a continuum - a matter of degree rather than strictly one or the other (Dennett & 
McKay, 2006). 
14 Unfortunately understanding the mechanisms of biological evolution requires a book in its 
own right, so rather than try to condense something that complex into a few paragraphs 
here, I instead direct the reader to Nettle (2009) for an accessible treatment of the subject.  
psychological modules responding to different environmental inputs (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992). As such, it most closely parallels nativist explanations of language 
and language origins than accounts which give a more central role to cultural 
transmission. 
This theory ties current behaviour to that which was adaptive in our past: the 
environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) - thought to correspond to some 
point in the Pleistocene (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000; Barrett et al., 2002). The argument 
is that certain behavioural traits which would have been adaptive for our ancestors 
(for instance, fear and avoidance of snakes) could, over time, have become 
genetically assimilated, as those people who possessed them were more likely to 
survive and reproduce than those who did not. Even though many of us live in an 
environment which is substantially different to the hunter-gatherer lifestyle of the 
EEA, these evolved behaviours continue to shape our current behaviour. For 
instance, we like sweet sugary foodstuffs now because those things would have 
helped us to survive in the EEA. Consequently, if we want to understand over-
eating behaviour in current populations, we have to understand the role that such 
behaviour would have had in the past (Nesse & Williams, 1995). 
  
Dual-Inheritance Models
Dual-Inheritance models (often alternately referred to as theories of Gene-Culture 
co-evolution) place their emphasis on the interactions between genes and culture. 
Unlike the EP approach, these models see culture as being currently adaptive, and 
transmitted rather than evoked (Nettle, 2009). As such, they fit more in line with the 
approach to language origins being advocated here. The idea behind these models is 
that culture and biology represent two distinct forms of inheritance, that can be 
functionally independent (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). In spite of their relative 
independence, they can also interact with one another in interesting ways. Culture 
can affect genes directly, as for example, in the link between dairy farming and 
lactose tolerance (Durham, 1991). Conversely, genes can affect culture directly too., 
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as any cultural trait that is deleterious to the reproduction of the organism will be 
wiped out (remember the example of the Albigenses people in the previous section). 
However, beyond this, there is a whole raft of possible interactions between the two.
Richerson & Boyd (2005) in particular emphasise the importance of population 
effects. Cultural traits can spread because they affect an organism’s biological 
fitness, but they can also increase because they affect an individual’s cultural fitness. 
Ultimately for Richerson & Boyd, all tributaries lead to the sea: cultural fitness can 
act as a proxy for biological fitness as much as the elaborate Peacock’s tail (Zahavi & 
Zahavi, 1997). Nevertheless, within this cluster of theories there is greater emphasis 
placed on culture being free to evolve for culture’s own sake.
Niche Construction
Niche construction theories also deserve a brief mention. Sometimes referred to as 
‘trial-inheritance theories’, these can be seen as a kind of extension to the dual-
inheritance theories described earlier. As well as biological and cultural inheritance, 
proponents argue that there is also a third system of ecological inheritance (Odling-
Smee et al., 2003). Not only do organisms adapt to their environments, but they also 
adapt their environments (Stone et al, 2007). Classic examples of the basic principle 
include beaver dams or bird nests, which effectively change the environment in 
which an organism must survive. These changes tend to last longer than the 
organism itself, are sometimes literally inherited by their offspring, and may even 
impact upon different species altogether. Long-term changes in the ecological niche 
inhabited by an organism in turn effect the selection pressures operating on that 
organism - for instance, the presence of a beaver dam creates pressures for beavers 
with certain morphological features, like stronger teeth and flat tails (Laland & 
Odling-Smee, 2000). Our theory of language evolution fits in quite well with this 
model, as the actual language being transmitted is itself an environment of sorts, 
that goes on to affect future generations. 
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As Bullock & Noble (2000:150) note in a discussion of the relevance of Kirby & 
Hurford’s (1997) model of language evolution to niche construction:
“New-born organisms must learn a grammar from a set of 
utterances provided by the parental generation. Thus the 
ecological legacy is not the physical environment but the linguistic 
one: a new organism is born into a world of speakers.”
There is definitely something captured by the theory of niche construction that is 
shared with those theories of language evolution that stress the importance of 
iterated learning; namely the great emphasis that both theories place on interaction 
and selective pressures arising at many different levels. Work has already begun on 
making those parallels clearer (e.g.  Odling-Smee & Laland, 2009).
2.4.3 Modes of Cultural Transmission
Working from mathematical models of biological evolution, Cavalli-Sforza & 
Feldman (1981) identified three different directions that cultural transmission could 
proceed in: vertical, oblique or horizontal. Of all these, vertical transmission shares 
the closest parallels with biological evolution, as it relates to the way in which 
cultural information gets passed down from parents to their children. Similarly, 
oblique transmission also refers to information passed down from generation to 
generation, but rather than specifying a parental relationship, this refers to any 
interactions between adults and children, or where information passes from 
someone with experience, to someone with less experience15. Finally, horizontal 
transmission relates to information being passed between members of the same 
generation, and/or level of expertise. 
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15  Due to the fact that vertical and oblique both refer to inter-generational transfer of 
information, many authors use the term vertical to refer to them both. In general I will 
follow this convention as well.
Various claims have been made about the different properties that each of type of 
transmission has. For instance, vertical transmission has mostly been associated 
with conservation and stability of traits (Laland et al., 1993), with prime examples of 
this being language and hygiene practices which tend to correlate strongly with 
those held by the parental generation (Stone, et al., 2007). Empirical evidence for this 
also comes from studies of Iranian rug-making, which reveal how mother-daughter 
transmission results in extremely stable designs (Tehrani & Collard, 2002), and 
studies of Stanford grad-students showing certain cultural traits which do not tend 
to change over time, like voting preference, are acquired vertically (Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005). In contrast, horizontal transmission has been associated with the 
generation of innovations and variation, and the rapid spread of cultural 
information (Stone et al., 2007).
Even within these broad types of transmission identified by Cavalli-Sforza & 
Feldman (1981), there is additional recognition of some sub-types. For instance, 
within horizontal transmission Stone et al. (2007) differentiate one-to-one (the 
‘standard’ form of horizontal transmission as conceived by many researchers), 
many-to-one (a more powerful form of transmission where several people transmit 
the same information to just one individual -- commonly described by psychologists 
as ‘peer pressure’), and one-to-many (where a particularly prestigious individual -- 
for instance, a political leader or celebrity -- influences the spread of information on 
a large-scale). Each of these sub-types also have different effects, with many-to-one 
transmission being particularly hard to resist, and one-to-many being associated 
with very rapid cultural change. 
Despite a wide-spread belief that the majority of cultural transmission is horizontal, 
there is a surprising amount of anthropological evidence for vertical transmission. 
Researchers have used the fact that the different modes of transmission result in 
different distributional patterns in order to identify which direction is the more 
dominant. In spite of the fact that cultural evolution definitely allows a greater 
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scope for horizontal transmission than genetic evolution16, vertical transmission is 
often still the dominant mode in cultural evolution (Guglielmino et al., 1995). This 
was demonstrated by a study which analysed some 47 different cultural traits in 277 
African communities. Guglielmino et al. (1995) reasoned that if horizontal 
transmission is more dominant, we would expect that cultures would tend to share 
traits with those communities geographically adjacent to themselves, but if vertical 
transmission is stronger, we would expect groups to conserve the traits of the 
cultures they descend from. It was statistically shown that the majority of traits 
showed evidence of descent over generations17 – especially amongst those traits 
most closely connected to reproductive success. This study was later supported 
using a worldwide sample (Holden & Mace, 1999). Collectively results like this have 
been taken to show that:
“even under the influence of close geographical neighbours, 
cultures can remain stable and coherent units...cultural 
evolution is not a free-for-all in which all traits become 
equally available for adoption each generation.” (Pagel & 
Mace, 2004:277). 
In other words, the concepts of distinct lineages and restrictions on descent are 
strongly operative within cultural evolution. This finding also goes some way 
towards addressing the concerns described earlier about whether cultural evolution 
can ever be fully understood if there are no clearly identified, discrete ‘units’ of 
selection. 
In the end, what all of these ‘directional’ accounts boil down to is that differences in 
population structures can substantially affect the dynamics of transmission, even if 
the underlying mechanisms remain the same. Mesoudi (2007) and Mesoudi & 
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16 It turns out that there are horizontal transmission type processes operating within biology, 
particularly with regards to the immune system (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005). 
17 The main exception to this trend were traits related to sexual division of labour, which did 
seem to pattern more with horizontal transmission.
Whiten (2008) agree. In a review of different cultural evolution experiments (see 
$2.4.4) they identify three basic types of population structure: linear diffusion, 
closed groups and replacement. In the broad terms we have been using so far, these 
correspond to vertical, horizontal and vertical and horizontal combined. The 
advantage of adopting this terminology and thinking about the situation in terms of 
population structure rather than direction of transmission however is that we can 
avoid falling into the trap of thinking of vertical transmission as being more 
Darwinian and horizontal as being more Lamarckian. This is important, as we have 
no reason a priori to assume that the mechanisms underlying transmission differ 
when one is engaged in cultural exchange with someone from your parent’s 
generation, and someone from your own. The next section will look at some actual 
examples of cultural evolution experiments that implement these various methods 
in more detail.
2.4.4 (Non-Linguistic) Cultural Evolution Experiments
Experiments on cultural evolution have mostly focused on identifying the precise 
social learning mechanisms that enable the development and maintenance of 
cultural traditions, in both humans and non-human animals. Until fairly recently, 
the idea of animals having any kind of cultural tradition would have seemed very 
strange. This has changed however, as studies of animals in the wild have revealed 
that not only do many species have a rich cultural life (e.g. McGrew, 1992; Boesch, 
1996; Whiten et al., 1999; Watanabe, 2001), but that the ability to transmit simple 
traditions between conspecifics is not unique to primates. It has in fact 
independently evolved several times in other species (Laland & Williams, 1997; 
Rendell & Whitehead, 2005; Janik & Slater, 2003; Fitch, 2010). This tells us that social 
learning is adaptive, and supports models and experiments of the process which 
show under which circumstances social learning offers the clearest advantages over 
individual learning (Boyd & Richerson, 1995; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002).
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One of the main focuses of interest lie in what types of social learning mechanisms 
support cumulative cultural evolution. One of the interesting differences between 
the types of cultural traditions that non-human animals have, and the types of 
cultural traditions that humans have, is that ours are said to involve the 
accumulation of innovations. Animal cultures, in contrast, are perhaps more 
fittingly described in the way that Boyd and Richerson view cultural inheritance “as 
a shortcut to individual learning” (Boyd & Richerson, 1985:14). Animals learn things 
socially that they could have discovered by themselves via trial and error individual 
learning. Humans on the other hand socially learn things that are too complex for 
them to have discovered independently (Boyd & Richerson, 1995). 
Tomasello (1999) attributes this difference in complexity to the ‘ratchet effect’: a 
combination not only of creative invention, but of social transmission that has a high 
degree of fidelity to prevent backward slippage and allow new innovations to be 
faithfully preserved and accumulate complexity over time. Consequently, focus on 
the mechanisms of cultural evolution has paid a great deal of attention to those 
which support high fidelity transmission, such as imitation and teaching, whereas 
those like stimulus enhancement, emulation and ontogenetic ritualisation have been 
argued to be insufficient for cumulative cultural evolution (for discussion of these 
terms in this context, see Tomasello et al., 1993).
Recently research has been less focused on identifying the precise mechanisms that 
support social learning in different species, and more on how any cultural trait, 
simple or cumulatively complex, gets transmitted through populations of individual 
learners. Whilst it has occasionally been possible to get close enough to observe 
populations of animals interacting socially in the wild (Biro et al., 2003), the greater 
experimental control of laboratory studies is often preferred (Whiten, 2005). Broadly 
speaking, there are three experimental methods that have been used by social and 
comparative psychologists to study cultural transmission (Mesoudi, 2007; Mesoudi 
& Whiten, 2008). Figure 2.7 shows these different methods. The rest of this section 
will explore some examples of each type of  experimental method.
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Figure 2.7: Three different experimental designs for cultural transmission experiments. Participants 
are represented by circles, and arrows indicate the direction of transmission either between 
generations (arrows cross vertical dotted lines), or between individual participants. In (a) we see the 
design for a typical transmission chain study, where information is passed along parallel chains 
(indicated by letter) of participants. In (b) we see the design of a typical replacement study, where four 
participants (A-D) interact together in some learning task. One participant gets replaced by a new 
learner at each generation. In (c) we see the design of a typical closed-group study. There are two 
conditions. In the upper, we see the social condition, where four participant (A-D) repeatedly engage 
in a learning task together. In the lower section we see an individual learning control condition, where 
participants engage in the same learning task, but are not allowed to interact with one another. 
Reproduced from Mesoudi (2007).
Linear transmission
In the linear transmission chain method, participants are organised into different 
chains, and information is passed along like in the game ‘Chinese Whispers’ or 
‘Broken Telephone’, with each learner learning from the previous. This corresponds 
to the broad definition of vertical transmission described in §2.4.3. This type of 
experiment has a long history of use in human social psychology, most prominently 
being used to explore how people’s recall of narrative descriptions change over time 
depending on their cultural expectations or pre-existing knowledge (Bartlett, 1932; 
Allport & Postman, 1947; Bangerter, 2000; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2004) or how prior 
cognitive processing biases impact upon information being transmitted (Kalish et al., 
2007; Griffiths et al., 2008). Often referred to as diffusion chains, this technique has 
also been used to explore how humans and non-humans can sustain different 
foraging traditions. 
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In one type of experiment, learners are given the task of opening a puzzle box 
containing a food reward. This is sometimes referred to  in the literature as an 
artificial fruit (Whiten et al,. 1996; Custance et al., 2001; Caldwell & Whiten, 2004). 
Typically, there will be multiple ways of manipulating the puzzle box in order to 
access the food, but learners will only be shown one method. These methods can be 
thought of as learned cultural variants. Traditionally, these studies have been used 
to isolate whether the species involved is capable of acquiring a cultural variant via 
observational learning, or whether the behaviour is learnt via individual learning 
techniques. However, by using a slight twist of the linear transmission method, 
known as open diffusion, researchers can use the artificial fruit task to examine how 
culturally acquired behaviours can actually be passed on through separate groups 
of primates (including human children). 
For instance, Whiten (2005) took three different groups of captive chimpanzees, and 
exposed them to a ‘pan-pipes’ device containing grapes. In two of the groups, a high 
ranking female was taught a technique for opening the device by a human 
demonstrator. The first technique involved using a stick to lift a catch, whilst the 
second involved using a stick to poke a release mechanism. In the third control 
group, neither technique was demonstrated. Once the chosen chimpanzee had 
acquired one of the two variants (lift or poke), the pan-pipes and the chimpanzee 
were returned to the group. Over the next few weeks, researchers noted the 
interactions between different chimps, and tracked how the modelled behaviour 
spread through the group.
One of the perhaps surprising results of studies such as these is that not only do 
chimpanzees and other primates show a strong bias towards conformity, preferring 
to adopt whichever technique is used by the group as a whole even if other 
techniques are independently discovered during experimentation (Whiten, 2005; 
Dindo et al., 2009), but that (chimpanzees at least) also prefer to copy the most 
prestigious model (Horner et al., 2010). This mirrors similar findings in human 
adults concerning conformity and prestige biases (see Richerson & Boyd (2005) for 
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discussion of these biases in general), suggesting that this could be a capacity shared 
with a common ancestor.
The more standard linear diffusion chain experiments have also been conducted on 
children using the artificial fruit method (Horner et al., 2006; Flynn & Whiten, 2008). 
These studies not only found the same conformity bias and faithful transmission of 
technique as in previous studies, but that there are both developmental and gender 
differences as well: older male children are better at faithfully imitating complicated 
behaviours than younger females. Interestingly, whilst studies involving dyadic 
transmission of behaviours from an adult to 3 year-olds have shown that children 
tend to over-imitate (i.e. copy even obviously redundant actions when trying to 
open a puzzle box or follow a recipe) (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Gergely & Csibra, 
2006), when interaction continues beyond the dyad and along a transmission chain 
of other children, this redundant information is rapidly parsed out (Flynn, 2008). 
This contrast between the behaviour of individuals engaged in a ‘one-shot’ learning 
task, versus the behaviour of multiple individuals engages in the same learning task 
over multiple generations, is a persistent finding in cultural transmission studies 
conducted in the laboratory, and something we will come back to in §3.2.3.
Replacement
In a somewhat different experimental set up involving just human participants, 
researchers have attempted to create ‘microsocieties’ in the laboratory18. This type of 
experiment typically involves the kind of replacement method illustrated in Fig. 2.7. 
In these studies, groups of participants interact with one another whilst performing 
some task. After a while, each group member is replaced one by one, with each 
replacement representing a new ‘generation’. Unlike linear transmission then, there 
is continuity of participants between generations. The combination of interaction, 
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18 Not every microsociety experiment involves the replacement method. The next subsection 
describes microsociety experiments which use the closed-group method. 
and generational turnover means that this method can be seen as a combination of 
horizontal and vertical transmission.
The replacement method also has a fairly long history within social psychology, 
most often being used  to investigate group conformity and how long it takes for 
negotiated or experimentally induced social norms to break down (Gerrard et al., 
1956; Jacobs & Campbell, 1961). More recently, it has been used to show how 
interacting groups and chains of participants can develop optimal behaviours over 
time (Baum et al., 2004; Caldwell & Millen, 2008), or under what conditions 
participants rely more heavily on social rather than individual learning (Caldwell & 
Millen, 2010). In the set of studies conducted by Caldwell and Millen, groups of 
participants are given the task of either making a paper aeroplane that will fly the 
furthest, or building the tallest tower out of spaghetti and modelling clay. We will 
briefly look at some examples of these.
In the first spaghetti towers study (Caldwell & Millen, 2008) seemingly arbitrary 
designs were found to emerge over time in each transmission chain. At any one time 
during the study there are two participants building towers, and two participants 
observing them. When ‘builders’ have finished, they are replaced by new 
‘observers’, and the old observers become builders. This process continues along the 
transmission chain for a number of generations. The similarity between the resultant 
tower designs created at each generation was then rated by independent observers. 
This similarity was found to be greater within-chains, than across-chains. In other 
words, tower designs were being passed on by individuals within the chain. In 
addition to this, towers were seen to increase in height cumulatively, as learners 
selectively retained elements of good tower design from previous participants in the 
chain. 
In the second study (Caldwell & Millen, 2010), uncertainty is introduced by the 
additional requirement that, after construction, the tower must be placed next to a 
desk-fan for five minutes. As towers have a tendency to collapse not long after being 
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built, this creates a situation where participants are less certain as individuals about 
what constitutes a ‘good’ design. In this condition it was found that participants 
relied much more heavily on the design of the previous builders than before. 
Additionally, and unlike what was found in the previous study, there was no 
significant increase in the height of the towers over time. One possible explanation 
for this is that the greater reliance on social learning is in some way inhibiting 
individual innovation, which is necessary for cumulative cultural evolution.
Closed-Group
This method explores cultural transmission between learners where there is no 
generational turnover at all. It therefore most closely corresponds to what has been 
termed horizontal transmission. Again, these experiments are often referred to as 
microsociety studies. For instance, McElreath et al. (2005) and Mesoudi and O’Brien 
(2008) both investigate how individual learners modify their strategies based on 
observing how other individuals react in similar environments. These studies are 
microsocietal in that participants are making choices about how to perform some 
function as a group: in McElreath et al., (2005) participants are given the role of 
farmers trying to maximise crop yields, whereas in Mesoudi & O’Brien (2008), 
participants are designing the optimal arrowheads for hunting. 
In both of these studies, participants were given the chance to examine the 
behaviour of other members of the microsociety and modify their own behaviour in 
response. For instance, in McElreath et al. (2005) participants could view what crops 
other farmers had chosen to plant. Against the predictions of models, the study 
found that a large number of participants did not take advantage of cultural 
learning, even when it would have resulted in a greater crop-yield. Of those that did 
copy, they only chose to conform to the behaviour of others when the environment 
changed and they were no longer getting an optimal pay-off. This indicates not only 
that there is a substantial amount of individual variation in the willingness to 
conform, but also that models of when people are likely to switch social learning 
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strategies are not always accurate. Human participants do not always behave 
optimally.
2.5 Summary
This chapter began by looking at what features make language an interesting 
phenomenon to understand. It argued that in order to understand how languages 
are acquired with such reliability and ease, and why languages of the world all 
share similar structural properties, we need to understand how languages evolved. 
Two contrasting accounts for language evolution were presented. In the first, 
universal properties of linguistic structure were seen as the direct consequence of 
genetically determined language-specific learning biases. In the second, universal 
structural properties were held to be emergent, arising from the interactions 
between biological evolution, individual learning, and cultural transmission. 
The fact that languages are culturally transmitted has been argued to at least 
partially account for why they exhibit the structural properties that they do. 
Language is the result of a process of iterated learning. Iterated learning has been 
extensively studied using computational models. I discussed the two main findings 
to have emerged from these studies: that languages adapt to be easier to learn over 
time, and that they also adapt to convey structured meanings by becoming 
structured themselves. We then moved on to explore cultural evolution more 
generally.
We began by exploring three different relationships that language shares with 
culture and cognition, pointing out that not only is language the conveyer of 
cultural content, but is itself the product of cultural processes. Language may also 
have enabled higher-order cognitive functions by virtue of providing a mechanism 
to share thoughts with others. Next we briefly examined some of the parallels and 
divergences between biological and cultural evolution, noting that whilst there is 
55
much disagreement about how cultural evolution is actually instantiated (for 
instance, whether it has discrete units of inheritance what the unit of selection is),  it 
is not necessary to understand the precise mechanisms of inheritance in order to get 
an understanding of how evolution might proceed. 
At this point, three different theories of cultural evolution were introduced: 
evolutionary psychology, dual-inheritance and niche construction. Each of these 
theories differs in the extent to which biology can be thought to dominate, and the 
extent to which human behaviour can be thought of as being currently adaptive. 
The evolutionary psychology approach, with its emphasis on evolved cognitive 
modules, was argued to be more compatible with explanations of language origins 
that make a direct appeal to biology. Both dual-inheritance and niche construction 
theories on the other hand emphasise the role of interactions between separate 
forms of inheritance: biological, cultural, and in the case of niche construction, also 
ecological. Language is a particularly good example of niche construction, as it is 
itself a kind of inherited environment that lasts a good deal longer than many of its 
speakers.
The next topic to come under scrutiny was the different modes of cultural 
transmission. Traditional definitions have focused on making distinctions between 
vertical (inter-generational) and horizontal (peer-to-peer) transmission. However, 
because of the long-standing assumption that vertical transmission is ‘like biology’ 
and horizontal is ‘like culture’, it was suggested that a better way of thinking about 
modes of transmission was in terms of the structure of populations rather than 
purely by direction. This is in part due to the fact that cultural transmission is not 
particularly dominated by horizontal exchange, and also because experimental 
psychologists studying cultural evolution in the laboratory have been using 
different terminology for a number of years.
Finally, this chapter reviewed some of the literature on a sample of those empirical 
investigations of cultural evolution in the laboratory. These studies have revealed 
56
many interesting continuities and differences between species, and also shown 
under what conditions we can expect to see social learning strategies favoured by 
participants, and how cumulative cultural evolution can be investigated in our own 
species. However, none of them have examined the topic of linguistic transmission. 








It seems then that there are a number of ways in which the cultural transmission of 
information has been explored in humans, as well as non-humans1. However, none 
of the experiments we have examined so far have made language itself the empirical 
target. This chapter will introduce research that does just that. In reviewing the 
existing literature, it aims to motivate a new experimental methodology for 
studying language evolution in the laboratory. It first examines why laboratory 
based experiments have only really been developed over the past few years, and 
describes some of the problems with investigating the origins of language 
empirically. It then moves on to look at some of the current approaches that have 
been successful, including computational studies, observational studies of natural 
language emergence, artificial language learning studies, and finally, experiments 
involving the emergence of artificial systems of human communication. 
The question of intentional design in language will then be approached. I will argue 
that there is a potential issue with the way in which current laboratory experiments 
investigate the emergence of novel communication systems, which allows for the 
participants to intentionally design a communicative system. This is not a good 
model of language evolution for several reasons. I will then outline the general 
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1 Parts of sections 3.2.4, 3.3 and 3.4.3 of this chapter appear in Cornish (2010).
methodology for an experimental framework that specifically rules out the 
possibility of learners intentionally creating systems designed for communication. 
Particular attention will be paid to the way in which results from this framework 
can be analysed, ahead of the experimental results which will appear in Chapters 
4-6.
3.1 What took you so long?
It may come as a surprise to researchers in other fields that the study of language 
origins has only recently started to collect data from laboratory experiments. Given 
the close relationship evolutionary linguistics shares with fields such as psychology, 
computer science, biology and developmental linguistics -- all fields associated with 
a high degree of empirical investigation -- it is more surprising still. However, 
evolutionary linguistics also has close ties with disciplines such as philosophy and 
cognitive science which, perhaps unfairly, have traditionally been associated with 
integrating empirical results from other fields in order to fashion out new theories, 
rather than generating empirical results on their own.
It is possible that, to some extent, we are still seeing the after-effects of history. Both 
prior to and immediately after the publication of The Origin of Species (Darwin, 1859) 
there was much interest in the evolutionary study of language. Due to the wildly 
speculative nature of the theories that emerged during this time period, 
unconstrained as they were by any firm knowledge of language acquisition, 
genetics and neurological processing which might have limited theorising to the 
realms of the more plausible, in 1866 the Société Linguistique de Paris enacted their 
famous ban on the study of origins and evolution of language (Christiansen & 
Kirby, 2003). This put a stop on this area of research for the next hundred years or 
so, and perhaps still affects the way evolutionary linguistics is viewed today.
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Whatever the cause, the sentiment that evolutionary linguists cannot employ 
traditional empirical methods has led at least one notable practitioner to recently 
conclude in a major linguistics journal that:
 “To enter [the field of language evolution] costs little: you can’t do 
experiments, so no expensive equipment is required...It’s still a pencil-
and-paper field” (Bickerton, 2007: 524). 
Lee et al. (2009: 32) have also made similar remarks concerning the impossibility of 
studying language evolution in the lab: “[I]t is not possible to use real human beings 
in experiments to see whether linguistic structures can emerge through simple 
interactions.” This idea that we cannot investigate language evolution using human 
participants is false, as the work that follows will show. However, the assumption 
still lingers, especially amongst researchers working just outside the field. Perhaps 
what is really at the heart of the problem is that language evolution presents a 
unique problem to science. How do we study the emergence of something so 
complex and rare that it has only happened once in the history of the world? How 
do we even begin to approach a problem that happened so long ago?
The Difficulty of Studying Language Evolution 
Linguists are well used to viewing language as a formal, idealised, and rule-
governed system. However, when we consider language as a complex adaptive 
system (CAS) things start to get decidedly non-linear. This is because in CASs (such 
as language) the total rarely equals the sum of its parts. Simple local interactions 
often give rise to complex emergent behaviour (Johnson, 2001). Furthermore, 
evolution is necessarily a historical process, which means that there may always be 
some element of randomness about it (de Boer, 2005). Historical accidents appearing 
early on in time can remain 'frozen' and constrain future development in 
fundamental ways, and even slight differences in the initial conditions can result in 
massively different outcomes in the final product (Gell-Mann, 1994). 
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These are just some of the difficulties that lie with any attempt to uncover the truth 
about language evolution. The sheer complexity of the phenomenon aside, efforts 
are also hampered because the object of study is not even visible to us – there is no 
way of going back in time or recreating the exact conditions that led to the 
emergence of language in our hominid ancestors (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003). Even 
if we could somehow go back in time with a team of researchers, we would have 
very little idea of what year we should return to. Even identifying roughly when the 
capacity for language evolved has proven a difficult challenge, let alone 
understanding how it evolved. We know that language must have been in place 
before anatomically modern humans left Africa, some 50,000 years ago, but tracing 
the capacity for language beyond this has proven problematic (Mellars, 2006).
Tracing Language(s) Through Time
One approach has been to examine the fossil record for clues to when language 
might have emerged. Unfortunately archaeological data cannot give us any direct 
clues, as language, being non-physical, leaves very little trace (Hauser & Fitch, 
2003). With that caveat in mind, some researchers have looked for clues in the skull 
structures of early hominids. One of the notable features of Homo sapiens is the brain 
size to body size ratio. An oft-quoted figure is that our brains are three times larger 
than we should expect for an ape of our size (Fitch, 2010). An increase in the size of 
our brains relative to our closest neighbours has long been associated with an 
increase in cognitive abilities, although this has been called into question (e.g. 
Macphail, 1982; Deacon, 1997). The message seems to be that bigger brains might 
have more processing power, but this might not correlate to more sophisticated 
behaviour or, more importantly, linguistic behaviour.
If we cannot learn anything about language evolution from the structure of the 
brain, what about other structures that are vital for language, such as the vocal 
tract?  Although fragile and not particularly well-preserved over time, the shape and 
positioning of the hyoid bone in certain specimens of Homo neanderthalensis has led 
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some researchers to conclude that Neanderthals probably had the same range of 
speech sounds as modern humans (Arensburg et al., 1989; Boë et al., 2002). However, 
this is contested (Lieberman, 2007), and in any case having the ability to make 
speech sounds is not the same as having the ability for language. After all, we know 
that chimpanzees are capable of making some of the gestures of sign language, but 
even after extensive training they still cannot fully acquire it (Gardner & Gardner, 
1969). Work investigating the vocal production in other species, such as dogs and 
deer, has also revealed that most mammals have a more dynamic vocal tract than 
previously thought which allows them to radically reconfigure their vocal anatomy 
when vocalising (Fitch, 2000). This once again urges us to be cautious in attempting 
to form conclusions based on fossilised evidence.
A different line of enquiry however has been to look at the archaeological record in 
terms of material culture. In other words, can we learn anything about language 
evolution by looking at the kinds of artefacts our ancestral hominids were making, 
or any evidence of their behaviours that they might have left behind? Judging from 
the discovery of accumulations of animal bones, and the analysis of stone tools, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that by 2 million years ago hominids were sharing food 
with one another and being sociable (Isaac, 1978; Plummer, 2004). We also know 
from fossilised footprints that hominids were bipedal at least 3.6 million years ago 
(Leakey & Hay, 1979). There is also archaeological evidence for what has been 
termed an ‘explosion’ in material culture 40-60 thousand years ago, heralding not 
only an increase in the number and designs of functional tools, but also the 
emergence of symbolic artefacts, such as art and decorative pieces (Deacon, 1997; 
Lewin, 2005). 
From all this indirect evidence, Barrett et al. (2002) present three possible scenarios 
of when language may have evolved: (a) in early Homo erectus, around 1.5 to 2 
million years ago (e.g. Deacon, 1997); (b) when Homo sapiens first appears around 
500 thousand years ago (e.g Falk, 1980; Aiello & Dunbar, 1993; Worden, 1998); or (c) 
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around the time of this material culture explosion, 40-60 thousand years ago (White, 
1982; Noble & Davidson, 1996). 
Rather than looking for historical evidence of biological hallmarks of language 
emergence, can we learn anything by examining how individual languages have 
formed over time?  The process of language reconstruction has a long and 
distinguished history within linguistics, although attempts to reconstruct earlier 
forms of language based on similarities between extant languages can only go back 
so far (Fox, 1995)2. Related to this, other approaches have looked at genetic data and 
the distribution of current languages, in conjunction with what is known about 
human migrations and population expansions throughout history (e.g. Cavalli-
Sforza, 2000)3. Although the goal of this work is to understand more about human 
history and evolution in general, the outcome of such studies does help to constrain 
theorising about the evolution of language as well.  
The main issue with both linguistic reconstruction and attempts to study human 
evolution over these shorter time-frames is that we run the risk of investigating 
language change, rather than language evolution. The difference between the two is 
subtle, but important. Whereas language change involves systems moving through 
the space of possible linguistic states, language evolution involves systems moving 
between spaces of possible linguistic states themselves. That is, it involves the 
transition from a state of no language to a state of language, rather than a transition 
from a state of language to a slightly different state of language (see Brighton (2003) 
for more discussion of this distinction). Whilst learning more about the ways in 
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2 Note that in spite of the note of caution sounded by researchers like Fox (1995) attempts 
have been made to reconstruct languages as far back as ‘Proto-World’, the hypothesised 
language from which all modern languages are descended from (e.g Bengtson & Ruhlen, 
1994; Ruhlen, 1994).
3 This kind of research is different to the work linking recent genetic changes in human 
DNA to specific features of language (Dediu & Ladd, 2007) in that it attempts to use genes of 
modern populations as a historical record of the human species. It is thus much more like 
linguistic reconstruction in nature, and focuses on language change, rather than language 
evolution.
which current languages change over time is relevant to our study, we must be 
careful to keep in mind that our original goal is to explain the emergence of 
‘language’, not specific languages.
Potential for Progress
One positive sign of progress comes from the comparative studies we explored in 
Chapter 2. Not only have the comparative studies of animal communication been 
useful for helping us identify which features of language are uniquely human, but 
we can also learn a lot from the degree to which our biological cognitive 
foundations for language are shared with other animals. For instance, determining 
whether the trait is homologous (i.e. related by descent) or analogous (i.e. arising 
independently in a separate lineage) can tell us whether that trait is present for 
functional or historical reasons (Fitch, 2010). In many cases, this alone is sufficient to 
tell us something about the evolutionary pressures driving selection, most 
obviously, whether or not that trait is an adaptive response to pressures arising from 
similar environments.
Another way in which comparative studies can inform research into language 
evolution is by telling us something about how culture evolves, or social learning 
behaviours in general (e.g. Boesch & Tomasello, 1998; Caldwell & Whiten, 2006; 
Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008). Although data from animal studies is definitely relevant 
to addressing questions about language evolution (and an interesting topic of study 
in its own right), it is still only indirectly related to the phenomenon we wish to 
understand. We cannot always assume there is a straightforward relationship 
between what we learn about animal communication and social learning 
mechanisms, and our own capabilities. However, one thing is certain: if we can get 
empirical data on how processes of cultural evolution work in non-humans, we 
should also be able to get empirical data on how processes of cultural evolution give 
rise to language in humans. Indeed, we have also seen several examples of this type 
of experiment in both animals and humans (§2.4.4). Although these did not involve 
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language, they still set a useful precedent for studying some of the mechanisms of 
cultural transmission that support linguistic transmission.
Perhaps the most important thing to bear in mind when thinking about ways in 
which we might progress our understanding is that we have the evolutionary end-
points of the process (i.e. modern languages) to hand. Even as you read this, 
languages are evolving4  -- although it is rare, we do have some limited access to 
natural cases of language emergence that are ongoing today (e.g. Nicaraguan Sign 
Language, creolisation). With greater constraints provided by our knowledge of 
neurology, language acquisition, language disorders, plus insights that can be 
gained from the analysis of computational simulations and formal modelling 
techniques, progress is being made in the field of language evolution. The next 
section explores some of these avenues.
3.2 Methods for Studying the Cultural Evolution of Language
Recall that the main aim of this thesis is to explore how language evolves as a result 
of being culturally acquired via iterated learning. Therefore our focus in this section 
will be on methods for understanding cultural evolution only.
3.2.1  Computational and Mathematical Studies of Language Emergence
As discussed in the previous chapter, over the last few decades the use of 
computational simulations and mathematical models to explore language evolution 
has rapidly increased. The advantage of this methodology stems from the fact that 
models allow us to check and refine our theories very rapidly. One of the key issues 
with studying CASs is that our intuitions do not always naturally match up with 
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4 If we are being picky, with the exception of newly emergent systems, we should really say 
that most languages are merely changing. See Brighton (2003) for a discussion on the 
differences between language change and evolution.
reality (Hashimoto, 2002). Making our theoretical assumptions explicit in a formal 
model of the process allows us to rigourously test whether our predictions do in fact 
follow from our hypotheses. Of the various models out there, the most relevant to 
the current work are the ILMs discussed earlier (see §2.3), which focus on explaining 
the emergence of compositional structure in language in terms of cultural 
transmission (e.g. Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Smith et al., 2003; Brighton et al., 2005). 
However, there have also been a range of computer simulations which explore the 
emergence of innate signalling systems as a result of purely biological evolution5. In 
particular, these studies have focused on determining under which ecological 
conditions we can expect to see evolution by natural selection resulting in the 
emergence of simple communication systems (MacLennan & Burghardt, 1994; 
DiPaolo, 1997; Cangelosi & Parisi, 1998; Noble, 1999), or on understanding the 
origins of the communication channel itself (Quinn, 2001). There have also been 
models conducted which explore how both cultural learning and biological 
evolution can interact together (Hinton & Nowlan, 1987; Kirby & Hurford, 1997; 
Watanabe et al., 2008) -- therefore focusing on all three elements of complex adaptive 
system described in §2.2. This can give us valuable insight as to how iterated 
learning may fit into the bigger picture of language evolution as a whole.
Additionally, the problem of language emergence has also been investigated 
mathematically (e.g. Niyogi & Berwick, 1997; Nowak et al., 2002; Griffiths & Kalish, 
2005, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007; Griffiths et al., 2008; Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2009). 
Many of these more recent studies have focused explicitly on separating the 
respective contributions of the process of transmission and the pre-existing learning 
biases held by the agents. This has been achieved by modelling agents as Bayesian 
learners, who form hypotheses about the data they have seen based not only on the 
likelihood of that hypothesis actually having produced that data but also the prior 
probability of that hypothesis being entertained by the agent without having seen 
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5 See Oliphant (1997) or Kirby (2002) for a more in-depth review of these models.
any data (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005; Kirby et al., 2007; Smith & Kirby, 2008; Ferdinand 
& Zuidema, 2009; see also §5.3 for discussion of these models).
Despite the breadth and depth of this research method, it is not immune to criticism. 
Although it is always possible to find specific faults with individual models, there is 
one charge that has been made toward computational models in general: that they 
over-simplify their subject matter. In some sense this is what makes the models 
desirable – we use models when we want to grasp the underlying dynamics of 
complex phenomena, and to do this, we must abstract away from modelling every 
detail (Cooper, 2002). However, this has led to claims that models may not 
generalise to human populations, and that models of language evolution in 
particular often contain “unrealistic initial conditions” which limit the problem 
space in non-trivial ways (Bickerton, 2003:86). One of the central goals of this thesis 
is to examine whether this claim holds up by making explicit attempts to replicate 
computational results in human populations in order to assess their ecological 
validity.
3.2.2 Emergence of Natural Human Communication Systems
It is not every day that we get to witness the birth of a new language; the vast 
majority of us are born into a community with a fully fledged linguistic system 
firmly in place. The few exceptions to this rule are therefore invaluable, as they give 
us a unique opportunity to observe the natural emergence of a human 
communication system. There are two main loci for witnessing such an event: in the 
formation of pidgin and creole languages (Bickerton, 1981), and in the formation of 
home-sign (Goldin-Meadows & Mylander, 1998), and full sign languages in the deaf 
community (Kegl, 1994; Senghas & Coppola, 2001; Senghas et al., 2004; Sandler et al., 
2005). One thing that has been emphasised in both studies of protolanguage and 
emergent sign-languages is the key role that children appear to play in the process.
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For instance, Senghas & Coppola (2001) have explicitly focused on the different roles 
played by adults and children in the development of a relatively young sign 
language in Nicaragua (NSL). This is a language that has been emerging since the 
1970's, when schools were established to educate the country's deaf children, most 
of whom lived in small isolated communities. Prior to this time, there was no 
established sign language in Nicaragua, or even a deaf community to speak of. Since 
this time however several cohorts of deaf people have passed in and out of the 
school system every year, and a new language has been rapidly emerging. Initially 
composed of just a few basic signs that were rapidly converged upon, each 
successive cohort (or generation) of learners has elaborated and systematised the 
grammar of the emergent language. 
The schools contain a mix of children and adults, all of whom have hearing parents. 
Senghas & Coppola (2001) investigated where the internal structure of NSL was 
coming from, and found strong evidence to suggest that it was the younger deaf 
students, and not the adults, who were providing the creative force. They link this 
back to the fact that children are much better at acquiring language than adults, 
despite the fact that adults are much better at mastering other complex skills 
(Newport, 1990). Although Senghas & Coppola (2001) have interpreted this result as 
showing that there is a qualitative difference in the behaviour of adult and children 
learners, they do however go on to point out that the status of the evolving 
language itself also plays a role, stating: 
“Each generation leaves the distinctive mark of their learning 
process on the model they provide for their children. When 
children learn a mature language, the mark is a subtle one...Only in 
cases like this one, when the model is not a mature language, do 
these language-learning abilities show their transformational, 
creative capacity.” (p 328) 
In other words, we only tend to see these creative capacities of children when there 
is a sparseness of data in the linguistic environment. They do not show up 
ordinarily during first language acquisition when the linguistic target is already a 
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fully-fledged language. This shows nice parallels with the findings of the iterated 
learning models discussed earlier, which suggest that languages only adapt when 
they are culturally transmitted and there is some kind of sparsity in the input (Kirby, 
2002; Zuidema, 2003; Kirby et al., 2008b).
Although the data deriving from these case-studies tends to be both detailed and 
directly relevant to language evolution, they do have their limitations. The first has 
already been mentioned -- they are rare. This makes it difficult to extract robust 
generalisations. Just as any empirical study needs many data points in order to 
calculate the size of the effect, we find we need many case-studies in order to be 
sure we are detecting the common processes underlying the emergence of new 
languages in general, and not just facts idiosyncratic to the formation of specific 
languages. The second issue is one of control. Although scientists working on these 
cases can look at the data and develop hypotheses about what is responsible, they 
cannot easily go on to test their intuitions by manipulating any of the variables. In 
most cases, researchers must remain passive observers to the phenomenon at hand, 
recording what happens but not intervening. 
3.2.3 Artificial Language Learning
Another method which has come to the fore in recent years is artificial language 
learning (ALL). In ALL studies, participants are trained on an artificial language -- 
usually just a sequence of letter strings generated by a grammar -- exhibiting some 
set of features controlled by the experimenters (Reber, 1969; Knowlton & Squire, 
1994). After training, learners are tested to see what they have acquired, and 
whether they can recognise novel sequences produced by the same grammar. This 
has proven to be a powerful method for ascertaining what kinds of structures 
humans can acquire, and one which is not only useful for studying abilities in 
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adults, but also infants (Saffran et al., 1996; Gomez & Gerken, 2000), and even non-
human primates (Fitch & Hauser, 2004)6.
There have been several ALL studies conducted that have tried to shed light on 
issues relating to language evolution. Following on from some of the findings 
obtained from the sign language study described earlier, Hudson-Kam & Newport 
(2005) used an ALL task to address performance differences between adults and 
children in terms of how they impose structure by regularising inconsistent inputs. 
In one study they found that when an artificial language contained irregularity (i.e. 
a grammatical feature was either consistently present or only present 60% of the 
time) children were much more likely to impose their own systematic pattern when 
attempting to reproduce the data than adults were. Although this finding seems to 
largely support Senghas & Coppola’s (2001) claim that children’s learning behaviour 
is categorically different to adults, a follow up study by Hudson-Kam & Newport 
(2009) complicates the issue somewhat by discovering that there are in fact certain 
conditions in which adults will regularise and children will not. It seems there are 
many factors which determine when learners will generalise observed patterns to 
new data, and when they will not.
The situation becomes more complicated still when we consider a more recent study 
by Smith & Wonnacott (2010), who show that when adults are engaged in iterated 
version of Hudson-Kam & Newport’s original (2005) study, the languages all evolve 
to become regular. This study illustrates one of the key findings that comes from my 
own work in Chapters 4-6. Namely, that the performance of an individual at the 
beginning of a transmission chain is radically different to the performance of an 
individual at the end of a transmission chain. Participants in Hudson-Kam & 
Newport’s original study are equivalent to participants in the first generation of 
Smith & Wonnacott’s. What the latter study shows is that although one adult might 
not regularise, if we have a chain of adults learning from one another, they will 
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6 These status of these animal studies is currently controversial. More replications of them 
are required.
regularise. In other words, we cannot predict what the outcome of iterated learning 
will be on the basis of the performance of the first learner. The significance of this 
finding will hopefully become clearer after Chapter 4.
Another application of ALL lies in testing specific predictions generated by different 
language evolution theories (Christiansen, 2000; Ellefson & Christiansen, 2000). This 
has been used in conjunction with computational simulations (Christiansen & 
Devlin, 1997; Ellefson & Christiansen, 2000) to investigate whether the brain 
mechanisms governing the acquisition and processing of language are linguistic or 
more generally cognitive in nature. For instance, Ellefson & Christiansen (2000) 
investigate the phenomenon of subjacency. All languages place certain restrictions 
upon the ordering of words. Violation of any of these restrictions results in 
sentences which are ungrammatical. The principle of subjacency is an example of 
one type of restriction which operates on languages. It refers to the fact that when 
elements undergo movement (for instance, in the formation of wh-questions in 
English) there are only certain places that a given element is accessible and free to 
move from (Newmeyer, 1991). 
The appearance of seemingly arbitrary subjacency constraints on word movement 
has been used to motivate the idea that language must be the result of specialised 
cognitive equipment. In other words, that these restrictions only make sense from a 
linguistic perspective (Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Ellefson & Christiansen designed an 
ALL experiment where they presented subjects with grammars that fit either natural 
or unnatural subjacency patterns, and found that they acquired the natural 
grammars significantly better. On its own, this might be taken to show that human 
participants prefer the natural subjacency constraints because those are the ones 
endorsed by UG. However, they also performed a computational model, using the 
same data to train a simple recurrent network (see: Elman, 1990). Although the 
computational agent had no specialised linguistic processing machinery, its 
performance matched that of human learners. Ellefson & Christiansen (2000) 
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therefore conclude from this that subjacency constraints seen in human languages 
could have emerged from very general cognitive constraints on sequence learning. 
3.2.4 Emergence of Artificial Human Communication Systems
There has recently been renewed interest in studying the emergence and evolution 
of human communication systems experimentally (e.g. Galantucci, 2005; Garrod et 
al, 2007; Healey et al, 2007; Scott-Phillips et al, 2009; Selten & Warglien, 2007; Kirby et 
al, 2008a; Theisen et al., 2010). These studies differ from the many experiments 
investigating human communication that came before (e.g. Garrod & Anderson, 
1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Christiansen, 2000; Pickering & Garrod, 2004; 
Hudson-Kam & Newport, 2005) by the emphasis placed on exploring the emergence 
of novel systems. In other words, these experiments do not start with a system 
(either natural or designed by the experimenter) in place initially, but let one evolve 
over the course of the experiment. This provides us with a direct route into 
understanding how such systems become established (Galantucci, 2005). 
It is clear that an experimental approach offers certain advantages over studying 
these phenomena indirectly via the use of computational and mathematical models, 
or via naturalistic observation (such as greater experimental manipulation, control, 
and replicability of results, etc.). Most of these newer experiments looking at the 
emergence of novel systems share the property of revolving around some kind of 
communication game. Participants (typically dyads) are given some shared goal or 
joint task that requires them to co-ordinate their actions in some way. The only way 
in which to do this is to interactively construct a communication system together, 
using whatever medium is provided. 
For instance, in Selten & Warglien (2007) pairs of participants are given a repertoire 
of available symbols, each with different sending costs, and instructed to converge 
upon a set of economical signals to identify different pictures. In Galantucci (2005) 
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pairs of participants must coordinate their actions in a 2D game-world by 
communicating with one another using a novel graphical medium, which prevents 
the use of common symbols or pictorial representations, forcing them to develop a 
new system of their own. In Healey et al (2007) pairs of participants (and later on, 
interacting groups) collaborate together using a virtual whiteboard, drawing images 
to identify different pieces of music. Similarly, Garrod et al (2007) encourage 
participants to depict various concepts (such as commonly known people, places, 
objects, and more abstract concepts such as ‘poverty’) using images in such a way 
that a fellow participant could identify them. In a slightly different twist, Scott-
Phillips et al. (2009) have an experimental set-up in which they do not even provide 
a dedicated channel for communication to take place in: given a task which requires 
two players to coordinate their actions, the only solution is to create one by using 
the movements of the players’ avatars in the game environment as signals. 
The fact that convergence does not come easily to participants in these experiments 
(most fail to agree on a system, and fewer still go on to develop one with structure) 
highlights the fact that the underlying processes responsible are not trivial. This is 
perhaps surprising given that we assume participants could easily invent a 
workable system on their own. In fact, Scott-Phillips et al (2009) find that reported 
reasons for failure often centre around an inability to convey a system to their 
partner rather than an inability to individually construct one in the first place. 
Conversely, Selten & Warglien (2007) showed that the chances of developing a 
successful system are massively increased when one player finds a way to take 
control and impose their invented system upon the other.  This raises the interesting 
question of what kind of design process we think is responsible for the emergence of 
structure in natural language -- is it one which is wholly reliant on the ingenuity and 
design skills of its users, or is there some other force at work? 
Although these studies all show that humans are adept at constructing novel 
communication systems, the next section argues that many linguistic changes are 
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not ‘designed’ by individuals in that manner. Rather, much of the structure present 
in human language is indicative of apparent design without a designer. 
3.3 Design without a designer
For centuries philosophers and linguists have debated the origins of linguistic 
structure and how languages change. One of the central mysteries involves 
identifying the source of those changes and innovations that lead to increasing 
structure. The intuitive answer is of course us, the speakers of language. Yet whilst 
languages change and evolve as a result of differential patterns of usage among 
speakers, they do not do so as a result of any intentional design on the part of an 
individual. As Keller (1994) points out, we cannot analyse a historical change like 
the shift in word ordering from Object-Verb to Verb-Object in Middle English, and 
come to the conclusion that it is an instance of human design.
Keller refers to events like this as phenomena of the third kind - grouping together 
things that are neither man-made (artefactual) nor entirely natural, but which are 
instead “the result of human actions but not the goal of their intentions” (Keller, 
1994:56). He argues that as most language changes are of this type, we need to 
invoke an ‘invisible hand’ explanation for language, adopting the metaphor 
proposed by the economist and philosopher Adam Smith to explain how locally 
self-serving actions of individual investors can unexpectedly lead to group-level 
prosperity. If this hypothesis is correct, it is only through developing an 
understanding of how apparent design emerges without a designer that we can hope 
to discover the origins of linguistic structure. 
Croft (2000) makes a similar three-way distinction between types of causal 
mechanisms involved in language change to that proposed by Keller (1994). On one 
hand, we have TELEOLOGICAL explanations, which are invoked “when a speaker is 
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claimed to innovate in order to alter the linguistic system in some way...the 
linguistic system is designed (by the speaker) to have the structure it does, and to 
change, as it does” Croft (2000:64). This corresponds with what Keller calls man-
made. Like Keller, Croft concludes that this is not a mechanism that operates in 
language change. Next we have INTENTIONAL explanations, where “the speaker is 
aiming towards some other goal in language use, and produces an innovation in the 
process” Croft (2000:64). This corresponds to Keller’s phenomenon of the third kind. 
We have seen evidence of this kind of mechanism at work in the experiments 
described in §3.2.4. The final kind of causal mechanism in language change involve 
NONINTENTIONAL explanations, where “[t]he language change is not even an 
intended means to achieve some other goal of the speaker. It is simply a change that 
just happens as a consequence of the act of production (and in some theories, also 
comprehension) of an utterance” (Croft, 2000:65)7. It is this kind of mechanism that I 
would like to investigate with the experiments in Chapters 4-6.
For Keller (1994), who views language change as a special instance of sociocultural 
change, explaining the properties of language inevitably requires seeing it as a 
product of cultural evolution. Although Keller primarily restricts his investigations 
to language alone, the invisible hand phenomenon is also at work in many other 
domains, for instance, in how crowds of people self-organise into the optimal spatial 
configuration for viewing performers. However, it is certainly not the case that every 
instance of cultural evolution requires an intentional or a nonintentional 
explanation. If we look outwith human communication, we find that many 
examples of culturally transmitted behaviours, such as tool-making and the kinds of 
incremental innovations we find in technological developments (Basalla, 1988; 
Petroski, 1992; Ziman, 2000), do seem to be directed and guided by human 
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7 This corresponds to what Keller (1994) calls ‘natural kinds’.  Keller does not place as much 
emphasis on these kinds of changes within language, which is one of the reasons why I will 
be using Croft’s definitions for the rest of the thesis.
intentions - they do require teleological explanations8. In that sense, we can see 
Croft’s (2000) three causal mechanisms as operating more generally within cultural 
evolution. 
For some commentators (e.g. Hallpike, 1986; Pinker, 1997; Benton, 2000; Bryant, 
2004), this teleological or goal-directed aspect is precisely what causes analogies 
between biological and cultural evolution to breakdown completely (Mesoudi, 
2008). Instead of perceiving this as an either-or debate (in which cultural evolution 
either proceeds via intelligent human design or some blind evolutionary process), 
Dennett & McKay (2006) encourage us to think of cultural change as: “a continuum 
from intelligent, mindful evolution through to oblivious, mindless evolution” (italics 
original). They go on to claim that: 
“in cultural evolution...there are undeniable cases of cultural 
features that evolve by Darwinian processes without any 
need to invoke authors, designers, or other intelligent 
creators. Most obviously, languages - words and 
pronunciation and grammatical features - evolve without 
any need  for grammarians, deliberate coiners, or other 
foresighted guardians of these cultural items.” (p. 353). 
So this brings us back to our central question - if some aspects of linguistic structure 
are led by this invisible hand, or are in fact completely nonintentional as Croft 
defines it, is it possible to capture this phenomenon and investigate it in the 
laboratory?  It could be argued that, in a sense, we have already seen the invisible 
hand at work in some of the studies discussed in §3.2.4. Whilst the interactions 
between participants do involve some degree of reasoning and purposeful design, 
participants’ intentions were to cooperate to solve the task. Although they were all 
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8  Sometimes it is uncertain whether or not the inventors themselves can anticipate the 
eventual usage of the object to which they contribute some design feature. In this case, we 
are back to describing these changes as intentional.  The original innovator may have 
intended to make a modification to improve the way in which a stone tool cracks nuts, but 
another observer may see that object, and believe that its proper function is as a spear-head. 
The creation of a new spear-head was not what the modification was designed for, but the 
modification itself was nevertheless intended. 
consciously aware that they needed to find a way to communicate with their 
partner, the negotiation process which allowed the basic communication systems 
used by different participants to become aligned with one another and become an 
established convention is also a complex dynamic system at work. As such, it has 
invisible hands of its very own; shaping, guiding and prompting structure into 
being. This notion would help to explain why the creation of a successful system is 
never guaranteed in these studies, in spite of the fact that an individual acting alone 
given explicit instructions to design a way to communicate, could easily invent a 
system fit for purpose.
However, if we genuinely want to explore the nonintentional end of the scale, we 
need to design an experiment where participants are not given the explicit task to 
communicate. Isolating exactly which elements arise through intentional design, 
and which through these more subtle and hidden forces, may well prove to be 
impossible in any experiment involving human participants. However, that should 
not prevent us from trying.
3.4 The Current Framework: The Human Iterated Learning Model
This section lays out the experimental framework that will be used for the rest of the 
thesis. It begins by clarifying a recent point of confusion amongst researchers about 
what iterated learning really consists of, before describing some early work that was 
done to investigate language change that bears many similarities with the suggested 
framework. Finally it looks in some detail at ways in which we can analyse the 
results of our experiments.
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3.4.1 Putting Iterated Learning in Context
There has been something implicit in all of the discussion so far that should be made 
explicit at this point. All the previous studies of language emergence in the laboratory are 
instances of iterated learning. What makes this experimental framework different to 
these other approaches is not that it involves iterated learning, and the others 
involve some other transmission mechanism. Instead, the difference lies in two 
factors: (1) population structure, and (2) the focus on nonintentional emergence of 
structure. This has caused some confusion in the literature of late, mostly as a result 
of the fact that the majority of researchers who have used the term ‘iterated 
learning’ before, in both linguistic and non-linguistic domains, have demonstrated it 
by using simulations (Kirby, 2000; Kirby, 2001; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Zuidema, 
2003) or experiments (Kirby et al., 2008a; Griffiths et al., 2008; Smith & Wonnacott, 
2010) that involve linear transmission chains of learners. This has in turn led other 
researchers to attempt to make contrasts between approaches which, strictly 
speaking, should not be made.
For instance, in a recent paper Garrod et al. (2010:33) state that: “One influential 
model assumes an evolutionary principle analogous to iterated learning in which 
the language is transmitted vertically down generations of speakers”. Using this 
definition of iterated learning, Garrod et al. (2010)  go on to contrast two different 
experimental conditions: iterated learning and social coordination. The contrast that 
was actually being made here was between linear transmission vs. closed group 
population designs. Of course there is nothing wrong with researchers redefining 
terms as they see fit. However, this particular example is dangerous as it implies 
there is a difference between the two conditions in terms of the mechanisms of 
transmission at work, rather than a difference in population structure.
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3.4.2 General Methodological Framework
This section will outline the general methodology for conducting iterated learning 
experiments to investigate the nonintentional emergence of language. The idea is 
that learning something about the way in which artificial languages are culturally 
transmitted in the laboratory can tell us something about the way in which natural 
languages are culturally transmitted in real populations.
The general method involves each participant learning a small artificial (‘alien’) 
language composed of a finite set of meanings (pictures) that are paired with signals 
(strings of letters, or possibly sounds). These languages need not be particularly 
large. In the experiments described later on in chapters 4 and 5 there were just 27 
meaning-signal pairs in total. Once a participant has acquired the artificial language, 
they are tested and their answers used to provide the training input to the next 
participant, who forms another ‘generation’ in the chain. This process repeats until 
the desired number of generations is reached. Throughout, participants are asked 
only to reproduce the language as accurately as they can; the source of their training 
data is not revealed, and they have no way of knowing the experiment is 
investigating the emergence of language. 
Training, Testing and Transmission
There are three distinct phases involved: training, testing, and transmission. During 
the training phase, participants are shown a picture from the set, alongside the 
signal string it is paired with, and informed that this is the way in which the alien 
would describe that image in its own language. The task is to learn the descriptions 
associated with each image to the best of their abilities. Training occurs via a 
computer program, which randomises the order in which each signal-meaning pair 
is presented, ensures that all training items are seen, and controls the length of time 
each training item is shown. The key variables to consider here are the amount of 
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training each participant receives (i.e. the number of rounds of training they are 
given), whether this training occurs in one continuous session or in blocks, and 
whether training blocks are structured in some way or randomised. 
Following a series of pilot studies conducted during my MSc (Cornish, 2006) it was 
decided that training would be conducted over three blocks, with an obligatory 
practice test and an optional two-minute break in between. Each training item 
appeared twice during each block, so six times in total over the course of a learner’s 
training session. Training items were presented in two parts: first the signal would 
appear alone for 1000ms, then the meaning would be shown alongside it for a 
further 5000ms.
Once training is complete, we move onto the testing phase, where participants are 
shown each picture in turn and instructed to supply the missing description. The 
final test can be (and in the experiments presented later on in Chapters 4 and 5, in 
fact were) preceded by a series of practice tests in between training blocks, which 
introduces the possibility of some indirect feedback being provided to facilitate 
learning: participants were given a limited opportunity to correct themselves over 
the intervening practice tests, as well as giving them the chance to become familiar 
with the testing procedure ahead of the final test. In the experiments presented here, 
the practice tests involved participants being presented with just a subset of 14 of 
the meanings and being asked to provide the correct description9. Following the 
third and final block of training, the remaining 13 items were appended to this set of 
14, ensuring that descriptions were collected for all 27 meanings in the final test.
These responses from the last round of testing are then used to generate a new set of 
training stimuli for the next generation during the transmission phase. It is during 
this final stage, which happens ‘offline’ after the participant has left, that some of the 
most interesting parameters can be explored, including the transmission bottleneck. 
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9 Depending on the exact condition of the experiment, half of these items may have been 
ones which they had seen earlier in training, and half may have been novel.
One of the advantages of the iterated language learning methodology is that it 
allows us to test very specific hypotheses about what occurs during language 
transmission by giving us complete control over what gets passed on. It is this 
aspect that affords iterated language learning more simulation-like qualities than is 
typical in non-iterated artificial language experiments. 
For instance, if we wished to test the hypothesis that a preference for shorter strings 
led to compositional structure, during the transmission phase we could artificially 
select only those strings that met some (possibly dynamic) string-length threshold 
and ensure that only these items were propagated to the next generation10. By 
examining the resulting languages that arise from this process of artificial selection 
we can determine whether this hypothesis is valid. In this case we are running the 
procedure like a simulation. We build in a condition to see what the future outcome 
is, and can then refine our intuitions as a result. Alternatively, if we wish to test the 
hypothesis that human learners actually have a bias towards producing shorter 
strings, we can just run the experiment without any such manipulations and 
examine the average length of strings at the end of the chain. In this case, we are 
using the methodology to experimentally test whether such a bias currently exists or 
not. Both strategies can be useful depending on the questions one wants to answer. 
To summarise, the procedure implemented in most of the experiments described in 
Chapters 4 and 5 was as follows: (1) participants are given verbal and written 
instructions asking them to learn the alien descriptions for a series of images; (2) 
three blocks of training occur; (3) final responses are gathered in the last test; (4) 
participants were debriefed; (5) the recorded output from each participant was 
processed ready for transmission to the next learner. During every block of training, 
82
10 It should be remembered that studying processes of artificial selection (e.g Mendel’s peas, 
the selective breeding programs employed by farmers, etc.) were what led to the 
breakthroughs in understanding how biological evolution worked. One of the points being 
argued here is that similar tactics of studying artificial selection in language and other 
culturally transmitted behaviours can lead to similar advances in understanding cultural 
evolution. This is consistent with the agenda laid out in Mesoudi et al. (2006). 
each training item is seen twice. Participants are then tested on roughly half (14) of 
the items, and given an optional 2 minute break before the next block of training 
commences. This sequence is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: The training-testing-transmission procedure for experiments I-IV. Training and 
testing occurs ‘online’ (when participants are in the laboratory) whilst transmission occurs 
‘offline’ (after participants have left). Each experiment involves three blocks of training and 
testing. Only the output from the final training cycle is processed ready for transmission to a 
new learner.
Generating Initial Languages
The experimental procedure is only one of the considerations that need to be kept in 
mind. One obvious factor we have yet to mention is how we begin this process. It is 










manipulations we can make here, which are again dependent on the kinds of 
questions we are interested in. For instance, if we wish to know whether a particular 
structural system can be stably transmitted, then we should give that system to the 
first participant and monitor whether it changes as a result of iterated learning. If 
however, we are interested in learning something about how linguistic structure 
emerges, we cannot initialise the chains with a fully structured system. Instead, we 
can use randomly generated signals. A simple method for constructing these is by 
concatenating CV syllables (drawn from a large but finite set) to form longer strings. 
This produces a set of signal strings which, whilst containing some regularities 
owing to the fact that they are constructed from a finite syllable set, is still highly 
unstructured with regard to the meanings. 
The Meaning Space
Further consideration must be paid to the design of the meaning-space - or rather, 
the stimuli we use to depict the meaning-space. Meaning-spaces themselves can be 
structured or unstructured, reflecting regularities and co-occurrences in the real 
world, or a controlled and simplified world of our choosing. In all of the studies 
discussed later, the pictures come from a small and highly structured meaning space 
consisting of three different dimensions (motion11, colour and shape), each of which 
contains three different variables (e.g. bouncing, straight and spiralling; black, blue 
and red; circle, square and triangle). This 3x3x3 design yields a total of 27 different 
possible combinations. Some examples of these meanings are shown in Figure 3.2 
below.
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11 In the actual experiments presented in Chapters 4 and 5, motion was indicated by dotted 
lines. This can be seen in Fig. 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Examples of the images used to depict structured meanings in Experiments I-IV. Each 
meaning varies in terms of motion, shape and colour. These examples show a bouncing black circle, a 
horizontally moving triangle, and a spiralling blue square.
Population Structure
The population structure can be manipulated in a variety of different ways. Not 
only is it possible to control the size of the population, but also the network 
structure (i.e. who talks to who). Since there are so many possible configurations, it 
makes sense for us to look at the simplest possible population structure first: a linear 
transmission chain, with just one learner at every generation. It is important to 
remember however that we can also implement closed-group and replacement 
designs, or in fact, have one learner receiving their own input back in a disguised 
manner, as in Griffiths, Christian & Kalish’s (2008) exploration of category 
learning12 .
3.4.3 Measuring Structure and Learnability
The next chapter reports the results of the first two experiments. Before we begin, it 
is perhaps worth spending a moment considering how we are to analyse the data. 
Given our hypotheses, we need to know two things. Firstly, whether the languages 
are evolving to contain more structure, and secondly, whether they are becoming 
easier to learn. In simulations, modellers have free access to the grammars being 
constructed by agents over the course of each run, which makes it relatively 
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12 See Winters (2009) or Line (2010) for some examples of population manipulations that 
have been tried within human iterated language learning.
straightforward to describe and make comparisons of the systems at different stages 
in their evolution. If we want to know whether the language at the final generation 
is structured, we can simply inspect the internal representation of it in the ‘mind’ of 
the agent and find out13. Although our use of human participants rules out such a 
direct approach, we still have plenty of resources available to us, most notably the 
forms of the languages themselves, to enable us to objectively judge the matter.
The issue of learnability is relatively straightforward. In short, a language is learnable 
to the extent that it is transmitted faithfully without error. In order to measure error in 
transmission, we need only to find a way of calculating the amount of change 
between different languages. So what determines whether a language is structured 
or not? We should remember here that we are dealing with a simplified definition of 
what a language is. In these experiments, a language is simply a mapping between 
meanings and signals. With that in mind, a language can be said to be structured if 
that mapping between the different levels (meanings and signals) is itself structure-
preserving. In other words, a language is structured if similar signals get reliably mapped 
onto similar meanings14. We therefore need a measure that can tell us whether there is 
a correlation between items that are similar in one dimension (meanings), and items 
that are similar in another (signals). The rest of this section explores techniques that 
allow us to do that, starting by examining methods for quantifying the distance 
between signals and meanings.
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13 This is at least true for symbolic models (e.g.  the ILM described in section 3.1 of Kirby & 
Hurford (2001)). Although it is also possible to access the internal states of agents in 
connectionist models it is not always particularly meaningful to. As Russell & Norvig (1995: 
584) explain, connectionist models “are essentially black boxes”. Whilst some modelers have 
used mathematical techniques such as hierarchical clustering (Elman, 1990) and Principal 
Components Analysis (Elman, 1991) to try to understand what is going on, these methods 
only allow abstract comparisons between network states.  Although connectionist models 
produce rule-like behaviour, they do not represent rules locally (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
2002). 
14  Obviously the origin of the structure in a language is going to come largely from the 
structure in the world. This is necessarily the case in these experiments given that we are 
providing our participants with a highly structured meaning-space. The final experiment in 
chapter 5 will address this issue in a different way, but for now we are simply interested in 
whether signals can come to reflect useful structure present in meanings.
Distance Metrics
How do we begin to go about measuring similarity in our language domains? One 
of the advantages of running experiments involving a fixed set of meanings is that it 
should make the task of constructing a simple measure of language structure much 
easier (Galantucci & Garrod, 2010). The fact that the meanings are predefined, and 
can be easily decomposed into features with different values means that they lend 
themselves nicely to being defined spatially.  As suggested by Brighton et al. (2005), 
we can view each meaning as a vector in some Euclidean space. Each vector is 
defined by two components: the feature of the meaning (in this case, colour, shape 
or motion) and the value of that feature (i.e. ‘blue’). These dimensions reflect and 
define the meaning space: so a 3x3x2 meaning space consists of 18 meanings 
varying along three features, the first two of which have three values, and the last 
having only two values; whereas a 5x5 meaning space consists of 25 meanings, that 
vary along five features and five values. 
Because the meanings in our experiment vary consistently in terms of the number of 
features and values, we can use Hamming Distance (HD) for the meaning-space 
(Brighton et al., 2005). This is a standard metric from information theory that looks 
at the number of substitutions required to convert one string into another (metrics 
like this are commonly referred to as edit distances, as they involve computing the 
number of changes required to get from state t to state t+1). In this case of our 
experiment, two meanings are compared against one another and for each feature 
value (motion, shape and colour) that differs between the two, a point is awarded. 
So for instance, a bouncing black square and a bouncing black triangle differ in a 
single feature, and therefore have an HD of 1, whereas a bouncing black square and 
a horizontal red circle differ in all features, so have an HD of 3. 
Given the precedent already set for using Hamming distance to measure similarity 
between meanings in this context (Brighton et al., 2005), there are no problems with 
adopting it for use in the experiments. However, there are alternative ways to 
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measure similarity between meanings, that we will briefly consider here. One of the 
reasons for adopting HD as a metric is that we know the exact features and values 
of our meanings in advance, and have a relatively simple semantic structure. When 
the exact semantic structure is unknown or high-dimensional, other techniques 
must be used. 
For instance, Shillcock et al. (2001) examined the level of systematicity between the 
forms and meanings of 1733 monosyllabic and monomorphemic English words, 
taken from the British National Corpus15. In order to measure the semantic distances 
between the different word meanings they first had to examine the lexical co-
occurrences of these words in the entire 100 million-word corpus. Using the vector-
space method presented by Lund & Burgess (1996), Shillcock et al. (2001) used this 
co-occurrence data to construct a semantic space containing some 500 dimensions. 
Each point in this high-dimensional vector-space represented a meaning, and the 
distance between any two points could be calculated using the angles between these 
vector points.
Lexical cooccurrence matrices are commonly used in the construction of semantic 
spaces in computational linguistics because being automatically induced, they avoid 
the problem of relying on the experimenter identifying the correct dimensions - a 
task which becomes exponentially more difficult to calculate as the number of 
meanings increases (Jurafsky & Martin, 2000). They also capture the intuitive idea 
that the meaning of a word is (at least somewhat) determined by the linguistic 
contexts in which it occurs (Tamariz, 2008). Lund & Burgess’ (1996) vector-space 
method is closely related to an approach known as Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA), 
developed by Landauer & Dumais (1997) as a more general solution to what has 
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15 See also Tamariz (2008) who used the same basic technique to investigate systematicity 
between forms and meanings in a corpus of spoken Spanish words.
come to be known as Plato’s problem: namely, how do we come to know so much, 
given so little experience?16 LSA works on the idea that:
“ some domains of knowledge contain vast numbers of weak 
interrelations that, if properly exploited, can greatly amplify 
learning by a process of inference....[T]he choice of the 
correct dimensionality in which to represent similarity 
between objects and events, can sometimes, in particular in 
learning about the similarity of the meanings of words, 
produce sufficient enhancement of knowledge to bridge the 
gap between the information available in local contiguity 
and what people know after large amounts of 
experience.” (Landauer & Dumais, 1997:211) 
By using the statistical properties of contextual co-occurrence, and very general 
induction mechanisms, Landauer & Dumais (1997) built a model which could 
acquire knowledge of English vocabulary from noisy internet chat forums at a 
similar rate to school children. This happened despite the fact that the model had no 
prior linguistic or perceptual similarity knowledge. The idea of measuring 
‘similarity’ may actually be more than a useful metric for our research purposes. 
Although we are only interested in calculating similarity between signals and 
meanings to determine whether the languages in our experiments are being 
faithfully acquired and more structured, it turns out that this could be something 
real learners are also tracking during acquisition.
Returning to the topic at hand however, just as we can consider using edit distance 
to compare meanings, so too can we use edit distance to compare signals. One 
potential complication with comparing edit distances for signal strings lies in the 
fact that the string lengths can vary. Instead of Hamming distance then, which relies 
on symmetrical lengths, a better metric is Levenshtein Distance (LD). This calculates 
not just the number of substitutions to turn one string into another, but also handles 
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16 The term “Plato’s problem” has been used by Chomsky (e.g. 1991) to refer explicitly to 
poverty of stimulus arguments in language acquisition. However, the term should be 
understood as being applicable to a wider set of induction problems than just those relating 
to language acquisition.
insertions and deletions as well (Levenshtein, 1966). For example if we wanted to 
compare the similarity between two strings, kopafilo and kapilo, we would 
calculate the most efficient way of turning one into the other: in this instance there is 
one substitution (o to a) and two deletions (a and f), resulting in a Levenshtein 
Distance of 3. This figure can be normalised to give a value between 0 and 1 by 
simply dividing the LD by the length of the longest string (Brighton et al., 2005) - in 
this case giving us a value of 0.375.
Once again we find that this is just one of many different ways in which we could 
measure distance between signals. Strictly speaking, if we were using spoken 
signals we should weigh the edit distances according to how frequently we observe 
that kind of edit (read: error) in a given phonetic environment. For instance, given 
the fact that unvoiced sounds have a greater tendency to become voiced if they 
appear intervocalically, we should perhaps give less weight to this kind of change as 
opposed to a more unusual one. In addition to the standard version of LD described 
here, Kessler (2005) reviews different techniques for measuring phonological 
similarity and describes versions of LD with different weights given to reflect the 
greater salience of certain types of edits. There are two reasons for not using any of 
these more sophisticated versions of LD in the present study however.
The first is that because the signals in the experiment were visual, and not 
phonetically transparent17, we have no idea if changes are likely to be the result of 
(a) typological mistakes, (b) phonological mis-parsings, or (c) combinations of both 
of these. Secondly, estimating these weightings relies upon native speaker 
judgments. There are no ‘universal’ patterns - everything is determined by the 
particular phonological structure of the language in question. As the signals used in 
these iterated language learning studies are artificially constructed, we have no 
native speakers. Even if we restrict our studies to only include monolingual English 
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17 Given the signal string maciro we cannot be sure whether participants will phonologically 
parse that as [m!ki"#], [m!kiro], [ma"i"o] or something else.
speakers, and treat the alien signals as pseudo-words, there are further 
impracticalities that arise.
As an illustration, Tamariz (2008) measured systematicity between forms and 
meanings in the Spanish lexicon using a large corpus of transcribed spoken 
utterances. In order to generate a measure of phonological similarity, a previous 
empirical study was run (Tamariz, 2005) to collect similarity judgements from native 
speakers. Using these perceptual judgements, a set of parameters can be devised 
and applied when comparing two strings. However, in order to do this, not only did 
string length have to be controlled for, but the syllable structure as well. This meant 
restricting investigation of similarity only to words conforming to the following 
structures: CVCV, CVCCV, or CVCVCV. Given the fact that we cannot restrict the 
output that each participant produces after training in any way, generating 
perceptual weightings for string similarity would be an exhaustive task in its own 
right.
Detecting structure within a language - The Mantel Test
Once a suitable set of metrics has been found for determining signal distances and 
meaning distances, how do we use those to judge the amount of structure between 
them? Again, we find that a number of different approaches have been taken in the 
literature (Shillcock et al., 2001; Brighton et al., 2005; Ellison & Kirby, 2006; Tamariz, 
2005). Whilst on the surface all of these measures appear quite different, they are in 
fact all just variants of a test proposed by Mantel (1967), which has been used more 
commonly to explore patterns of correlations between different distance metrics 
within ecology (Sokal & Rohlf, 1995). The rest of this section will explain how this 
test works by using a toy example from that domain.
Essentially Mantel’s test assesses the correlation between two symmetrical matrices, 
each cell of which contains the distance between an object and every other object in 
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the set. Imagine we were interested in whether species with similar genes had 
similar geographical distributions. The first matrix would therefore contain all of the 
genetic distances between all possible species in the study, and the second would 
contain all geographical distances between those same species. This is illustrated 
using hypothetical data in example 3.1, where {a,b,c} are three different species, and 
numbers represent some notional distance in the relevant domain.
(3.1)! ! ! geographical distance! !       ! genetic distance
! ! ! ! a! b! c! ! ! a! b! c
! ! ! a! 0! 2        2.24! ! a! 0! 4! 3
! ! ! b! 2! 0! 1 ! ! b! 4! 0! 2
! ! ! c       2.24! 1! 0 ! ! c! 3! 2! 0
Typically when we are wanting to see whether two variables like this co-vary in an 
interesting way we can simply perform a statistical test to determine the strength 
and direction of any correlation, and the degree of confidence we have about that 
correlation being genuine. We cannot do this here however. The problem with 
making a straightforward correlation between the two matrices is that distances, by 
their very nature, are not independent from one another. In a matrix containing n 
objects, if you could imagine moving one of them slightly, n-1 distances would also 
change as a direct result. 
To illustrate this more clearly, consider Figure 3.3 below. The space on Fig. 3.3.left 
depicts the space represented in the original geographical distance matrix outlined 
in example 3.1. If we imagine moving datapoint b slightly (Fig 3.3.centre), from 
position [2,2] to [2,1], we have not only changed the matrix cells for that one object, 
but also all the distances from that object to all of the others (Fig 3.3.right). It has 
moved closer to a and further away from c.
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Figure 3.3: A pictorial representation of the geographical space depicted in example 3.1 (left) and the 
consequence of moving one of the elements (centre). This figure demonstrates the fact that distances 
are not independent of each other. Not only has the location of b changed (to b’) but all of the distances 
between b’ and every other location, as shown in the new geographical distance matrix (right).
This lack of independence means we cannot rely on standard parametric tests to 
show significance. Mantel’s (1967) solution was to perform a Monte-Carlo (or 
permutation) test on the two matrices in order to calculate significance that way. The 
way this works is as follows. First we go ahead and calculate the correlation 
anyway. The exact test we use depends on the nature of the data and the distance 
metrics we have decided to use. Given that we have adopted the same distance 
metrics used in Brighton et al. (2005) it makes sense to use the correlation measure 
that they use: Pearson’s product-moment coefficient.
Once we have this coefficient, this becomes our veridical score. Next we take one of 
the two datasets, and we shuffle the order of elements within it. This destroys the 
veridical mapping between our two distance measures but preserves the actual 
data, effectively asking the question of what would happen if the exact mapping 
between the two was unimportant. In terms of the matrix itself, it has the effect of 
randomly shuffling its rows and columns. Example 3.2 shows what this shuffling 
procedure looks like when applied to the genetic distance matrix. We then 
recalculate the correlation on this new randomly aligned data, and judge whether it 
it the same or greater than that observed in the veridical. 
aa b’
c cb
(3.1)! ! ! geographical distance! !       ! genetic distance
! ! ! ! a! b’! c! ! ! a! b! c
! ! ! a! 0! 1        2.24! ! a! 0! 4! 3
! ! ! b’! 1! 0        1.41! ! b! 4! 0! 2
! ! ! c       2.24     1.41! 0! ! c! 3! 2! 0
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(3.2)   ! ! ! geographical distance! !       genetic distance
! ! ! ! a! b! c! ! ! a! c! b
! ! ! a! 0! 2        2.24! ! b! 4! 2! 0
! ! ! b! 2! 0! 1 ! ! a! 0! 3! 4
! ! ! c       2.24! 1! 0 ! ! c! 2! 0! 1
Crucially we must reshuffle this matrix thousands of times to construct the 
frequency distribution of scores18. This gives us two things. Firstly we can now 
calculate a level of statistical significance (the p-value) in an intuitive and safe (in 
terms of our data violating the independence assumption) manner by simply 
counting the percentage of times a correlation is discovered that is equal-or-greater-
than the veridical. Secondly using the information derived from the frequency 
distribution (basically the mean and standard deviation) we can standardise the 
veridical score to derive a z-score. Importantly, the z-score, unlike the actual 
veridical correlation score, can be used to compare observations across different 
frequency distributions. This may not be important for our toy example but it will 
certainly be important for comparing our languages, as the data at each generation 
will have different distributional properties depending on the exact forms and 
mappings that it contains. 
Judging learnability across languages - Transmission Error
The Mantel test examines the structural properties of languages within generations, 
but we also need a measure to assess the similarity of languages across generations. 
For this, we can use a distance metric we have already encountered - the 
Levenshtein Distance. Whereas previously we used it to compare each signal to 
every other signal within a language, this time we will use it to derive one number 
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18 Of course, with this toy example where n=3, the matrix is so small that we would easily 
discover every possible permutation quite quickly. However, as the number of possible 
permutations increases factorially with n, a large number of randomisations is preferred in 
order to sample as many of these as possible. In the studies presented in the next three 
chapters, the results were drawn from 10,000 randomised samplings.
that tells us how similar a language is to another language. Taking each meaning, m, 
in turn, we calculate the normalised Levenshtein Distance (nLD) for the signals sm 
and sm‘ in the two languages we are comparing (Brighton et al., 2005). We then 
simply average this score over all 27 meanings, giving us a number that varies 
between 0 and 1 which tells us the average amount of transmission error that there 
is for each signal in the language. A figure of 0 means that there was no error at all 
during transmission. In other words, the language was perfectly learnable. A figure 
of 1 would imply that none of the signals were reproduced faithfully at all. In 
practice, hitting either extreme of this measure is difficult, as having a single 
misplaced letter detracts from the maximum score, and even chance 
correspondences produce scores greater than zero.
The measures for calculating transmission error and structure that have been 
described here and chosen to be the standard measures used for the rest of this 
thesis (i.e., nLD, and the Mantel test using HD and LD) have been selected for two 
reasons. Firstly, on the basis of their generality -- they both appear well suited to 
detecting all kinds of structure and similarity. Secondly, they have been selected 
because they are well-understood in the context of iterated language learning with 
simple meaning-spaces (Brighton et al., 2005). Note however that there are 
additional measures of structure and learnability available which tend to be better 
suited for measuring certain types of structure than others. We will see some of 
these more specialised measures in Chapter 5, and again in Chapter 6. 
3.5 Summary
This chapter began by exploring some of the reasons why language evolution has 
proven to be such a difficult subject to study. Although we have abundant 
evolutionary end-points of the process around us in the form of modern day 
languages, there are very few uncontroversial clues to be gained from the fossil 
record or archaeological data to support our theorising. Next we considered other 
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forms of evidence that could shed light specifically on the processes of cultural 
evolution. We then looked at some of the pros and cons of current empirical 
approaches. 
Starting with computational and mathematical studies of the origins of language, 
we noted that many of these models had been criticised in terms of their ecological 
validity, or for the kinds of simplifying assumptions they make. Next we explored 
the natural emergence of human communication systems, such as new sign 
languages. Whilst these case studies do provide us with a wealth of highly relevant 
data, they do suffer the downside of being very rare. In addition, although 
researchers can record and monitor the development of these new systems, they 
cannot intervene or manipulate the process of emergence in order to test specific 
hypotheses. The next empirical strand we focused on was artificial language 
learning. This technique has been used both to test specific hypotheses related to 
language evolution (for instance, to ascertain whether human performance matches 
the performance of computational models), as well as to study processes identified 
by researchers working with sign languages and creoles as being relevant.
The final set of empirical studies we examined concerned those which investigated 
the emergence of novel communication systems in the laboratory. This, as with the 
artificial language learning studies, has the advantage of providing us with 
complete experimental control. One thing that was noted about the majority of these 
studies is that the participants involved are always consciously aware that they need 
to communicate with a partner or group members, and in some cases, take 
deliberate steps to try to invent a system to allow them to do. This led us to consider 
what kind of process we think is responsible for the appearance of design in 
language. 
Here two complementary theoretical frameworks were presented, with which to 
think about language change. Both frameworks agreed that language was not the 
result of purposeful design on the part of individuals: it might emerge as a result of 
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human actions, but those actions were not deliberately intended. There were two 
ways in which language could end up having ‘design without a designer’ - either a 
language user could intend to achieve some kind of goal with their language use 
and inadvertently produce an innovation at the same time (this type of causal 
mechanism was defined as INTENTIONAL); or else a language user could have no 
higher goal in mind, but make a change as a consequence of the act of production or 
comprehension (this was referred to as NONINTENTIONAL). Whilst many studies 
have investigated intentional processes of language emergence, none were found to 
focus exclusively on nonintentional processes. This observation motivated the 






Language Adapts to be 
Learnable
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1. Bottlenecks on Transmission
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most crucial parameters within the 
ILM is the size of the transmission bottleneck. Changing the size of this parameter 
changes the dynamics of iterated learning considerably. If learners are exposed to 
the entire set of meaning-signal pairs, the initially holistic system is able to be 
entirely learned by rote and never changes. If learners are only exposed to a tiny 
fraction of meaning-signal pairs, the system never becomes stable. It is only when 
the bottleneck is neither too large, nor too small, that we begin to see systems 
emerge that are compositionally structured and stable (Kirby, 2000). Given its 
relative importance in terms of explaining the emergence of language-like structure 
then, it is surprising that the bottleneck itself has not received that much theoretical 
scrutiny in the modelling literature. 
This chapter begins by exploring the notion of the bottleneck in more detail. It starts 
with the observation that simulations of iterated learning have tended to model the 
transmission bottleneck as somehow external to the agent, a distributional fact of 
the environment rather than anything to do with the way the agent processes the 
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training data internally.  It then goes on to present the results of two iterated 
language learning experiments that investigate what, if any, difference these 
bottlenecks make to the way in which languages emerge1. The first experiment 
follows the approach used in the simulations, investigating what happens when 
cultural evolution is driven by a pressure to generalise to novel stimuli present in 
the environment, whereas the second examines what occurs when pressure comes 
from a more naturalistic memory constraint internal to the learner. It will be shown 
that in both cases the languages are adapting under pressures for greater 
learnability, and consequently, become more structured over time. However, neither 
produces systems which are optimal for communication.
4.1.1 A Closer Look at the Bottleneck
The idea of a bottleneck in the transmission process is not controversial. One of the 
principal challenges facing any account of first language acquisition, or indeed, any 
general theory of linguistics, is to explain how it is that the child converges on the 
correct grammar for his or her language based on the highly variable and finite 
exposure to that language that they receive (see Fig 2.2 for characteristics of the 
linguistic input available to the child). We all arrive at the acquisition process having 
encountered only a small subset of the possible words and utterances in our 
language, and yet somehow we manage to negotiate the tricky path towards 
comprehending it in its entirety. 
Whilst the jury is still very much out on the issue of whether the quality of the 
linguistic input available to the learner is really so impoverished as to necessitate a 
helping hand in the form of innate linguistic knowledge or not (see §2.2.1 and §2.2.2 
for this debate), it is clear at least that language is still somehow being acquired 
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1 The experimental results reported in this chapter have appeared in several publications: 
most notably in Cornish (2010), but also in Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby (2009); Kirby, Cornish 
& Smith (2008); and Kirby, Smith & Cornish (2008). 
despite differences between individuals’ data-exposure histories (to use the 
terminology of Pullum & Scholz, 2002). So what causes these differences in data-
exposure, and just how much do they influence language?  To answer this question, 
we need to look in more detail at how the bottleneck is working to constrain the 
process. 
4.1.2 Different Types of Bottleneck
Within the simulations, transmission constraints have most typically been 
operationalised as the amount of training data given to each learner agent - what 
Hurford (2002) calls a semantic bottleneck. Given that the number of possible 
conveyable meanings in the models is usually large but finite2, this bottleneck can be 
more formally defined as the proportion of the total number of meaning-signal pairs 
seen by each learner agent. Note that this is a physical restriction on the meanings 
that a learner encounters in the world, and not a restriction on the signals that a speaker 
produces, or can accurately retrieve from memory. These distinctions will be 
important later. 
In many ways this is an entirely reasonable way to model the transmission 
bottleneck. The fact that this training subset is always selected anew at random for 
every learner is good because it effectively captures the idea that there is natural 
variation in exposure to meaning-signal pairs between individuals: each agent gets 
a unique sample of the language, paralleling the fact that no two natural language 
learners ever receive identical exposures to language. The fact that there remains a 
large proportion of novel (i.e. unseen) meaning-signal pairs that the learner agent 
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2 Although there are some models which claim to have infinite meaning spaces (e.g. Kirby, 
2002a), they are infinite in virtue of containing recursive operations. At their core, they rely 
on a finite set of atomic meanings. In such models it perhaps makes more sense to quantify 
the bottleneck in terms of the number of positive training examples seen by the agent 
instead. As the experiments reported in this thesis only have finite meaning-spaces, we will 
refer to the size of the bottleneck as the proportion of meaning-signal pairs seen vs. unseen.
might have to convey is also quite realistic. Our immense productivity in language 
is one of the traits we most wish to understand, after all. 
However, leaving aside the discussion of semantic bottlenecks for a moment, it 
turns out that there are other ways in which modellers can conceptualise a 
bottleneck on language transmission. Hurford (2002) surveyed the ILM literature 
and identified at least two additional types of bottleneck to have been explicitly 
implemented in models: production bottlenecks and intake bottlenecks (Table 4.1).
type description
semantic learners encounter just a subset of possible 
meanings during acquisition
production speakers produce just a subset of possible 
utterances after acquisition
intake only a subset of meaning-signal pairs are actually 
taken in and used in acquisition
 Table 4.1: A summary of the definitions of three transmission bottlenecks discussed in Hurford 
(2002).
A production bottleneck appears as a result of choices made by the agent over 
which signal to produce in response to a given meaning. When speakers have 
acquired several different forms for a particular meaning, they must somehow 
decide which one to utter at any given moment, they cannot simply utter them all. 
An intake bottleneck on the other hand relates to the fact that not all of the 
meaning-signal pairs which are heard by a learner are actually used when it comes 
to the process of acquisition itself. Of the linguistic data to which a child is exposed, 
only a subset of it may trigger learning. We must therefore distinguish between 
input to a learner and what they take from that input (Hurford, 2002). 
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All of the models in Hurford’s review seem to actually implement these different 
types of bottleneck in parallel, albeit often only implicitly. For example, in Kirby 
(2001) there was explicit mention of how the semantic bottleneck was implemented. 
A careful reading of the text reveals however that if agents had more than one rule 
in their grammar for conveying a particular meaning, only one would be selected at 
random for production, and that any forms which already had a meaning assigned 
to them were ignored by the induction algorithm if they were seen in a different 
meaning context -- in other words, production and intake bottlenecks had also been 
incorporated implicitly into the model. 
In order to understand the individual contributions made by each type of 
transmission constraint, Hurford (2002) ran a series of simulations where 
bottlenecks were applied one at a time in a simple model of vocabulary evolution3. 
In these simulations, populations of agents learned names for a finite set of atomic 
meanings by observing other agents’ naming behaviour. If agents were prompted to 
name an unfamiliar meaning, they could invent a random signal for it, but if the 
meaning had already been encountered, they could use a remembered name. He 
discovered that when there was a semantic bottleneck but no production bottleneck 
the number of synonyms in the lexicon tended to increase. This is because at every 
round there was a fairly high chance that a novel meaning would be encountered 
for which the agent had no signal. In this situation, the agent will have to invent a 
new signal, thus increasing the number of signals associated with that meaning in 
the population as a whole. 
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3 In the end,  Hurford did not run these simulations isolating intake bottlenecks, possibly 
because there are many different possible ways to conceive of constraints operating on 
language acquisition, all of which may have different signature effects when applied in 
isolation. However, with regards to the intake bottleneck implemented in Kirby (2001), he 
concluded that it worked in that instance to prevent homonymy from arising (Hurford, 
2002). By ignoring forms they had already assigned a meaning to, agents avoided 
introducing ambiguity into their grammars. A different intake bottleneck (e.g.  only signals 
with the letter ‘a’ will be acquired by the learning mechanism) would have very different 
effect (the number of signals with the letter ‘a’ in them would rapidly increase in the next 
generation).
In contrast, when there is only a production bottleneck, but no semantic bottleneck, 
the number of synonyms decreased until there was only one signal associated with 
every meaning in the population. This works irrespective of how the production 
bottleneck is implemented (e.g. whether the agent selects the form it has heard most 
frequently, the form it has heard most recently, or one chosen at random). Again, 
this is explained by the fact that there will inevitably be chance occasions where a 
particular form is not produced by a learner. Consequently, that form will not be 
present in that learner’s output to the next generation, and over time, will disappear 
from the population altogether.
These findings present us with several intriguing ideas. First and foremost, it has 
been shown that different types of transmission bottleneck may have different 
effects on the structure of language. Secondly, these different constraints can work 
orthogonal to one another. If there is tension and trade-offs between them it means 
that we cannot take it for granted that their combined effects will simply be 
additive. If one constraint is encouraging synonymy, and the other attenuating it, 
we cannot predict in advance what the eventual outcome will be. This in turn means 
that we need to be even more certain that we design models with the right features. 
So what is the ‘right’ bottleneck to model? Is there a reason that past iterated 
learning models have tended to implicitly incorporate multiple bottlenecks?  In 
order to answer these questions we need to look more closely at where these 
bottlenecks originate: in the transmission cycle itself.
4.1.3 Bottlenecks in the Transmission Cycle
In biology it has been noted that evolution can be seen as a series of transformations 
between different types of object - for instance, the transformation of genotypes into 
phenotypes (Lewontin, 1974). It is possible to view linguistic evolution as a series of 
transformations between different types of object as well (Kirby, 1999). In fact, I 
would like to argue that we can modify this idea slightly by thinking of these 
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transformations as bottlenecks operating within different domains - the external “E-
Language” domain where language is publicly represented, and the internal “I-
Language” domain where language is privately represented in the minds of 
speakers and hearers.
The transformations that were originally identified in Kirby (1999) have been 
reproduced in Figure 4.1. I have relabelled this diagram with the different kinds of 
bottlenecks that Hurford (2002) identifies. Here, one complete cycle of transmission 
is shown, starting with a fully competent language user producing a set of 













Figure 4.1: Reproduction of a diagram showing the transformations within and between the I-
Language and E-Language domains of a speaker and a learner, taken from Kirby (1999). These 
transformations, which were originally just labelled T1, T2, T3 and T4, can actually be conceived of 
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as bottlenecks that appear through the cycle of transmission. In the I-Domain, language internalised 
in the mind of a speaker (competence) goes through a production bottleneck which determines which 
utterances get spoken and appear in the E-Domain.  This set of spoken utterances then encounters a 
semantic bottleneck, which reduces this set to just the utterances heard by a learner. These heard 
utterances then go through a processing bottleneck, which filters out any utterances that are not 
memorable/salient. Out of this information which has been spoken, heard, and remembered, only a 
subset is hypothesised to actually be used in the learning process (to develop competence in a new 
individual).
Starting with the competent language user, we find that the production bottleneck 
mediates which utterances get transferred from the I-Language domain, to the E-
Language domain. The process of production operates internally within a speaker. 
In contrast, as we have already mentioned, the semantic bottleneck is external to the 
agent. It determines which (out of a finite many) of the utterances that have been 
spoken by a language user, actually make it to the ears of a language learner. At this 
point we need to identify another kind of bottleneck, which I will call a processing 
bottleneck. This type of bottleneck covers the transformation from E-Language back 
to I-Language, whereby utterances that have actually made it to the ears of the 
learner get processed and parsed by the cognitive mechanisms that learner 
possesses4. Finally, a subset of whatever makes it through processing will eventually 
go on to trigger changes in the knowledge a learner has of language (intake). Both 
the processing and intake bottlenecks operate internally within the language learner. 
The result of all of this is the successful transmission of linguistic competence.
Of course, these bottlenecks are more than singular constraints. Instead, they are 
types of constraints. For instance, many factors influence which of the utterances that 
get spoken make it to the ears of the hearer; such as the presence or absence of noise, 
the structure of the environment (i.e. what there is to talk about), and even social 
dynamics between the speaker and hearer. Nevertheless, we can see all of these 
biases as a type of semantic bottleneck in virtue of which point it occurs at in the 
transmission cycle. Traditionally these constraints in transmission have all been 
considered to operate more or less simultaneously, as Figure. 4.2 shows.
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4 Kirby (1999) deals almost exclusively with this kind of bottleneck.
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Figure 4.2: Traditional conceptualisation of the constraints operating during linguistic transmission. 
There are many different biases all acting at the moment of transmission. However, the cycle of 
transmission itself is composed of different moments. Understanding how these moments relate to one 
another can help us to design experiments to tease these factors apart. Taken from Kirby, Brighton & 
Smith (2004).
Although they undoubtedly do all make their influence felt at some point during 
transmission, we can perhaps be more specific about exactly when this occurs. This 
in turn allows us more control in designing experiments that investigate any of 
these specific topics. Whilst it is true that we cannot remove the internal bottlenecks 
from our participants5, we can at least manipulate those bottlenecks which are 
external to the learner, and ask what influence they have on the cultural 
transmission of language. The rest of this chapter looks at this.
4.2 Experiment I: Generalisation to Novel Stimuli
Following on from our discussion of the role of bottlenecks in cultural transmission 
it should be clear that our goal here can not be to understand every bias affecting 
language. Instead, we can learn a valuable lesson from the computational 
simulation approach: by stripping away the complexities of the problem and 
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5 Although we might be able to influence them in other ways, for instance, by forcing or 
ignoring certain types of production from our participants,  or limiting their working 
memory by running distraction tasks during processing.
starting the modelling process off on a small-scale, we can come to understand what 
the essential components are and how much of the behaviour can be explained by 
the little things. We have already begun this process by creating an experimental 
framework capable of observing the evolution of simple forms and structured 
meanings in the laboratory, and breaking down the process of transmission into 
distinct stages that we can exert some experimental control over. Now it is time to 
see whether anything useful comes from this. We will start by attempting to 
replicate a common finding of computational models of iterated learning: that 
compositional structure arises when agents are forced to generalise to novel stimuli. 
4.2.1 Method
An overview of the general methodology for the experiment can be found in §3.4.2. 
This section describes the particular design used to explore what effect being 
exposed to novel (i.e. unseen) stimuli has on the structure of the resulting 
languages. As always, the experiment is interested in how structure emerges from a 
state of non-structure, and it was important that participants were unaware that 
their data would be passed on to future learners.
Aims and Experimental Hypotheses
The basic aim of the first experiment was to try to replicate the computational 
findings concerning the semantic bottleneck in a small population of human 
learners. To reiterate, ILMs with linear transmission chains and a semantic 
bottleneck in place (e.g. Kirby, 2000) tend to result in systems which are both highly 
learnable, and highly structured. In particular, it has been found that compositional 
structure emerges from an initially holistic language. That is, agents converged on a 
solution to express complex meanings by using signals where the meaning of the 
whole was derived from the meanings of signal-parts and the way they were put 
together. 
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Following from this, our expectations were as follows. If human learners were 
actually  doing the same thing as simulated agents, we should first expect that the 
languages being transmitted between human agents should become easier to learn 
toward the end of the experiment: that is, transmission error scores between learners 
should decrease as the number of generations increase. The second result we expect 
is that this decrease in transmission error should correlate with an increase in the 
amount of structure in the languages. Finally, we might also expect to see 
compositional structure emerging. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
1. The Learnability Hypothesis: Languages will become easier to learn as a result 
of iterated learning. 
2. The Structure-Increase Hypothesis: Languages will become more structured as 
a result of iterated learning.
3. The Compositionality Hypothesis: Pressure to generalise to novel stimuli will 
result in languages evolving to become compositional.
Experimental Design
In order to test these hypotheses, a series of four transmission chains, each 
consisting of ten ‘generations’ of learners, were run6. Each chain was initialised with 
a different randomly generated initial language, and all used the same structured 
3!3!3 meaning-space, as described in §3.4.2. As we wanted to try to replicate the 
computer simulations, a 50% semantic bottleneck was also implemented. Given that 
there is an odd number of meanings, this meant that each participant was trained on 
exactly 14 out of the 27 items. These training items varied between generations, and 
were selected at random anew during the off-line transmission phase of the 
previous generation. 
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6  One of the chains in this experiment (C) was actually obtained during my MSc project, 
where I piloted this framework (Cornish, 2006).
Three rounds of training were given, with each of the 14 seen items being presented 
twice within each block. In between training rounds, there was a test phase. The first 
two tests were short -- containing only 7 seen and 7 unseen items. The final test 
consisted of every single meaning. Training data for the next generation was drawn 
exclusively from this set of final responses. Figure 3.1 in §3.4.2 shows a graphical 
representation of this training-test schedule. The experiment itself was run using E-
Prime, and the statistics were analysed using R.
Participants
In total, 40 participants were recruited, primarily via an advertisement placed in the 
University of Edinburgh’s student employment service (age: M = 22.25, S.D = 2.43). 
There were 25 female participants, and 15 male participants, and each was assigned 
to a chain and a generation at random. Participants were not required to be 
monolingual English speakers, but were required to be fluent in English. In order to 
be eligible to take part, volunteers had to have normal or correct-to-normal vision, 
not be dyslexic, not have already taken part in an ‘alien language learning’ 
experiment before, and also not have formally studied linguistics. This latter 
requirement was added following piloting of the software used for presenting the 
experiment, which revealed that those with an extensive background in the formal 
analysis of linguistic systems tended to approach the task in a highly analytical way 
and were more likely to have come across the iterated learning models or have some 
idea of the research interests of the experimenter. 
Finally, participants were compensated with £5 for their time and travel costs. The 
study conformed to the ethics guidelines set by the University of Edinburgh’s 
College of Humanities and Social Science, and participants were fully briefed before 
taking part of their rights of withdrawal and anonymity.
Procedure
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Instructions were given both in writing (see Appendix A) and verbally. Participants 
were told that they would be shown a series of images and the way in which an 
alien would describe those images, and that after some time, they would be tested 
to see what they had learned. However, they were unaware that their output data 
would become training data for future learners. They were encouraged to always 
give a response, even if they were unsure “in order to maintain good relations with 
the aliens”. They were informed that there would be three rounds of training and 
testing, and that although the training items were automatically presented by the 
computer, they could pace themselves throughout all the testing phases. 
At the end of the language learning task, participants were given a short 
questionnaire to fill in detailing what they thought the experiment was about, how 
they approached the task of learning the language, how they thought the language 
worked, and at what point (if any) they became aware that they were being tested 
on items that they had not been trained on. Finally, once this data had been 
collected, participants were fully debriefed about the experimental aims of the 
study. All in all, each experiment lasted no more than 35 minutes, including the 
questionnaire and debrief. The experiment was run on E-prime, and the results were 
analysed using R.
4.2.2 Results of Experiment I
Structure and Learnability Increase
In order to address our first two hypotheses, the structure and error scores were 
calculated  for every generation of each chain and are plotted in Figure 4.3 below 
(see §3.4.3 for how these measures are calculated). The graph on the left shows the z-
scores calculated from running the Mantel Test with 10,000 randomisations. As we 
can see, structure increases in each chain. In particular, all languages were 
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significantly structured after generation 6 (the dotted line represents the 95% 
confidence interval - subsequently, any point above that line is significant to the 
p<0.05 level or greater). The graph on the right of Fig. 4.3 shows the learnability of 
the languages in each chain in terms of the average nLD error score between 
adjacent generations. This shows a clear decrease in transmission error over time, 
with half of the chains becoming stable in the final generations.
In order to determine whether there was a significant increase in structure and 
decrease in error over the course of the whole experiment, one-tailed paired t-tests 
were run on the beginning and ends of the chains7. From the results of these it was 
possible to confirm both predictions: the languages are adapting to become 
significantly more structured over time (as shown by a mean increase in structure of 
4.763, t(3) = 3.4296, P < 0.02) and significantly more learnable over time (as shown 
by a mean decrease in transmission error between first and final generations of 
0.638, t(3) = 8.656; P < 0.002). 
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7 Two data points are missing from Chain A in Fig 4.3.left. This is because at this point the 
language had only two words in it - one for ‘blue spiralling square’ and another for 
everything else. In this situation, it does not matter which meaning the odd-signal-out is 
associated with: in terms of the degree of structure this kind of system has, the same value 
would be returned if the odd-signal-out was paired with any of the meanings. Following this 
intuition, this means that in this situation our measure of structure is undefined. The Monte 
Carlo sample (which we use to produce our z-score) contains no variation on account of 
every possible ordering being equally likely. The t-test for structure was therefore run using 
the score for generation 8 instead of 10 for that chain. 
Figure 4.3.  Graph showing the structure (left) and normalised error (right) scores by generation,  of 
four transmission chains where a 50% data bottleneck was present. These results indicate that 
languages are becoming significantly more structured and easier to learn over time. Points above the 
dotted line (left) represent significant structural regularities between meaning-signal mappings. This 
graph has been remade from Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) with 10,000 Monte-Carlo 
randomisations instead of 1,000. 
This begs the question of exactly how the languages are changing to do that. In 
computer simulations, the presence of a semantic bottleneck  encourages systems to 
arise that are compositional. Have the languages in the experiments evolved to 
become compositional as well? 
Reduction of Signal Types
If we examine the total number of distinct signals used at each generation, we find 
that this cannot be the case. Table 4.2 shows that this number decreases both rapidly 
and dramatically across all chains. If the languages were perfectly compositional, 
there would be 27 distinct signals for each of the 27 distinct meanings. However, 
although it is tempting to conclude that this decrease in the number of strings can 
explain the reduction in error seen earlier -- as having fewer strings to learn makes 
the process of recall easier -- the presence of the semantic bottleneck means this 
cannot be the case. Remember that participants are only being trained on half of the 































meaning-signal pairs. In order to achieve perfect transmission (which some chains 
do), this entails that there is intergenerational agreement on the signals to be used 
on unseen meanings. Even if we only have a handful of distinct signals to 
remember, it is not obvious how this alone would help bypass the constraints 
imposed by our transmission bottleneck. 
generation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
chain A 27 17 9 6 5 4 4 2 2 2 2
chain B 27 17 15 8 7 6 6 6 5 5 4
chain C 27 24 8 6 6 5 6 5 5 5 5
chain D 27 23 9 10 9 11 7 5 5 4 4
Table 4.2: Table showing the number of distinct signal strings found in the languages of each 
generation for four chains. This number decreases very quickly over time, resulting in just a handful 
of unique signals at the end of the experiment.
Systematic Underspecification: An Adaptation
In order to understand what is going on we need to move away from quantitative 
analyses of the languages, and start examining them qualitatively. Table 4.3 shows 
the final language from one of the chains resulting in a stable language. Each cell in 
the table shows the signal used for each individual meaning, with motion and shape 
features indicated in the corresponding row names, and the colour feature being 
represented by column. As we would expect given Table 4.2, instead of a one-to-one 
mapping between meanings and signals, we find ambiguity. However, the 
meanings are not just underspecified by the signals, they are systematically 
underspecified by them. In a way, systematic underspecification is a type of 
categorisation. Although there are just five signals, there is a regular pattern in the 
way those five signals get assigned to the meanings. In this particular case all 
spiralling objects are called ‘poi’, all horizontally moving objects are called ‘tuge’, 
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and there is a three way distinction between bouncing objects based on the shape of 
that object: squares are ‘tupim’, circles are ‘miniku’, and triangles are ‘tupin’.
Clearly the fact that this system persists completely unchanged for the final three 
generations indicates that it is well adapted to the problem of being faithfully 
transmitted. Rather than treating the ambiguity as in instance of homonymy or 
synonymy though, it is possible that the meaning-space itself is changing along with 
the language. Support for this theory comes directly from the post-test reports of 
learners exposed to this particular system. According to the participant at 
generation 9 of this chain: “the aliens don’t seem to care about colour”. For this 
learner, although he could clearly perceive that the meanings varied along three-
dimensions, the signals themselves forced him to reinterpret that assumption. By 
rationalising that the aliens were colour-blind, he realised that there were in fact, 
only two dimensions to keep track of.
Table 4.3: A table showing the final language from a stable system in Experiment I (Chain C). The 
meanings in this language are systematically underspecified by the signals. This system  easily 
survives the transmission bottleneck by effectively reducing the number of meanings to just five: 
things that move horizontally; things that spiral; bouncing squares; bouncing circles; and bouncing 











the five emergent categories surviving are high. This table has been redrawn from Kirby,  Cornish & 
Smith (2008) with permission.
So how does this actually make the language easier to learn? By dropping a 
meaning feature like colour (and in the case of spiralling and horizontally moving 
objects, shape also) the system has not only decreased the number of salient features 
to be differentiated by name, it has also effectively increased the number of possible 
tokens of each ‘type’ or category of meaning. To explain, there is only one token of a 
horizontal black square, but there are three tokens of a horizontal square, and nine 
tokens of something horizontal. By increasing the number of tokens for a given 
meaning, you increase the frequency and likelihood of it passing through the 
semantic bottleneck to be reproduced by the next generation. Systematic 
underspecification therefore appears to be a powerful adaptation, perhaps 
explaining why it appears to some extent in all four chains. We will return to this 
notion in more detail later in the discussion, but for now, we can ask ourselves how 
it is exactly that systems like this come to arise. 
The Evolution of Signal Forms
One of the exciting things about iterated language learning experiments is that we 
are able to live the diachronic linguist’s fantasy: we have a continuous and complete 
record of the utterance acquisition and production history of every speaker in a 
language, and we can use this to find the early origins of synchronic features of the 
language. For instance, if we examine the history of the language shown in Table 4.3 
we can trace the changes each and every signal underwent over time. If we pick one 
of the signals in the final generation, for instance, ‘miniku’ (meaning ‘bouncing 
circles’) we can follow its ancestry right back to a variant in the original input: 
‘miniki’, meaning a horizontal blue square. This form was altered to ‘miniku’ by the 
very first learner, again to refer to a horizontal blue square. It wasn’t until 
generation 4 that this signal became associated exclusively with bouncing objects, 
but then it was mostly used for bouncing triangles. By generation 7 it was being 
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used for nearly all bouncing items, but at generation 8 it appeared in its current role, 
referring exclusively to bouncing circles (see Appendix B1). 
These historical changes over time can be more succinctly represented visually in a 
coalescent tree (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, 2009). These trees are used extensively in 
evolutionary biology to show relationships of descent amongst phylogenies (Barton, 
2007; Hein, Scherup & Wiuf, 2005). One potential issue is how we determine 
relationships of descent in this instance. The ‘miniku’ example was fairly trivial to 
analyse, as the signal itself underwent almost no changes and could be traced back 
to a variant in the initial signal-set by virtue of a common meaning. However, not 
every signal will be this free of noise. We have already seen that the mappings 
themselves, between signals and meanings, are adapting to transmission constraints 
and are therefore highly changeable. Given that our goal is only to trace the 
evolution of signal forms over time, and not the mappings, we need to factor out the 
mappings from our analysis entirely8.
How then are we to proceed? We need to start by making some simplifying 
assumptions. The first is that a learner’s representation of a particular form is 
potentially influenced by any of the forms that they have seen during training, and 
not just the target one. The second, is that in cases where we see exact replication of 
a signal, we can confidently assume a relationship of descent exists, and in cases 
where we see only similarity with other signals, we can only assume a possible 
relationship of descent. Although we can operationalise this similarity 
algorithmically (for instance, by only classifying signals that are above a certain nLD 
threshold as being in a possible relationship of descent), in this experiment the 
signal-sets are actually small enough to analyse by hand9. Figure 4.4 shows a 
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8 If we do not then we are simply reproducing the data in the way it is shown in Appendix 
B1, which tells us which signals were used for which meaning and how that changes over 
time, but tells us nothing about how new signals are innovated or altered.
9 Multiple coders can be used, and measures of inter-rater reliability taken to control for any 
effects of coding bias. Given the fact that we are making similarity judgements with a 
maximum of just 14 strings, just one coder was used on this data.
coalescent tree generated for chain A from the first experiment. Undisputed 
relationships of descent are shown by solid lines, whereas possible relationships are 
indicated by dotted lines. Obviously only seen items (shown in bold) could 
influence the language of future generations10. 
From the tree we can see that there is initially a lot of variation and innovation going 
on, with very little faithful transmission, as evidenced by the number of dotted lines 
indicating possible relationships of descent. At this early stage in the history of the 
language, the transmission process seems to principally involve the generation of 
new signals out of recombinations of signal parts. Rather than witnessing the 
replication of whole signals, we see replication of bigrams and larger n-grams in 
new configurations. For example, in the first generation we find the signals ‘lepa’ 
and ‘pali’ arising. These signals were both present as substrings within a seen signal 
in the initial language: ‘lepali’. In addition to finding innovations resulting from the 
loss of signal elements, we also see innovations arising from blends. For instance, 
the appearance of ‘nepi’ in the third generation appears to be the result of a mixture 
of ‘nemi’ and ‘nepa’.
After this brief flurry of innovation, we quickly see a ‘core’ set of signals developing. 
This occurs from around generation three onwards. One thing that is particularly 
noticeable in this tree is the strong effect of ‘frozen accidents’ (Gell-Mann, 1994). A 
frozen accident is essentially a chance event which has far-reaching consequences 
for the future. We can see this when, for instance, the random selection of seen items 
causes signals to be completely lost from the system. Importantly, this occurs 
irrespective of whether those signals appeared particularly frequently in the 
populations before they were selected.
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10 Those with keen eye-sight will notice a curious example in Fig. 4.4 whereby an unseen 
item - ‘nemi’ - was nevertheless perfectly reproduced by the second learner. This is not a 
graphing error, but is a phenomenon that occurs several times in the data. Although it is 
unusual to see it in the very first generation, there is nothing particularly miraculous about 
its appearance here: two other seen signals just happened to be very similar to it (‘nemine’ 
and ‘lemi’). 
Why is this important? Well, in this instance we can think of numerosity as a proxy 
for the fitness of each signal. Their suitability as signals has been tested by past 
learners, and their frequency has actually increased. If two signals are equally fit 
(frequent), and one gets selected and ends up heavily influencing the system in the 
future whilst the other does not, then we must conclude that this is an instance of a 
historical accident. It was not the case that one signal was better suited to be passed 
on, it was just a chance event that led one to propagate, and the other to become 
extinct. On the other hand, if two signals were not equally fit, and the fitter one 
went on to affect the future language, this would instead be an instance of cultural 
selection. We see examples of both processes at work here: for instance, the loss of 
‘lepa’ and the survival of ‘nemene’ in generation 2 appear to be the product of 
chance; whereas the relative success of ‘maho’ over ‘mapo’ in generation 1 might be 
better construed as cultural selection. Crucially, however it is the random 
application of the bottleneck that would seem to be most responsible for the steady 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In summary, we can accept both the learnability and the structure-increase 
hypotheses set forward earlier. We found that the transmission error between 
languages significantly decreased over time, and that this coincided with a 
significant increase in the amount of structure found in each language over time. 
However, both quantitative and qualitative examinations of the languages 
themselves revealed that unlike in computer simulations of iterated language 
learning, the systems did not evolve to become compositional. Instead, individual 
signals increased their chances of surviving the bottleneck by increasing their 
frequency in the languages. This came at the expense of expressing all 27 meanings, 
which meant that the meanings became underspecified by the signals. However, 
this underspecification was not indiscriminate: it was argued that a systematic 
relationship between signals and meanings still evolved, it just involved a 
reclassification of the meaning-space to describe fewer dimensions. We must 
therefore reject the compositionality hypothesis, and conclude that there is 
something slightly different going on in the human iterated language learning 
study, compared to the computational versions.
4.3 Experiment II: The Effect of Imperfect Learning
The first experiment has shown us that when there is a semantic bottleneck in place 
it creates a pressure for greater generalisation. Under such circumstances, systems 
will actually adapt to overcome the restrictions imposed by this bottleneck, and 
reorganise themselves in a systematic way. The fact that participants are being 
forced to describe novel stimuli during their final test however, makes it impossible 
for them to fully succeed at the task without some sort of structural relationship 
existing between meanings and signals. Even though the participants are not aware 
of it until the last minute (if at all), this simple experimental manipulation has made 
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a memorisation strategy completely useless. In some sense this is unfair: 
participants are being misled as to the parameters of the task they have been given, 
and the design of the experiment is such that some sort of change in the language is 
inevitable from the outset. Put another way, it is all well and good to show that 
participants generalise when faced with labelling novel stimuli, but can we be sure 
that this situation arises naturally without some reliable intervention?
In order to address this concern, a second experiment was run. This time, instead of 
only training participants on half of the language, they were exposed to all of it. This 
means that, in principle, it is now possible for a language to be memorised and 
transmitted holistically right from the beginning of the experiment. This has been 
tried before, in computational simulations of iterated learning. For instance, Smith 
(2003) clearly demonstrates that if an ILM is run with no semantic bottleneck in 
place, no cultural evolution occurs at all -- the randomly generated idiosyncratic 
signals created in the first generation are maintained throughout. This is because in 
this model, agents are perfect learners. They are capable of memorising even large 
numbers of meaning-signal pairs flawlessly. Given the fact that human memory is 
not that reliable, it is worth investigating whether this ‘memory bottleneck’ could 
play any significant role in the emergence of structure11.
4.3.1 Method
Aims and Experimental Hypotheses
Although our research question is different (instead of questioning whether the 
semantic bottleneck is capable of explaining the emergence of structure in language, 
we are now questioning whether natural human memory limitations can function in 
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11 To use to terminology outlined in §4.1.3, constraints on our memory are clearly a kind of 
processing bottleneck, affecting how much of the information that survives the semantic and 
perceptual bottlenecks actually makes it into our heads.
the same way) our experimental hypotheses remain basically the same, with one 
exception. Given that in the last experiment, the languages evolved to be 
systematically underspecified instead of compositional, we will replace the 
compositionality hypothesis with one about systematic underspecification.
1. The Learnability Hypothesis: Languages will become easier to learn as a result 
of iterated learning. 
2. The Structure-Increase Hypothesis: Languages will become more structured as 
a result of iterated learning.
3. The Systematic-Underspecification Hypothesis: Pressure arising from natural 
memory constraints will result in languages evolving to become underspecified 
in a systematic way.
Throughout, we are looking for any similarities or differences in the kind of 
languages that emerge in the first and second experiments. Because the only 
experimental difference between them is the presence or absence of the semantic 
bottleneck, we can consider them to be two contrasting conditions.  Occasionally it 
will be more convenient to refer to the two studies by condition (i.e semantic 
bottleneck (SB) or no semantic bottleneck (nSB)) instead of by name. 
Experimental design
Once again four transmission chains were set-up with new sets of initial languages, 
randomly generated and paired with the structured 3!3!3 meaning-space. These 
chains were each run for ten generations of learners. Unlike the first experiment 
however, each participant was trained on all 27 meaning-signal pairs. Training and 
testing phases were held proportional to those in Experiment I; although there were 
more training items in total, each meaning-signal pair was seen the same number of 
times (i.e. six times - twice in each of three rounds) and for the same duration (six 
seconds total) as before. Following the final test, the entire set of meaning-signal 
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pairs was transmitted to the next participant. Again, this experiment was carried out 
using E-Prime, and the results were analysed using R.
Participants
A total of 40 new participants (age: M = 21.075, S.D = 2.63) were recruited via 
another advertisement in the University of Edinburgh’s student employment 
service. From this 40, there were 24 female and 16 male participants. Eligibility 
restrictions were the same: normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no dyslexia, 
participating in an ‘alien language learning‘ experiment for the first time, fluency in 
English, and not a linguistics student. These participants were paid £5 for their time 
and travel costs, were randomly assigned to one of the four language chains, and 
were given the exact same instructions as the previous participants. All participants 
were fully briefed before taking part of their rights of withdrawal and anonymity. 
This study fully conformed to the ethics guidelines set by the University of 
Edinburgh’s College of Humanities and Social Science.
Procedure
The experimental procedure was identical to that described in §4.2.1, with the only 
difference being that there was no semantic bottleneck in place. As the participants 
were being trained on more signal-meaning pairs however, Experiment II lasted a 
bit longer: including time for filling in the questionnaires and debriefing, 
participants spent around 50 minutes on the task. 
4.3.2 Results of Experiment II
Structure and Learnability Increase
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In spite of the changes we have made to the experiment design, our hypotheses 
concerning the languages becoming more structured and easier to learn remain the 
same. To determine whether they hold, the structure and error scores were 
calculated for each language chain, and are shown in Figure 4.5 below. Overall, we 
find a similar result to the first experiment, with all chains showing statistically 
significant increases in structure (mean increase of 7.39; t(3)=9.08, P<0.001) and 
decreases in error (mean decrease of 4.45; t(3) = 4.628, P<0.005) between the first and 
last generations, as shown by one-way paired t-tests. However, the systems that 
emerged do appear to be less stable than the ones from the previous experiment. 
Only one of the four languages was perfectly transmitted, and only for one 
generation. 
Figure 4.5: Graph showing the learnability and structure scores over generations in Experiment II. 
The graph on the left shows that structure increases steadily over time (points above the dotted line 
represent z-scores significantly different from what we would expect by chance). The graph on the 
right shows transmission error (measured as nLD) decreases over time. Both graphs have been remade 
from Cornish (2010), using 10,000 Monte-Carlo randomisations instead of 1,000.
Finding less stability in the systems is in some ways counter-intuitive, as we might 
expect that once some structure had emerged in the languages, having full access to 
the data should actually facilitate acquisition. Afterall, it should be easier to detect 
structural regularities when provided with more evidence than it is with less. Of 
course, a general point can be made here concerning the fact that we only have four 































chains to base our observations upon. We cannot rule out the possibility that we 
have just been unlucky not to observe more stability in this particular instance. 
However, it could also be that there are features within the languages themselves 
which actively discourages stability from emerging. It is to this question we now 
turn.
No Change in Level of Difficulty of Task 
Perhaps the reason for instability is simply due to the fact that we are presenting the 
participants with a harder task. It is possible that even though we have kept the 
amount of training per item constant, by giving participants access to more 
meanings to learn from we have increased the cognitive load placed upon them. If 
this prevents useful structures emerging in the first place, then having extra training 
data could actually reinforce the idea that the system contains no order and slow 
down the whole process. In order to test this we can compare the learnability scores 
for the first generation of learners in the current experiment (shown in Fig.4.5.right) 
to the scores found for the first generation in the previous experiment (shown in Fig.
4.3.right). If participants are finding the task harder in the nSB condition, we would 
expect to see that reflected in their performance on the random initial languages.
For clarity, the error-scores of the first generation for the four chains in each 
condition are reproduced in Table 4.4 below. From this table we can see that there is 
not much difference between the performance of the first learner in either condition. 
Although on average we find recall to be slightly better in the nSB condition (mean 
error of 0.715 with the semantic bottleneck, and just 0.675 without), this difference 
was not found to be statistically significant (t = 0.9389, df = 3.974, p-value = 0.4012). 
This means that exposure to a greater number of meaning-signal pairs is not making 
the task more difficult for participants. 
Interestingly, the statistical test also indicates that seeing the entire language is not 
making the task of learning the system any easier either. This is surprising, as when 
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the bottleneck is in place the performance of the first participant is rigidly capped. 
In order to get error lower than the 0.5 mark, the participant would have to have 
access to the unseen meaning-signal pairs, which of course, they do not. Participants 
in the second experiment on the other hand, have no such restriction. There is 
nothing in the design of the experiment preventing them from doing much better 
than 0.5. Obviously whilst there are some talented individuals in the world who are 
capable of associating 27 randomly constructed signals with 27 unfamiliar meanings 
in the 16 minutes and 20 seconds of training time given, most individuals are not. It 
seems that no matter how many examples participants are given, on average only 
approximately 30% of it will be correctly recalled12.





Table 4.4:  Error-scores of the first learners in the semantic bottleneck (experiment 1, left) and no 
semantic bottleneck (experiment 2,  right) conditions. The differences in these scores are not 
statistically significant, indicating that the removal of the bottleneck has not made the task of learning 
the language any easier or harder.
Reduction of Signal Types
In order to determine whether languages were becoming underspecified as in 
Experiment I, we can examine the number of distinct strings again. As Table 4.5 
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12 Remember that the measure of error is based on the average recall of the whole language. 
Recalling 30% does not necessarily entail getting 30% of the signals correct. It could just as 
easily mean getting 30% of each signal correct, or some combination of perfect recall of a few 
signals and low levels of recall of parts of others.
shows, the number of distinct signal types once again decreased, but not quite to the 
same extent as previously found. In order to judge this, I ran another set of unpaired 
t-tests on these numbers, and those obtained from the first experiment (shown in 
Table 4.2) by generation. Although generations 1-8 showed no significant difference, 
in the final two generations the nSB condition had a statistically significant increase 
in the number of distinct words produced as compared to the SB condition: 
generation 9 (t(3) = 2.4804, p=0.05) and 10 (t(3) = 3.1623, p=0.02) have retained more 
signal types overall than what we witnessed in the previous experiment.
generation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
chain A 27 23 20 14 13 13 10 9 10 7 7
chain B 27 21 14 10 8 8 11 9 9 9 6
chain C 27 20 15 14 8 6 6 5 6 6 7
chain D 27 25 10 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Table 4.5: The number of distinct signal-types by generation for all chains in Experiment II. This table 
shows that there is a steady reduction in the total number of signals found in each language over time. 
However, there was a significant increase in the number of distinct signals in the final two 
generations when compared to the results of Experiment I. 
Overall we can confirm our two basic hypotheses about learning and structure-
increase, and so far have seen that removing the semantic bottleneck appears to be 
increasing the amount of variation in the systems, albeit at the expense of stability. 
Now we will look to see what a qualitative analysis of the languages in the nSB 
condition reveals.
Systematic Underspecification, Irregularity and Internal Structure
Table 4.6 shows the language which got the highest overall structure score, at 
generation 9 in chain A. From this, we can see that once again, a form of systematic 
underspecification has arisen. In the previous study, the appearance of this 
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phenomenon was explained in terms of the bottleneck on transmission encouraging 
a reduction in the size and structure of the meaning-space: this in turn increased the 
number of tokens of each meaning-type, which increased the chance of at least one 
token making it through the bottleneck. This is enough to allow the system to be 
reliably inferred by the next learner. Here it appears that the ‘memory bottleneck’ is 
doing something similar. Just as in the example shown in §4.2.3, we find that the 
colour dimension has been lost13. However, there are a number of interesting 
differences here as well.
The first thing to notice here is that the signal form used for bouncing objects 
contains a number of irregular variants -- specifically, ‘mucapo’ and ‘nukapo’. 
Although these signals all share roughly the same structure, they display variation 
in the first and second consonants. We do not find these kinds of irregulars in the 
semantic bottleneck condition (see raw data in Appendix B1). Furthermore, if we 
examine the signals associated with bouncing objects in the generations preceding 
this one, we find that this is not a one-off occurrence. The variation has actually 
persisted for some time (Table 4.7).  Even as far back as generation 4 we find the 
same basic pattern. By looking at Table 4.7 we can see that these irregulars are not 
stably associated with any specific meanings (i.e. colour or shape). To borrow an 
analogy from phonology, it appears that they are in free variation, and although 
many of these alternative variants eventually disappear over time, they do so only 
gradually.
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13  It is worth pointing out that there is no evidence in my data to suggest that there is 
something special about colour which makes it more likely to be the dimension that gets 
ignored. Of the eight chains described so far, four could be described as motion:shape 
systems (where motion was most consistently encoded, and shape a secondary 
characteristic), two were colour:motion systems, one was a motion:colour system, and one 
was undetermined. The undetermined chain was the one shown in Fig. 4.3 which had just 
one word for ‘blue spiralling square’ and another for everything else.
Table 4.6: The language with the highest structure score in Experiment II (Chain A,  generation 9). 
Although this language is systematically underspecified, there are some signs of internal structure to 
the way signals are constructed. For instance, all bouncing objects share the suffix ‘-ini’, whereas all 
objects moving towards the right have the suffix ‘-apo’. There are also irregulars present (e.g. 


















wag ni wag ni wag ni
waginini waginini waginini
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muhapo magini nucapo nucapo nukapo nucapo
nucapo mukapo mukapo mucapo mukapo nucapo
muhapo mucapo mucapo mucapo mucapo nucapo
mutapo nucapo nucapo nucapo nucapo nucapo
mukapo mugini mukapo mucapo nukapo mucapo
muckapo mucapo mukapo mukapo nucapo mucapo
mugeni mugenini nucapo nucapo nukapo nucapo
mukapo mucapo mukapo mukapo nucapo nukapo
muhapo nucapo mucapo mukapo nucapo mucapo
Table 4.7: Variation in signals associated with bouncing objects in chain A. Although there is a 
common underlying pattern here (a nasal consonant, followed by ‘u’,  followed by a non-nasal 
consonant, followed (mostly) by the sequence ‘apo’), there appears to be nothing conditioning exactly 
which variant gets used. Irregulars like these can only survive in the language when there is no 
semantic bottleneck in place.
 
The presence of irregular variants can potentially explain why there is less stability 
here than when there is a semantic bottleneck in place: having full access to the data 
allows these irregulars to survive, and complicates the learning process by making it 
necessary to memorise exceptions on a case by case basis. Although broad 
categories of signal-types may be stable over time as Table 4.7 shows, our measures 
of error are highly sensitive to even slight differences in form, obscuring the fact that 
there is actually quite a lot of continuity between generations (Cornish, 2010).
The second thing to notice about the language shown in Table 4.6 is that it appears 
there is a degree of internal structure to the signals used. Spiralling objects all 
contain the suffix ‘-ini’, whereas objects moving to the right all end in ‘-apo’. There 
also appears to be some local regularity associated with the shape of bouncing 
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items: the prefix ‘nuak-’ refers to squares, ‘wag-’ refers to circles, and ‘wagig-’ refers 
to triangles. This is exciting, as it looks as though we are starting to see evidence for 
some kind of compositionality, albeit as part of a language that is very 
underspecified. Unfortunately none of the participants from this chain reported 
being aware of any kind of prefixes or suffixes, and indeed, the language loses this 
clear structure by the next generation. 
Examining the other three chains in this condition (see Appendix B2) does not 
reveal any other cases of internal structure in regular alignment with particular 
meaning aspects, but all of the chains’ signals do show signs of being composed of 
subparts that get reused. For instance in the final generation of chain C we find the 
majority of the words have a common ending, ‘-laki’, and that the single exception 
to that pattern, ‘mano‘, is itself repeated in another signal, ‘manolaki’. We should be 
wary of getting too excited by this finding however, as the same thing occurs 
(although arguably to a lesser extent) in the languages created in the first 
experiment (Appendix B1)14. 
The Evolution of Signals
Two factors seem to differentiate the languages emerging in this condition: the 
signals contain more variation, and in addition to becoming more learnable via the 
underspecification route, at least one of the chains contains signals that have 
internal structure which unambiguously maps onto specific meaning aspects (like 
motion). We can examine how these features arise historically in the chains by 
creating another coalescent tree like in Figure 4.3. As both of these features are only 
found in one chain (A), we will continue our focused exploration of it here by 
examining the evolution of its signal forms. This coalescent tree is shown in Figure 
4.5.
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14  Recall ‘tupim’ and ‘tupin’ in the language shown in Table 4.2. Also, the final few 
generations of chain B in Appendix B1 shows considerable reuse of signal parts: ‘ninalehe’, 
‘lehe’, ‘nina’, ‘wina’, and ‘winako’ being prime examples. 
One of the first things to notice if we compare the two coalescent trees is that 
although we appear to have more variation and innovation in the nSB condition 
overall, we again see that the trend in both is for more of this early on, rather than 
later. This is in spite of the fact that earlier we only found statistically significant 
differences in the number of distinct signals in the final two generations. How can 
we explain this? It seems to boil down to a simple case of numbers. The major 
difference between the two conditions is that when we have a semantic bottleneck 
in place, even easy to learn signal types are at risk of being removed from the 
language if they are infrequent. 
The kinds of mistakes learners make during recall fall neatly into three kinds: (i) the 
learner incorrectly applies a learned signal to a different meaning and produces a 
novel mapping between meaning and signal (this is why the language becomes 
underspecified in both conditions); (ii) the learner confuses parts of different signals 
and combines them to produce a novel signal (this frequently happens early on in 
both conditions); or (iii) the learner makes a typographical error and produces a 
novel signal (this can theoretically happen at any point, but does not typically occur 
at all if the number of distinct strings is very low). The latter two error types are, by 
their very nature, low frequency additions to the system. This means that if they 
occur in the semantic bottleneck condition, they are extremely likely to be removed 
from the system almost as soon as they are created. 
Of course, this is only half of the story however. We also only see participants 
making mistakes that result in the innovation of new signal forms when there are 
enough signal types in the system to cause difficulties in learning. In the nSB 
condition, signals are lost so quickly early on that it soon becomes unlikely to even 
make a mistake in the first place. This can be seen by examining the point at which 
new signals stop being created in the two coalescent trees (i.e. where we see the last 
relationship of possible descent). In Figure 4.6 we find new signals being created 
even in the final few generations in the nSB condition, whereas in the SB condition 
(Fig. 4.4) this ceases by the third generation. The same seems to hold true of the 
133
other chains in both conditions: if we note at which point new signals stop being 
generated we find that this occurs between generations 5 and 10 in the nSB 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We can summarise these results as follows. Firstly, just as in the previous study, we 
can confidently accept both the learnability and the structure-increase hypotheses 
on the basis of significant decreases in transmission error between languages, and 
significant increases in the amount of structure found in each language over time. 
Furthermore, we can also accept the systematic underspecification hypothesis, as 
languages in this experiment adapt to be learnable by encoding fewer dimensions of 
meaning. However, in spite of these similarities, there were also some differences 
between the languages constrained only by limitations in human memory, and those 
constrained by an external semantic bottleneck. First among these is the stronger 
persistence of variation -- both in terms of a greater number of distinct signal types, 
and also irregularity. Secondly, one of the chains evolved a language that was not 
only systematic in the way it was underspecified, but also had internal structure 
that was regularly aligned with some aspects of meaning. Suffixes regularly 
expressed different types of motion (spiralling vs. movement-to-the-right), and for 
some meanings, shape was locally encoded as a prefix. 
4.4 Discussion of Experiments I and II
This section discusses the implications of the results of the first two experiments in a 
little more detail. The key point to note is that we see structure emerging as an 
adaptive response to any kind of bottleneck on the process of transmission. These 
studies extend previous computational results by demonstrating that the presence 
of a semantic bottleneck is not essential in order for cultural transmission to become 
adaptive (Cornish, 2010). Instead, all that is required for adaptation is imperfect 
information. Whilst the actual source of that imperfect information (i.e. natural 
limitations on human memory, or restricted exposure to data encountered in the 
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world) is unimportant for the emergence of structure in general, it might play a role 
in shaping what that structure looks like. In other words, the dynamics of cultural 
transmission are as important as the mechanisms constraining it in accounting for 
the emergence of a specific system. 
As a case in point, we have seen how the loss of variation early on inhibits the 
generation of signal innovations. Whilst this does encourage more stability in the 
resultant languages, it also leads to features which seem less useful for the task of 
communication (i.e stability in this case comes at the expense of being able to 
unambiguously identify more of the meanings in the meaning-space). In short then, 
one of the main findings to emerge from these two studies is that the principle of 
linguistic adaptation holds true in a population of human learners. Structure is the 
inevitable result of transmission with constraints. Whatever emerges will be 
adapted to those constraints, but perhaps more tellingly, to those constraints only. 
Given that there was no explicit pressure on the systems to create unambiguous 
mappings between meanings and signals, we should perhaps not be too surprised 
to find that systems with those qualities do not naturally ‘fall out’ of the process. 
This is an issue we will be turning our attention to in the next chapter. 
The second point to note concerns the differences between the two experiments: 
although the languages in both studies are adapting to fit the learning biases of the 
human participants, the semantic bottleneck in the first experiment additionally 
inhibits the survival of signals at random. This has some interesting implications. In 
the second experiment, the only processes occurring during transmission are 
selective -- for greater salience, learnability, cohesion with other words, relationship 
to the meanings, etc. Whilst this kind of cultural selection of signals fitting these 
constraints is still present in the first experiment, the effect of the semantic 
bottleneck is subtly different. 
In some sense, the action of the semantic bottleneck equates to what biologists 
would call neutral selection without innovation. This process has been used in 
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biology to explain how traits in a population can rapidly change over time and 
fixate on one particular variant, without that variant being connected with any 
enhancement of fitness for the organism (Nettle, 1999). Rather than being about 
Herbert Spencer’s term, ‘survival of the fittest’, neutral drift is about ‘survival of the 
luckiest’ (Kimura, 1989). Models have shown that given a population of variants 
that are not under selection for any particular trait, and a random policy of removal 
of those variants steadily over time, taking this process to its logical extreme will 
result in one variant taking over entirely (Cavalli-Sforza, 2000; Nettle, 2009). In fact, 
this is very nearly what we found in one of our chains (A) in the first experiment. 
In sum, whilst there is there is a only a one stage process of cultural selection (for, 
amongst other things, signals that are more easily acquirable) in Experiment II, there 
is a two stage process in Experiment I. First the semantic bottleneck removes items 
at random, and then cultural selection prunes what is left. This explains the 
difference in the amount of variation in each condition.
 
How are we to interpret the findings here? In some sense it is disappointing that we 
did not find more evidence of compositional structure here. That is not to say, 
however, that the structure we did find is not in itself ‘language-like’. In fact, we 
find that underspecification is actually rife in natural language. As an example, we 
can consider the case of common nouns. Unlike proper nouns which pick out 
unique referent in the world, common nouns refer to entities of a general type. 
Something similar appears to be happening in the languages arising over the course 
of the transmission chains in these experiments. Rather than picking out every 
potential meaning to be distinguished, it seems that more general categories of 
meanings are forming. In a sense, the signals are acting as a cue to participants to 
lump together meanings with similar features15. This (re)categorisation of the 
meaning-space appears to be part of what gets transmitted to the next generation. 
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15 Recall the comment from one of the learners in the first experiment about how the aliens 
did not seem to see colour (§4.2.2).
In order to explore how language and cultural transmission interacts with 
categorisation in more detail, Matthews (2009) (see also Matthews, Kirby & Cornish, 
2010) used this experimental framework to investigate how signals evolve in a 
world with continuous meanings. Instead of having discrete, finite meanings, this 
study explored what would happen if human participants were trained on signals 
paired with meanings whose features varied along continuous dimensions. Using 
morphing software, the dimensions of shape and orientation were manipulated to 
create a meaning-space where horizontal triangles mutated into vertical rectangles, 
and vertical triangles mutated into horizontal rectangles. This created 100 different 
meanings, each of which was only very slightly different to its neighbouring 
meanings.
Initial languages were randomly constructed, and participants were given a subset 
of training items to learn, drawn from the meaning-space at random. During the test 
phase, they were asked to provide signals for another subset of meanings, again 
drawn at random. These meanings were almost certainly not the same as those that 
they had seen in training, yet nevertheless, their output was recorded and 
transmitted to the next generation. Using a control set of items that participants 
were always asked to name after they had produced the new language for the next 
learner, Matthews (2009) demonstrated that the signals began to partition the 
meaning space up in different ways. The languages in this study were structured by 
categorising similar meanings with similar strings. Furthermore, there was 
interesting variation between transmission chains as to how this partitioning was 
achieved.  Not only were signals and category boundaries transmitted between 
generations, but the very notion of how ‘similarity’ was defined also got culturally 
transmitted. For instance, some chains were blind to the rotation of the objects, and 
would classify objects as similar if they were the same basic shape in a different 
orientation, whereas other chains classified objects in different orientations as being 
dissimilar.
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It is interesting that in Experiments I and II we find that structure also emerged via 
categorisation. As categorisation underlies linguistic properties like 
compositionality and recursion, this makes these initial results appear a little more 
encouraging. Taking another perspective, let us think for a moment about how well 
the systems that emerged would function in a communicative context. Participants 
at the beginning have very little chance of successfully communicating any of the 
meanings to another learner. Participants at the end would be able to convey quite a 
few meanings reliably, but certainly not all 27. Although we did not find robust 
signs of compositionality emerging like the simulations did, these results are at least 
suggestive of the idea that features of language that are useful for communication 




Language Adapts to be 
Expressive
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first two experiments described in the previous chapter have shown that 
language adapts to all and only those constraints being placed upon them1. In these 
studies, the only pressure being put upon the systems is to be learnable. As a result, 
the languages adapt in ways that suit this outcome. However, some of the structural 
features that emerge from this process, such as the widespread underspecification of 
the meanings, although well attested in natural language, do not seem particularly 
suited for communication. A potential reason for this stems from the fact that there 
is no pressure constraining the languages to uniquely express all of the meanings. 
This raises an interesting question: if we build in a pressure for expressivity, will we 
find compositional structures better suited for communication emerging? This is 
what the experiments in this chapter aim to find out2. Before we begin, we should 
perhaps spend a moment thinking about what we mean by ‘expressivity’.
Expressivity relates to the ability of signals to differentiate meanings within a 
language. As such, it is also related to the amount of variation in a system, and also 
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1 This includes not only the external constraints being manipulated in the experiment itself 
(i.e the semantic bottleneck), but also those cognitive constraints internal to the learner. 
2 The results reported in this chapter have also appeared in several publications, including 
Cornish (2010), Cornish et al. (2009), Kirby et al. (2008a) and Kirby et al. (2008b).
to the number of distinct signals. It is different to the kinds of distinctiveness 
requirements hypothesised to drive song creativity in certain species of birds 
(Marler, 1957; Ptacek, 2000), because that implies that the signals themselves must 
be dissimilar from one another or from the signals produced by other vocalisers. 
This is not the case with an expressivity requirement: here, all signals must do is be 
able to express all of the meanings that a speaker wishes to convey in such a way 
that a hearer can easily recover those meanings. We might, therefore, expect a 
language which is fully expressive to have one-to-one mappings between signals 
and meanings, and contain little or no redundancy or ambiguity3.
In the case of natural language, the ability for signals to unambiguously differentiate 
between possible meanings comes directly from the pressures of communication 
itself.  Since one of our aims is to explicitly investigate whether we can observe the 
nonintentional emergence of language-like structures in humans, we will have to 
find some other way of encouraging expressivity in our experiments. The next 
section discusses ways we can possibly achieve this.
5.1 The Expressivity Requirement
If we take a closer look at various iterated learning models, it turns out that they all 
have an expressivity requirement built in somewhere4. Even in ILMs which purport 
to have no meaning-space at all (e.g. Teal & Taylor, 2000; Zuidema, 2003), the 
algorithms insist that agents must continue creating signals until they have satisfied 
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3  In reality, we know that human language is not nearly so perfect. Given that 
communication occurs over a noisy channel and involves making generalisation inferences 
over imperfect data, some degree of ambiguity and redundancy is actually hypothesised to 
be adaptive, and perhaps even the inevitable outcome of processes of iterated learning 
(Hoefler, 2006). Also, we should not underestimate the role of pragmatics and context as a 
disambiguator in real world communication. 
4 See Cornish (2005) for more discussion of this phenomenon, and an example of a small ILM 
study that shows how even initially highly structured and varied input degrades rapidly 
without the pressure to maintain a minimum degree of expressivity.
a minimum level of expressivity. If we take the model by Zuidema (2003:55) for 
instance, we find that this requirement is controlled by a parameter, E:
“To avoid insufficient expressiveness, we also extend the 
generalization step with a check if the number EG of different 
strings the grammar G can recognize is larger than or equal 
to E. If not, E-EG random new strings are generated and 
incorporated in the grammar.”
Examining the results, Zuidema (2003:56) further notes that “after an initial phase of 
over-generalisation, the expressiveness remains close to its minimally required 
level”. Let us contrast this for a moment with what was going on in Experiment I. 
Humans, unlike the computer agents, were given only one chance to produce a 
signal for a given meaning. They were not forced to continue to produce an output 
until they had produced 27 distinct signals. 
In some ways it is surprising that participants do not seem to do this naturally. 
Several studies have investigated the claim that humans have a one-to-one mapping 
bias, and found it to be rather robust (e.g Slobin, 1977; Haiman, 1980; Macnamara, 
1982). When children learn a new word, studies have revealed that they make 
several assumptions when trying to identify the correct referent from a context. In 
addition to preferences for whole, rather than parts of objects, attention goes 
initially towards those objects which are unnamed: children never instinctively 
assume that a referent has more than one name (Markman & Wachtel, 1988). 
In a discussion on learning biases implemented within the ILM, Smith (2003) makes 
explicit mention of one-to-one mapping biases: the models do not naively include 
an expressivity constraint by accident, it is there to model known human biases. The 
results of the experiments in Chapter 4 are therefore potentially of wider interest as 
they reveal that participants are happy to over-ride this learning bias given the right 
circumstances during cultural transmission.
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5.2 Experiment III: Adding an Expressivity Constraint
There are many ways we could go about introducing an expressivity constraint. One 
method that we have already discussed would be to force participants to keep 
producing utterances until they have produced 27 distinct ones (§5.1). There are 
several reasons why this is not an ideal way to enforce expressivity. The first is 
methodological. How do we decide which meanings to show to participants again? 
Do we show them all?  What if a participant responds to a given meaning differently 
each time we present it? How do we decide which of the signals to transmit to the 
next generation in this case? 
The second issue is one of preserving the integrity of participants belief in what the 
task is about. We want to make sure that participants are unaware that they are 
changing the language5. We would have to find some way of justifying why we 
were continuing to prompt learners for responses if we wanted to maintain this 
illusion. Of course, we could just tell participants that they had used the incorrect 
signal, but this leads to more methodological issues. If a participant makes a 
genuine mistake and uses the wrong signal for a meaning early in the test, when the 
real meaning appears later on and they try to use the signal that they know to be 
correct they will be (falsely) told that they are wrong. This would be both confusing 
and demoralising. Note we cannot just keep prompting them until they produce 
exactly the same responses as the previous generation, as (a) this would lead to no 
change in the system, and (b) they may only have seen half the data.
The effect that we are finding when there is no pressure for expressivity is that it 
leads to an increase in the number of homonyms in the language: signals become 
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5 This goes back to our attempts to design an empirical framework suitable to investigating 
what Croft (2000) describes as nonintentional mechanisms of change (§3.3). If participants 
believe the task is about anything other than reproducing the data they have been given as 
faithfully as possible, then we can no longer be sure we are seeing changes that : “happen as 
a consequence of the act of production” (Croft: 2000:65).
associated with more than one meaning, and this leads to ambiguity in the system. 
Although it turns out that this is exactly what we should predict given the 
transmission constraints imposed, if we want to model the emergence of an 
expressive language we need to find a way to handle the ambiguity that this 
introduces. We have actually already seen another way to handle the introduction of 
ambiguity in computational simulations of iterated language learning (§4.1.2). In 
Kirby (2001), ambiguity is prevented from accumulating in the system by the 
learning agents being programmed to ignore any signals for which they already 
have meanings for. If agents later see the same signal paired with another meaning, 
they are prevented from adding that mapping to their grammars. Obviously, we 
cannot prevent our human learners from associating signals with multiple meanings 
in this way.  We can, however, ignore repeated signals on our participants behalf by 
choosing to not select them during transmission (see §3.4.2). In other words, we 
cannot prevent learners from introducing ambiguity into their output, but we can 
prevent it from featuring in their input.
We can refer to this process as filtering (see Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). What this 
amounts to is the idea that learners only learn from novel signals. Note that this is 
actually quite a realistic assumption: if a learner hears a signal that they think they 
already know the meaning for, they are unlikely to actually check to see whether the 
signal actually matches up with the meaning that they believe is intended. They will 
parse it and move on. If they hear a novel signal on the other hand, they will always 
check to see what it could possibly relate to in the world. Due to the way meanings 
and signals are always presented together, participants in the studies are always 
made aware of any underspecification of the meanings, therefore intervention to 
correct this is, I believe, justified6.
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6 It would be interesting in the future to test whether this is the case using this experimental 
framework. One manipulation we could explore might involve giving participants the 
choice of whether to ‘inspect’ a meaning or not. If they were also given either a time-limit or 
a limit on the number of inspections they could make over the course of learning, we would 
predict that learners would limit their choice of when to check up on the meaning of a signal 
to only those cases where they encounter a novel utterance. 
The way the filtering process was implemented was as follows. experiment 
proceeds as normal until the transmission phase. Recall that it is at this point that 
meaning-signal pairs are selected to be transmitted to the next generation. In the 
case where there is no semantic bottleneck in place, this phase involves no real 
selection or transformation of the data7 -- the entire output simply gets passed on 
from the previous learner. When there is a semantic bottleneck in place however, a 
subset of meaning-signal pairs are randomly chosen to be transmitted. It is after this 
selection procedure that the expressivity filter applies. If any training items contain 
homonymous signals, all but one (selected at random) is removed from the subset to 
be given to the next learner. 
The expressivity filter does create one issue; namely that the removal of homonyms 
after the semantic bottleneck has been applied means that participants are no longer 
guaranteed to receive 14 items in their training input. Two strategies were 
considered for ensuring that the number of training items remained constant, but 
ultimately, both were rejected. The problem is that they introduce selection biases 
into the experiment. For example, the first strategy that was considered involved 
removing homonyms from the language before the bottleneck applied. This plan was 
rejected for two reasons. Firstly, it would not work when learners had fewer than 14 
unique signals in their whole output. Of course, if this was the case, one suggestion 
might be to use this criterion (at least 14 unique signals) as a benchmark for rejecting 
that participant, and try training a new learner on the same data in hopes that they 
might recall more items. Note that this is equivalent to selecting learners with above 
average recall ability, which is something that we did not do in our previous 
experiments. 
The second reason for rejecting the strategy of applying filtering before the 
bottleneck relates to the effect it has on the selection of meanings. Currently 
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7 Technically, even when there is no semantic bottleneck in place there is still selection of 
training-items, which ensures that the new learner receives them in a different order to that 
in which they were produced.
meanings are selected at random. This models the idea that we are motivated to 
communicate about things that just happen to be going on in the world around us. 
If we switch the order of the two processes (filtering and selection of meanings to 
convey) then the world is no longer our random guide. The world is suddenly 
under pressure to only present us with a subset of meanings that are related by the 
(fairly arbitrary) fact of having a unique signal. To clarify, when filtering follows the 
bottleneck, every meaning is equally likely to be selected to be transmitted. if 
filtering precedes the bottleneck however, some meanings are more likely to be 
selected than others simply because they are expressed with a novel signal. As 
appearing in a learner’s training input is highly correlated with being faithfully 
acquired (and therefore, with the preservation of the distinctiveness of the signals), 
these meanings are likely to be continually sampled again, and again, and again. 
Eventually we will just see the transmission of the same 14 meanings with just 
minor variations in their signals.
The second strategy that was considered does not fare much better. This idea 
involved actively replacing repeated signals with a novel one. Two options for 
implementing this were debated. The first was inspired by ILMs like Zuidema 
(2003), who had agents randomly construct novel signals when they had run out of 
unique learned signals. The first issue with this approach is that it is clearly not the 
natural response of our learners. It is therefore unclear what creating a random 
signal string corresponds to in real-life. The second issue relates to the fact that the 
signals in a given system at any point in time are there because they share a 
common history. They have evolved together and have the features that they do in 
virtue of this fact8. If we start introducing completely novel signals at later points, 
those signals will, (i) be recognisably different, and (ii) have a potentially disruptive 
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8 We have already seen this clearly in the coalescent trees in the previous chapter (§4.2.2 and 
§4.3.2), which show how signals evolve over time as a result of descent with modification.
influence on the language9. It is as if we were undoing all of the evolution of that 
particular meaning-signal pair, and resetting it to generation zero. A less extreme 
alternative that was considered was to replace the signal that was filtered out with 
the last novel signal that a previous participant in the chain had produced10. In the 
worst case scenario this is equivalent to generating a new random signal as it might 
involve going back to the original form in the initial language. However, more often 
than not this might involve only stepping back a few generations. Whilst this would 
be less noticeably disruptive than random invention, it still has the problem of 
destroying lines of inheritance.
In summary, the two options that I considered for ensuring that participants always 
received 14 items in their training input were to either (a) apply the filtering process 
before the bottleneck, or (b) to replace those repeated signals that got removed with 
an alternative. Both of these strategies were found to introduce selection pressures 
not found in the previous experiments; for either learners with better recall, or for 
just a subset of meanings having distinct signals; or else they interrupted the 
evolution of signal forms themselves. Given this, it seems that the correct course of 
action is to accept that learners might sample from fewer meaning-signal pairs 
during training. Not only does this more closely replicate processes occurring in 
some ILMs (e.g. Kirby, 2001), but it also maintains greater continuity with the 
previous experiments. Both this and the fact that the filtering technique also has the 
added advantage of being invisible from the point of view of the learner, will be 
especially important for comparing this study to the studies in the previous chapter.
5.2.1 Method
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9 The results of Zuidema (2003) show that given an extremely large number of generations, 
these issues will ‘wash out’ over time. However, given that we have practical limitations on 
the number of generations we can run, these concerns are important.
10 To clarify, we mean that the signal is novel with respect to the current generation, and not 
necessarily novel with respect to the generation of origin.
The same basic methodology described in §3.4 was used in this experiment, 
however, this time we added in a pressure to express meanings uniquely. Because 
the experiment with the semantic bottleneck was slightly more economical to run in 
terms of time, and most ILMs include a semantic bottleneck, we use one here as 
well.
Aims and Experimental Hypotheses 
We want to find out whether adding an expressivity constraint to the task 
encourages compositional structures to emerge. Our hypotheses are therefore 
almost identical to those in the first experiment (§4.2), but with one slight 
modification: instead of predicting that compositional structure will emerge as the 
result of pressure to generalise to novel stimuli, it is predicted that we also need a 
pressure for expressivity. The three hypotheses have been reproduced below.
1. The Learnability Hypothesis: Languages will become easier to learn as a result 
of iterated learning. 
2. The Structure-Increase Hypothesis: Languages will become more structured as 
a result of iterated learning.
3. The Compositionality Hypothesis: Pressure to generalise to novel stimuli 
combined with a pressure to uniquely express each meaning will result in languages 
evolving to become compositional.
Experimental Design
Four initial languages were randomly generated to seed each chain11. Each chain 
was run for ten generations, and had both a semantic bottleneck in place as well as 
filtering. This meant that participants were trained on around 50% of meaning-
signal pairs and all meaning-signal pairs represented a unique one-to-one 
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11 One of the chains in this experiment (D) was actually obtained during my MSc project, 
where this framework was piloted (Cornish, 2006).
mapping12 . The training and test procedures were identical to those outlined in 
Experiment I, with three rounds of training, each followed by a test round. Only the 
signals produced for meanings in the final test were transmitted to the next learner. 
The experiment was run using E-Prime software, and the results were analysed 
using R.
Participants
Another 40 participants were recruited via an advertisement at the University of 
Edinburgh’s student employment services to take part in this study, of which 18 
were male and 22 were female. They had an average age of 22.75 (S.D = 4.53), and 
were each offered £5 for their participation. Participants were assigned to a 
generation and chain at random, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
were fluent English speakers, not dyslexic, and had not participated in any of the 
previous studies or taken courses in linguistics before. The study conformed to the 
ethics guidelines set by the University of Edinburgh’s College of Humanities and 
Social Science, and participants were fully briefed before taking part of their rights 
to withdraw from the experiment at any time, and that their participation and 
results would remain anonymous.
Procedure
The training procedure was identical to that of the first experiment. Training items 
were displayed in a random sequence on a monitor for six seconds each. Every 
training item was seen six times over three rounds of training - twice per round. 
During testing phases participants were shown meanings and given an unlimited 
time to provide the correct signal associated with that meaning. No explicit 
feedback was given to participants during training or testing, and participants 
remained unaware of the true purpose of the study until after they had completed 
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12 A retrospective analysis revealed that on average, participants in this study were actually 
trained on 12 items (44% of the data), instead of 14. 
training and testing, filled out a questionnaire about their experiences, and been 
debriefed about the true purpose of the experiment.
5.2.2 Results of Experiment III
Structure and Learnability Increase
We can apply our measures of structure and transmission error once more to get a 
general overview of what is happening to the languages over time. As Figure 5.1.left 
demonstrates, we find that all four chains show significant levels of structure by the 
second generation, and a general trend for these levels to increase over time 
thereafter, whilst Figure 5.1.right indicates a steady decrease in the amount of 
transmission error between learners over time. Paired t-tests on the structure scores 
obtained in the initial and final generations confirm that the increase was 
statistically significant (as shown by a mean increase in structure of 6.77, t(3) = 2.535, 
P<0.04), and examination of the transmission error scores reveals a similar story. 
Languages are significantly more learnable by the final generation than they are at 
the start (mean decrease in error of 0.43, t(3) = 8.056, P<0.002).
Figure 5.1: Structure and learnability increase over generations in all four transmission chains in the 
filtered condition. Languages become significantly more structured over time (left) , whilst 































transmission error between adjacent generations significantly decreases (right). Redrawn from Kirby, 
Cornish & Smith (2008) using 10,000 randomisations instead of 1,000.
 
The language produced by the final generation of chain B is notably an exception to 
this general pattern. Not only are the levels of structure negligible for this learner, 
but examination of the error scores (Fig. 5.1.right) reveal a sharp spike, indicating 
that the language has undergone a lot of change. Visual inspection of the language 
in question suggests that a possible reason for this is a combination of the random 
application of the semantic bottleneck, which removed a few of the more key 
exemplars required for inferring the structure of horizontally moving objects in 
particular (see Appendix B3), and a slightly poorer than average recall of seen items 
by the individual learner in question. As an example, the learner at generation 10 
reproduced only two items perfectly, compared to the previous three learners who 
on average reproduced six items perfectly. Individual variation in recall ability is to 
be expected of course, although we should predict that as chains are run for longer, 
this should have less of a de-stabilising impact.  
Pressure for Expressivity Increases Signal Types
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, our pressure for greater 
expressivity is indirect and quite subtle. One thing we need to determine is therefore 
whether our manipulation has actually had any noticeable effects. In other words, 
does our filtering process actually encourage the preservation of more distinct 
signals?  In order to judge this, we can examine the number of distinct signal types, 
and compare them to those obtained in the unfiltered condition (Exp I). Figure 5.2 
shows this information in a box-plot. For ease of comparison, the data from the 
unfiltered condition has been reproduced in the same format13. 
From this we can see that although there is some initial loss in the filtered condition 
(Fig. 5.2.lower), the overall level remains fairly stable across all four chains. This 
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13 This information was previously shown in Table 4.2.
stands in strong contrast to the unfiltered condition (Fig. 5.2.upper), where the loss 
is both more severe, and increases cumulatively over time. In order to determine 
whether the differences between the number of signals in both conditions was 
significant, an unpaired one-directional t-test was performed at each generation. 
The levels of significance have also been indicated in Fig 5.2 (n.s = not significant, * 
= P<0.05, ** = P <0.005). These reveal that from the second generation onwards, the 
number of distinct signals in the filtered condition was indeed greater than that 
obtained in the same generation in the unfiltered condition. Therefore we can 
conclude that filtering is having the desired effect of encouraging more of the 
meaning space to be uniquely expressed with a single signal.
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Figure 5.2:  Box-plots contrasting the number of distinct signals found over generations across all four 
chains in the filtered (Exp III) and unfiltered (Exp I) conditions.  Horizontal lines indicate the median 
number of signals, boxes indicate the interquartile range,  and whiskers indicate maximum and 
minimum values found. Whereas the number of signal types in the unfiltered condition (upper) 
rapidly decreases over time, those in the filtered condition (lower) remain relatively stable and high. 
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n.s
Significant differences between the two conditions were found from generation 2 onwards. Taken 
together this shows that filtering is indeed encouraging greater expressivity in the languages.
Compositionality: an Adaptation
Looking at Fig 5.2.lower more closely, we find that at generation 9, at least one of the 
languages actually has 27 distinct signals. If we examine this language in more 
detail, we find that it is in fact, compositional. Table 5.1 shows what this system 
looks like. Each cell in the table contains the signal associated with each of the 27 
meanings, with columns corresponding to a colour (black, blue or red), whereas 
horizontal rows reflect motion and shape according to the symbols shown. We can 
see that signals in this language are composed of three segments, each of which 
conveys a different aspect of the meanings. The colour of the objects is regularly 
encoded in the first segment (which corresponds to the initial letter: n- for black; l- 
for blue; and r- for red) whereas motion is regularly encoded in the final segment (-
ki for horizontal; -plo for bouncing; and -pilu for spiralling). Shape is more 
unreliable, but is otherwise encoded in the middle segment (there is a general 
tendency for squares to contain -re-, -ne- or !; circles to contain -ho- or -he-; and 
triangles to contain -ki- or -ke-). 
The one exception to this pattern is the signal for a horizontal red square - renana - 
which appears to be an irregular. Examining the history of this chain we find that by 
chance, this meaning-signal pair was seen by every generation from generation 8 
onwards. This ties in nicely with the findings of Kirby (2001), which showed that 
irregularity could arise and be maintained in systems transmitted via iterated 
learning provided that some meanings appeared more frequently than others. 
Although this meaning certainly did not appear in participants training any more 
than any other, the fact that it reliably survived the bottleneck at a time when therest 
of the system was undergoing changes to become more regular and rule-based has 
allowed for it to retain its idiosyncratic structure. This is of course, just a single 
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anecdotal case and further investigation using this experimental framework, along 
the lines of the study conducted by Beqa et al. (2008), is required14.
Table 5.1: A fully compositional language arising from Experiment III (Chain A, generation 9). This 
language has 27 distinct signals for each of the meanings, and each signal is composed of three 
segments. The first segment represents the colour, the middle segment represents the shape, and the 
final segment represents the motion of the object. Reproduced from Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) 
with permission.
A similar compositional system to this also emerged in Chain D in this condition, 
between generations 4 and 7, although it was not nearly as perfect as the example 
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14 This study follows the same methodology outlined here but specifically manipulates the 
regularity of initial variants (in the language given to the first learner, half the signals were 
regular, half were irregular), and the frequencies that certain meanings appear in during 
training (creating a set of high-frequency items, and a set of low-frequency items). It 
demonstrates that low-frequency items are much more likely to become regularised over 
time if they were originally irregular, than high-frequency items were. In effect, this study 
successfully replicates the Kirby (2001) findings but uses human learners instead of artificial 
agents.
not just a peculiarity of this chain alone. The fact that compositional systems, when 
they do arise, do not seem to be very stable is intriguing however. We will come 
back to this in Experiment IV.
The Evolution of Signal Segments in a Compositional Language
The fact that we can decompose the final few generations of this language into 
different signals segments (i.e. beginning, middle and end) is interesting. How 
might this segmentation structure have arisen historically over time? In order to 
address this question we can examine the relationships of descent between signals 
in a coalescent tree, like we did in the previous two experiments. Unlike in the 
previous two experiments where we analysed the signals as holistic units, and 
examined how forms changed and increased in frequency over time, this time we 
can analyse the signals by segments (Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, 2009). 
We are primarily interested in quantitatively determining the extent to which the 
signals have adapted to the structure of the meaning space, and when that might 
have occurred. Cornish et al. (2009) implement a technique for doing this using this 
data15. The first step in this process relies upon us being able to make a 
parsimonious segmentation of the signal-strings in the language into elements that 
correspond to different aspects of meaning. We need to be able to examine the 
language in its final generation and formulate rules like “the beginnings of signals 
consistently encode colour” or “signal-final ‘-pilu’ reliably encodes the motion of 
spiralling”. If we do this to the language shown in Table 5.1, we end up with each 
string being divided up into three different sub-strings as described earlier. In order 
to allow for a consistent analysis, we then need to carry this segmentation pattern 
back to all previous generations. 
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15 The Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby (2009) paper represents joint work, and will be referred to 
several times in this chapter. To be clear:  H.C. and S.K. designed the study. H.C. collected 
and analysed the language data. M.T designed and performed the RegMap and coalescent 
tree analysis. H.C., M.T., and S.K. contributed to writing the paper in that order.
Before we begin, we need to introduce some terminology to enable us to describe 
what is going on. An analysis of the language consists of determining the following: 
(i) signal segments - the position within the string where different meanings are 
conveyed (in this case, the beginning, middle, or end of words); (ii) signal segment 
variants - actual tokens residing in a given segment position (e.g. ‘-pilu’, ‘n-’, or ‘-
aho-’); (iii) meaning elements - aspects of meanings (i.e. the features of the meaning 
space, like motion, shape and colour); and (iv) meaning element variants - actual 
instances of a given meaning (i.e. the values of particular features of the meaning 
space, like ‘black’, ‘bouncing’, or ‘triangle’) (Cornish et al., 2009). 
Fig 5.3 illustrates how such a segmentation process might occur using a toy example 
with signals associated with a meaning-space varying in two features (shape: circle 
or square) and three values (shape of insert: circle, cross, or star). Beginning with the 
most recent generation (4 in this case), the signals are analysed into two signal 
segments: the first indicating shape of object, the second indicating the shape of 
insert. We then look to the immediately preceding generation and do the same 
thing, keeping in mind both what the previous signal segment variants were (i.e. 
DO, RE, MI, FA, SO) and that we must always have two segments. We aim to 
always preserve signal variants from the more recent generation, unless a more 
parsimonious analysis presents itself. 
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DO.MI DO.MIR DO.MIR DO.MIR
DO.SO DO.LA TI.LA TI.X
DO.FA SO.FA RE.FA DO.FA
RE.MI RE.MI RE.MIR RE.MIR
RE.SO RE.SOR RE.SOR RE.SOR
RE.FA DO.FA DO.FA X.FA
Figure 5.3:  An example of the segmentation process at work.  Strings in the final generation (4) are 
segmented into two parts according to the most parsimonious alignment between meanings. This 
segmentation pattern is then carried back to earlier generations one at a time. Criteria for determining 
where segmentation boundaries are must take into account both (i) the segmentation patterns seen in 
the more recent generation,  and (ii) the most plausible segmentation within the current generation 
being processed. Segment locations are represented by a full stop, and null segments by X.
Applying this segmentation procedure to generation 2 results in the identification of 
two new signal variants (MIR and SOR). At generation 3 we are presented with the 
novel string ‘TILA’. Due to the fact that we treated ‘LA’ as a suffix in the previous 
generation, and all other prefixes in the signal space appear to be composed of two 
letters, we segment the string as ‘TI.LA’. It should be clear that at some point we will 
get to a situation where we have to posit a ‘null’ sub-string in place of one of our 
signal segments (in the example above this is represented by X). In the toy example, 
this happens twice at generation 1, where we find the signals ‘TI’ and ‘FA’. Do we 
posit a null signal variant in segment position one or two?  In this case, we must 
view each case on its own merits. Given both the segmentation suggested by the 
previous generation as well as the presence of ‘DO.FA’ in the current generation, it 
makes sense to posit the null variant before ‘FA’. In the case of ‘TI’, we have no 
evidence supporting it as being a prefix or a suffix in the current generation. 
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However, in the previous generation it was analysed as a suffix, so it is more 
parsimonious to do the same again here.
Cornish et al. (2009) applied this segmentation technique to the compositional 
language described earlier. Using this, they examined how the lineages of signal 
segment variants appearing in the final segment position changed over time16. 
Figure 5.4 is a reproduction of this coalescent tree17. From it, we can see a similar 
pattern of emergence to what we saw previously when examining whole signals. 
Early generations contain many low-frequency signal variants, which quickly 
reduce in number until just a few high-frequency signal variants remain. These 
variants which appear at each generation are not random, but are related to those 
that appear before. In some cases this involves direct and perfect replication of a 
variant (indicated by solid lines), but even where new signal variants appear, it is 
easy to determine possible relationships of descent between seen variants (indicated 
by dotted lines).
Often, many of the changes that occur to form new signal variants appear similar to 
those that are well attested in natural language change. For instance, Cornish et al. 
(2009) note that we find cases of phonological reduction (‘hona’ becomes ‘na’), 
metathesis (‘neki’ becomes ‘nike’), single segment replacements (‘pilu’ becomes 
‘pilo’; ‘nepi’ becomes ‘napi’) and blends (‘humo’ and ‘huna’ combine to form ‘homa’ 
and ‘hona’; ‘na’ and ‘ki’ merge to form ‘neki’). They also point out that the 
frequency of each signal variant, over time, comes to confirm what we already 
know: that the language is adapting to a meaning-space consisting of three 
elements. This can be seen most readily at generation 4, where we find just three 
variants (‘na’,‘neki’ and ‘pilu’) each appearing nine times , and again in generations 
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16 Note that we can also do the same for variants appearing in the initial and middle 
positions.
17 This coalescent tree differs from those shown in Chapter 4 in that frequency information is 
indicated in brackets. This is a purely cosmetic difference, making it easier to spot frequency 
patterns between generations.
9 and 10, where we find ‘plo’, ‘pilu’ and ‘ki’ (with the irregular ‘na’, being part of the 
renana example discussed earlier). 
From this, we can hypothesise that  signal endings came to perfectly encode one of 
the meaning elements in generation 4 (we do not know which at this point, as we 
have not been factoring meanings into our analysis), and again in the final two 
generations. This is interesting, as if we return to Fig 5.1.left, our measure of 
structure shows this chain at this generation to have only moderately high levels of 
structure. There is no sign in the Mantel test to indicate that we have a perfect 
structural mapping between parts of the signal and parts of the meanings. Of 
course, if we wish to see whether this occurs at other points in the chain we can also 
draw up coalescent trees for the remaining signal segments (i.e. the beginning and 
middle positions) in order to determine when other forms arose to encode meaning 
elements. However, it would be better if we could determine this statistically. 
Fortunately, the fact that an analysis of the frequencies of signal variants alone 
provides clues as to how meanings break-down into elements, is something that we 
can exploit if we wish to analyse the emergence of compositionality more 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Quantifying the Emergence of Compositionality
Following on from the previous discussion, Cornish et al. (2009) present a method 
for directly quantifying the emergence of compositionality, based on an application 
of RegMap (see: Tamariz & Smith, 2008; Tamariz, in press). RegMap measures the 
regularity of the mappings between meanings and signals. It is different however to 
the Mantel test described in §3.4.3 in that rather than working at the level of whole 
signals and meanings, it instead looks at the correspondence between signal 
segments, signal variants, meaning elements, and meaning variants. RegMap is:
“...an information-theoretic metric that combines the 
conditional entropy of meanings given signals and of signals 
given meanings and normalises the result to make it 
comparable across systems of different sizes. Informally 
what RegMap (short for regularity of the mappings) does is 
return the degree of confidence that a signal element 
consistently predicts a meaning element (for instance, the 
degree to which we can be sure that the beginning of the 
signal encodes color).” (Cornish et al., 2009:196)
Whilst the Mantel test is a general measure of correlation between meanings and 
signals, it does not differentiate between compositionality and other types of 
structure that we have found such as underspecification. RegMap on the other hand 
is targeted at measuring this precise kind of structure. It can be formally defined by 
the following equation (taken from Cornish et al., 2009),
where H(S|M) is the conditional entropy of a signal segment given a meaning 
element (telling us how uncertain we are on average about predicting, for instance, 
what colour an object is if we hear the first segment of its signal) , H(M|S) is the 
conditional entropy of a meaning element given a signal segment (or how uncertain 
we are on average about what initial signal we should produce if we know the 
8 Cornish, Tamariz, & Kirby 
 
quantify regularities in the mappings between signal and meaning elements in order to objectively 
confirm this.  
 
 
Quantifying the emergence of compositionality 
 
We now have an analysis of all the languages in terms of: signal segments - in this case, the word 
beginning, middle or end; signal segment variants, actual tokens residing in a segment position - 
such as pilu or ki. Similarly, we can define: meaning elements, aspects of meaning - motion, shape 
and colour; and meaning element variants, actual instances of a meaning element - for instance, 
‘blue’ or ‘circle’ or ‘bounce’.  
   Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) quantify the emergence of structure using pairwise distance corre-
lation (Shillcock et al., 2001). This measures the extent to which similar meanings are expressed 
using similar forms – or more precisely, whether there is a correlation between the structure of the 
meaning and signal spaces. Although this is valuable in showing that structure emerges, it does 
not allow us to track the evolution of the compositional structure of the languages directly: as a 
measurement, the pairwise distance correlation is very general and cannot distinguish between 
compositionality and other kinds of structure (such as underspecification). Here we apply a new 
method of analysis to one of the chains7 reported in Kirby, Cornish & Smith (2008) to tackle this 
problem. We use RegMap (Tamariz & Smith, 2008), an information-theoretical metric that combines 
the conditional entropy of meanings given signals and of signals given meanings and normalises 
the result to make it comparable across systems of different sizes. Informally, what RegMap (short 
f r regularity of the mappings) does is return the egre  of confidence that a signal element consis-
tently predicts a meaning element - for instance, the degree to which we can be sure that the be-
ginning of the signal encodes colour. 
 
   More formally, H(X|Y), the conditional entropy, is the Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1948) but re-
placing p(x) with p(x|y). The RegMap for a meaning element (M) and a signal segment (S) is given 
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   H(S|M) is the c nditional entropy of the signal segment give  the meaning feature, or the uncer-
tainty about the meaning when we know the segment. This relates to comprehension. For example, 
for shape and first signal segment, H(S|M) quantifies how uncertain we are on average about 
what shape an object is if we hear the first segment of its corresponding signal. H(M|S) is the con-
ditional entropy of the meaning feature given the signal segment, or the uncertainty about the seg-
ment when we know the meaning. This relates to production. Still, in the case of shape and first 
signal segment, H(M|S) quantifies how uncertain we are on average about what first segment to 
produce if we know the shape of an object. The logs of nm and ns normalise the values between 0 
and 1; nm is the number of different meaning values (e.g. triangle, circle, square for shape); ns is the 
number of different segment variants in the relevant segment position. Subtracting the conditional 
entropies from 1 returns levels of confidence instead of uncertainty.  
 
   Figure 3 shows the RegMap values for all combinations of signal and meaning elements both with 
and without a bottleneck for the 10 generations.  The ‘input’ data shown in Figure 3 (upper) re-
flects the extent to which signals predict meanings in the sub-set of the language (taken from the 
previous generation) that was actually transmitted to the current generation, after the bottleneck 
was applied. The ‘output’ data shown in Figure 3 (lower) is obtained from the complete languages 
                                                      
7 Specifically, we examine chain 3 in experiment 2, but similar results can be obtained wherever composi-
tionality clearly emerges. 
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colour of an object), ns is the number of different signal variants in the relevant 
segment position, and nm is the number of different meaning variants that the 
particular meaning element can take. By taking the log of these last two values, we 
can normalise the values between 0 and 1, enabling us to compare across different 
systems, and by subtracting these normalised conditional entropies from 1, we 
return the levels of certainty instead of the levels of uncertainty. 
Figure 5.5 shows how RegMap quantifies the system that emerged in Chain A in the 
filtered condition. Each graph represents the RegMap values calculated for our three 
meaning elements (motion, shape and colour) in each of our signal segment 
positions (first, middle, and final). In order to establish statistical significance for 
these values, a Monte Carlo analysis involving 10,000 randomisations of the possible 
mappings between meanings and signals were performed (see §3.4.3 for a general 
description of Monte Carlo tests). The distributions of the values obtained by these 
randomisations are shown in box-plots: points above (or below) these distributions 
represent significant divergence from that which we would expect at random (more 
than two standard deviations away). Fig 5.5.upper shows this information for the 
subset of the language that is actually given as training input to learners (i.e. after 
the semantic bottleneck and filtering processes have been applied), whereas Fig 
5.4.lower shows this information for the whole language. 
If we begin by looking at these lower graphs, we can see that from initial levels that 
are indistinguishable from random, the RegMap values do increase to significant 
levels for each signal segment. However, this does not happen at the same rate for 
all segments, but appears to be a gradual process spread out over several 
generations. First of all motion becomes encoded by the final segment in generation 
three, then colour is encoded by the first segment in the fifth generation, before 
finally shape starts to become significantly encoded by the middle segment from the 
ninth generation onwards.
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Figure 3: Regularity of the associations between signal and meaning elements, measured as Reg-
Map, changes over time in the direction of maximising compositionality, whereby signal elements 
are consistently associated with distinct meaning elements. The continuous coloured lines repre-
sent RegMap values obtained with all nine segment-meaning feature pairs in the ten generations of 
a language family from Kirby, Cornish and Smith 2008, referred to in Example 3. The boxplots 
show the distributions of values obtained with 10,000 randomised languages. The upper graphs 
show RegMap values from the sub-set of language (taken from the previous generation) that was 
actually transmitted to the current generation, after the ‘bottleneck’ was applied. The lower graphs 
show RegMap values obtained from the complete languages that participants actually produced at 
a given generation, before the bottleneck was applied. 
 
   Focusing first on the bottom graphs, obtained from the participants’ output languages, we see 
that, starting off from values indistinguishable from random at generation 1, RegMap becomes 
massively increased to highly statistically significant levels; specifically, by the third generation, 
motion is consistently encoded by the final signal segment, by the fourth generation colour is en-
coded by the initial segment and by the ninth generation, shape is encoded by the middle segment 
(all p<0.001). 
 
   Second, a comparison of the input (upper) and output (lower) results in Figure 3, reveals the ef-
fect of the bottleneck. The RegMap values are, in the majority of cases, amplified by the bottleneck 
(the absolute value of RegMap increases). Moreover, the lower the input RegMap, the more likely it 
is to be amplified by the bottleneck. How is this happening? The answer is potentially counterin-
tuitive; randomly occurring patterns are more likely to be perceived the smaller the system is. At 
least in the early generations, a sub-set drawn from a language is more likely to accidentally con-
tain more regular patterns than the entire language. Implicit in this, and by the same token, a given 
Figure 5.5: The regularity of the mappings between signal and meaning elements changes over time. 
RegMap quantifies how in a compositional system (Chai  A, Exp III), signal s gments become 
consistently associated with distinct meaning elements. Each coloured line represents RegMap values 
for how reliably a given meaning element (shape, colour, or motion) is being encoded by a particular 
segment (initial, middle or final). Box-plots show the distributions of these values obtained with 
10,000 randomised languages as a control: any points above or below the whiskers therefore show 
significant differences to what we would expect to see by chance. Upper graphs show RegMap values 
of the subset of the language used in training for each generation,  after the semantic bottleneck and 
filtering occurred, wher as the lower graphs r present th  RegMap values obt ined in the l nguage as 
a whole. Differences between the two therefore reveal the effect that these transmission pressures are 
exerting on the system. Taken from Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby (2009) with permission.
Competition between Meaning and Signal Variants
These RegMap calculations can not only tell us at what point in the history of the 
language that associations between meanings and signals arise, they can also tell us 
something about the way in which meaning elements and signal segments compete 
with one anoth r. In order for a language to be compositional, it is im rtant that 
th  ystem evo ve to avoid ambiguity. If e comp re the upper and ower graphs in 
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Fig 5.5, we can find evidence for competition between meanings all vying for 
expression by the same signal segment. As an example, Cornish et al. (2009) point 
out that in the input to the third learner, the final segment equally encodes both 
motion and shape (Fig 5.5.upper). However, rather than reproduce this conflict in 
their own output, the learner resolves the issue by ignoring the association linking 
the final segment with shape, and instead amplifies the association with motion, 
which we see reflected in the RegMap scores in Fig 5.5.lower. 
Conversely, cases of signals all vying to express the same meaning also occur. If we 
look to the input to generation 5 we discover that the RegMap values for colour are 
similar in both the initial and the middle segment positions. If we look to the output 
graphs we find that the learner at this generation resolves this conflict by ignoring 
the association with the middle segment, and massively amplifying the strength of 
the association with the first segment only. This shows us that not only are 
individual signal elements coming to encode specific elements of meaning, but that 
the system as a whole is adapting to avoid ambiguity.
How Transmission Amplifies Structure
The RegMap analysis  has so far shown us when signals come to encode meanings, 
and also that the system resists ambiguous mappings. However, we have not yet 
discussed precisely how these two events come about. What exactly is going on 
during transmission to make this happen?  Making a comparison between the upper 
and lower graphs does reveal one striking fact, however: in most cases, the absolute 
values of RegMap are slightly higher in the input, as compared to the values in the 
output. More specifically, the lower the RegMap values are in the language as a 
whole, the more likely they are to be amplified in the subset of the language given 
as training. What does this mean?
In essence, when we compare the input languages to the output languages, we are 
seeing the effect that our transmission constraints (the joint action of the semantic 
bottleneck and the expressivity filter) are having on the system. What the difference 
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between the two graphs is telling us is that when we take a sub-set of the language 
and filter out homonyms, we are on average finding more structure in that sub-set 
than we do when we examine the language as a whole. This is potentially counter-
intuitive, as it suggests that the less data we encounter, the more regularity we 
perceive. Particularly early on in the chain when there is very little global structure, 
a small random sample of meaning-signal pairs taken from the whole language is 
more likely to contain some regular patterns by chance, than a more comprehensive 
sample of the language would do. At the very least, it is likely to contain less 
counter-evidence against such patterns existing.
Of course, it could well be the case that a subset of the language genuinely reveals 
no structural patterns at all. In this case, the language should be transmitted with 
just as little structure as it had before. The important point to note is that the illusion 
of structure only has to occur once for it to actually become a reality for the next 
learner. In this way, structural increase is inevitable as long as learning is done on 
incomplete data. As Cornish et al., (2009: 200) explain:
“The smaller subsets sampled as inputs to the next generation may 
locally contain more systematicity than the entire language. 
Iterating this learning process using these smaller samples 
therefore provides a platform that allows systematic patterns to be 
noticed, remembered, and replicated preferentially, thereby 
allowing them to gradually accumulate in the languages as a 
whole.”
Structural regularities in our languages therefore arise as a consequence of chance 
patterns that are observed locally being generalised to the language as a whole18. 
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18 It should be noted that this same process probably accounts for the increases in structure 
in all of the iterated language learning experiments described so far, even when there is no 
semantic bottleneck or filtering constraints in place (as was the case in Exp II). Even in this 
instance, we know that there are naturally occurring memory constraints operating that we 
have already seen effectively doing the same thing as the semantic bottleneck.
5.2.3 Summary
This study has investigated how languages evolve when there is both a semantic 
bottleneck and a pressure for expressivity present during transmission. Homonyms 
were filtered out of participants training input in order to encourage signals to 
uniquely express more of the meaning-space. As with the previous iterated 
language learning experiments, when the resulting languages were analysed, it was 
found that transmission error decreased over time as measures of structure actually 
increased (Fig 5.1). Comparisons between the current study (the filtered condition) 
with the first study (the unfiltered condition) indicated that our indirect pressure for 
greater expressivity was working: the number of distinct  signals in languages in the 
filtered condition were much higher, and maintained more stably over time (Fig. 
5.2).
Qualitative analysis of the languages themselves revealed that two of the four 
chains show signs of compositional structure. If we want to learn more about how 
compositional mappings between individual components of signals and individual 
components of meanings arise, there are two different methods. The first is indirect; 
by looking at how signal variants evolve over time in coalescent trees we can detect 
frequency patterns which suggest when signals start to reflect meaning structures 
(Fig. 5.4). The evolution of signal forms alone cannot tell us exactly which meaning 
element a given signal comes to encode. However, the second method can. 
Using a measure of structure known as RegMap (Tamariz & Smith, 2008; Tamariz, in 
press) we can precisely quantify not only when regular mappings emerge, but also 
chart the competition between signals and meanings vying to express one another, 
and also examine the way in which transmission amplifies structure within a 
language (Fig 5.5). It was argued that much of the structure-generating effects of the 
transmission process can be explained with reference to the fact that it involves 
participants only seeing a sub-set of the data: by chance, sub-sets may ‘accidentally’ 
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contain more structure locally than in the system as a whole. When this data is used 
as the basis for generating new data, weak structural relationships get amplified, 
increasing their influence in the future.
5.3 Discussion of Experiments I and III
Experiments I and III differ only in terms of the presence or absence of an 
expressivity constraint. Nevertheless, with this small change we find the emergence 
of languages exhibiting some very different structural features. This is interesting in 
four ways. 
Trade-off between learnability and expressivity
Firstly it confirms our intuitive understanding of the tension that might exist 
between learnability and expressivity. From a purely logical standpoint, it stands to 
reason that the most learnable systems should also be highly inexpressive. In the 
extreme example, the simplest kind of language to acquire should be one in which 
there is just one word for everything (or perhaps, even no words at all). Conversely, 
more expressive systems should tend to be harder to learn: the more meanings we 
have to differentiate, the further we get away from the ‘ideally learnable’ system of 
one word. 
Our experiments have confirmed both of these intuitions empirically. In the 
unfiltered condition where we have no pressure to be expressive we see the number 
of distinct strings fall to extremely low levels - to just two signals in chain B. 
However, whilst these languages may not be able to uniquely express more than a 
handful of meanings, they are highly learnable and stably transmitted. In the 
filtered condition on the other hand, where there is a subtle pressure to express 
more of the meaning-space, we find the opposite: we find highly structured systems 
that arise and convey a greater proportion of the total meanings, but these systems 
are not acquired as faithfully. We can therefore see such compositional systems as a 
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trade-off between the twin pressures of learnability and expressivity. This confirms 
previous simulation results of iterated language learning.
Non-intentional emergence of language-like structure
The second way in which the appearance of such radically different structures is 
interesting relates to our aim of exploring the potential explanatory power of 
nonintentional mechanisms of change operating within language evolution. The 
different outcomes prove that the languages really are created nonintentionally; we 
know this because the only difference between the two conditions was actually 
invisible to participants. This meant that participants in each experiment 
experienced identical learning conditions. The crucial experimental manipulation 
occurred off-line, meaning that there was no way for participants to be aware of 
which condition they were in, and therefore no way in which they could have 
known to alter their behaviour. Our conclusion must be that the differences between 
the languages in each condition did not arise because participants consciously 
designed them, or even because they intended to make any change at all. 
Participants in both conditions are doing exactly the same thing - attempting to 
replicate the languages exactly as given - yet very different  structures emerge as a 
result.
Cultural Transmission Adds Something to Iterated Learning
Related to this, the third point of interest is that the emergence of qualitatively 
different solutions to the task tells us that transmission really is capable of adding 
something to our understanding of where structure in language comes from. This 
may just seem like a restatement of the previous two observations, but it is a point 
currently worth emphasising because of the results of several recent mathematical 
models (Griffiths & Kalish, 2005, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007; Ferdinand & Zuidema, 
2009). These models are all Bayesian versions of the standard ILM (see §3.2.1), and 
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each present three different (potentially conflicting) accounts of the role of 
transmission in iterated learning.
Recall that in BILMs, agents’ inductive biases (what they bring to the task of 
learning) are explicitly encoded in the form of a prior distribution over hypotheses 
(P(h)). This distribution dictates how likely the agent is to assume a hypothesis is 
correct before it has even seen any data. These prior beliefs interact with the data 
being transmitted according to Bayes rule:
where P(d|h) is the likelihood of the data being explainable by a given hypothesis, 
and P(d) is the probability of observing the data averaged over all hypotheses (this 
acts to normalise the equation)19. Using these three pieces of information, the agent 
can calculate the posterior probability (P(h|d)) that a specific hypothesis could 
generate that data - in other words, the agent can choose which hypothesis to use in 
order to reproduce that data for the next learner.
In one of the very first applications of Bayesian iterated learning, Griffiths & Kalish 
(2005) found that the stationary distribution of transition matrix probabilities 
between all possible languages20  (in other words, the actual outcome of iterated 
learning) precisely matched the agents’ prior distributions. The implication from 
this is clear. It suggests that the learner’s prior biases alone determine the outcome 
of iterated learning: cultural transmission adds nothing to the process.
Figure 1: Graph of hypotheses [.6 .3
.1; .2 .6 .2; .1 .3 .6] and example
prior vector [.7 .2 .1]. Each hypoth-
esis’ shape is entirely determined by


















Figure 2: Bayesian iterated learning,
in the monadic (black) and polyadic
(+green/grey) condition. When all pri-
ors are equal, the chain is called homo-
geneous, otherwise it is heterogeneous.
Figure 3: Hypothesis structure and priors
affect stationary distribution of monadic
maximizers. b=1; hypotheses [! (1!
!)/2) (1!!)/2); (1! x)/2 x (1! x)/2;
(1!!)/2) (1!!)/2) !], with x on hori-
zontal axis and ! = .33 in curve (a), .4 in
(b), .6 in (c) and .8 in (d).
Hypotheses: agents are assumed to consider a fixed set of
hypotheses about the state of the world. Each of these hy-
potheses assigns different likelihoods to each of a fixed set
of possible observations (they are thus probability distri-
butions over data, P(d|h)). These hypotheses could repre-
sent, for instance, different languages that generate a set of
utterances, or different functions that describe a set of data
points. The exact nature of the hypotheses is left unspec-
ified, but the basic properties of the model should be gen-
eralizable to a variety of systems where information is cul-
turally transmitted (including not only language, but also,
e.g., music and bird song). In this paper, the hypotheses are
set at the beginning of each simulation and are the same for
all agents. In our examples, we will use a set of hypotheses
of size three: h " H = {h1,h2,h3}.
Data: The observations that an agent can make about the
state of the world will be referred to as data points. Data
points are from a fixed set of possible values and in
our model we restrict the size of this set to three: D =
{d1,d2,d3}. In linguistic terms, a data point can be inter-
preted as any piece of evidence (a “trigger”) that the target
language has a particular property. Different hypotheses
assign different likelihoods to different data points. Mul-
tiple data points may be organized into a string, where the
likelihood of the string is the product of the likelihoods of
the points. Data in our model is any such string of length
b# 1: d " Db.
Prior probability: The prior is a probability distribution
over hypotheses, defining the probability P(h) assigned to
each hypothesis before any data is seen. Thus, the prior
models the inductive bias of the learner. An example short-
hand we will use to note the prior is [.7 .2 .1], where the
prior probabilities for h1, h2 and h3 are .7, .2 and .1, re-
spectively1.
1Note that in Bayesian modelling the choice of priors is typi-
cally constrained by a set of principles that assure the outcome is
not trivially steered by the modeller (e.g., priors must be uninfor-
mative) and that calculations remain feasible (e.g., priors must be
conjugate to the likelihood function). In our model, we allow any
choice of prior over any set of hypotheses; this is ‘unorthodox’ yet
Ag nts perform inference by combining their prior beliefs




where P(h|d) denotes the posterior probability that a hypoth-
esis could have generated the data in question and P(d) =
"h"H P(h)P(d|h) is the probability of the data averaged over
all hypot ses.
Hypothesis choice: Once the posterior probabilities are cal-
culated, we still need a strategy to choose one particu-
lar hypothesis h, from which to generate the data. We
consider the same two strategies as in much earlier litera-
ture: (i) the maximizer simply chooses the hypothesis with
the maximum posterior probability (MAP) or, if there are
multiple maximums, a random one from the set of MAP-
hypotheses; (ii) the sampler chooses one hypothesis ran-
domly, but weighted by the posterior probabilities.
Data Production: Once a hy othesis is ch sen, the next
step is to generate new data using that hypothesis. For
instance, assuming the agent has chosen h1, each data
point in the output string will be randomly generated, but
weighted according to the likelihood of each data point un-
der h1. The number of data points in this string defines
the “transmission bottleneck” b. A characteristic string
of size b = 10 under hypothesis h1 of figure 1 would be
< d1d1d1d2d1d2d2d1d3d1 >.
Population structure: Agents are organized into discrete
generations of one or more individuals (figure 2). If
the number of agents per generation is exactly 1, the
model resembles previous ILMs; we will call this condi-
tion monadic. We will also consider larger populations, a
condition labeled polyadic. Because each generation only
learns from the previous, the model can – regardless of
very relevant for some of our results, as one reviewer notes, but it is
consistent with our view that it is the reality of human biology that
ultimately determines which priors and hypotheses are appropriate




19 These two terms ( P(d|h) and P(d)) quantify the role of cultural transmission in the models.
20 The stationary distribution of transition probabilities basically tells us the final state that 
would result from running a simulation for as long as it takes to reach the stable equilibrium 
where no further change happens. Fortunately there are well understood mathematical 
techniques for extracting this stationary distribution without having to run each simulation 
for the (potentially) extremely large number of generations it would take to reach this point. 
Whilst this finding does leave some room for debate -- learning biases can of course 
be acquired via experience with the world and interaction with others, and are not 
necessarily biologically innate (Griffiths & Kalish, 2007) -- obviously this result 
suggests that the scenario presented in §2.2.2 and §2.3 which stresses the importance 
of cultural transmission as an evolutionary mechanism capable of explaining the 
appearance of design, could be wrong. 
In order to investigate this further, Kirby, Dowman & Griffiths (2007) performed 
another BILM with one difference: rather than agents sampling over posterior 
probabilities of the hypothesis (i.e. having the chances of a hypothesis being selected 
be proportional to its strength) as in Griffith & Kalish (2005), agents instead selected 
the maximum posterior probability. This change in the hypothesis selection strategy 
had an immediate effect. Rather than mirroring the prior biases of the learners, 
cultural transmission was shown to amplify them. Interestingly, they showed that 
the strength of initial biases had very little effect on the final outcome. Even weak 
biases got amplified.
Both of these studies only focused on properties of the agents, such as the strength 
of their initial biases and what strategies they use to select hypotheses. In a third 
study, Ferdinand & Zuidema (2009) extend this work by exploring social properties 
such as the size of the population (monadic or polyadic) and bias heterogeneity 
within agents (whether population consists of agents who all have the same or 
different biases). They too conclude that cultural transmission adds something to 
the explanation, and show that for  population sizes greater than one, or when there 
is heterogeneity within the population, even agents who sample their hypothesis 
from the posterior have stationary distributions that are different to their priors.
The results of Exp I and III adds support to this stance, as they show that an 
externally imposed cultural transmission constraint can generate a different 
outcome to iterated learning, despite all the learners possessing the same learning 
biases. This suggests that we should proceed with caution when using iterated 
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learning as a diagnostic tool for revealing the prior biases of learners, as is done for 
example in Kalish et al. (2007). In this experimental study, participants are given a 
function learning task to complete. During training, participants were shown a 
horizontal bar of varied lengths and had to adjust the height of a vertical bar until 
they were satisfied. At this point they were given feedback on where they should 
have located the bar, and the next training item appeared. During the test, 
participants were given the same task, but received no feedback. The data points 
collected from the test were transmitted to the next learner, until nine generations 
had completed the task.
The results from this study were shown to reflect known inductive biases of 
learners: over generations, participants tended to converge on the positive linear 
function, even when chains were initialised with negative linear functions or just 
random points. It could well be the case that cultural transmission in this instance is 
not contributing anything significantly different to the particular learning biases 
involved, but we cannot be sure. The fact that learning biases can be acquired 
(presumably culturally) is something that researchers need to carefully untangle 
when making modelling assumptions or interpreting experimental results21.
In any case, if we refer only to the data presented in this body of work, the fact that 
the constraints on cultural transmission were the only thing to change between the 
two conditions shows us that iterated learning is doing more than just revealing the 
prior biases of learners. 
It Does Not Matter That Participants Already Have Language
The fourth and final way in which the contrasting results of Experiment I and III are 
interesting concerns a possible criticism that could be levelled at all of the results 
described so far. Namely that as all of the experiments involve participants who 
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21 For instance, work by Ferdinand & Zuidema (2008) shows that replicating the Griffiths et 
al. (2007) study with graduate students specialising in mathematics and logic reveal different 
prior biases. In particular, it seems that experience of working with functions changes a 
learner’s response.
already have a linguistic system in place (perhaps even several linguistic systems), it 
could feasibly be the case that the structures we see emerging are simply the 
reflections of the native languages of the learners. If this is the case, what light can 
studies such as these really shed on our understanding of language evolution?
This is not a criticism to take lightly. Although similar accusations can be levelled at 
many of the other experimental paradigms that investigate the emergence of novel 
communication systems (e.g. Galantucci, 2005; Garrod et al, 2007; Healey et al, 2007; 
Theisen et al, 2009; Scott-Phillips et al, 2009), these studies do at least rely on a 
different communication medium, either using graphical means or physical 
movement to convey meanings. As such, they may not tap quite as directly into 
‘linguistic structure’ as studies like these.
Fortunately, there are two reasons for believing that this is not what is going on 
here. Firstly, our invisible modification appears to shape the properties of the 
emergent languages much more than any similarity to the languages of participants. 
Secondly, we find that these experimental results are backed up by the 
computational models already described. Agents in these models have no prior 
linguistic system in place or any language specific learning biases in place, but 
nevertheless go on to develop systems with the kinds of properties found here. The 
most parsimonious explanation is therefore that the structures we have seen 
appearing in the experiments arise from transmission constraints and the adaptive 
process of iterated learning, rather than being the product of underlying native 
language competences (Kirby et al., 2008a; Cornish et al., 2009).
There is a small caveat to this, as Cornish et al. (2009: 201) note:
“We fully expect that language evolution through iterated learning 
will involve adaptation to all aspects of the transmission 
bottleneck, and this will include the biases of language learners...
[P]articipants bring to bear a mixture of biologically basic biases 
and those that arise from their acquired cultural heritage. We can 
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see no principled way to separate these out. This means that our 
experiments should not be taken as a ‘discovery procedure’ for 
uncovering our evolutionary ancient learning biases but rather as 
a tool for understanding the fundamental adaptive dynamics of 
the cultural evolution of language by iterated learning.”
This means that although we might expect to find that the native languages of the 
learners do interact in the process at some level (for instance, certain forms might 
appear to be more salient than others based on similarities or consistency with 
existing language structures, and thus will be preferentially retained by learners), 
this does not mean that these interactions alone are responsible for the appearance 
of design. There are many biases at work, and transmission is key to understanding 
how these biases manifest themselves.
5.4 Experiment IV: Increasing Transmission Fidelity
The previous experiment has shown us that having a pressure for expressivity is a 
necessary requirement for compositional structures to emerge. Nevertheless, it does 
not seem to guarantee compositionality. It only appeared to emerge in two of our 
four chains, and even when it did appear, it was not stably transmitted to future 
generations. Perhaps one of the reasons for this is the fact that participants’ levels of 
recall are actually quite low throughout. 
As an example, if we take a look at the normalised Levenshtein Distance scores we 
have obtained from the first generation of learners in all three experiments so far 
(Fig 4.1.right, Fig 4.4.right, and Fig 5.1.right), we find that participants are struggling 
to accurately learn the items they are being exposed to during training. Of course 
the languages given to the first generation represent the hardest learnability 
challenge of all22. Nevertheless, it is striking that the measure of transmission error 
shows learners are only getting between 20-35 per cent of signals correct. This is 
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22 Due to the fact that all three studies investigate different experimental conditions, the first 
generation represents the only point at which we can safely aggregate performances.
hardly surprising when we consider that they only see each training item six times 
in total. If the amount of exposure to each training item was increased, would it lead 
to the emergence of compositional languages that were more stable?  This is the 
question that Experiment IV seeks to address.
5.3.1 Method
Aims and Experimental Hypotheses
This experiment investigates the question of how important early transmission 
fidelity is. In order to investigate this, the number of exposures to training items was 
doubled from six, to twelve. There was both a semantic bottleneck, and an 
expressivity requirement in place, making it comparable to the previous experiment. 
Just like the previous experiment, it was hypothesised that learnability and structure 
scores would increase over time, and that compositionality would emerge due to 
pressure arising from the filtering constraint. It was additionally hypothesised that 
the increase in fidelity would help compositionality to be maintained over time. 
These hypotheses are reproduced below. 
1. The Learnability Hypothesis: Languages will become easier to learn as a result 
of iterated learning. 
2. The Structure-Increase Hypothesis: Languages will become more structured as 
a result of iterated learning.
3. The Compositionality Hypothesis: Pressure to generalise to novel stimuli 
combined with a pressure to uniquely express each meaning will result in 
languages evolving to become compositional.




Four chains were initialised with randomly constructed languages, containing 27 
meanings paired with 27 signals. Participants were trained on approximately half of 
the meaning-signal pairs, which were presented one at a time, in random order, 
twelve times each. An expressivity filter was also applied to ensure that every signal 
was unique. Training occurred over three distinct rounds, with each training item 
getting four exposures each time. After each training round, participants were given 
a practise test where they were shown a picture of a meaning, and asked to provide 
the correct signal. At the end of the final training round, this test was extended to 
include each of the 27 meanings, including the ones that participants had not seen in 
training. The output from this final test was collected and used to form the training 
input to the next generation. The experiment was run using E-Prime software, and 
the results were analysed using R.
Participants
A group of 40 participants were recruited via an advertisement in the University of 
Edinburgh’s student employment service. Of these, 17 were male and 23 were 
female, with an average age of 21.48 (S.D = 3.64). Participants were offered £5 to 
take part, and in order to be eligible had to meet the following requirements: be 
fluent in English, not be dyslexic, have normal or corrected-to-normal vision, have 
not taken part in any previous studies, and not have have formally studied 
linguistics. Each participant was assigned to one of the four transmission chains at 
random. The study conformed to the ethics guidelines set by the University of 
Edinburgh’s College of Humanities and Social Science, and participants were fully 
briefed before taking part of their rights of withdrawal and anonymity.
5.3.2 Results of Experiment IV
Learnability and Structure Increase
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In order to investigate the first two hypotheses, the structure and error scores were 
calculated for each generation of each chain. These values are shown in Figure 5.6. 
As we would expect, the error and structure scores in the first generation as 
compared to the last generation show significant differences. Paired one-tailed t-
tests indicate a mean decrease in error of 0.35 (t(3) = 11.079, P < 0.0008) and a mean 
increase in structure of 8.45 (t(3) = 5.767, P < 0.005). Examining Fig 5.5 in more 
detail, it appears that all languages are significantly structured after the third 
generation, and at least one chain is stably transmitted for several generations. This 
would seem to confirm hypotheses one and two.
Figure 5.6: Structure and transmission error scores over generations for chains in Exp IV.   These 
graphs show that the languages are becoming easier to learn, and more structured over time. 
Additionally, it appears that at least one chain is being transmitted faithfully over multiple 
generations. Transmission error (right) is measured using normalised Levenshtein Distance, whereas 
structure (left) is calculated using z-scores derived from a Monte-Carlo analysis of the correlation of 
the distances between meanings and signals. Points above the dotted line (left) indicate significant 
structural regularities between meaning-signal mappings. Re-drawn from Cornish (2010) using 
10,000 Monte-Carlo randomisations instead of 1,000.
Transmission Fidelity Increases
Before we continue, we must first examine whether or not increasing the amount of 
training has had the desired effect of increasing the fidelity of transmission. In other 































words, has error decreased as a result of participants receiving more exposure to 
training items? To test this, we can compare the performance of learners on the 
initial randomly generated languages in both the single (Exp III) and double (Exp 
IV) training conditions. Although we predict that these languages are harder to 
learn on average than later ones, we cannot be sure that languages at later 
generations are comparable as they are likely to be differently structured. These 
transmission error scores are shown in Table 5.2 below.





Table 5.2: Transmission error scores found at generation one in the single and double training 
conditions. These scores indicate that increasing the amount of training is indeed increasing the 
fidelity of transmission.
If we run an unpaired one-tailed t-test on these scores we find that the difference 
between them is significant (t(3) = 2.8633, P < 0.01): recall in the double training 
condition was significantly higher (mean error 0.558) than in the single training 
condition (mean error 0.721). 
Compositionality is Not Stable
Our third hypothesis predicts that we will find compositional languages appearing 
in the chains as a result of the trade-off between learnability and expressivity 
pressures. Examining the raw data (Appendix B4), it appears that we find at least 
one instance of compositionality, arising at generation four of chain D. This system 




















Saturday, 18 September 2010
Table 5.3: An example of a compositional system arising at generation 4 in Chain D in the double 
training condition. This language has 27 distinct signals, and has a very similar structure to the 
system which emerged in the single training condition (Exp III). Signals in this system are composed 
of three morphemes: colour-shape-motion. Redrawn from Cornish (2010) with permission. 
This system bears a striking resemblance to the compositional language that 
emerged in the previous experiment. Every meaning has a unique signal, and there 
is a clear pattern to how signals are internally structured. The first segment 
represents colour: wa- for black; hu- for blue; and po- for red. The second segment 
represents the shape of the object: -ki- for square; -ke-  for circle; and -ni- for 
triangle. The final segment represents the motion of the object: -mo for horizontal; -
ki for bouncing; and -kuko for spiralling. There are some minor deviations from 
these general rules, but even these appear to only apply in a predictable context. For 
instance, bouncing triangles acquire the same suffix as spiralling squares and circles, 
whilst spiralling triangles acquire a suffix which appears to be a combination of the 
standard bouncing and spiralling suffixes.
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It is good to see another strong example of a compositional system arising in a chain 
that has an expressivity filter applying. However, the main aim of the double 
training condition was to see whether this encourages any compositional system 
that might arise to be more stably maintained. Has this occurred here? Examining 
the language at generation 10 of this chain reveals that this system does not last. Not 
all elements of this system have been lost, however. In fact, looking a little closer, we 













wak ko hek ko pok ko
waki o pok o pok o
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Table 5.4:  An example of a language at generation 10 that was previously compositional and is now 
underspecified. What is surprising about this structure is that it arises in a chain (D) involving both 
filtering and double training. Parts of the signals correspond to colour and motion features, however, 
shape is no longer explicitly encoded. 
In spite of the fact that the languages are still being filtered for homonyms at every 
generation, we nevertheless find that this system is underspecified. Signals can still 
be decomposed into compositional parts however, but instead of differentiating all 
three meaning elements like before, now signals are composed of just two parts: 
colour and motion. Examining the signal variants themselves , we find little change 
in those used to refer to colour.  We find wa- still corresponds to black, hu- has 
changed to he- to describe blue objects, and po-  is still used to describe red items. 
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However, it appears that the variant which previously meant triangle has merged 
with the old suffix for horizontal to form -nimo (indicating horizontal movement); 
there is a new suffix -kiko to describe bouncing items; and a new suffix -hikeko to 
describe spiralling items. Both of these latter suffixes are possibly related to the old 
motion suffixes combined with one of the old shape variants.
Compositional Underspecification: A Stable Compromise?
The mixed system shown in Table 5.4 is not a one-off. Recall that our examination of 
Fig 5.5 revealed that at least one of the chains resulted in a system that was stably 
transmitted for at least five generations in a row. An examination of the structure of 
this languages, taken at the mid-point of its stable run (generation 7) reveals that it 
too exhibits properties of both a compositional and underspecified system. It is 
shown below in Table 5.5. This system again settles upon a solution to the problem 
of transmission by only encoding the colour and motion features of the meaning-
space. Again, colour is represented by the first segment: [null] in the case of black 
items, pa- in the case of blue items, and me- in the case of red items. Suffixes encode 





















Saturday, 18 September 2010
Table 5.5: Another example of a language that is both underspecified and compositional 
arising in a chain involving both filtering and double training. This example comes from 
Chain B, generation 7. This language was stable for five generation.
The systems that emerge in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are remarkable in that participants in 
these conditions never see any examples of homonyms in their training data. In 
order for underspecification to survive in languages that are being filtered, a delicate 
balancing act must be maintained. As long as homonyms are evenly distributed 
throughout the language (as they are here), and there is some degree of 
compositionality that allows participants the chance to reconstruct any form 
unlucky enough to not make it through the transmission bottleneck, the filtering 
process can be bypassed. This kind of system therefore represents an elegant, albeit 
unexpected, solution to the particular transmission constraints being applied here. 
The fact that it is transmitted more faithfully than any other that we have 
encountered so far is a testament to the fact that is is also highly adaptive.
5.3.3 Summary
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This study examined whether increasing the amount of exposure participants had to 
training items would increase the fidelity of transmission, and lead to the emergence 
of compositional systems that were stable. Four transmission chains were run with a 
semantic bottleneck and filtering, to encourage the emergence of compositional 
structure. In contrast to Exp III, participants also received double the training. A 
comparison of the levels of recall by the first generation of learners in the single and 
double training conditions revealed that the extra training was helping participants 
to acquire the signal-meaning pairs more faithfully. Qualitative analysis of the 
resulting languages however showed that only one instance of compositionality was 
recorded, and that this was not stably transmitted to future generations.
Instead, that particular system changed to incorporate features of both 
compositionality and underspecification. An almost identical system to this one was 
also found in another chain. In this particular case, that system was stably 
transmitted, over five generations. The fact that an underspecified system could 
emerge in a condition where homonyms were filtered out before transmission might 
at first appear surprising, but reflects the fact that there always was, in a sense, an 
optimal solution to bypassing the expressivity filter. Although this result was 
certainly not anticipated by the author in advance (and, I would argue, could not 
have been engineered consciously by participants, even if full disclosure was given 
of the fact that their data was being culturally transmitted to others), it is a reminder 
that cultural evolution is capable of adapting in surprising and unpredictable ways.
5.5 Discussion of Experiments III and IV
The fact that we did not find stable compositional languages in Experiment IV 
definitely adds weight to the idea that compositional systems are fundamentally 
harder to acquire than underspecified systems. Even though a perfectly 
compositional system was created early on in one of the chains, the increased 
training was still not enough for it to be faithfully acquired by later generations. 
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How then can we account for the fact that in computational simulations of iterated 
language learning, compositionality is not only consistently found in all runs, but 
also highly stable when it does emerge?  Perhaps the most significant difference 
between the ILMs and these transmission chain experiments lie in the number of 
generations of learners that they employ. Simulations of artificial agents are 
typically run for hundreds if not thousands of generations before stable 
compositional systems emerge. Therefore one explanation for our lack of success 
here is that perhaps the transmission chains need to be allowed to run for longer. 
The vast number of generations required in some ILMs has actually been used as a 
criticism against the ecological validity of such models. For instance de Beule & 
Bergen (2006) point to a number of studies which show that pidgins and creoles 
emerge with compositional languages in just a few generations, making the models 
appear unrealistic in comparison. The results of the studies presented here supports 
this idea that human learners are much faster at converging upon compositional 
systems - in both experiments III and IV we find cases of compositionality arising in 
as few as four generations. A more obvious difference between the cases of evolving 
pidgins and creoles, and the experiments here concerns the structure of the 
populations involved. One avenue of work which is currently being explored at the 
LEC in Edinburgh involves increasing the number of learners per generation. Early 
work suggests even adding just one more learner to each generation can result in 
the emergence of more stable compositional systems (Line, 2010; Winters, 2009).
Going back to the languages that we did find in the double training condition, the 
fact that two of them seemed to find the perfect structural balancing act between the 
two system types (compositional and underspecification) really is quite remarkable. 
Consider again that in spite of the fact that participants never see duplicate signals 
in their input, they  still end up being in perfect accord with previous generations in 
where to posit duplicate signals in their output. This was not a solution that any of 
the participants (or even the experimenter for that matter) could have anticipated in 





Language Adapts to Sequence 
Learning Biases
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The picture we have built of language so far is that over the course of its 
transmission from learner to learner, it encounters many different constraints which 
can (over time) impact upon its structure. Each of these constraints is a different 
kind of bias that the language is adapting to. Some of these biases are internal to the 
learner, and others are external. For instance, in chapter 4 we explored a kind of bias 
that was externally imposed - the semantic bottleneck - and contrasted it to the 
naturally occurring phenomenon of imperfect learning. In chapter 5 we looked at 
another externally imposed constraint in the form of the filtering process that 
removed homonyms from the input to learners and encouraged greater expressivity. 
The fact that the presence of these external biases can be shown to have such major 
impacts upon the resulting systems is a reminder that we must be careful when 
making claims that we can use iterated learning as a means to uncover those biases 
that are internal to learners. As Smith et al. (2008: 534) point out:
“mental properties cannot simply be read off from [properties of 
language], because the cultural process mediating between aspects 
of the mind and features of language distorts the underlying 
biases of human learners.”
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That being said, it is clear that at least some, or indeed the majority, of the kinds of 
adaptations that we have seen the languages in these experiments undergo clearly 
have been the result of learning and processing mechanisms that are internal to our 
human participants. Our most consistent finding is that languages change in ways 
that make them easier to learn by future learners. Whilst in some sense we have 
already seen the outcome of such cognitive constraints in the studies presented, 
their effects have been intertwined with those of many other biases. It would be nice 
if we could study these mechanisms and learning processes in isolation somehow.
One obstacle to achieving that goal with the current experimental framework is the 
presence of structured meanings. The meanings to be conveyed represent yet 
another external constraint to which language must adapt. Consider how in every 
experiment so far we have seen that the structure of signals comes to reflect the 
structure of the meanings in some systematic way - whether that involves the 
meanings themselves undergoing some kind of levelling of features leading to fewer 
distinct signals being required to express them, or signals becoming decomposable 
into segments which get mapped onto individual meaning elements. In fact, it could 
well be argued that given the presence of our fixed and easily decomposable 
meanings, we perhaps should not be so surprised that we get structured signals out; 
in a very real sense, it is meanings and our need to differentiate them which cause 
this structure to appear.
Given that we find ourselves in a position where the previous work has focused 
exclusively on the cultural transmission of meanings and signals - or rather, how the 
presence of structured meanings can give rise to language-like structures - we can 
ask ourselves another question. Can other types of cognitive constraints, in the 
absence of meanings, give rise to any interesting structural features?  In other words, 
what happens when the only things being culturally transmitted via iterated 
learning are signals?  This final experiment explores just this, by attempting to 
isolate the effect of sequence memory constraints on cultural transmission.
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6.1 Sequential Learning Constraints
Language, either spoken or signed, consists of a complex arrangement of signals 
that can be described in terms of statistical relations between different units 
(Conway et al., 2007). These signals are necessarily organised sequentially. This 
stems from the fact that the communication channel itself demands that 
transmission be serial. As such, we expect that the ability to encode and manipulate 
sequential patterns should be an important pre-requisite for using language 
(Lashley, 1951). This is indeed the case. Not only is there is a strong link between 
sequence memory, and both word learning and vocabulary development (Gupta & 
MacWhinney, 1997; Baddeley, 2003), but a number of psychological studies have 
also linked deficits in sequence learning with a range of different language disorders 
(Plante et al., 2002; Hoen et al., 2003; Christiansen et al., 2010). At the same time, 
artificial language learning (ALL) studies have shown that sequential learning is 
implicated in many aspects of normal language acquisition, from segmenting 
speech sounds (Saffran et al., 1996), to detecting long-distance dependencies 
between different words (Gomez, 2002; Onnis et al., 2003).
Taking this into consideration, it has been suggested that language has evolved to fit 
these sequential learning and processing mechanisms in the brain (Christiansen, 
1994; Christiansen & Chater, 2008). This approach stresses the fact that these 
cognitive mechanisms originally evolved for purposes other than language. 
Although sequence memory and sequential learning abilities are employed 
extensively in language, they are in fact domain-independent mechanisms, involved 
in motor control and planning, as well as working memory (Lashley, 1951; 
Christiansen & Ellefsen, 2002; Baddeley, 2007). We have already seen empirical 
investigations of this idea that universal properties of linguistic structure can be 
explained by these non-linguistic constraints on learning. For instance, Christiansen 
& Devlin (1997) show how word order patterns that match  observed typological 
distributions in the real world can be derived from models relying on very general 
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sequential learning mechanisms, whilst Ellefsen & Christiansen (2000) show how 
linguistic subjacency constraints could be derived from limitations on sequential 
learning using both connectionist models and ALL studies involving humans (see 
§3.2.3).
Whilst studies like these indicate that there is an apparent fit between universal 
properties of natural language structure and these general cognitive constraints, this 
relationship has only been shown in humans indirectly, via tests of comprehension. 
In other words, participants have been tested on different types of structure created 
by the experimenter and shown to only be able to acquire those structural patterns 
that are in some sense ‘naturally’ occurring (Ellefsen & Christiansen, 2000). When 
combined with computer simulations that replicate this same behaviour, this 
strongly implies that there is nothing specific to language about the mechanisms 
responsible. Nevertheless, the argument would be strengthened if we could not only 
observe these structural patterns being easily acquired by individuals in an ALL 
experiment, but also to witness them actually emerging culturally in a population of 
learners, from a starting point of no structure.
In the next study we will investigate whether these biases in participants’ ability to 
process and recall sequences can lead to the cultural evolution of structure. 
Importantly, we will change our framework slightly to try to remove any other 
biases that might be acting upon the signals, and we will initiate the transmission 
chains with signals that do not contain any structural regularity. 
6.2 Experiment V: Transmitting Signals With No Meanings
6.2.1 Method
Aims and Experimental Design
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In all of the previous experiments we have defined a language as a set of mappings 
between signals and meanings. The aim of this experiment is to investigate how 
sequence memory constraints affect the structure of signals when they are culturally 
transmitted without any meanings1. In short, we want to ascertain whether 
structural regularities appear when there is no externally imposed structure 
encouraging adaptation. Our working hypotheses will therefore be familiar: we are 
expecting signals to become easier to learn, and more structured over time.
1. The Learnability Hypothesis: Signal-strings will become easier to learn as a 
result of iterated learning.
2. The Structure-Increase Hypothesis: Signal-strings will become more structured 
as a result of iterated learning.
As there are no computational simulations of this particular experiment, we do not 
have any firm predictions about the precise nature of the structure that we might 
find.
Experimental Design
In order to address the hypotheses, a series of eight transmission chain experiments 
were run2. Participants were trained on a set of 15 signals via an implicit learning 
technique. During training participants were shown each signal very briefly on 
screen, before being given the opportunity to reproduce the signal they had just 
seen by typing it out. This only happened after a delay, which forced participants to 
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1 The design of this experiment benefitted enormously from collaborative discussions held 
with Morten H. Christiansen, who offered useful advice on constructing the initial 
languages, implicit learning techniques, and also suggested quantitative methods to analyse 
the results.
2 This was done using a custom-built experimental platform created by Simon Kirby using 
Processing.
keep the item in their mind for a short while. Once the signal had been reproduced 
by the learner, the next signal appeared automatically. After six passes over all of the 
training data, participants were asked to recall all 15 items. They were not told in 
advance that they would be required to do this, and no feedback on their 
performance was offered until the very end of the experiment, when they were told 
how many items they had reproduced perfectly. Every unique signal that a 
participant entered during this recall round was accepted, regardless of whether it 
was correct or not. If participants entered a string that they had already submitted, 
they were notified of this, and asked to try again. The experiment continued until 
either all 15 strings had been provided, or participants withdrew themselves3. The 
data collected in the recall round became the new training data for the next learner, 
and the process iterated until ten ‘generations’ had passed.
Materials
The design of the initial stimuli was very carefully controlled in this study. Each 
“language” consisted of a set of fifteen letter-strings. These were initially 
constructed to ensure that the frequency of bigrams and unigrams was as uniform 
as possible. Each string-set was composed of six characters (a-f), each of which 
appeared exactly 10 times. The lengths of strings were also controlled so that some 
were not more frequent than others. Five of the strings were three characters in 
length, five were four characters in length, and five were five characters in length. 
Particular attention was paid to the beginnings and ends of strings: each character 
could only start or end a string a maximum of three times in order to ensure that the 
distribution of characters did not favour certain start or end sequences. For instance, 
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3 In total, three participants excused themselves from the final recall round as they felt they 
could not remember any of the items. These participants were fully debriefed and received 
payment like any other participant, but as they did not provide a full set of signal-strings for 
the next participant, their results were discarded.
if #a  appeared three times, a# could only appear twice4. This meant that every 
initial language had the same approximate distribution of bigrams. This structure is 
shown in Figure 6.1 below. An example of one of the initial languages is also given 
in Table 6.1. This shows the language in its underlying form, and not the form given 













Figure 6.1: The frequency distribution of bigrams in the initial languages of Exp V. Each bar 
represents a particular bigram (for example ‘ac’, ‘#b’ or ‘ff’) and the frequency that that particular 
bigram appeared in the data.  As the figure shows, none of the bigrams appeared more than three times 
in total, and this only occurred at edge positions. The strings in each language were tightly 
constrained to have as flat a distribution as possible and avoid any patterns being present from the 
outset.
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4 The # symbol represents the beginning or end of a string. As these regions (known as the 
‘anchor points’) are particularly salient for participants, extra effort was put into ensuring 


















Table 6.1: An example of one of the initial languages generated for experiment V. This shows the 
underlying form of the language presented to learners in chain B. These languages were generated 
with strict controls to ensure that they contained as little regularity or repeating patterns as possible.
Controlling Other Biases
Designing the initial languages in this way ensured that there were no strong 
regularities in the initial input to learners that could bias them in any particular 
direction. However, this is not the only type of bias we could imagine operating in 
this kind of study. Of additional concern was the fact that certain combinations of 
letters are easier to pronounce than others. Consider the example of PODDA versus 
LWRRT. Clearly the former would be much easier to remember than the latter. In 
order to address this we only used consonant letters to form strings.
There are two other kinds of bias that could potentially affect the learnability of 
strings, even of those composed entirely of consonant characters: the first concerns 
the possible introduction of acronyms into the data, while the second concerns the 
possible effect of the keyboard layout encouraging the emergence of certain typing 
patterns. In order to avoid both of these biases, at the end of every experiment the 
languages were remapped onto new consonant characters, and the output of this 
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remapping was visually inspected for acronyms before being given to the next 
learner. This remapping preserved the underlying structure of the languages, but 
destroyed the surface structures which might have been influenced by participants’ 
additions. Table 6.2 illustrates what this process looks like using a small example.
In this table we can see that the underlying (plain-text) form of the language in the 
first generation consisted of three strings <abc, ddbe, abdde>. These characters 
were mapped onto consonant letters, creating the training input given to the first 
learner: VTG, DDTR and VTDDR. After training, the first learner attempts to 
reproduce the strings that they were given. This reproduction is not perfect 
however, and two new strings have been created. The second one is of particular 
concern - DVDTV. Being as though this string contains salient acronyms, if we gave 
it to the next learner and it was successfully reproduced we could not be sure 
whether it was because there was something adaptive about its underlying 
structure, or whether it was just easily identified and remembered because of the 
associations caused by the acronym. In order to overcome this, we first ‘decode’ 
each string to reveal its plain-text identity, and then apply our remapping procedure 










abc VTG VTG abc LHP
ddbe DDTR DVDTV dadba FLFHL
abdde VTDDR VTTGK abbcf LHHPX
Table 6.2: An example of the remapping procedure used in Experiment V to remove typing biases and 
the generation of acronyms. The underlying structure is maintained in plain-text form, visible only to 
the experimenter. The forms that participants actually see consist of capitalised consonant characters. 
After every generation,  these strings are decoded back into plain-text, and then re-encoded and 
checked for acronyms. If acronyms are present after the remapping, it is repeated with another set of 
characters until a solution is found.
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To recap, the characters a-f  were only used by the experimenter to keep track of  the 
underlying structure, and allow comparisons over generations. Participants actually 
received sequences like VTG, DDTR, and VTDDR. 
Participants
In total, 80 participants were recruited for the study, with the vast majority 
responding to an advertisement placed in the University of Edinburgh’s student 
employment service. Of this number 51 were female and 29 were male (age: M = 
21.72; S.D = 4.08). For this study it was decided that all participants should be 
monolingual speakers of English. In addition to this requirement, participants were 
only eligible if they had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were not dyslexic, 
and had not taken part in any of the previous experiments. As the experiment lasted 
less than 15 minutes, participants received £2 and were offered a biscuit for taking 
part. This study met the ethical guidelines set by the University of Edinburgh’s 
College of Humanities and Social Science. 
Procedure
Participants were given both verbal and written instructions about the format of the 
experiment (See Appendix C). At no point was the experiment referred to as a 
language task: participants were told that the experiment was exploring their recall 
abilities, but they were not told how many letter strings there were, nor were they 
informed about the recall test at the end. Training was conducted using an implicit 
learning technique. Strings were selected at random and appeared one at a time on 
the screen for exactly 1000ms, before disappearing. At this point, there was a 3000ms 
delay where participants could not use the keyboard. If participants attempted to 
start typing before the 3000ms wait period was over, their string would not appear 
on the screen and a beep would sound letting them know that they had typed too 
soon. This delay was included to ensure that participants were implicitly forced to 
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commit the string to short-term memory. After the delay, participants were 
prompted to reproduce the string that they had just seen by the appearance of a 
flashing cursor.  This process repeated as soon as the learner had entered their 
response, and continued until each of the 15 strings had been seen exactly six times. 
On average, this took a little over six minutes. 
Once this training phase had been completed, more instructions appeared on the 
screen. Participants were now told that they had seen 15 different letter strings, and 
that they needed to try to reproduce all 15 of them as best they could. This part of 
the experiment was self-paced. A counter at the top of the screen let participants 
know how many guesses they had left, but they were not given any feedback as to 
whether their answers were right or wrong. If the same string was entered twice, an 
error message appeared to let the participant know, and encourage them to make 
another attempt. Once the final string had been entered, participants were 
immediately given their absolute score, were given a quick questionnaire to fill in 
detailing whether they noticed any patterns in the languages or not, and were then 
fully debriefed about the purpose of the experiment. 
6.2.2 Measuring Structure and Learnability
In order to test our hypotheses, we need to be able to measure both structure and 
learnability in our languages. Recall that in §3.4.3 we defined language as a 
mapping between meanings and signals, and stated that a language was structured 
if similar signals get mapped onto similar meanings. Since we have removed 
meanings from our definition of language (a language is now just a set of 15 
different letter-strings), our definition of structure must also change. Signals in our 
languages have no external referents, so there can be no relationship between parts 
of the signal and any units of semantic or propositional content. However, that does 
not mean that signals cannot be composed of parts. 
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Here we can make a useful comparison to the way some animal communication 
systems work. For instance, the songs of some species of birds and cetaceans also 
convey no propositional content, yet nevertheless appear structured hierarchically, 
involving the re-use of smaller units to form larger units that get repeated (Payne & 
McVay, 1971; Nelson, 1973; Doupe & Kuhl, 1999; Rendell & Whitehead, 2005; 
Hurford, 2011). For instance, Brenowitz (1997) describes the hierarchical structure of 
birdsong in the following way: notes (or elements) combine to form syllables, which 
link together to form phrases (or motifs), which together constitute a given song type. 
Similar observations have been made concerning humpback whales (Payne & 
McVay, 1971), whose songs are generally composed of more than a dozen complex 
units organised into phrases, which get repeated to form a theme, which gets 
combined with other themes to form the song. Clearly, the structure of signals in 
these animals is combinatorial but not compositional. There is a syntax, even if there 
is no semantics.
We can use this insight then to help us describe what we expect the emergence of 
structure in our culturally transmitted signals to look like. In short, a language is 
structured if it contains reusable units which can be combined to form larger units. This is a 
fairly broad definition of structure, but it is good as long as we have a reliable way 
to measure whether signals contain units that are being reused. Fortunately, in the 
literature on artificial language learning, there is at least one technique that we can 
co-opt to do this: associative chunk strength (ACS) (Knowlton & Squire, 1994). 
According to Pothos & Bailey (2000:851):
“To compute the global associative chunk strength...we 
considered all the chunks that make up a given test item (i.e., 
all pairs or triplets of sequential symbols). The associative 
chunk strength of each chunk is defined as the number of 
times it appears in the training items. The chunk strength of 
a test item is calculated by averaging the associative 
strengths of all chunks in the item.”
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In other words, it tells us how often on average each chunk (i.e bigram or trigram) 
that makes up a given signal appears in the training data. We can illustrate it using 
an example. Let us imagine that a learner is given the following training items to 
learn from: abc, abd, and abcdef. Now let us imagine that during the test the learner 
produces the sequence abc. This signal is composed of three different chunks: ab, 
bc, and abc.  Examining the training input, we see that ab occurs three times, bc 
occurs twice, and abc also occurs twice. We calculate the ACS for this signal by 
adding these frequencies together (7) and dividing by the total number of chunks 
(3). This reveals that each chunk in this signal appeared on average 2.33 times in the 
training data. We can then calculate the average associative chunk strength (referred 
to as the global chunk strength) of all signals in our language by adding up the ACS 
score for each individual signal, and dividing this by fifteen. 
If global ACS is shown to increase over time, it means that fragments are being 
identified and re-used more often. This indicates two things: firstly that learners are 
grouping together individual characters in order to create these chunks, and 
secondly, that these chunks are being reproduced as independent units. In terms of 
determining whether those fragments themselves are going on and combining to 
form larger units above this level, this will have to be determined via qualitative 
analysis of the strings themselves5. Another way to think about ACS is to imagine its 
effect on the learner: in languages where ACS is high it makes items appear more 
familiar, independently of whether those items have been seen before or not6. This is 
because learners are effectively seeing ‘bits’ of signals that they have not seen, 
repeated or packaged up in the structures of signals that they have. Although we 
will not be using any kind of semantic bottleneck here and learners will see all of the 
data, increased global ACS should help facilitate acquisition in much the same way 
199
5 There are automatic ways to extract this information. For instance, Suzuki et al., (2006) 
managed to create an automated classifier system for analysing humpback whale song 
which could differentiate units and phrases using measurements of entropy and transitional 
probabilities. 
6 Morten Christiansen (personal communication).
that compositionality does -- by increasing the number of tokens that can be 
generalised from.
It is worth noting that we are using ACS in a slightly unusual way here compared to 
the literature. Typically ACS is measured to ensure that novel grammatical and 
ungrammatical test stimuli given to participants has the same distributional 
structure. This is because items with high chunk strength tend to get rated by 
participants as being more grammatical (Knowlton & Squire, 1994). In other words, 
researchers want to be sure that participants are correctly identifying grammatical 
structures because of rules they have acquired through training, and not because 
there are noticeable structural differences between the two sets of stimuli. As such, 
ACS is a known proxy for indicating the amount of structure in test items (Pothos & 
Bailey, 2000). However, it is usually a factor to be controlled when generating 
stimuli, and not a dependent variable to be analysed over the course of 
experimentation.
If we move on to how we determine learnability however, we find that we do not 
need to redefine anything. Like in our previous studies, a language is learnable to the 
extent that it is transmitted faithfully without error. However, we do encounter one 
problem when it comes to calculating transmission error. In the previous studies we 
had a way to pair signals from one generation with signals from the other; we used 
the meanings as a stable link. When we calculated the normalised Levenshtein 
Distance (nLD) (§3.4.3), we were effectively asking: “how similar was the signal 
used by learner 3 to describe a bouncing black triangle, to the signal used by learner 
2 to describe the same object?” The assumption was that signals, even if poorly 
learnt, were always associated with the meaning the were trying to express. Now 
that we have no meanings, how can we be sure which signal the learner was trying 
to replicate in their output?
Again, there is a measurement used in AGL studies which can help us: Global 
Similarity (Vokey & Brooks, 1992; Conway & Christiansen, 2005). Typically this 
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measurement is used to give an idea of how similar training and test sets are to one 
another based on the number of fragments shared between signals in each set, by 
first identifying the best possible alignment of those signals7. To simplify the measure 
slightly and to keep it comparable to our previous analyses, instead of basing our 
calculation on the number of shared fragments between signals, we will base it on 
the nLD error values between signals. This is a purely cosmetic change, which 
ensures that the data, when graphed, shows error increasing or decreasing instead 
of similarity.
The way that this works is as follows: first we must find the number of elements by 
which a signal in generation n differs from its closest match in generation n-1. In 
other words, we calculate the nLD for all possible pairings of signals in the 
language, and then find the alignment between them that gives the lowest nLD 
score for each signal. This measure nicely captures our intuition that some 
particularly salient signals might be used more than once as the basis for 
generalisation in the recall round8. Once we have found this alignment, we can 
calculate the average nLD score for the whole language, as described in §3.4.3.  
6.2.3 Results of Experiment V
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7 It is worth noting that for researchers designing AGL experiments, having training and test 
sets with high global similarity is undesirable. By insisting on selecting the alignment that 
maximises global similarity, they are therefore being highly conservative.
8 This aspect does make the measure subtly different to that used in the previous studies, 
which assumed that each and every signal had to be used as the basis for generalisation for 
another signal once and once only. As a result, I also developed a slightly different metric to 
the standard global similarity measure described here,  which matched this requirement by 
using a hill-climbing algorithm to identify the optimal alignment of signals (the alignment 
which gave us the lowest average nLD score, given the constraint that there must be a bi-
unique mapping between signals).  However, the results of applying this slightly more 
stringent bi-unique mapping version of global similarity to the experimental data was 
almost identical to the one obtained using the more standard metric, so is not included here.
Learnability Increases
The transmission error (measured as Global Similarity - see §6.3.2 for the description 
and exact modifications used) was calculated for each generation, and is shown in 
Figure 6.2 overleaf. If we examine all eight chains we find that although there is a lot 
of variation, there is an observable trend showing that error decreases over time. 
This can be seen more clearly in Figure 6.2.lower, which shows this same 
information, but in the form of a box-plot. Although there are a few outliers over the 
first few generations (one in the first generation who had notably poorer recall than 
the other participants in this condition, and another two learners in generations two 
and five who have notably better levels of recall), we can still see that the difference 
between the first and last learners appears substantial. 
A one-way paired t-test was run on the first and final generations, which showed 
that error was significantly toward the end of the chains (mean decrease of 0.725; 
t(7) = 4.6305,  P < 0.002) as compared to the beginnings. This result allows us to 
confirm the learnability hypothesis: languages are indeed becoming easier to learn 
over time. But how does this occur? It is to this question that we now turn.
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Figure 6.2: Global Similarity (error) decreases over generations in Experiment V. The upper graph 
shows every datapoint, whereas the lower graph shows the spread and descriptive statistics of the data 





































in more detail. Thick horizontal bars indicate the median,  boxes show the inter-quartile ranges, and 
whiskers indicate the maximum and minimum values or 2 standard deviations away from the mean, 
whichever is smaller.  Points outside this range are considered to be outliers. Here we find we have 
three points like this, in generations one, two and five.
Associated Chunk Strength Increases
In order to understand whether languages are becoming more structured over time, 
we first look to the ACS values. These provide us with an idea of how much re-use 
of fragments there is over time. These values are shown in Figure 6.3. From this we 
can see that there is a steady increase over time. If we run a one-way paired t-test on 
the values found at the beginning and the ends of each chain we find that this 
increase is massively significant (mean increase in ACS of 1.412; t(7) = 6.203, P < 
0.0003). This tells us that the number of distinct fragments that appear and are 
repeated by learners has significantly increased over time. In the first generation, an 
average of just over 1 fragment per signal is repeated between generations; by the 
final generation, this has risen to nearly 3 fragments per signal. Given the fact that 
the average character length of signals is just 4.175 (a slight increase from the 
average of 4 in the initial input), this increase is substantial.
This indicates that at the very least, participants are combining individual characters 
in order to create chunks or fragments which seem to act like reusable units. 
Therefore, in some sense we can interpret the increase in ACS as an increase in 
structure as we defined it earlier. However, if we want to understand what this 
means in reality, we need to see what these languages actually look like.
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Figure 6.3: Associated Chunk Strength increases over generations in Experiment V. This tells us how 
many times on average the chunks (bigrams and trigrams) that form signals in the language appeared 
in the training data. The fact that this number increases over time indicates that these chunks are 
being treated as independent units by learners, and being reused in greater numbers as the experiment 
goes on.
Final Language Structures
Just as we did in Experiment I-IV, we can analyse the languages that emerge over 
time qualitatively by examining the signals we find in the final generation. Table 6.3 
shows what the language depicted in Table 6.1 transformed into after being 
acquired by ten learners in succession. As you can see, there are a number of 
patterns that stand out in this system. Generally we can categorise strings as falling 
into distinct pattern types. The most striking of these are the four signals consisting 
of repeating triplets of characters. Next we find a group of four that all conform to 
































the general pattern of fcXaX9.  Some of these members overlap with another group 
which have the general pattern of fcXXf, so we can perhaps more parsimoniously 
describe these strings as being a type all together, starting with fcXXX. Finally, there 
are three strings that all contain the bigram db10, and two short strings which 

















Table 6.3: An example of one of the more interesting languages found in the final generation of 
Experiment V. This language has a great deal of structure in it. We can identify four broad categories 
of strings emerging, each with minor variations: strings with three repeating characters; strings 
beginning with the bigram fc; strings containing the bigram db; and two irregulars. Crossing these 
boundaries is an additional pattern - that of palindromes. This feature was highly salient to learners, 
with four learners reporting it in their debriefing questionnaires. 
Another feature that is striking about this particular language is that many of the 
strings (53%) are palindromic (i.e. have the same structure forwards as they do 
backwards). Furthermore, this pattern seems to apply more globally across the 
language as a whole, rather than being a feature of any of the individual pattern 
types we have already identified. If we examine the raw data for this chain (Chain 2, 
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9 The X’s indicate where variant characters can appear.
10  These share some similarities with some of the strings beginning fcXXX, but as the db 
combination does not appear anywhere else, it seems more parsimonious to analyse them as 
separate ‘types’. 
Appendix B5) we can see that this pattern emerges slowly, from no instances of 
palindromes in the initial language, to 2 in the first generation, 5 in generation five, 
7 in generation seven, etc., until we reach 8 in generation 10. Although this chain 
was not the most learnable, four of the participants were consciously aware that this 
pattern existed11. This was the only example of this type of ‘global pattern’ to arise 
in any chain however, and the majority of participants only reported spotting local 
similarities between strings.
A more representative example of the kinds of languages that emerged is shown in 
Table 6.4. This shows the language at both the initial and the final generations. Here 
you can see that strings again seem to form groups that pattern together, but this 
time do not seem to have any higher organisational patterns. There does appear to 
be some internal structure to the signals however: certain chunks only appear at the 
end of strings (e.g. -dad, -da, -ae), whilst others only appear initially (e.g. fec-, fce-, 
fed-). The fact that these latter languages were learned much more easily than the 
initial languages appears to indicate that participants are sensitive to these patterns, 
and that they facilitate acquisition.
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11 Only one out of the four learners who noticed this pattern actually explained the system as 
working by having palindromes however (gen9).  The remaining three reported this 
language as “having a rythym [sic.]” (gen7), “there is a pattern when you type - dum dum 
DUM dum dum” (gen10) and “you get lulled into the pattern on the keyboard...you need to 
leave your fingers on the keys so you can type quickly” (gen5).
















Table 6.4: An example of one of the more typical languages found in the final generation of 
Experiment V. The distribution of fragments in the final language of chain C show many strong 
patterns. With the exception of the four three letter strings, there seem to be strong restrictions on 
which bigrams and trigrams start and end signals. As this final language was learned much more 
easily than the initial language, we can conclude that these patterns are aiding learners in their task.
6.2.4 Summary
This experiment was designed to try to isolate the effect of sequence memory 
constraints on cultural transmission. By modifying our previous experimental 
framework to remove as many biases as possible (including, most notably, the 
pressure being exerted upon signals to adapt to reflect the structure of the 
meanings) we attempted to answer the question of whether signals would still 
become more learnable and structured over time, even in the absence of any 
language-like task. To that end, initial languages consisting of  carefully constructed 
letter-strings that contained as few regularities as possible were passed along a 
series of eight transmission chains. 
Transmission error was calculated between each of the ten generations and found to 
decrease over time, indicating that the languages were becoming easier to learn. The 
change in distribution of bigrams and trigrams over time was investigated by 
measuring the associated chunk strength of fragments between generations. This 
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revealed that certain chunks began to form and be re-used more often than others. 
Analysing the emergent languages descriptively revealed the appearance of 
patterns, particularly at the beginnings and ends of signals, that participants 
appeared sensitive to. Given the design of the experiment, the only explanation for 
the appearance of these distributional patterns is that they arise from sequential 
learning biases of the learners being amplified by cultural transmission.
6.3 Discussion of Experiment V
Although participants in Experiments I-IV are all given a learning, rather than a 
communication task, in Experiment V we have almost removed every trace of 
language. What, therefore, can this experiment tell us about how linguistic 
communication evolved?  As the brief survey of the literature on sequence learning 
indicated (§6.1), several proponents have suggested that language has adapted to be 
learnable by domain-general, rather than language-specific, learning biases. In order 
to make this argument convincing, we require evidence not only that the domain-
general learning biases that humans possess can more easily process certain types of 
structure, but that those same domain-general learning biases can actually generate 
such structures. This experiment provides that evidence.
The first thing to note, therefore, is that in spite of the fact that little if anything is 
linguistic about this study, we find similar outcomes arising here as we do with the 
other more obviously linguistic experiments. This is interesting, as it indicates that 
the same underlying process is at work in both cases. We find cumulative 
adaptation resulting in better recall over time. The second point that can be made 
concerns the point at which we started the previous experiments. In constructing 
our initial languages for Experiments I-IV, we sampled from a set of pre-generated 
CV-syllables. The reason we did that was because we know that language is, in a 
sense, composed of these low-level units which have not been assigned with a 
209
meaning12 . In order to create meaningful distinctions at higher levels of 
organisation, we require these ‘worker units’ to do the hard graft. But where do they 
come from?  How do they get their structure?  This experiment can perhaps speak to 
questions like these.
To recap, when we transmitted signals without any meanings, what we got out at 
the end was the appearance of small chunks that began to get reused with greater 
frequency amongst all the signals in the language. These chunks were seen to 
emerge because of domain-general constraints on sequence memory being 
amplified by the process of cultural transmission. Language is full of meaningless 
units such as these. An implication from this work then is that these constraints 
could have been an important factor which shaped linguistic structure. If this is the 
case, there is no reason to suspect that this process was limited only to a stage in 
language evolution where there were only meaningless signals. Sequence learning 
biases are likely still operating and exerting a subtle force on language today, but as 
with the case of the creative capacities of children only being evident in cases of new 
language formation, and not when acquiring a fully-fledged language (Senghas & 
Coppola, 2001; see §3.2.2), we may only witness these effects in unusual 
circumstances.
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12 Note that I am not suggesting that a syllable is inherently a meaningless unit - of course, a 





7.1 Looking Back: In Answer to Earlier Questions
We began this thesis with three questions in mind. Namely:
1. Why is language structured the way it is and not some other way?
2. How does the process of cultural transmission give rise to language structure?
3. Can features of language structure which appear to be designed for 
communication evolve in the absence of a) actual communication, and b) 
intentional design?
We should now be in a position to provide some answers. This section will tackle 
each of these questions in turn.
7.1.1 Why is language structured the way it is and not some other way? 
In Chapters 2 and 3  I reviewed literature which suggested a partial answer to the 
first question: language has the structural features it has because those are the 
features that emerge when initially unstructured systems get culturally transmitted 
via iterated learning. In other words, since language is a complex adaptive system in 
its own right, capable of evolving culturally, these processes of cultural transmission 
could have an explanatory role to play in understanding the emergence of structure. 
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Although this intuition had previously been verified as being logically sound in 
computer simulations and mathematical models, the experiments described in 
Chapters 4-6 demonstrate that the concept is applicable to human learners. These 
studies show that language-like structural relationships can emerge in initially 
unstructured artificial languages, when they are culturally acquired via iterated 
learning along linear chains of human participants. Importantly, we can 
demonstrate a direct link between specific constraints being placed on languages 
during transmission and the structures that emerge. In other words, we can account 
for why the artificial languages were structured the way they were and not some 
other way, by specifically identifying and manipulating these pressures to different 
effects.
In particular, Experiments I-IV show that the signals in a language always adapt to 
reflect the structure of the meanings that they express. However, the relationship 
between signals and meanings is not simple. In Experiments I and II when there 
were only pressures acting on systems to be learnable, we found that the meaning-
space became reorganised in response to this requirement. Meanings became 
underspecified by signals. Importantly, however, this underspecification was 
adaptive: rather than affecting meanings and signals at random, there was a kind of 
systematic levelling or recategorisation process at work which led to semantically 
related objects being given the same signal. This made these systems very easy to 
learn and reproduce in full, even when participants were only being trained on half 
of the data (Chapter 4). In Experiments III and IV on the other hand, when there 
were pressures being placed on the system to not only be learnable, but also 
expressive, a different kind of structure emerged. Here signals evolved to express 
meanings, or parts of meanings, compositionally.
In Experiment V there were no meanings for signals to adapt to. In this study 
(described in Chapter 6) many elements of the previous studies were stripped out, 
leaving a task that was not remotely language-like. The purpose was to investigate 
whether sequence memory biases could give rise to structure in signals. This was 
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indeed found to be the case. From an initial starting point of string-sets that 
contained very little regularity or repetition of sequences of characters, the systems 
evolved to have increasingly learnable distributional structures. 
In sum, the languages in our experiments came to have the structures that they did 
because they were adapting to pressures arising from transmission. Some of these 
pressures were external to the learners and imposed upon the language without 
their knowledge (e.g. the semantic bottleneck, filtering) and others were internal to 
the learners (e.g. biases on sequence learning). As Chapter 4 discussed, these 
pressures get exerted at different points in the transmission cycle, and only some of 
them are directly controllable by the experimenter. Therefore, it is important to 
remember that although we have focused our explanations on the three kinds of 
bottleneck named above, there are others at work also. For instance, we would 
predict that constraints on sequence memory would also be playing a role in 
shaping the languages in Experiments I and IV, even though we cannot directly 
detect it.
7.1.2 How does the process of cultural transmission give rise to language 
structure?
Turning to the question of exactly how processes of cultural transmission give rise to 
language structure, we can use the fact that we have the entire recorded histories of 
all of the languages in the chains to track the evolution of individual signal forms, or 
in the case of compositional languages, parts of signals, over time. This kind of 
analysis technique was demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, and revealed that there 
were clear lines of descent between signals. The amount of signal variants was 
found to decrease over time as a result of competition. In this way, the system 
slowly emerged.
One of the key findings of the mathematical models of iterated learning described in 
Chapters 3 and 5 suggests that cultural transmission works to amplify the prior 
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learning biases of agents, thus giving rise to structure. We saw in Experiment III 
how constraints on cultural transmission (in this particular case, a combination of 
the semantic bottleneck and filtering) increase the amount of regularity in the 
language as a whole, in virtue of the participants’ training data containing more 
structure locally. Generalisation based upon this locally more regular structure leads 
to increasing structure globally. 
These same mathematical models also make different predictions about the role of 
cultural transmission in processes of iterated learning. In one model (Griffiths & 
Kalish, 2005; 2007) the outcome of iterated learning has been shown to be just a 
reflection of the learning biases of the agents. In other words, cultural transmission 
is not adding anything to the process or leaving any mark on the resulting system 
that was not already, in a sense, present in the mind of the agents a priori. Other 
models show that by altering the way agents select between competing hypotheses 
about the data (Kirby et al., 2007), or by changing the population dynamics of the 
models (Ferdinand & Zuidema, 2009), the outcome of iterated learning is modified 
by cultural transmission. The experiments support this latter idea that transmission 
is adding something. As an example, the fact that we found a difference between the 
results of our first experiment (which had no requirement to be expressive) and our 
third experiment (which did have a requirement to be expressive) shows that it is 
the manipulation of the way languages were being transmitted which is responsible 
for the effect, and not just the learning biases of participants alone.
7.1.3 Can features of language structure which appear to be designed for 
communication evolve in the absence of a) actual communication, and b) 
intentional design?
None of the experiments contain any communicative element to them. Participants 
were not learning the languages in an interactive environment or using the 
languages ‘for’ anything. In Experiment V in particular, the stimuli was not even 
referred to as a language; participants were recruited on the understanding that they 
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were to take part in a recall experiment. Yet nevertheless all experiments show that 
the transmitted systems adapt over time and become structured. As participants are 
not actually using the language for communication, how can we be sure that the 
structure that appears is in fact of the type that is useful for communication? At least 
in Experiments I-IV, it is important to note that the types of structure that arise 
(underspecification and compositionality) are widely found in human language. 
Here we know that they underlie communication - compositionality, in allowing for 
greater productivity in language, and underspecification in allowing objects to be 
categorised together and assigned a common label (for example, the common noun 
‘chair’). The structures that arose in Experiment V are harder to interpret, as it is 
difficult to know what the letters in the signal strings correspond to in language. 
Nevertheless, the fact that learnability improves over time is an indicator that the 
signals at the end of the study would be better candidates to be used as labels if 
meanings were suddenly introduced than the signals at the beginning of the study.
In terms of the signals evolving in the absence of intentional design, again we can 
look to the contrast between the results found in Experiment I and Experiment III. 
The filtering condition was invisible to participants. Even if they had been making 
intentional changes to the language in the first experiment (for instance, by choosing 
to only try to memorise difficult signals, or ignore minor variations, or use 
mnemonic tricks for recall, or by having any goal other than straightforward 
reproduction of the signal-meaning pairs), they would have had no way of knowing 
to perform a different action in the third experiment. Therefore, we can safely 
conclude that the differences we saw between conditions were not the result of any 
goal directed behaviour by learners.
7.2 Implications for Language Evolution
As the review in Chapter 2 hopefully highlighted, the field of language evolution 
has a number of divisions within its ranks. This is a good sign of healthy debate. 
Broadly speaking, theories of language evolution can be separated along two main 
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lines: on the issue of language-specific learning biases, and on the role of cultural 
transmission. On the one hand there are researchers who hold that language must 
be reliant on innate knowledge specific to language (e.g. Chomsky, 1965; Pinker, 
1994), whereas others stress the importance of general cognitive mechanisms (e.g. 
Elman et al., 1996; Christiansen & Chater, 2008). Separately, there are also researchers 
divided over the importance of cultural transmission in explanations of language 
evolution, with some placing no emphasis on it (e.g. Pinker & Bloom, 1990) and 
others who contend that it actually does some work (e.g. Brighton et al., 2005). What, 
if anything, do these experiments contribute to our understanding of these issues?
The results of these studies on human learners do not, on their own, tell us anything 
about the nature of learning biases involved in language. It could be argued that the 
fact that we see language-like structures emerging here is simply a reflection of the 
underlying linguistic capabilities that is the biological legacy of Homo sapiens 
everywhere. If this is the conclusion that some readers draw from this work, then it 
is one I can just about live with. However, what cannot be in doubt is the fact that 
constraints on cultural transmission are actively ‘doing something’ here. The 
participants in different experimental conditions did not have different processing 
mechanisms: what shaped the different structural outcomes was the data that was 
being transmitted and how it was affected by the external manipulations we made. 
Therefore, one thing that these studies confirm without a doubt is that theories of 
language evolution need to take cultural evolution more seriously.
I said that I could live with the reader coming away with the conclusion that 
humans have language-specific learning biases. That is not to say that I think that is 
the right conclusion however. The point cannot be established based on these results 
alone, but needs to be understood in the wider empirical context. The starting point 
for all of these studies were findings coming from computer simulations of iterated 
learning. In these models, agents are not rewarded for successful communication. 
They have no pre-existing language. They have no language-specific learning biases. 
What they do have are general cognitive mechanisms that allow them to process 
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sequences, the ability to form categories and make generalisations, and the 
willingness to copy others. 
Given that the experiments with human learners essentially replicate the behaviour 
of these much simpler agents, it seems that the most parsimonious explanation is 
that universal structural properties of language do not require language-specific 
brain mechanisms.  If we follow this argument to its natural conclusion then, one 
implication that we can take away from these studies is that compositional language 
did not necessarily require much to get off the ground. As long as there is a basic 
desire to distinguish between different objects (a need for expressivity), and some 
desire to copy the vocalisations of others (a need for learnability), cultural evolution 
will deliver.
7.3 Key Contributions
The key findings of the five studies tell us a number of interesting things. Firstly, 
that it is possible to witness the cultural evolution of language in the laboratory; 
secondly, that results from computer simulations of the process can, to a large 
extent, be said to generalise to human learners; and thirdly, that language adapts to 
those pressures placed upon it during transmission. The importance of these three 
results should not be underestimated. 
Evolutionary linguistics is a field that has traditionally suffered (or at least been 
perceived to suffer) from a lack of data. These experiments provide a new way for 
us to extract information relevant to understanding the processes that underlie the 
emergence of language-like systems. It is hoped that the development of this 
experimental methodology will open the door for more research in this area. Indeed, 
the early signs give us reason for optimism. Several studies which acknowledge this 
framework have already been conducted, extending the work presented here by: 
exploring different population structures (Winters, 2009; Line, 2010); manipulating 
characteristics of the meaning-spaces (Beqa et al., 2008; Matthews et al, 2010); 
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investigating regularisation (Smith & Wonnacott, 2010); exploring different 
modalities (Tamariz, Brown & Murray 2010); and even attempting to compare the 
performance of adults and children (Flaherty & Kirby, 2008). The recent growth in 
this area has recently been charted in a Trends in Cognitive Science paper (Scott-
Phillips & Kirby, 2010).
That the results of these experiments also support computational simulations of the 
process enables us to not only respond to critics of the modelling approach and 
make our findings more accessible to researchers in other fields, but it also enables 
us to better understand the nature of the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the 
appearance of structure in these systems. Likewise, where results deviate from those 
predicted by simulations, it serves to highlight areas where our modelling 
assumptions are incorrect. Thus I hope to have demonstrated that both research 
methodologies are mutually supportive, and have a greater impact when their 
results are viewed together rather than individually.
Finally, the discovery that language does in fact adapt to constraints arising during 
transmission adds something concrete to our understanding of how language might 
have evolved in our species; namely, that biological evolution is not the only 
adaptive mechanism capable of generating linguistic structure. This should not be 
taken as suggesting that biological adaptations play an insignificant role in language 
emergence, however. One of the themes that recurs throughout the thesis is that 
cultural transmission works to amplify any biases present either in the learner, or 
arising from the transmission process itself. In some sense, the outcome of this work 
is the generation of more questions. Where do learning biases come from? And also: 
what neurological mechanisms support iterated learning in humans?  How did those 
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Instructions to participants in Experiments I-IV




Raw data from 4 transmission chains in Experiment I
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black hopa vulepami vulepami vulepami nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
bounce circle blue manehowu nemine vulepami nepa vulepami nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
bounce circle red wuneho nemine lepa vulepami maho maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
bounce square black pamamapo vulepami vulepami vulepami nemene nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
bounce square blue lemipo veneme lepa vulepami nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
bounce square red howu nemine nemene maho maho maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
bounce triangle black nehowu pamapapo vulepami nemene nemene nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
bounce triangle blue nemi mahole nemi vulepami nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
bounce triangle red wunene pali nepa vulepami maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal circle black lipapo nepa nepa nepa maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal circle blue poliho vemine nemene nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal circle red maho maho maho maho maho maho maho nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal square black nehomami pamapapo pamapapo maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal square blue powuma lemi maho maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal square red wumaleli maho maho maho maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal triangle black lilema pamapapo pamapapo nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal triangle blue lemaho nemi nepa maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
horizontal triangle red lemilipo maho nepa nemene maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
spiral circle black lepali mapo vulepami pamano pamano pamano pamano nepa nepa nepa nepa
spiral circle blue lemi nemene wulepami nemene nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
spiral circle red nemine lepa nemine maho maho maho maho nepa nepa nepa nepa
spiral square black pohomali wulepami vulepami maho nepa nepa nepa nemene nemene nepa nepa
spiral square blue maholi waheme nemene pamano nemene nemene nemene nemene nemene nemene nemene
spiral square red wupa nemi maho maho maho nepa nepa nemene nemene nepa nepa
spiral triangle black wulepami wulepami maho nepi nemene nemene nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
spiral triangle blue nepa nemu nepa nepi vulepami nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
spiral triangle red mahomine nemine lepa maho maho maho nepa nepa nepa nepa nepa
Table showing raw data for Chain A in Experiment I. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black lema lehe lehe lehe lehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
bounce circle blue manane nawilehe nawilehe nawilehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
bounce circle red lehe lehemu nawilehe nawilehe lehe lehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
bounce square black ninamahe lehe lehe lehe lehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
bounce square blue nawipuko lehe nawilehe nawilehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
bounce square red puneniko lehe nawilehe nawilehe lehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
bounce triangle black maheko lehe lehe lehe lehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
bounce triangle blue hena nawilehe nawilehe nawilehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
bounce triangle red leheni lehe lehe lehe lehe lehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe ninalehe
horizontal circle black konema nepomu koneko mopuno nina winako lehe nina lehe nina nina
horizontal circle blue nepunani manehe mopulau mopulau nina lehe lehe lehe lehe nina nina
horizontal circle red punema koneko mopunau mopulau ninakau mopulau mopulau mopulau nina nina nina
horizontal square black naniwi koneko koneko mopulau nina nina nina nina nina nina nina
horizontal square blue lemahene punawi koneko mopulau nina nina lehe lehe lehe lehe nina
horizontal square red koneko koneko nekolau mopulau mopulau lehe lehe lehe nina nina nina
horizontal triangle black puleni nepomu ninakoneko nina nina lehe lehe lehe nina nina nina
horizontal triangle blue helewina ninapomau ninapolau mopulau nina nina nina nina nina nina nina
horizontal triangle red koma konekowi ninakolau ninakau ninakau nina nina nina lehe nina nina
spiral circle black winako winako winako winako winako winako wina winako wina wina wina
spiral circle blue nawi nepomuni winapu wina wina wina wina wina wina wina wina
spiral circle red wina winamako wina wina wina wina wina wina wina wina wina
spiral square black wile makoko mopunu wina wina wina wina winako wina wina wina
spiral square blue punawi nepumehe mopuno wina wina wina wina wina wina wina wina
spiral square red lekopule makomu mopune wina wina wina wina wina wina wina wina
spiral triangle black makoko winako winako wina wina winako winako winako winako winako winako
spiral triangle blue malehewi nawikok wina wina wina wina wina wina wina wina winako
spiral triangle red makopu wina wina wina wina wina wina wina wina wina winako
Table showing raw data for Chain B in Experiment I. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black kinimapi kimei hepini tuge tupim tupim minku miniku miniku miniku miniku
bounce circle blue wikuki miwn miniku tupim tupim tupim miniku miniku miniku miniku miniku
bounce circle red kikumi miheniw hepini tupim tupim tupim miniku miniku miniku miniku miniku
bounce square black miwiniku pemini nige miniku mihunu mihunu miniku miniku tupim tupim tupim
bounce square blue pinipi kupini tuge tuge tupim tupim tupin miniku tupim tupim tupim
bounce square red kihemiwi pon mihenu mihunu miniku tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim
bounce triangle black miwimi poi poi poi poi miniku miniku miniku tupin tupin tupin
bounce triangle blue nipi mhip mpo tuge miniku tupim tupin tupin tupin tupin tupin
bounce triangle red wige kuwpi tupim miniku miniku miniku tupin miniku tupin tupin tupin
horizontal circle black nihepi mip nige tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
horizontal circle blue wigemi mpo nige tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
horizontal circle red mahekuki miniku tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
horizontal square black wimaku nige nige mihenu tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
horizontal square blue miniki miniku tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
horizontal square red gepinini poh tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
horizontal triangle black wikima tuge nige nige [null] tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
horizontal triangle blue nipikuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
horizontal triangle red hema weg mpo tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge tuge
spiral circle black pikuhemi kuhepi hepini tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi poi poi
spiral circle blue kimaki wige tupim tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi poi poi
spiral circle red pimikihe mie tupim tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi poi poi
spiral square black gepihemi hepinimi hepini mihenu tupim tupim poi poi poi poi poi
spiral square blue kunige himini miniku tupim tupim tupim tupin poi poi poi poi
spiral square red miki hipe tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi
spiral triangle black mihe pobo nige poi poi poi poi poi poi poi poi
spiral triangle blue winige tupim tupim tupim tupim tupim tupin tupin poi poi poi
spiral triangle red kinimage hipe poi tupim tupim tupim tupim poi poi poi poi
Table showing raw data for Chain C in Experiment I. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black keni wema wepa wepa wema wipe wema wema wepa wepa wikepi
bounce circle blue wumepihu wape wape hukela wema wawakipi wakepi wema wema wepa hidoku
bounce circle red nihulu nihulu niveli niveli niveli wepa hudulu wikepi wikepi wikepi wikepi
bounce square black pime piwe wepa wepa wipe wuwu wepa wepa wepa wepa wikepi
bounce square blue memelu hukile nihulu hekulu heduku hidulu wakepi wema wepa hidoku hidoku
bounce square red meluwa nihulu nihulu niveli wema wawkipi wema wema wikepi wikepi wikepi
bounce triangle black wawapike wawapike wawapike wipe wema wipe wema wema wepa wepa wikepi
bounce triangle blue wuhame huwe wipe hekulu hedulu nihulu wema wikepi wema hidoku hidoku
bounce triangle red wani pikewa wawakipe hekulu wepa wema wema wikepi wikepi wikepi wikepi
horizontal circle black wapiwu pime wipe wipe wipe wepa wipe wepa wepa wipe wipe
horizontal circle blue mehuniha niweli wema wema wepa nihulu wepa wepa wipe wepa wipe
horizontal circle red niluha peluma wepa nirulu wema nihulu wepa wepa wepa wepa wikepi
horizontal square black kemepi wume nihulu wipe wipe wipe wipe wipe wipe wipe wepa
horizontal square blue meni pewa hukela nirulu wema wawakipi wepa wepa wepa wepa wepa
horizontal square red kepihuwu wepamehu hukela nihulu wepa nihulu wepa wepa wepa wikepi wepa
horizontal triangle black piwu pime nihulu wipe wipe jiduku wipe wepa wepa wipe wipe
horizontal triangle blue wuke piwe wema wipe wepa wepa wepa wepa wepa wipe wipe
horizontal triangle red huhani humepa wawakipe wepa wema nihulu wepa wepa wepa wipe wikepi
spiral circle black nimepa piwe wepa wipe wepa wepa hudulu hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku
spiral circle blue mepikelu wuhili huke;a wepa wepa wepa hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku
spiral circle red nimeni lihuke wipe wipe niveli wepa wakepi wikepi wikepi hidoku hidoku
spiral square black lume luwema wepa wepa hedulu hiduku hudulu hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku
spiral square blue kewaha hukela wema wakala nihulu wawakipe hudulu hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku
spiral square red kewamewu meka hukela hekulu wawakipe wawakipi hudulu hidoku wikepi wikepi hidoku
spiral triangle black luwaha pehilu wawakipe wepa wepa hiduku hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku
spiral triangle blue wapi pikelu wawakipe wawakipe nihulu wpie hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku hidoku
spiral triangle red humeni nihuli wema wipe wakepi wipe nihulu wikepi wikepi wikepi hidoku





Raw data from 4 transmission chains in Experiment II
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black huhunigu niguki wagukike mukoni muhapo magini nucapo nucapo nukapo nucapo nukapo
bounce circle blue kemuniwa kekoguni mugike mukoni nucapo mukapo mukapo mucapo mukapo nucapo nucapo
bounce circle red kihupo hugukiki nupokiki mukapo muhapo mucapo mucapo mucapo mucapo nucapo nucapo
bounce square black wakiki huwiku mugike mukoni mutapo nucapo nucapo nucapo nucapo nucapo nucapo
bounce square blue pokikehu nugukike nugikinu koni mukapo mugini mukapo mucapo nukapo mucapo nucapo
bounce square red waguhuki muguki wekike mukapo muckapo mucapo mukapo mukapo nucapo mucapo nukapo
bounce triangle black nihu wakiki koni koni mugeni mugenini nucapo nucapo nukapo nucapo nucapo
bounce triangle blue niguki wukeki koni koni mukapo mucapo mukapo mukapo nucapo nukapo nukapo
bounce triangle red koni koni mukoni mukoni muhapo nucapo mucapo mukapo nucapo mucapo nucapo
horizontal circle black muwapo muguki wapo kapo kapo hapo hapo hapo kapo hapo hapo
horizontal circle blue powa wapo nuha hapo hapo hapo hapo hapo kapo hapo hapo
horizontal circle red hukinimu niguki hapo kapo kapo kapo kapo kapo kapo hapo hapo
horizontal square black wako muwapo mukeki nugeki kapo hapo hapo hapo kapo hapo hapo
horizontal square blue hukeko waku kapo hapo hapo hapo hapo hapo hapo hapo hapo
horizontal square red pohumu gukike kapo huni hapo kapo kapo kapo kapo hapo hapo
horizontal triangle black muko nihu huni kapo kini hapo hapo hapo hapo hapo hapo
horizontal triangle blue kokeguke nihu koni koni hapo hapo hapo kapo hapo hapo hapo
horizontal triangle red kimu wakeke huni kapo kapo kapo kapo kapo kapo hapo hapo
spiral circle black kekewa wakeko nugeke kapo wakeke wunigni maginini waginini wagnini wagini waginini
spiral circle blue komuhuke wakigu huguni wakeke wakeke nugini wagini wagini wagini wagini waginini
spiral circle red kopo kopo nugoni nugikini nugikini mugingi nugikini nugokini nugakini wagini waginini
spiral square black huwa wakuki wakeke wakeki mugenini wagigini nugini wagini waginini waginini waginini
spiral square blue hukike huguni kapo noguni wakeke wagini wagini wagini waginini waginini wagini
spiral square red ponikiko nuguki mukapo wakeke nugikini mugini wagini wagini nugakini waginini waginini
spiral triangle black kowagu guni wakiki wakiki wakeni mugini magini waginini wagini nuakini macini
spiral triangle blue kokihuko muguni hapo nuguni mugeni mugini wagini wagini waginini nuakini waginini
spiral triangle red kiwanike nuguki wakeki nugeni wakeke wagini wagini nugakini nugokini nuakini nakaini
Table showing raw data for Chain A in Experiment II. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black kuwo nahenko lugigipi gulo gulo naheku pulo pulo pulo pulo pulo
bounce circle blue wonagi huwo lugigipi legigipi legigipi lugipigi gulo neheku nahepu nehepu nepu
bounce circle red pelu gulo gulo gulo naheku naheku pulo pulo nagigipi nagigipi pili
bounce square black wogipena huko naheku lugigipi lugigipi naheku pulo pulo pulo pulo nagigihi
bounce square blue napena huko henko naheku legigipi legigipi naheki neheki naheki nehepu pulo
bounce square red penapiku penapiku naheku naheku naheku legigipi pili pili pili pili nepi
bounce triangle black gapinahe naheku gunko gunko nagigeki gunko pulo pulo pulo pulo nepi
bounce triangle blue hewoku luwenko naheku henko nageku legigipi pulo neheki naheki nehepi nepu
bounce triangle red giku giko naheku naheku nageku nekigeki pili pili pili pili pili
horizontal circle black lugigipi lugigipi pelu gulo gulo gulo naheku nagegepi pulo nepu pulo
horizontal circle blue naheku ligigipi gulo gulo gulo pilu nagegepi hepu nepu nepu pulo
horizontal circle red kuluwo naheku gulo gulo gulo pihu nagigipi pulo pili nepu pulo
horizontal square black wogiluku lugowo pelu pilu pilu pilu nagigipe pulo pulo nepu pili
horizontal square blue gikuna pihu pihu pihu pilu pihu pili nehepu nehi napu nepi
horizontal square red napeheku guko neku pihu pihu pihu gulo nagigipi pili pili pili
horizontal triangle black penalu giku pelu pilu pilu gulo hepu nepu nepu nepu nepi
horizontal triangle blue pihena pihu pihu pilu pilu pihu hipu nepu nepu nepu nepu
horizontal triangle red naku naku pilu pihu pihu pihu nagigipi pili pili pili pili
spiral circle black lugana galu nekigeki nekigeki lugigipi gulo nagigipi pulo pulo pulo pulo
spiral circle blue heku henku heki legigipi gulo nekigeki nagigipi nehepu nahepu naheki nepi
spiral circle red wonalupe lugibi legigipi naheku gulo legigipi nagigipi nagigipi nagegepi nagigipi pulo
spiral square black galukuna wugo gelu lugigipi lugigipi naheku naheku nagegepi pulo pulo pulo
spiral square blue napiwo naheku lugigipi legigipi legigipi naheku nahepu nagegepi nahepu nehepu nagighi
spiral square red lupiwo naheku lugigipi lugigipi lugigipi legigipi pili nagigipi nagigipi nagegepi pulo
spiral triangle black nahe pelu geki henko lugigipi legigipi naheku neheku pulo pulo pulo
spiral triangle blue pihe lungo naheku lugigipi legigipi legigipi pulo nehepu neheki nehepi nepi
spiral triangle red galu nahenko heki heku lugigipi lugigipi pulo nagigipi nagigipi nagegepi pulo
Table showing raw data for Chain B in Experiment II. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black kalu humoneki humonpiki luneki manolaki trilaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
bounce circle blue mola kahupiki kumopiki nane lunaki lunalaki lunalaki lunlaki lunolaki lunolaki lunolaki 
bounce circle red pihukimo nemalo nane humoneki lunaki trilaki manolaki manolaki humolaki humolaki humolaki 
bounce square black moki kunapiki humonpiki nano mano manolaki manolaki manolaki trilaki trilaki manolaki 
bounce square blue luneki kaneki humopiki nuleki manolaki manolaki manolaki humalaki manolaki manolaki lunalaki 
bounce square red lanepi lahupino kumonaki trileki trilaki manolaki manolaki humalaki humalaki humalaki humalaki 
bounce triangle black nane nane humoneki huleki mulaki trilaki trilaki trilaki trilaki trilaki trilaki 
bounce triangle blue kalakihu hokune humopiki trileki trilaki lunlaki lunlaki trilaki trilaki trilaki trilaki 
bounce triangle red mokihuna naki nane luneki trilaki trilaki trilaki trilaki trilaki trilaki trilaki 
horizontal circle black nelu maneki malo mano mano mano mano mano mano mano mano 
horizontal circle blue kanehu malo korane naleki lunaki manolaki manolaki mano mano mano mano 
horizontal circle red namopihu kuneki luneki luniki humalaki mano mano mano mano mano mano 
horizontal square black lumonamo huneki humano mano mano mano mano mano mano mano mano 
horizontal square blue kinehune humonamo nari maleki mulaki manolaki manolaki mano mano mano mano 
horizontal square red lahupine kahune kuneki naleki mano mano manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
horizontal triangle black kapihu malo humona mano mano mano mano mano mano mano mano 
horizontal triangle blue humo humo humo keleki manolaki mano mano mano mano mano mano 
horizontal triangle red lahupiki luneki luneki muleki trilaki mano manolaki mano mano mano mano 
spiral circle black pilu malo kuneki naleki mano mano mano mano mano mano manolaki 
spiral circle blue neki kahune pilu luneki lunaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
spiral circle red pinemohu luneki luneki nane humalaki manolaki manolaki humalaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
spiral square black kilamo pilu pilu mano mano mano mano manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
spiral square blue kahuki pilu pilu luneki humalki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
spiral square red neluka namupiku kuneki meneki mano humalaki humalaki humalaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
spiral triangle black luki luneki kuneki mano mano mano manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
spiral triangle blue namola kuneki pilu luneki trilaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki trilaki 
spiral triangle red lumoka haneki luneki maleki kelaki humalaki humalaki manolaki manolaki manolaki manolaki 
Table showing raw data for Chain C in Experiment II. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black melipa mawehika meme liga liga liga liga liga liga liga liga
bounce circle blue pamu pamu paweliga hinoliki hinoliki paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli
bounce circle red mewega linuhiko memenu hinoliki meme meme meme meme meme meme meme 
bounce square black gamuwe maweliga liga liga liga liga liga liga liga liga liga
bounce square blue linuhiko luhiko hinoliki hinoliki hinoliki hinoliki hinoliki hinoliki paweli paweli paweli
bounce square red komehi hikomeli highili meme meme meme meme meme meme meme meme 
bounce triangle black hiko hiko hiko highili liga liga liga liga liga liga liga
bounce triangle blue palime palime pawemeli hinoliki hinoliki hinoliki hinoliki hinoliki paweli paweli paweli
bounce triangle red gawe gawe hiko meme meme meme meme meme meme meme meme 
horizontal circle black hiwenuko linu meme meme memenu liga liga liga liga liga liga
horizontal circle blue nuhiwenu liga meme menu paweli memenu memenu memenu menenu memenu memenu
horizontal circle red memenu memenu liga meme meme meme meme meme meme memenu memenu
horizontal square black paweko liga liga menu meme liga liga liga liga liga liga
horizontal square blue konulipa pawehiko meme liga memenu memenu memenu memenu honolike honolike memenu
horizontal square red linu menu menu meme meme meme meme meme meme meme meme 
horizontal triangle black mume meme hiko liga liga liga liga liga liga liga liga
horizontal triangle blue pawemeli mume liga menu paweli paweli paweli memenu menenu memenu memenu
horizontal triangle red liga liga menu paweliga meme meme meme meme meme meme meme 
spiral circle black melime melime meme hinoliki liga liga liga liga liga liga liga
spiral circle blue munuko pawemeli paweli meme paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli
spiral circle red komume hikoliga paweli paweli meme meme meme meme meme meme meme
spiral square black numekopa mumehiko liga meme paweli liga liga liga liga liga liga
spiral square blue wega notomeli paweliga paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli
spiral square red higahili highili paweli meme meme meme meme meme meme meme meme 
spiral triangle black pawe pawemali hiko memenu liga liga liga liga liga liga liga
spiral triangle blue gahi paweliga paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli paweli honolike honolike honolike
spiral triangle red muwemeko pawe memenu memenu meme meme meme meme meme meme meme





Raw data from 4 transmission chains in Experiment III
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black kalu lanapi keluupilu kahona kahona neki nekiplu nekinono nerena nehoplo reneplo
bounce circle blue mola kalu kanupilu lehona kahuna laneki lapipilu lapklu leneho lahoplo lareplo
bounce circle red pihukimo kalu napilu kahona kanana kanana kanana renana renana rehoplo reneplo
bounce square black moki lanapi lapilu kanupilu kahona kahopilu nekipilu nekeno nekeno nereplo nereplo
bounce square blue luneki lapalu lunahoma lehona lanuna lanpilu lanepilu lahoki kapilu laneplo laneplo
bounce square red lanepi kanepi luhona lanpilu kahuna kahepilu kaneki nekipilu renana replo reneplo
bounce triangle black nane kilahuna kahoma kanupilu lunona lanpilu nekinono nekiplu nekiplo nekiplo nekiplo
bounce triangle blue kalakihu lamuna kepihoma kanupilu kahuna nehoki lapiranana kanana lepilo lakiplo lakiplo
bounce triangle red mokihuna pinamula nepalu lapilu nanuna kahopilu kapilu kanana rekiplo rahoplo rekiplo
horizontal circle black nelu napilu pilu neki kahoneki nepilu nekepilu nekeno nereki neheki faneki
horizontal circle blue kanehu pilu pilu lanike kaneki lanepilu lahoki laneki laneki lahoki lareki
horizontal circle red namopihu pilu kanupilu kaneki kanneki kane kaponeki reneki renato reneki reneki
horizontal square black lumonamo pilu laneki neneki neki neki nepilu naneki nereki nereki nereki
horizontal square blue kinehune nahuna kaneki laneki laneki laneki laneki lanoki lanena lereki laneki
horizontal square red lahupine humo kaneki kaneki kaneki kaneki kaneki luni renana renana renana
horizontal triangle black kapihu kahumo neki neki luneki nekipilu nekeni keniko nekeki nekeki lakaki
horizontal triangle blue humo neki homa neki kaneki lanpilu lapineki laneki laneki lakeki lakiki
horizontal triangle red lahupiki pilu kaneki naneki naneki kenepilu kaphiki reneki raneki raheki rekiki
spiral circle black pilu kinepilu pilu pilu kahopilu nekopilu nepipilu nahokilu nepilu nehopilu renepilu
spiral circle blue neki kinepila lepilu lepilu kapilu lahopilu lahopilu lahopilu lehopilo lahopilu larepilu
spiral circle red pinemohu lamuna napilu kanpilu kanpilu kahopilu kapilu rehopilu rehopilu rehopilu rehepilu
spiral square black kilamo kahuna kahona kapilu kapilu nekilu nekpilu kekilu nehopilu nepilu nerepilu
spiral square blue kahuki luneki luneki lanpilu lanpilu lanepilu lanepilu lanpilu lanpilo lanepilu lanepilu
spiral square red neluka lanuka napilu kahona kapilu kahopilu kanepilu kanpilu rehopilu repilu renepilu
spiral triangle black luki kalu kinu lupilu lupilu nekipilu nepilu nepilu nepilu nekipilu lakipilu
spiral triangle blue namola neki nakemi lepilu kapilu lanepilu lapipilu lakipilu lakipilo lakipilu lakipilu
spiral triangle red lumoka napulu kaneki nepilu napilu kapilu kapipilu rekepilu rakipilu rahopilu rekipilu
Table showing raw data for Chain A in Experiment III. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black melipa mewnihi mewena mewega menowa helahilhil meknowa meknowa mehnoa mehnoah mekoah
bounce circle blue pamu gamewe mowoga mewega menowa helhilhil menoah meknoa mehknoah meknoa mekhoah
bounce circle red mewega owumuga mewega pewega menowa meknowna meknoah meknoa mehknoah mekhnoah mehkoa
bounce square black gamuwe muwenega mowoga monowa menowa meena hilahillhil meknowa mehnoa mehnoah mehkoa
bounce square blue linuhiko mowoga mowoga monowa menowna menowa menahilhil meknoah meknoa mekhnoa mekoah
bounce square red komehi pawenego mowoga monowa menowna pewega menahilhil meknoah mehknoah mehnoa mehkoah
bounce triangle black hiko mowenghi mowoga kewona kenowa mena mehnoha mehnoha mehnoah mehnoah meknoah
bounce triangle blue palime palinia mowoga meena menowa meknowa meknowah meknoah meknoa meknoah meknoah
bounce triangle red gawe mewenega mewoga kewona menowa meena menaoh meknoa mehknoah meknoa mekhoa
horizontal circle black hiwenuko mewnahi lina mewega menowa pewega mena mena pega pega mekhoah
horizontal circle blue nuhiwenu menunana lina pewega pegewa pewega pega pega menu menu menu
horizontal circle red memenu liga pewega mewega menowna perega palin palim palim palim mekoa
horizontal square black paweko palin palin palin kenowa meena mena menu pega palim mekoa
horizontal square blue konulipa peenla palin palin pewega pegawa meknoa meknoa menu pega meknoah
horizontal square red linu lega palin palin palin palin palin palim pegu pega mekhoah
horizontal triangle black mume meewena meweena lina kenowna perega pegu pegu pegu pega mekoah
horizontal triangle blue pawemeli lina lina lina kenowna pewage mena pegu pega pega mehkoa
horizontal triangle red liga lega lina lina kenowna perega pegas pegas palim palim palim
spiral circle black melime memilhi meena helahilhil kenowna hellahilhil hellahillhill helahillhil hellahilhil helahillhil meknoa
spiral circle blue munuko memeena helhilhil helahilhil helahilhil helhilhil hellahillhill hellahillhill hellahilhil hellahillhil helihilhill
spiral circle red komume helhilhil helahilhil meena meena helhilhil helahilhil hellahilhil hellahilhil helahillhill helihillhil
spiral square black numekopa pawethi helhilhil helhilhil helahilhil hellahilhil hellahillhill helahilhil helahilhil helahillhill mekoah
spiral square blue wega helahilhil kewona helhilhil helhilhil knowna helahilhill helahilhill helahillhill hellahilhil mekhoah
spiral square red higahili kenowma helahilhil helhilhil meena hilhilhil helahilhil helahilhill helahilhill helahilhill helihillhill
spiral triangle black pamu hilihihi kenowna kenowna kenowna hellahillhill helahilhill hellahilhil hellahilhil helahilhill mekhoah
spiral triangle blue gahi peneka peneena kenowna helahilhil helhilhil helahillhill helahilhil helahilhil helahillhill mehkoa
spiral triangle red muwemeko pawena meena kenowna helahilhil hilhilhil hellahillhill hellahilhil meknoah meknoah mekhoa
Table showing raw data for Chain B in Experiment III. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black kuwo wogilupu wogilopa wogipenal penalowgi wogipenal wogipenal wogininalgi wonilunalgi wolilunagi wolilunagi
bounce circle blue wonagi napiwo wogilupe wogipenal woginepal woginepal wogipenal wogipenalgi wonilunalgi wogilenani wolilunagi
bounce circle red pelu wogilupu wogilupa nepalwogi wogilugan wogiluna wogilunagi wogilunagi woginunagi wolilunani wonunali
bounce square black wogipena wogipena nepalwogi woginepal wogipenal wogipenalgi wogipenalgi penlunagi woninagi wolinunalgi wonunali
bounce square blue napena nape wogilope nepalwogi woginepal woginepal wogipenalgi wogipenalgi wolinalgi wolinunalgi wolinunagi
bounce square red penapiku heka penalogi wogiluna wogiluna wogilunowgi wogipenalgi penaninagi wogipenalgi wolinulalgi wolinunali
bounce triangle black gapinahe wogipena wogipenal wogipenal wogipenal wogipenal woginepalgi woginunagi wonalgi wolilenul wolilunali
bounce triangle blue hewoku heka wogilupe wogipenal nepalowgi wogineptunewoginepalgi nulagi wolinalgi wolinulagi wolinunali
bounce triangle red giku lugana wogipule wogipenal luganowgi wogilunagi woginepal nenalgi wogiwenagi wolinugi wolinunali
horizontal circle black lugigipi kuwo lugana wogiluna penalowgi penalgi nunagi wonagi wogilunagi penagi penali
horizontal circle blue naheku napena lugana penalike nepalowgi nunapagi nunagi woginalgi wolilunagi penagi penagi
horizontal circle red kuluwo heka lugana nepalowgi luganowgi lunagi lunagi woginal wogilunagi penalgi penalgi
horizontal square black wogiluku lugana lugana penalwogi penalowgi penalgow penalgi penalgi nulagi penalgi penagi
horizontal square blue gikuna napena lugana penalike lugana nepalgi penalgi penalgi wonalgi penalgi penagi
horizontal square red napeheku napiwo penalike lunawogi lugana lunagi penalgi penalgi penalgi penalgi penalgi
horizontal triangle black penalu lugana penalowgi penalowgi nepalike penalgi nepalgi nulagi nunalgi nulani penali
horizontal triangle blue pihena penaliku lugana lugana penalowgi neptungi nepalgi nunagi wonagi penal penal
horizontal triangle red naku giku lugana wogipenal lugana lungagi nepalgi nulagi wogalgi penul penali
spiral circle black lugana kuwo reki reki pike pike like wonagi wonagi wonagi wonalgi
spiral circle blue heku napena heki heki nepalike nike penal wonulgi wolilunagi wonagi wonagi
spiral circle red wonalupe heka heki heki like like wogiluna woginal nolunagi wolinagi wonalgi
spiral square black galukuna wogipena reki reki hike pike penal penal nenalgi wonalgi wonalgi
spiral square blue napiwo napena kibve neki nike nike penal penal wolinulagi wonalgi wonagi
spiral square red lupiwo wogilupe neki heki like like penal penal penal wonalgi wonalgi
spiral triangle black nahe kuwo kipe kipe pike pike nike nike nike wonali wonali
spiral triangle blue pihe giku neki kipe nepalike nike like nike wonalgi wolinag wonagi
spiral triangle red galu giku neki heki hike like nepal nike woninal wolinal wonalgi
Table showing raw data for Chain C in Experiment III. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black huhunigu pikoku wikiko wikiko winekuki winekuki winikike winikiko wunkiko winikiko winikiko
bounce circle blue kemuniwa huniki hukiki kunkuki kunkuki hunekuki honekiko honekiko kunkike hunekiko hunekiko
bounce circle red kihupo piko pokiko ponekuki ponekuki ponekuki punekiko ponekiko punkiko punekiko punekiko
bounce square black wakiki wukiki winekiko winikiko winukuki winikuki winikeko winikiko winikiko winikiko winikiko
bounce square blue pokikehu ponuko kunikeko hunekuki hunekuki hunekuki kunekiko kunekiko ponekiko hunekiko hunekiko
bounce square red waguhuki poku ponekiko ponekuki punekuki punikuki ponekiko punekiko pinkiko punkiko hunekiko
bounce triangle black nihu kikiki kikiki winekiko wikekuki wanikuki winikiko winikiko winekiko winekiko punikiko
bounce triangle blue niguki hukeko hukiki kunekuki kunekuki kunikuki kunekiko kikekiko pinekiko ponikiko winikike
bounce triangle red koni koni ponekiko ponekiko ponekuki punekuki punekiko punikiko punkiko punkiko punkiko
horizontal circle black muwapo wuniki wineko wineko wineko wineke wineke wineke wuneke winekike punike
horizontal circle blue powa pinokiki huneko kuneko kuneko kunike honeke honeke kineke hunike wineke
horizontal circle red hukinimu kuniko ponukeko poneko poneko ponike punike ponike puneke punike winikike
horizontal square black wako wako wikeko wineko wuneko wanike wineke winike wineke winike puneke
horizontal square blue hukeko ponikio huniko huneko huneko hunike kuneke kuneke huneke ponike hunekike
horizontal square red pohumu hukeko ponekuko poneko puneko punike punike puneke puneke ponike punike
horizontal triangle black muko wakiki kineko wineki wikeko wineke wineke winike wunike winike wineke
horizontal triangle blue kokeguke piniko kuneko kuneko kuneko hunike kuneke punike honike huneke wineke
horizontal triangle red kimu koniki pokiko poneko poneko punike punikiko punike punike ponike wineke
spiral circle black kekewa wiki wiki wikiko winekiko winikike winikeke winekike winikike winike winekike
spiral circle blue komuhuke ponukiko huki kunekuki kunkiko kunikike honekiko honekike kinike ponike hunikike
spiral circle red kopo ponikiko poniki poneko pokiko punikike punekike ponikike poneike ponike punikiki
spiral square black huwa ponikiko wineko wikuki winekiko winekiko winikike winekike winike winikike winikike
spiral square blue hukike hukeke hunekiki hunekiko hunekiko kunike kunekike kunekike kinkike hunike punkike
spiral square red ponikiko ponikiko ponekuki poneki puniko punekiko punikike punekike punkike ponike punikike
spiral triangle black kowagu winiko wineki winuki wikiko wanikike winikike winkike winkeke winike winikike
spiral triangle blue kokihuko hukiki hunekiko hunekiko kunekiko kunekike kinekike kinekike honkike huneke winike
spiral triangle red kiwanike kuniko pokiko ponekuki pokiko punikike ponekiko ponekiko pinkike punike winikike





Raw data from 4 transmission chains in Experiment IV
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black kalu kalu lineki lineki huheki huneki huneki huneti kaneki hineki heniki
bounce circle blue mola balu kineki piteki kiheki kiheki kineki haneki huneti heniki lineki
bounce circle red pihukimo capola capola kineki haneki haneki haneki kapeki kineki hiniki hiniki
bounce square black moki lumoneki mohuki huteki huteki huteki lineki kaneki kanitu kaneki haneki
bounce square blue luneki lineki pinemahu mahuki kiteki kiteki haneki kineti linetu kaneki kaneki
bounce square red lanepi lanepi huneki hakeki hateki hateki hapeki hapeki hanetu kanetu hineki
bounce triangle black nane kapola kapiki lineki lineki lineki lineki lineti lineki linitu leneki
bounce triangle blue kalakihu mahiku maheki kineki kineki kineki kiteki kapeki lineki leniki laniki
bounce triangle red mokihuna kapeki mahetu kapeki hapeki kapeki kapeki lineki linetu linitu leniki
horizontal circle black nelu lumonamo lumeno kihetu huniki huniki huniki huniki kiniki heniki heniki
horizontal circle blue kanehu humo lumono kakitu kipiki kihiki kihiki haniki hiniki hiniki haniki
horizontal circle red namopihu lanehu laneki pitetu haniki haniki haniki kiniki haniki heniki heniki
horizontal square black lumonamo lumonamo kinehune hutetu hutiki hutiki haniki kiniki huniki haneki heneki
horizontal square blue kinehune lunepi mahetu hatetu kiniki kitiki kitiki kiniki kaniki kaneki haneki
horizontal square red lahupine kinehune kinehune hatetu hatetu hatiki hatiki haneti kaniki kaneki haneki
horizontal triangle black kapihu kapihu kapetu kapetu liniki liniki liniki liniki liniki liniki liniki
horizontal triangle blue humo humo kakitu kakitu kiniki kiniki kiniki kapeki kiniki leniki laniki
horizontal triangle red lahupiki capeki pineku katetu hapiki kapiki katiki kiniki liniki liniki laneki
spiral circle black pilu pilu pilu pilu hutetu hunetu hunetu hunetu hanetu hinetu hinitu
spiral circle blue neki neki mahetu pilu kinetu kihetu kinetu hapetu hunetu henitu henitu
spiral circle red pinemohu pinemohu pineku pakiku hanetu hanetu hanetu hapetu kinetu hanetu henitu
spiral square black kilamo neluki hatuhi hatuhi hutetu hutetu linetu kanetu kanetu kanetu hanetu
spiral square blue kahuki kahuki mahuki lineku kitetu kitetu kapetu kinetu hunetu kanetu hinetu
spiral square red neluka neluko kineki hatuhi hatetu hatetu hapeku kapetu hanetu hanetu hanetu
spiral triangle black luki kahepi kahepi kapeti huhetu linetu linetu linetu linetu lenitu linitu
spiral triangle blue namola luneki luneki kaketi kinetu kinetu linetu kinetu linitu linetu lenitu
spiral triangle red lumoka neluki kahetu kapilu hanetu kapetu kapetu kinetu linetu lanitu lanitu
Table showing raw data for Chain A in Experiment IV. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black melipa wenumeko mewenume gahili gahili gahili gahili gahili gahili gahili pagahilli
bounce circle blue pame pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahilli
bounce circle red mewega mewemeko mewemeko gahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahilli
bounce square black gamuwe gamuho mewenume gahili gahili gahili gahili gahili megahili gahili gahilli
bounce square blue linuhiko pawegame pawegame pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pahilli
bounce square red komehi komehi pawelinu gahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahilli
bounce triangle black hiko wemenuko mewehili pahili gahili gahili gahili gahili gahili gahili pagahilli
bounce triangle blue palime palime palihili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahili pagahilli
bounce triangle red gawe palime paweganu gahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahili megahilli
horizontal circle black hiwenuko gamuho menuko galinu linu linu linu linu linu linu wenu
horizontal circle blue nuhiwenu wemenuko pagahili pawenu palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu
horizontal circle red memenu memenu memenu linu melinu melinu melinu melinu melinu melinu wenu
horizontal square black paweko paweno galinu linu linu linu linu linu linu linu galinu
horizontal square blue konulipa pawehili pawega linu palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu melinu
horizontal square red linu linu linu linu melinu melinu melinu melinu melinu melinu malinu
horizontal triangle black mume pawehili pali linu linu linu linu linu linu linu galinu
horizontal triangle blue pawemeli pawehili lime palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu palinu
horizontal triangle red liga liga palinu linu melinu melinu melinu melinu melinu melinu malinu
spiral circle black melime wegahili mewenu gawemu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu
spiral circle blue munuko himanuko himanuko pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu palinu
spiral circle red komume memenuko memenuko gawemu gawemu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu
spiral square black numekopa mewuno wemenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu
spiral square blue wega wega pawenu mewenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pamenu
spiral square red higahili hegahili pawenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu
spiral triangle black pamu memenuko paweko wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu wenu
spiral triangle blue gahi paweko paweko pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu pawenu palinu
spiral triangle red muwemeko weganu weganu pawenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu mewenu
Table showing raw data for Chain B in Experiment IV. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black kuwo lugana luxana lugana peloana logana lagana luxana lugana lugana ligana
bounce circle blue wonagi pela pela pelo luxana hegana lagana hana lugana lugana legena
bounce circle red pelu pela luxana napena geki nipana lagana h lugina lugena lizana
bounce square black wogipena hika hexigana hexana lugana luxigana luxana luzana luzana luzana ligana
bounce square blue napena napena hexigana peloana peloana luxana luxana luxana luxana luzana luzana
bounce square red penapiku hika luxana napena geki geki luxana luxana luzina luzina leguna
bounce triangle black gapinahe wociana lugana lugana lugana lagana lugana lugana lugana lugana legana
bounce triangle blue hewoku luciwo luciwo luxana luxana luxana lagana lagana lugena lugina legena
bounce triangle red giku gika gika geki geki geki geki geki lugina luzena lizana
horizontal circle black lugigipi lugiana hexigana hexigana hexigana hena hena hena hena hena nepana
horizontal circle blue naheku pela hexigana goana hena hena hena hena huna huna huna
horizontal circle red kuluwo luxana hena hena hena hena hena hena hina hina huna
horizontal square black wogiluku hexipena hexipena hexipena hexigana lagana hexigena hexigena hena nepana nepana
horizontal square blue gikuna hika hexigana hipena hexigana hexigana hexigana hexigana hexigana nepena nepena
horizontal square red napeheku gowo hena luxana hexigana hexigana hexigina hexigina hexigina hexigina nezana
horizontal triangle black penalu penipika higana hipena napena lagana nepena nepena hena nepana huna
horizontal triangle blue pihena hexigana hexigana napena napena napena napena nepena nepana nepana huna
horizontal triangle red naku hena hena hena napena napena nepena hepena nepina nepina huna
spiral circle black lugana lugana luxana lugana hexipena goana goana goana pena gouna gouna
spiral circle blue heku peloana peloana pelo goana goana goana goana guana guana guana
spiral circle red wonalupe wopelana luxana goana goana goana goana goana goana goana goana
spiral square black galukuna hika luxana luxana hexana hexpina hexigina lugana lagena nepa gouna
spiral square blue napiwo peloana peloana peloana peloana peloana peloana luxana lagana nepa guzana
spiral square red lupiwo napena napena hexana hexana hexana hexipena lagana lagana gona nepena
spiral triangle black nahe napena lugana hipena hipena hinepa hipena nepa nepa napa napa
spiral triangle blue pihe goana goana luxana heki nepa nepa nepa nupa nepa napa
spiral triangle red galu hika hika heki heki hinepa nepa nepa napa nepa nepa 
Table showing raw data for Chain C in Experiment IV. Shaded cells indicate that this item was selected to be seen by the next 
generation during training.
motion shape colour 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bounce circle black huhunigu hokuhume kikeko wakeki wakeki wakeki wakeki wakike wakiko wakiko wakiko
bounce circle blue kemuniwa hukeko hukekuko hukikuko hunkeki hunkeki hukekuko hukiko hekiko hekiko pokiko
bounce circle red kihupo wagakiki pokekuko pokeki pokeki pokeki pokeki pokiko pokiko pokiko pokiko
bounce square black wakiki wakiki wakiki wakiki wakiki wakiki wakeki wakeki wakiko wakiko wakiko
bounce square blue pokikehu hokeko kukeko hukiki hunkiki hunkiki hukekuko hukeki hekiko hekiko hekiko
bounce square red waguhuki nihu ponikeko pokikuko pokiki pokiki pokekuko pokeki pokiko pokiko pokiko
bounce triangle black nihu nihu kekuko kekuko wanikuko wanikuko wakiko wakiko wakiko wakiko wakiko
bounce triangle blue niguki niguki nihu hunikuko hunikuko hunikuko hukikuko hukiko hekiko hekiko hekiko
bounce triangle red koni wagakiki ponihumo ponikuki ponikuko ponikuko pokike pokike pokiko ppokiko pokiko
horizontal circle black muwapo wakeko wakemo wakemi wakemo wakemo wakino wakino wanimo wanimo wanimo
horizontal circle blue powa hukoke hukemo hukemo hunkemo hunkemo hukimo hukimo hekino hekimo henimo
horizontal circle red hukinimu koni pokemo pokemo pokemo pokimo pokino pokimo ponimo ponimo ponimo
horizontal square black wako wako wakemo wakimo wakimo wakimo wakino wakimo wanimo wanimo wanimo
horizontal square blue hukeko hukeko hukimo hukimo hunkimo hunkimo wanimo hukino hekino hekino henimo
horizontal square red pohumu pohumo pohumo pokimo pokimo pokimo pokino pokino ponimo ponimo ponimo
horizontal triangle black muko nihu koni wanimo waknimo wanimo wanimo wanimo wanimo wanimo wanimo
horizontal triangle blue kokeguke wakiki hunimo hunimo hunimo hunimo hunimo hunimo hekimo hekimo hekiko
horizontal triangle red kimu koni pokoni ponimo ponimo ponimo ponimo ponimo ponimo ponimo ponimo
spiral circle black kekewa kekewa wakeke wakekuko wakekuko wakekuko wakekuko wakekuko wahekiko wakiheko wahikeko
spiral circle blue komuhuke hokehume hukeko hukekoku hunkekuko hunkekuko wakekuko hukekuko hekiheko hekiheko hehikeko
spiral circle red kopo ponikiko pokikuko pokikuko pokekuko pokekuko pokekuko pokekuko pohekiko pohiheko pohikeko
spiral square black huwa kikuko wakeke wakikuko wakikuko wakikuko wakikuko wakekiko wakiheko wahiheko wahikeko
spiral square blue hukike hokuhume hukekuko hukikuko hunkikuko hunkikuko hukekuko hukekiko hekiheko hekiheko hehikeko
spiral square red ponikiko ponikiko pokiko pokikuko pokikuko pokikuko pokekuko pokekiko pokiheko pokiheko pohikeko
spiral triangle black kowagu hokehume niwakewa wanikuko wanikuki wanikuki wakikuke wakikuko wakiheko wakiheko wahikeko
spiral triangle blue kokihuko hukoke hunikuko hunikuko hunikuki hunikuki hukikuko hukikuko hekiheko hekiheko hehikeko
spiral triangle red kiwanike ponikiko pohumeko pohikuko ponikuki ponikuki pokikuko ponikuko pokeheko pokiheko pohikeko





Raw data from 8 transmission chains in Experiment V
chain 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
afa afa edd efda cda cbfaf edd aff ahf fca bfa
bac cee cbfaf efdb bcfaf bcfaf dee afaa afaa fhb afc
cde bcfad add aee edd edd aff bchc bchcf afaa ahc
dcf edd efcba bdd cbfaf dee bcfb bchcf fhc bchcf ahf
edd bcdd cbfa add add add bibf bhbf fah ahf fhc
fcfd fabee cda bcfaf fdb ebd bcafa bfcf fbhf bch fca
aefb cbfaf efda cbfaf efdb afbf ebd cbf bchc afc abff
bbce cbfa bdd cfaf eca cfbc haf chf fch ahc fbhf
caba cbaee bcfaf bfaf cfbd afaa fde fhc bch bfa bhcb
deaf cbd aee efaf dee aff bchcf hcf aaf bfc bch
edbcc efad efdb cda acfg fdbc hbc haf fca fhc bcbcf
feadb fdeba bcfa faf cba efbc afaa fha afbf ach bchbf
acbee cbfad cfaf cdb eda haf bcfcf fah hfc abff bchcf
bdfef ead efaf dee efaf bcfb cafbf hfbf bcf bhcb afaa
cbfad cda bfaf cfba cfaf bibf eac fbhf fbc fbhf fhb
Table showing raw data for Chain 1 in Experiment V. 
The data is shown in the order in which it was produced by participants.
chain 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
abd bdc aed aaa aaa ccc ccc ccc aaa ccc ccc
bdc ecd fbfcf ccc fbfdf dcf aaa aaa ccc dba bbb
cae aabee fcfbf aca fbfbd aaa dcf fcdcf fdbcf fca ddd
def fbfcf aabee aed aca fbfbd fdbdf facaf fcdfa aaa aaa
ecd adba ced fcfbf dfb fdbdf fdbfd fdbfa fcbdf fcbaf fcdaf
fcdb adb ccfdb fcfeb dfbfd fdacf fcdfd fcbdf fdadf fdbdf fcbcf
adba ccbfc aaa bbdc efb dca fdfdb daf fbdbf fcbdf fca
bfde ced ccc bed cdf fbdbf fcdbf caf fdbaf fcbcf fdbdf
ceaa fcfbf ccbdc feb cfbfd fcdbf dca fadbf fca fcdbf fcbaf
dfed ccbdc aca ccfbd dfa fdcdf fbfbd fdbdf dba fdcdf cbd
efdac ccc afa ced cac dfbdf fdafd fdadf fcadf fabaf dbfbd
fbfcf caf abf fdf dfacf fbd dfbdf fcadf fbcaf bbb fcbab
aabee aed bbdc bbcd dfc fdfbf fdcdf fbdbf fcacf fcbfa fcdcf
bccfb aaa bcf bedbb ccc fdfbd daf fca fbcbf fbdbf dbdaf
cebaf afd aec fcfdf fbddf fcbdf fdbcf fdbcf fcbaf ddd fcbad
Table showing raw data for Chain 2 in Experiment V. 
The data is shown in the order in which it was produced by participants.
chain 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
aec bce fdcdc feg bac bac fecac bac bac eed fecdad
bce fcfdf eed bac fdcdc fcg ddde eed fecac dde eed
cab ddde fecac fdcac fdede fecac dde dde dde bac dde
dbd fcfb fec fdcdc fdcac fedad eeed fecac eed fedad fecda
eff eef ddde fecdc facec fecad eed fedad fcedad fedcd fecae
fefa eca fecdc fdcec fedcd fedac fdcdc fecad fceae fedae bac
acbf feca bac ddde eeed edd fcdcd feada feeae fcedad fedad
bfea fecae feg eeed ddde dde feadc fedac fecad fed fecad
cead eed ebc eed dde ddde faedc fde fecda fecdad bfa
ddde dee decdc dde eed eeed bac fec fec fade fceae
ebafb cgdf fdcec fcede fcdad fadad fecad fadcd fedcd fceda fceda
fcfdf acbf fcd fcded fcg feaea fedad fdeae fdaec fecde fcada
abecd bef fdcac fdece fdced fdcdc fdaea fcedad feada fce fcede
bacdc fbcdc cac fcdcd fecac fcdcd fec dfeae fedad fcede fcdad
cbdae bfd dec fecac fcdac fadec fadcd fadec fcdad fecae fedae
Table showing raw data for Chain 3 in Experiment V. 
The data is shown in the order in which it was produced by participants.
chain 4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
abc fccf adafb bae fceff eaf eaf cfcea baf cdcef baf
baf adafb cba eab adacb adacb fcfeg abf fba cdceg bad
cbd bafb dae adafc ebae adacf dadeg cdcfa efa fba cfde
dce fdeff fdecb fecff eaf fae baf ecbf cdceg baf decf
eea fade fdfcb eade eab ebce cfceg adaef dcdeg cdef cdcef
fccf fae caeb dae adacf fcfe adaeb dadeg fcdb fcde cecdg
abfa eadcb bae cfe ceaff adaeg fba cfceg fdce def dgef
becd cba fdeb adacb acd adaef fcfda fbce cdcef bad cfeg
cdfe fdecb bedfc fdcff fced caf fda ecfb cdef decg cdceg
dfac ecb efb bef ceab cea cfcea bfa dcdef decf cgde
ecbad adec edae caeb cfb fcea adaeg eaf cdcbf cfde decg
fdeff dafe cfe cfeb ceaf ebfe adafc fba ebf cdeg cdge
adafb ade cfeb fced fcea fafeb fceb fcdb cdfg cecdg gecd
bedae edbab fdeff cbae bca fafed cfcda fcb dcda cecdf efcdg
cebdb efba cdeff feaff fca bae aeb caf dadeg fdce cfedg
Table showing raw data for Chain 4 in Experiment V. 
The data is shown in the order in which it was produced by participants.
chain 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
daa daa daa daa bde bde fdfca fdfac fdfcb fdfbc add
ecd eaca bde bde daa daa daa daa baa cadbf fdfbc
feb bed ccafd dece dba dba dba fdfbc bda fdfcb fbdca
afc ccafd edcd bdfac dbac adfbd dfdca bda bcfad cadfb fdfba
bde fbdef dece ccbdf bdec fdfba bfcda fdbca bfdac fbcad fdfad
cbaf bde edca bdfca dfdac dfdca afdcb acdfb bfdca dbfca fbdac
dcec dabf fdebc acfdb afdcb bdec fafdc fdfca daa bdfca caa
eaca bdcf bdfac dfdbc fdfac dbc bcdfa dfb adcfb cbfda cafbd
fdbe dcec fbdfa fbca bdfac adfcb dfdac bafdf fdfbc add facbd
abfb cdbf bdc fdfca ccbda bdcfa bdfac bcfad bdfac caa afcbd
badfd dafc fbadc deca afdbc bdce cafda cbfad acdfb daa fcbad
cceda bad dab afdcb bdcfa bfdca dbfac bfdac acdbf cafbd faa
defac badcf dacbf dba bdcaf afdcb dafcb cdfad dfb fbdca cdd
efbcb cafbd fdcbf bdec afcdb dfdcb cdafb fdfcb cadfb fadcb adbfc
febdf bacf cbdaf dbac facbd bdea dfacb baa cadbf fdfca adbcf
Table showing raw data for Chain 5 in Experiment V. 
The data is shown in the order in which it was produced by participants.
chain 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
dba ebfaf dbda dce dce ecd ehc ehc ehc daba hdi
ecd cde ebea ebea dbda fdfb ceh fdabc ehcaba fdbc dcd
fab fade fbacb abaea ecd daea fdfb edc che fdcd fdcd
aef fbacb cdea edc fcde edbd adaba che dadb dhc hdaba
bdc fcdf cde fced dcda fdbh ecd fbaec fdcaba cdeaba faba
cefb cbade edc dbda adaea adab fadba edcba fdcd fdaba fcdaba
daed dce dce ecd ceg ceh edcd echaba daba hdaba fdaba
ebea fce cbae cfebc fdfb ehc fdaba fdaba fdaba fdec ecd
fcde fcdce abaea eaeb bedc abeda fbabh dbda edc dcaba ech
affc acede ecd fcea ebea dbda aeabc adab edcaba adab dcaba
bcbda ebea cabec dcea fcfab aeaba aeaba adbc fdbc fcdaba fabdcd
caddc fad dcea fecba edea edaba fdaeb abafd bdch hdi ceaba
dfece adc eaeb ced cde cded aced abach abad eab fhaba
ebfaf dbda fcad bcefb efc dcea ecdad fbda fbch feaba fedh
fbacb acde fced feabe aeaba adabe dbda fbdad edaba fheaba adcd
Table showing raw data for Chain 6 in Experiment V. 
The data is shown in the order in which it was produced by participants.
chain 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
dfb bfacc caedb dga faff dgc ghc gdc bfbb bfb aea
eea ceadb adb faff afaa faff ged ged babb abab bfb
fcd feb faee fabb dgb afaa gde babb fbf cefgd cefgd
abc bad cadea caedb egc egd fbff bfb fecgd cefdg cefdg
bde fde facc cadeb facbe facdg faff bfbb bba ceb cde
cefb cabde feb cabdc ebd bfaa bfaa bfaa bfb ced baba
dbef bbd bda ebd gde edg gdc ced bab bbf dcdeg
ecff afee fabb edb fabb fbff fcedg cedfg cedfg bfbf bfbf
fcba eff acde bec bfaa ghc bfbb abaa ced aea fde
afee fedc aff dec ceg ged babb gcegd ceb dgedc bab
bfacc fadb cadec afaa aedgc bfd abaa cdged cadb beb faf
caeda adb fad afbb dgc abaa afaa babf aedb cef cfe
dacbd fbdd dbe afbc egK bea faf bfbf aafb baba cdfgd
ebadc caeda faff cabec ceba gdc bfb gefdg ffab fea cgdfg
faddb efb dga fac babb abb fbf fbf baba cde cda
Table showing raw data for Chain 7 in Experiment V. 
The data is shown in the order in which it was produced by participants.
chain 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
bad efdf cbc caccf cfcca dfdfa bae dfdfa dfdfa abe abe
cbc bfdfa cac abe ebfb ebfb bfe fbe dfabc fbe fbe
eda eccdf dad bcea fbe dfdca bfa afb bfc dfdfc dcdcf
afb cbc fdcfa fbed eaf ebf dcdca bfa baebf dfabe dabcf
dbe cac bead efdfc eab dcdca dfdfa bae dcdcf bfc dcabe
febd caccf abe becd dfdfa efdca cacfb dcdca abf dcdcf dafbe
bbab dad caccf dfdfa dfdcf fbe fbe dcdfa afabe abc bfc
cecf eddfa dfefa fbea dfeb cfcca efd fab dcabf bcf dadcf
efdf dea dfcfa fcafc edfb bfa ebd cab fba dcdbf dcabf
acdd dfabe fbea befb efdcf efca fba dadfa abe dcbcf dcbcf
deabe bead fdfca fecfa efdca efbf afb baebf fbe dcabe dcf
fafcc fcbf edcdf dfdcf ecfe bae efdab bca dfdaf dfabc dfdcb
bfdfa efdfa bced efcfd edca ecfca cfdca dfabc dfb fbc dcfbe
caeea fded fbec edfb efba efcfa efbfd acdfb bae dabfc dcace
ecdcf bced dfec ebfb dcdcf fbae cfdea fda fab dcfbe dbdac
Table showing raw data for Chain 8 in Experiment V. 




Instructions to participants in Experiment V
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.
During the experiment you will see a series of letter strings appear 
on the screen. We would like to see how well you can learn them. 
After each string appears, there will be a short delay before you 
are allowed to type in what you think you saw. Try to remember the 
strings as accurately as possible. You can use the backspace button 
if you make a mistake, and can press ENTER to see the next string.
Please press the track-pad button when you are ready to begin, and 
good luck.
Thank you! You just saw 15 different strings. 
We would like you to try to recall all of them now as best you can. 
Please keep going until you have tried to remember each one. We will 
give you an indication of how many you have left to enter. However, 
we won't tell you how many you got right until the end of the 
experiment.
Press the track-pad button to begin.
You have already entered this string.
Please try again.
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We introduce an experimental paradigm for studying the cumu-
lative cultural evolution of language. In doing so we provide the
first experimental validation for the idea that cultural transmission
can lead to the appearance of design without a designer. Our
experiments involve the iterated learning of artificial languages by
human participants. We show that languages transmitted cultur-
ally evolve in such a way as to maximize their own transmissibility:
over time, the languages in our experiments become easier to learn
and increasingly structured. Furthermore, this structure emerges
purely as a consequence of the transmission of language over
generations, without any intentional design on the part of indi-
vidual language learners. Previous computational and mathemat-
ical models suggest that iterated learning provides an explanation
for the structure of human language and link particular aspects of
linguistic structure with particular constraints acting on language
during its transmission. The experimental work presented here
shows that the predictions of these models, and models of cultural
evolution more generally, can be tested in the laboratory.
cultural transmission ! iterated learning ! language evolution
The emergence of human language has been cited by MaynardSmith and Szathmary (1) as the most recent of a small number
of highly significant evolutionary transitions in the history of life on
earth. The reason they give for including language in this list is that
language enables an entirely new system for information transmis-
sion: human culture. Language is unique in being a system that
supports unlimited heredity of cultural information, allowing our
species to develop a unique kind of open-ended adaptability.
Although this feature of language as a carrier of cultural infor-
mation obviously is important, we have argued that there is a second
sense in which language is an evolutionary milestone: each utter-
ance has a dual purpose, carrying semantic content but also
conveying information about its own construction (2–5). Upon
hearing a sentence, a language learner uses the structure of that
sentence to make new inferences about the language that produced
it. This process allows learners to reverse-engineer the language of
their speech community from the utterances they hear. Language
thus is both a conveyer of cultural information (in Maynard Smith
and Szathmary’s sense) and is itself culturally transmitted. This
cultural transmission makes language an evolutionary system in its
own right (2–3), suggesting another approach to the explanation of
linguistic structure. Crucially, language also represents an excellent
test domain for theories of cultural evolution in general, because the
acquisition and processing of language are relatively well under-
stood, and because language has an interesting, nontrivial, but well
documented structure.§
During the past 10 years a wide range of computational and
mathematical models have looked at a particular kind of cultural
evolution termed ‘‘iterated learning’’ (4–13).
Iterated Learning. Iterated learning is a process in which an indi-
vidual acquires a behavior by observing a similar behavior in
another individual who acquired it in the same way.
Spoken (or signed) language is an outcome of iterated learning.
Although in some circumstances aspects of language may be
explicitly taught, acquired from a written form, or arise from
deliberate invention, almost all the features of the languages we
speak are the result of iterated learning. Models of this process
(4–13) demonstrate that, over repeated episodes of transmission,
behaviors transmitted by iterated learning tend to become 1) easier
to learn, and 2) increasingly structured. Note that this process is
cumulative and is not considered to arise from the explicit inten-
tions of the individuals involved. Rather, this type of cultural
evolution is an ‘‘invisible hand’’ process leading to phenomena that
are the result of human action but are not intentional artifacts (14).
Although these models are indicative of the power of cultural
evolution in explaining language structure, skepticism remains as to
how well computational models of learning match the abilities and
biases of real human learners. For example, responding to a
growing body of computational models of the emergence of mul-
tiword utterances from unstructured randomness (5, 8, 10, 11, 15),
Bickerton notes, ‘‘Powerful and potentially interesting although this
approach is, its failure to incorporate more realistic conditions
(perhaps because these would be more difficult to simulate) sharply
reduces any contribution it might make toward unraveling language
evolution. So far, it is a classic case of looking for your car-keys
where the street-lamps are’’ (16, p. 522).
What is needed, therefore, is an experimental paradigm for
studying the evolution of complex cultural adaptations using real
human participants. Ideally, this paradigm should mirror previous
computational and mathematical models and provide a test for the
claim that iterated learning leads to adaptively structured lan-
guages. It should demonstrate whether cumulative adaptive evolu-
tion without intention is possible purely by virtue of cultural
transmission.
In this paper, we implement such a paradigm and demonstrate
cumulative, adaptive, nonintentional cultural evolution of an arti-
ficial language in a laboratory population of human participants.
Diffusion Chains. Diffusion-chain studies provide the best example
of experimental treatments of iterated learning. In these experi-
ments a participant observes some target behavior (provided by the
experimenter) and then is required to replicate that behavior in
some way that can be observed by a second participant. This second
participant in turn attempts to replicate the first participant’s
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behavior for a third participant, and so on. (We refer to each
iteration of this cycle as ‘‘1 generation.’’) Using this procedure, we
can observe the diffusion of behavior through a chain of cultural
transmission. The first reported use of this methodology was by
Bartlett in 1932 (17), but only recently did researchers begin to apply
this approach systematically (18–24).
The most recent, and arguably the most significant, instance of
a diffusion-chain experiment is the work of Horner et al., which
explores the cultural transmission of tool-use strategies in popula-
tions of chimpanzees and children (24). Diffusion chains are set up
in which an experimenter demonstrates 1 of 2 possible techniques
for opening a puzzle box (‘‘artificial fruit’’) to a participant. Sub-
sequent participants observe their predecessor’s box-opening be-
havior and then in turn become the model for the next generation.
These experiments demonstrate clearly that both chimpanzees and
children are capable of high-fidelity cultural transmission: the
box-opening technique used by the last participant in the chains (of
up to 10 individuals) is the same as that demonstrated to the first
participant, with a chain of faithful transmission between the first
and last participants.
Although these experiments show that cultural transmission can
be studied empirically even in nonhumans, they do not support our
claim that culture leads to cumulative nonintentional adaptation
because the behavioral information that is being transmitted is
drawn from a limited set of possibilities. For example, in the
puzzle-box study, there are essentially 2 different strategies for
opening the box. The task is not complex enough to demonstrate
adaptation, let alone cumulative adaptation. In any case, both the
strategies seem to be equivalently ‘‘adaptive’’ in cultural and
environmental terms, in that both open the box and both are
transmittable.
To get around these problems and to allow us to make a direct
comparison with human language, we replicate the basic diffusion-
chain design with a more complex artificial-language learning task
of labeling visual stimuli with strings of written syllables (25, 26). To
make this task tractable, we use adult human participants and
observe the cultural evolution of the artificial language for 10
cultural generations.
This work bears some resemblance to a recent body of experi-
mental work on the shared construction of communication systems
(27–30). Of particular relevance is a recent paper by Selten and
Warglien (30) that demonstrates that pairs of participants some-
times can create structured and efficient communication systems
over the course of repeated interactions. The major difference
between the experiments described here and the work of Selten and
Warglien is the role of intentional design. In Selten and Warglien’s
experiments, as in those of Galantucci (27) and Garrodet al. (28,
29), participants interact repeatedly with the explicit goal of arriving
at a shared system for communication. Therefore the systems they
construct are the outcome of conscious design. Our diffusion-chain
experiment allows us to explore whether structured languages can
emerge without intentional design, as has been argued to be the
case for language (14).
Design of Experiment 1. Participants are asked to learn an ‘‘alien’’
language made up of written labels for visual stimuli. The stimuli are
pictures of colored objects in motion, and the labels are sequences
of lowercase letters (see Fig. 1 for an example and the Methods
section for more details).
For training purposes, the language to be learned (a set of
string–picture pairs) is divided randomly into 2 sets of approx-
imately equal size: the SEEN set and the UNSEEN set. A
participant is trained on the SEEN set, being presented repeat-
edly with each string–picture pair in random order (see Methods
for details). During subsequent testing, participants are pre-
sented with a picture and asked to produce the string they think
the alien would give for that picture. Participants are tested on
both the SEEN and UNSEEN sets in their entirety.
The initial set of labels in the language is generated and assigned
randomly, and the first participant in the experiment is trained on
this random language. Subsequent participants are trained on the
output of the final testing of the previous participant, which is
re-divided into new SEEN and UNSEEN sets. Note that the
experimental procedure is equivalent for all participants, despite
the different sources of training data: at no stage are participants
told that they are being trained on the output of another person, nor
did any participants guess that the transmission of an acquired
language was part of the experiment. Crucially, participants believe
they are copying the input language as best they can; a posttest
questionnaire revealed that many participants did not even realize
that they were being tested on stimuli they had not seen in training,
so that intentional design on the part of the participants is unlikely.
To put it another way, the participants’ goal is to reproduce the
language, not improve to it in some way. (We return to this point
in the Discussion section).
Our hypothesis is that we will observe cumulative adaptive
evolution of the language being transmitted in this experiment; that
is, we should see the emergence of adaptive structure in response
to the pressure on the language to be transmitted faithfully from
generation to generation. If this hypothesis is correct, we should see
2 things: 1) an increase in the learnability of the language over
generations (i.e., a decrease in transmission error), and 2) the
evolution of linguistic structure (i.e., an increase in predictability in
the mapping between meanings and signals).
We devised 2 measures to test this hypothesis. First, we used a
measure of string similarity to compare words in the languages of
participants at adjacent generations (seeMethods). The Levensh-
tein edit distance (31) between pairs of words (i.e., the smallest
number of character insertions, replacements, and deletions re-
quired to transform 1 word into the other) provides a reasonable
theory-neutral measure of distance. We normalized the edit dis-
tance for length of words so that identical strings have a distance of
0 and maximally distinct ones have a distance of 1. The mean
distance between all of the words in a participant’s output and the
corresponding words in the previous generation’s output gives a
straightforward measure of the error in transmission of the
language.
Second, we constructed a measure of linguistic structure based
on measures of compositionality used in some computational
models (12). Our aim was to quantify the degree to which the
mapping between meanings (visual scenes) and signals (character
strings) is systematic, an obvious hallmark of structure in human
language. A language is systematic if patterns of similarity and
dissimilarity in signals provide information about the relationship
between the meanings those signals map on to. Accordingly, we
calculated the correlation between all pairs of edit-distances in the
set of signals and the corresponding distances between meanings
(i.e., whether they differed in shape, color, and/or movement). By
using Monte-Carlo techniques, we can calculate the extent to which
this alignment between meaning and signal differs from the align-
ment we would expect to see by a random, unstructured assignment
of signals to meanings (see Methods for details).
kihemiwi
Fig. 1. An example string–picture pair.
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Results of Experiment 1. The results of our first experiment, involv-
ing 4 separate diffusion chains of 10 participants each, are shown in
Fig. 2. Each of these chains was initialized with a different random
language. There is a clear and statistically significant decrease in
transmission error between the initial and final generations (mean
decrease 0.748, SD! 0.147; t (3)! 8.656; P " 0.002). This decrease
confirms the first of our predictions: the language is adapting to
become increasingly transmissible from generation to generation.
Indeed, toward the end of some chains the language is transmitted
perfectly: these participants produced exactly the same strings for
every meaning as their predecessor, although they had not been
exposed to the strings associated with half of those meanings.
How is this adaptation possible? Is any structural evolution of the
language taking place as in the second of our 2 predictions? As
Table 1 shows, the number of distinct strings in each language
decreases rapidly. The initial random languages are completely
unambiguous: every meaning is expressed by a distinct signal. The
transmission process cumulatively introduces ambiguity as single
strings are re-used to express more and more meanings. In other
words, the languages gradually introduce underspecification of
meanings. Clearly, the reduction in the number of strings must
make a language easier for participants to learn, but the reduction
alone cannot account for the results we see. For example, the
reduction does not explain how, in some chains, participants are
able to produce the correct signal for every meaning, including
meanings drawn from the UNSEEN set.
The answer to this puzzle lies in the structure of the languages.
The initial random language is, by definition, unstructured: nothing
in the set of signals gives any systematic clue to the meanings being
conveyed. The only way to learn this language is by rote. Equally,
if a language is randomly underspecified, then rote learning is the
only way it can be acquired. For example, if the same signal is used
for a black spiraling triangle and a red bouncing square, then a
learner must see this signal used for both of these meanings to learn
it. Because we deliberately hold items back from the SEEN set, rote
learning for all meanings is impossible. For learners to be able to
generalize to unseen meanings successfully, there must be system-
atic underspecification.
We can observe exactly this kind of structure evolving by
examining a language as it develops in the experiment. For example,
by generation 4 in 1 of the diffusion chains, the stringtuge is used
exclusively for all pictures with an object moving horizontally. The
distribution of the other strings in the language is more idiosyncratic
and unpredictable at this stage. By generation 6,poi is used to refer
to most spiraling pictures, but there are exceptions for triangles and
squares. Blue spiraling triangles or squares are referred to astupin,
and red spiraling triangles or squares are tupim. In the following
generation, these exceptional cases are reduced to the blue spiraling
triangle and the red spiraling square. By generation 8 (shown in Fig.
3), and also for generations 9 and 10, the language has settled on
a simple system of regularities whereby everything that moves
horizontally is tuge, all spiraling objects are poi, and bouncing
objects are divided according to shape.
It is precisely because the language can be described by using this
simple set of generalizations that participants are able to label
correctly pictures that they have never previously seen. This gen-
eralization directly ensures the stable cultural transmission of the
language from generation to generation, even though each learner
of the language is exposed to incomplete training data.




























Fig. 2. Transmission error and a measure of structure by generation in 4 chains.a shows the increase in learnability (decrease in error) of languages over time.b shows
structure in the languages increasing. The dotted line inb gives the 95% confidence interval so that any result above this line demonstrates that there is a nonrandom
alignment of signals and meanings. In other words, structure in the set of signals reflects structure in the set of meanings. In 2 cases, this measure is not defined and
therefore is not plotted (seeMethods). The language discussed in the paper is circled.
Table 1. Number of distinct words by generation in the
first experiment
Generation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
! Chain 1 27 17 9 6 5 4 4 2 2 2 2
" Chain 2 27 17 15 8 7 6 6 6 5 5 4
‚ Chain 3 27 24 8 6 6 5 6 5 5 5 5
# Chain 4 27 23 9 10 9 11 7 5 5 4 4










Fig. 3. An example evolved language in the first experiment. This language
exhibits systematic underspecification, enabling learners to reproduce the whole
language from a fragment.













Our structure measure confirms that the languages evolve to
become more structured. As can be seen in Fig. 2b, significantly
nonrandom structure in the mapping from meanings to signals
emerges rapidly. Furthermore, the languages produced by the final
generation are significantly more structured than the initial lan-
guages (mean increase 5.578, SD! 2.968, t (3) ! 3.7575, P " 0.02).
Languages in this experiment are evolving to be learnable, and
they are doing so by becoming structured. This development of
structure confirms our hypothesis regarding the cultural evolution
of language. However, we are interested in whether it would be
possible for a language to evolve that is learnable and structured but
also expressive, i.e., a language that would be able to label meanings
unambiguously. Such a language cannot rely on systematic under-
specification of meanings but instead must find some other means
of gaining structure.
Design of Experiment 2. Accordingly, in the second experiment we
made a single minor modification: we ‘‘filtered’’ the SEEN set
before each participant’s training. If any strings were assigned to
more than 1 meaning, all but 1 of those meanings (chosen at
random) was removed from the training data. This filtering effec-
tively removes the possibility of the language adapting to be
learnable by introducing underspecification: filtering ensures that
underspecification is an evolutionary dead-end. This process, al-
though artificial, is an analogue of a pressure to be expressive that
would come from communicative need in the case of real language
transmission.
Results of Experiment 2. As expected, under the modified regimen,
the overall number of words in participants’ output remains com-
paratively high throughout the experiment, as shown in Table 2. Fig.
4a shows how transmission error changes as the language evolves.
Once again, it is clear that the languages are becoming more
learnable over time (mean decrease 0.427, SD ! 0.106, t (3) !
8.0557, P " 0.002) although it is not possible to introduce the kind
of underspecification seen in Experiment 1. Furthermore, it is clear
from Fig. 4b that, as in Experiment 1, the languages are becoming
increasingly structured over time (mean increase, 6.805, SD !
5.390, t (3) ! 2.525, P " 0.05). Because filtering rules out the
generalizations that emerged in the previous experiment, a differ-
ent kind of structure that does not rely on underspecification must
be emerging.
If we examine the languages at particular stages in their cultural
evolution, we can see exactly what this structure is. For example,
Fig. 5 shows the language output by a participant at generation 9 in
1 of the diffusion chains. When one looks at this language, it
immediately becomes clear that there is structure within the signals.
We can analyze each signal as 3 morphemes expressing color, shape,
and movement, respectively, with 1 exceptional irregularity (renana
for a bouncing red circle). It turns out that this general structure
emerges by at least generation 6 and persists to the end of the
experiment, although the details change as some morphemes are
lost or are reanalyzed from generation to generation [seesupport-
ing information (SI) Tables S1–S8 for the complete set of
languages].
Discussion
What we have observed here under laboratory conditions is cu-
mulative cultural adaptation without intentional design. Just as
Table 2. Number of distinct words by generation in the
second experiment
Generation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
! Chain 1 27 23 22 17 21 21 17 21 25 13 16
" Chain 2 27 26 13 10 10 16 16 12 12 13 12
‚ Chain 3 27 11 16 14 12 17 14 16 20 19 12
#Chain 4 27 19 19 17 19 17 22 23 21 27 23
Symbols correspond to those in Fig. 4.




























Fig. 4. Transmission error and structure by generation in the experiment in which ambiguous data were removed from the training set at each generation.a gives
error for the whole language;b gives structure. These results show that, despite the blocking of underspecification, structure still evolves that enables the languages










Fig. 5. An example evolved language in the second experiment. The language
is structured: the string associated with a picture consists of substrings expressing
color, shape, and motion, respectively. The hyphens represent 1 way of analyzing
the substructure of these strings and are added purely for clarity; participants in
theexperimentalwaysproducedstringsofcharacterswithoutspacesoranyother
means of indicating substructure.
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previous computational models have predicted (4–13), the cultur-
ally evolving language has adapted in a way that ensures its
successful transmission from generation to generation, despite the
existence of a bottleneck on transmission imposed by the incom-
plete exposure of each participant to the language. Cultural adap-
tation results in languages that circumvent this transmission prob-
lem by exploiting structure in the set of meanings to be conveyed.
Note that this adaptation is cumulative with respect to learnability
and structure but not with respect to expressivity: cumulative
adaptation does not suggest that the languages necessarily become
more functional with respect to communication.
In all our experiments we have shown that languages, by virtue
of being culturally transmitted, become increasingly learnable and
increasingly structured. An obvious question is: to what extent does
the structure we see emerging resemble structures found in real
human languages?
In the first experiment, we saw underspecification introduced
into the language. This underspecification was not random but was
systematic, in that similar meanings were given the same label. The
form of the language reflected regularities in the visual scenes,
namely that they consisted of shape, color, and motion. Of course,
in the experiment this process ran unchecked and in some cases led
to languages in which almost every meaning was expressed by a
single signal.
The languages in our first experiment therefore could be seen as
being counter-functionally ambiguous. However, there is another
way of thinking about our results. Rather than seeing the emerging
language as ambiguous, some participants thought it revealed
something about the way the aliens saw the world. For example, in
posttest discussions, 1 participant noted that ‘‘color is not important
to these aliens.’’ This observation suggests that the participants did
not consider the language to be ambiguous, but instead thought that
it reflected the distinctions in meaning that the aliens were inter-
ested in communicating. The collapse of distinctions based on color
(which eventually occurred in all 4 replications of the first experi-
ment) in favor of distinctions based on shape and movement is
compatible with the literature on a shape bias, an expectation that
words will refer to shapes of objects rather than to properties such
as color or texture (32). It may be that, while adapting to become
more learnable by eliminating semantic distinctions, the languages
in the experiment retain the distinctions that seem most salient
and/or likely to be labeled linguistically.
Systematic underspecification similar to that found in the exper-
iments is an important feature of natural language. For example, in
the class of nouns only proper names refer to specific entities. Other
nouns are underspecified and typically correspond to natural
classes. However, systematic underspecification is not the only way
in which the structure of the set of meanings makes itself felt in
linguistic expressions. Most obviously, natural languages exhibit the
species-unique property of compositionality in syntax and morphol-
ogy.¶ The meaning of an expression normally is a function of the
meanings of subparts of that expression and of the way the subparts
are put together. It is precisely this property that we hypothesize
allows language to be both learnable and expressive.
Expressivity in human language is assumed to be a consequence
of the use of language for communication and also may be
attributable to predispositions of child language learners (33, 34).
In 1 computational model of iterated learning (8), an expressivity
requirement is enforced simply by filtering out ambiguous meaning-
strings from the data given to the learner, leaving a training set with
a unique 1-to-1 mapping between meanings and strings. Although
learners still are free to infer ambiguous strings, such ambiguity
would not be transmitted to the following generation.
We implemented exactly this filtering process in the second
experiment, to dramatic effect, even though for the participants the
conditions in this experiment were essentially identical to those in
the previous experiment. As in Experiment 1, after being presented
with string–picture pairs, the participants had to recall these pairs
and generalize to unseen pictures. Nevertheless, unlike in the
previous experiment, systematic compositional structure emerged.
Rules evolved for constructing signals out of a combination of
meaningful substrings, and these rules tended to be transmitted
from generation to generation once they had emerged (seeTables
S1–S8 for the full set of languages). The difference between these
2 experimental settings is simply that the second introduces a new
adaptive challenge for the evolving language. To be transmitted
faithfully from generation to generation, a language in this exper-
iment must be both learnable and unambiguous. The learnability
constraint is imposed by the participants in the experiment, and the
ambiguity constraint is imposed by our additional filter.
The result is the evolution of exactly the type of structure that
optimizes both these competing constraints: compositionality. The
evolution of this structure reveals a key feature of cultural trans-
mission: it gives rise to adaptive systems that respond to the
pressures imposed by the transmission bottleneck that exists be-
tween the producer and learner of behavior. Crucially, this adap-
tation by the language maximizes its own transmissibility, and the
adaptation can take place without intentional design on the part of
the individuals involved. Participants in the second experiment
could not be aware that ambiguous signals were being filtered, and
yet a completely different sort of structure emerged. This finding
demonstrates that adaptation can be independent of the intentions
of individuals.
Finally, the difference between the 2 experiments also shows that
the languages that emerge are not simply a reflection of the native
language of the participants. A participant’s first language may
influence the learnability of a particular artificial language and
therefore play a role in shaping the cultural evolution of those
languages in our experiments. However, this explanation cannot be
the whole story: if participants were merely stamping their own
linguistic knowledge onto the data that they were seeing, there
would be no reason we would find rampant structured underspeci-
fication in the first experiment and a system of morphological
concatenation in the second.
Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to study cumulative cultural
adaptation in the laboratory. Using a diffusion-chain paradigm with
an artificial-language learning task, we provide empirical support
for computational and mathematical models of iterated learning
that show language to be an adaptive system in its own right. We
demonstrate the cumulative evolution of an adaptive structure
without intentional design on the part of the participants in the
experiment.
We can understand the linguistic structure emerging in these
experiments as an adaptive response by language to the problem of
being transmitted from generation to generation. In particular,
language faces the problem of being reproducible from a sub-
sample. In the first experiment, the language solves this problem by
introducing systematic underspecification in the meaning-signal
mapping. In the second experiment, the language faces the addi-
tional challenge of being transmitted despite filtering for ambiguity.
Compositional structure is a potential solution to this particular
transmission problem, and this structure emerges. It is important to
reiterate that participants in the experiment did not intentionally
design this solution; indeed, they were not even aware of the
problem. Participants believed they were reproducing as best they
could the language to which they were exposed. Just as biological
evolution can deliver the appearance of design without the exis-
tence of a designer, so too can cultural evolution.
¶Arguably, the dance of honey bees (35) and the calls of Campbell’s monkeys (36) are both
minimally compositional. However, there is no evidence (as yet) for culturally transmitted or
open-ended compositional communication outside our species.














Eighty participants were recruited to participate in an ‘‘alien language’’ learning
study. Each had to learn a language made up of written labels for visual stimuli.
Participants were university students with no background in linguistics. The
female:male ratio was 46:34, the mean age was 22.5 years, the minimum age was
18 years, and the maximum age was 40 years. The experiment was conducted in
accordance with the ethics procedures of the Department of Linguistics and
English Language at the University of Edinburgh. Participants carried out the
experiment at a computer terminal and received written and verbal instructions
(see SI Text). During training, participants were presented with string–picture
pairs on the computer monitor. During testing, participants were presented with
pictures on the monitor and were prompted to enter strings using the keyboard,
with any sequence of alphanumeric characters being permissible.
Visual Stimuli. There were 27 possible stimuli to be labeled. Each was a colored
object with an arrow indicating motion. Each object feature (shape, color, mo-
tion) varied over 3 possible values: square, circle, or triangle; black, blue, or red;
horizontal motion, bouncing, or spiraling motion.
Labels. The set of labels in the initial language was generated and assigned
randomly and was constructed by concatenating between 2 and 4 syllables
(without spaces between) taken from a set of 9 simple consonant–vowel pairs.
Because participants were free to enter any sequence of characters they chose
during testing, subsequent labels were unconstrained.
Training and Testing Regimen. Each language (a set of 27 string–picture pairs, 1
string for each of 27 possible pictures) was divided randomly into 2 sets: the SEEN
set (14 string–picture pairs) and the UNSEEN set (13 string–picture pairs). Each
participant acquired the language in a single session comprising of 3 rounds of
training with an optional 2-minute break between rounds. A single round of
training consisted of 2 randomized exposures to the SEEN set, followed by a test.
In the first 2 rounds this test phase contained only half the SEEN and half the
UNSEEN items; the final test at the end of the third round (which was the only
source for the next generation’s language) consisted of all 27 pictures.
During each training pass through the SEEN set, participants were presented
with each pair in a random order, with the string being displayed for 1 second
followed by both string and picture being displayed for a further 5 seconds.
During testing, participants were presented with a picture and prompted to type
in the string they thought the alien would produce for that picture.
In the second experiment, the SEEN set was filtered before presentation to
participants. Specifically, if any string labeled more than 1 picture, all but 1 of
those string–picture pairs (chosen at random) was moved into the UNSEEN set. As
a result, the trainingdata seenbyparticipants in thesecondexperimentconsisted
of a purely 1-to-1 mapping from strings to pictures, even if the language of the
previous generation included 1-to-many mappings.
Diffusion-Chain Design. The first participant in the experiment was trained on a
language with randomly constructed labels. Subsequent participants were
trainedontheoutputof thefinal testingof thepreviousparticipant: theprevious
participant’s final testing output was randomly redivided into a new SEEN and
UNSEEN set.
Measure of Transmission Error. The mean distance between all the signals in a
participant’s output and the corresponding signals in the previous generation’s












m is the normalized Levenshtein distance (31) between stringssi
m and sj
m,
and the sum is over a set of meaningsM of magnitude !M!.
Measure of Structure. For a particular language, a measure of structure is
computed as follows. The distances between all pairs of strings in the language
are calculated using normalized Levenshtein distance. In addition, the distances
between all pairs of meanings also are calculated using a simple hamming
distance (so that meanings differing in 1 feature have a distance of 1, meanings
differing in 2 features have a distance of 2, and so forth). The Pearson’s product-
moment correlation between these 2 sets of distances then is calculated, giving
an indication of the extent to which similar meanings are expressed using similar
strings. To compare across different languages and to measure significance, it is
necessary to compute a Monte Carlo sample of this measure under permutations
of the strings over meanings. The graphs shown in the paper give thez score for
the veridical correlation based on 1,000 randomizations. The dotted line on the
graph therefore shows the 95% confidence interval that the observed mapping
could be obtained by random assignment of signals to meanings. This measure is
undefined when there is no variation in the Monte Carlo sample, for example
whenthe languagehasonly thesamestringforallmeaningsor forallbut1of the
meanings. In these cases, all possible reorderings are equally structured.
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Language, Learning and Cultural Evolution: how linguistic 
transmission leads to cumulative adaptation
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1. Introduction
An explanatory approach to language must, among other things, answer the question why lan-
guage is structured in the particular way it is and not some other way. In other words, we seek to 
account for the particular universal properties of linguistic structure. Attempts to tackle this chal-
lenge take many forms (Hawkins, 1988), but in this chapter we look at a particular type of explana-
tion, which we can term the adaptive systems approach.
This approach to an explanatory account for language focusses on its dynamical aspects, noting 
that the universal properties of language are actually the result of multiple complex dynamical sys-
tems operating on different time-scales each influencing the others. Specifically:
• Learning/use. The language produced by an individual is shaped in part by the cognitive 
mechanisms for learning and processing language. In other words, an individual’s language 
adapts on an ontogenetic time-scale through acquisition and use.
• Cultural2  evolution. The actual language spoken by any individual is also, obviously, a result 
of the language spoken by other individuals in the community and goes on to affect the lan-
guage of future generations of speakers. Language universals arise from the interaction of in-
dividuals with particular cognitive and usage-based constraints in populations who share 
language. To put it another way, language is transmitted through a repeated cycle of learning 
and use leading to a process of change and evolution on a cultural time-scale (e.g., Brighton et 
al, 2005).
• Biological evolution. Finally, the cognitive machinery that drives the cultural evolution of 
language is itself the result of biological evolution. This leads to the possibility that the uni-
versals that emerge through cultural evolution may alter the fitness landscape of the indi-
viduals that learn and use these languages, ultimately leading to the biological evolution of 
the mechanisms for learning and processing language (e.g., Briscoe, 2000). 
When we talk about these systems as being adaptive we mean that they result in the “appearance of 
design”. That is, there is a fit between the structure that is the result of the dynamical system and 
some function of that structure. Adaptation is most familiar in the context of biological evolution, 
where natural selection is often seen as an optimising process generating phenotypes that are fit 
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2 The use of the term culture is potentially problematic. Throughout this chapter we use it in a technical sense 
to mean any information that is transmitted through a population by means of production of behaviour by 
an individual and acquisition of similar behaviour by another individual through observation. Language is 
transmitted culturally in this sense, but this does not mean it is necessarily shaped by other aspects of the 
“culture” of the individuals that posses it.
for survival and reproduction, but our point is that this is only one example of possible adaptive 
mechanisms.
At the core of this multiple adaptive systems approach to language is the idea that a) much of 
language structure is adaptive and b) whilst appearing to be designed there is no actual designer 
involved. This chapter will look mainly at the latter claim with respect to cultural evolution in par-
ticular by reference to mathematical, computational and experimental models of the transmission 
of language. Briefly, we aim to show that the process of transmission of language through repeated 
acquisition and use leads to cumulative adaptations without the need for biological evolution or 
any intention to adapt language on the part of those that use it.
2. The orthodox evolutionary view
Figure 1: The orthodox evolutionary view. The universal properties of linguistic structure are deter-
mined by the nature of our individual cognitive machinery which is the result of biological evolution 
under natural selection for communication.
Faced with explaining the universal properties of linguistic structure, one influential approach has 
been a direct appeal to biology. In this view, language structure arises from our species-specific bio-
logical endowment – we have the types of languages that we do because we have an innately-
given language faculty with a particular structure that constrains the possible types of language 
(e.g., Hoekstra & Kooij, 1988). In particular, Chomsky (1975) suggests that it is a set of innate con-
straints on language acquisition that determines the nature of human language.
For many (e.g. Hurford, 1990) this is an unsatisfying explanation as it stands, since it appears 
simply to push the need for answers back but not dispel them. It transforms one puzzle “why do 
we have the particular language universals we do?” into another “why do we have the particular 
language faculty we do?”. In a landmark paper Pinker & Bloom (1990) set out a strategy for an-
swering this second question in order to support a broadly nativist approach to explanation. This 
strategy has become what might be called the orthodox evolutionary approach to language (see 
figure 1).
Pinker and Bloom (1990) argue that language structure has all the hallmarks of an adaptation. To 
them, many of the fundamental features of language appear to be tailored to communicating com-
plex propositions through a serial signalling medium. If Chomsky is right in arguing that these fea-
tures of language are the way they are because they arise from an innately given faculty for lan-
guage, then this makes language appear like many other features of our biology. The language fac-
ulty, like the heart or the liver, is an organ that appears adapted to a particular survival-relevant 
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If this is correct then the structure of the language faculty, like the structure of other organs, is 
best explained by appealing to biological evolution by natural selection. As they put it:
“Grammar is a complex mechanism tailored to the transmission of propositional struc-
tures through a serial interface... Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a 
trait should be attributed to natural selection: complex design for some function, and 
the absence of alternative processes capable of explaining such complexity. Human 
language meets this criterion.” (Pinker & Bloom, 1990:707)
This biological/evolutionary approach to linguistic explanation is appealing since it neatly 
grounds out the explanation of linguistic structure in the well-established mechanism of natural 
selection. 
Despite its appeal, there are reasons to be cautious with this orthodox evolutionary approach as 
it stands. One problem with the view portrayed in figure 1 is the link between “individual cogni-
tive machinery” and “universal properties of linguistic structure”. The Chomskyan approach to 
explaining language universals rests on a tacit assumption that constraints/biases on language ac-
quisition will directly lead to equivalent constraints/biases on the distribution of possible human 
languages. But is this assumption justified?
A lesson can be learned from a different way of explaining language universals known as the 
functional/typological approach. Here, universals are explained by appealing not to innate character-
istics of our language acquisition machinery, but rather to properties of the uses language is put to. 
We will not be looking at this literature in any detail here, but one of the criticisms levelled at it is 
that it fails to solve what has been termed the problem of linkage: how exactly does a feature of lan-
guage use end up being reflected in the cross-linguistic distribution of language types (Kirby, 
1999)?  The point is not that this problem is insoluble, but rather it is an absolutely crucial part of 
any explanation. What is the mechanism that links the proposed explanans to the explanandum in 
question?
This linkage problem exists just as forcefully for the Chomskyan approach (see Kirby et al, 2004 
for discussion):
Problem of Linkage. Given a set of observed constraints on cross-linguistic variation, 
and a corresponding pattern of functional preference or language acquisition biases, an 
explanation of this fit will solve the problem: how does the latter give rise to the 
former? [Italic text added to the original definition from Kirby, 1999]
What is needed is a way of bridging the gap between an individual-level phenomenon (the struc-
ture of a language-learner’s cognitive machinery) and a population-level phenomenon (the distri-
bution of possible languages). As Kirby et al (2004) argue, the solution to this problem is to explic-
itly model the way in which individual behaviour leads to population effects over time. As noted 
in the introduction, language emerges out of a repeated cycle of language learning and language 
use, and it is by studying this socio-cultural process directly that we will see how properties of the 
individual leave their mark on the universal structure of language.
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Figure 2: The solution to the Problem of Linkage. The universal properties of language arise from the 
cultural evolution of language through generations of socially interacting individuals with particular 
cognitive machinery. Of central importance is the precise contribution of the cultural evolutionary 
process in determining language structure.
Of course, it may well be that when we examine this linking mechanism we will find that lan-
guage universals do indeed straightforwardly reflect language learning biases, for example. If this 
is the case, then the orthodox evolutionary explanation is a reasonable one. However if the extra 
box in figure 2 does some work for us, then this explanation cannot hold – at least in its present 
form. Indeed, we may find that the explanatory burden may be lifted to some extent from our in-
nate machinery, and hence from biological adaptation through natural selection.
3. Modelling cultural evolution
So far we have identified the importance of understanding cultural evolution as it applies to lan-
guage because it represents the solution to the problem of linkage in the orthodox explanation for 
linguistic structure. The difficulty is that we have a surprisingly poor understanding of exactly 
how cultural evolution actually works in general (although there is a growing literature, e.g. Boyd 
& Richerson, 1985, Mesoudi et al, 2006). Compared to our detailed empirical and theoretical un-
derstanding of language acquisition, for example, or the process of biological evolution by natural 
selection, we do not have a strong empirical base for cultural evolution or an accepted set of prin-
ciples for how individual biases lead to population-level phenomena.
There is, of course, an extensive literature on historical linguistics which appears relevant. It is 
important to note that our target is subtly different. When linguists study language change, they 
consider how a language at one point in time turns into a different language at a later point. How-
ever, we would expect both of these languages to fall within the boundaries described by our the-
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around the space of possible languages rather than in the origins of that space in the first place.3 
We will return to this distinction later in a more formal context.
In order to better understand how cultural evolution works in general, and how it operates in 
shaping language in particular, we have set out to model it in three different ways over the past 
decade or so (given here in the order they have been explored):
• Computational models. Our first approach was to build simulations of populations of indi-
viduals with particular language learning machinery and see what types of languages emerge. 
The goal here was to examine the extent to which the resulting language structure was deter-
mined by features of the cultural transmission process rather than being directly encoded in 
the learning mechanisms (e.g. Kirby, 1994, 1999; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; Smith, 2002; Smith et 
al 2003; )
• Mathematical models. Based on our experience of the computational models, we developed 
an idealised mathematical framework which enabled us to state precisely how much our in-
nate endowment determines the structure of language (e.g., Kirby, Dowman & Griffiths, 2007).
• Experimental models. Finally, to act as a check on the plausibility of the formal models and to 
see how closely human subjects behave like their computational idealisations, we developed a 
novel experimental paradigm for cultural evolution (e.g., Cornish, 2006).
All three of these are based on a framework for understanding cultural evolution we have called 
the iterated learning model (see figure 3). Iterated learning is the fundamental process underlying 
many forms of cultural evolution, including language. It is the process of the transmission of be-
haviour where that behaviour is acquired by an individual observing similar behaviour in another 
who acquired it in the same way. The model, based on Andersen’s (1973) and Hurford’s (1990) 
treats the transmission of language as a repeated transformation between some linguistic represen-
tation internal to an individual (or “agent” to use the modeller’s parlance) and utterances that are 
external to that individual and can be observed by another. It is through being repeatedly learned 
and used by agents in the model that language evolves culturally.
Because our aim here is not a theory of language change, we do not typically start the models off 
with something that falls within the space of possible human languages. Instead we are interested 
in how (and whether) such human-like languages emerge in the models when one is not present in 
the initial conditions (see Brighton, 2003, for a detailed discussion of the methodological issues this 
raises). By varying features of the way in which language is transmitted from agent to agent in the 
models, we can begin to build-up a picture of how cultural evolution might work.
For the remainder of this chapter, we will briefly review the main results so far from the three 
strands of modelling research listed above and discuss what they tell us about how we should ap-
proach linguistic explanation. Of particular interest will be the question: how much of language 
structure that appears to be designed for communication need not be explained in terms of the in-
tentions of communicating agents at all?
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3 There are some exceptions to this. For example, there have been attempts to apply grammaticalisation the-
ory to the origins of language by reconstructing a pre-existing state where language universals would have 
been different (Heine & Kuteva, 2002).
Figure 3: The Iterated Learning Model.  The first agent has knowledge of language represented by a 
hypothesis h1 . This hypothesis itself represents a language Lh1 . Some subset of this mapping, L’h1, is 
externalized as linguistic performance for the next agent to learn from. The process of learning results 
in a hypothesis h2. The process is then repeated, generation after generation.(Taken from Brighton, et 
al, 2005:185)
4. Computational models: language transmission is adaptive
Since the early nineties, there have been a variety of attempts by a number of researchers (e.g. 
Kirby, 1994; Batali, 1998; Kirby, 2002a; Teal & Taylor, 1999; Tonkes, 2001; K. Smith, 2002; Steels et al, 
2002; Brighton, 2003; Zuidema, 2003; de Boer, 2005; A. Smith 2005; Vogt, 2005; Oudeyer, 2006) to 
build simulation models of the cultural evolution of language (see, e.g. Kirby, 2002b; Steels, 2003, 
for review and Brighton et al, 2005, for a detailed account of one particular strand of research). 
Most of these models adopt a framework similar to the one outlined in figure 3: a population of 
agents produce language-like behaviour in response to observing similar behaviour in other mem-
bers of the population. They differ (often radically) in their assumptions about the nature of the 
population, their model of learning, and exactly what form the agents’ language takes.
For example, Batali (2002) has a model in which there is a relatively large but static population of 
agents throughout the simulation, whereas Kirby (2000) implements a model with purely vertical 
cultural transmission in a chain of “adults” and “children”. In the former, no-one is born and no-
one dies, but in the latter there is strict generational turnover with the children replacing the adults 
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Fig. 1. The it rated learning model. The first agent has knowled of language repres nted by a hypothesis h1. This hypothesis
itself represents a language L
1
. Som subset of this mapping, L!h1 , is externalized as linguistic performance for the next agent
to learn from. Th process of learning results in a hypothesis h2. The proc ss is then repeated, generation after eneration.
3.2. The language model
Before proceeding to a fully-specified Iterated LearningModel we must introduce our language model.
The particular model we introduce will figure in both models featured later in the paper. The discus-
sion surrounding the language model will also llow us to define the featur of language we will be
invest gating throughout this article. This is property of language—a linguistic universal—t rmed com-
positionality.
A model of language needs to capt re the fact that a language is a particular relationship between
sounds and meaning. The level of abstraction we will aim for captures the property that language is map-
ping from a “characteristic kind of semantic or pragmatic function onto a characteristic kind of symbol
sequence” [73, p. 713]. When we refer to a model of language, we will be referring to a set of pos-
sible relationships between, on the one hand, entities representing meanings, and on the other, entities
representing signals. Throughout this article we will consider meanings as multi-dimensional feature
structures, and signals as sequences of symbols.
Meanings are defined as feature vectors representing points in a meaning space. Meaning spaces will
be defined by two parameters, F and V . The parameter F defines the dimensionality of the meaning
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each generation and a new set of children being introduced. In Batali (1998) agents are recurrent 
neural networks being trained using standard connectionist algorithms, whereas Brighton’s (2002) 
agents induce finite state machines using Minimum Description Length learning. In Kirby (2002a), 
agents communicate meanings represented as hierarchical symbolic propositions, whereas Vogt’s 
(2005) agents play communication games grounded in visual stimuli.
Despite the large range of different assumptions, methods and motivations across these models 
one broad conclusion seems warranted (cf. Christiansen, 1994; Deacon, 1997):
The Principle of Linguistic Adaptation: if a learner is given imperfect information 
about the language they are attempting to learn (e.g., if they are subject to noise, 
processing constraints, or they simply do not hear all the data), then cultural trans-
mission becomes an adaptive system. As a result, languages will emerge that appear 
to be optimised to the problem of being transmitted from individual to individual.
We can think of the transmission of the knowledge of language from one agent to another as pass-
ing through a narrow “bottleneck”. A large (or potentially infinite) language must be reconstructed 
by a learner despite the imperfect information imposed by the bottleneck.4 The very act of repeat-
edly squeezing language through this bottleneck causes language to change in such a way that its 
chance of being transmitted through the bottleneck with high fidelity is maximised.
The literature provides numerous examples of the principle of linguistic adaptation at work in 
simulations and shows how it can be used to cast light on specific linguistic problems. Here we 
provide three illustrations from our own work in this area. These summaries are necessarily brief, 
but nevertheless we hope they will give a flavour of the work in this area.
Hierarchical universals and competing motivations
Language universals of the sort discussed in the typological literature are often implicational in 
nature (e.g., Croft, 1990). That is, languages are predicted to have property Q if they also have 
property P, but not necessarily vice versa. In other words: P!Q. In some cases, researchers have 
uncovered whole chains of implications of the form P!Q & Q!R & R!S etc. These are often re-
written in the form of hierarchies of types: S>R>Q>P. Languages which exhibit a feature at some 
point in the hierarchy will also exhibit all the features higher in the hierarchy.
An influential typological study of relative clause formation provides a prototypical study of hi-
erarchical universals. Keenan & Comrie (1977) present evidence for the following hierarchy of ac-
cessibility to relative clause formation:
The Relative Clause Accessibility Hierarchy: 
Subject>Direct Object>Indirect Object>Oblique>Genitive>Object of Comparison
If a language can relativize any position on this hierarchy, they can relativise all 
higher positions in the hierarchy.
How might we explain a universal pattern such as this one? Kirby (1997) examines an explana-
tion due to Hawkins (1994) that appeals to asymmetries in the difficulty in processing different 
relative clauses. Simplifying somewhat, the idea is that the greater the structural distance between 
a head noun and the trace (or resumptive pronoun) in a relative clause, the greater the load there is 
on the working memory of the parser. However, this fails to explain why there should be a link 
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4 Note that this way of expressing things suggests an analysis of this sort of cultural evolution along the lines 
of Sperber (1996). However, it is also possible that the evolution of language in these models could be stud-
ied in terms of populations of competing replicators (e.g. Croft 2000, Kirby 1999).
between processing load during parsing and the observed universal – what is the mechanism that 
links the two?
In order to solve the problem of linkage here, Kirby (1997) sets out to model, in a simple simula-
tion, how this parsing preference actually results in a hierarchical universal.5 The simulation con-
sists of a population of agents. Each agent has a grammar which either allows or disallows relative 
clauses for each point on the hierarchy. The population of agents is updated through a process of 
generational turnover whereby a new population of agents is created; each agent in the previous 
generation produces example relative clauses according to their grammar; and the new agents ac-
quire their grammars on the basis of the examples produced by the agents from the previous gen-
eration. The learning mechanism is set up in such a way that the probability that a learner acquires 
a particular relative clause type is dependent both on the number of examples the learner hears 
and the parsing difficulty associated with each clause type. This implements in a straightforward 
way a parsing-based bottleneck on the cultural transmission of language.
The results of this model immediately demonstrate a problem with the explanation for Keenan 
and Comrie’s (1977) hierarchy as it stands. No matter what the initial distribution of languages is 
in the population, the only stable end state is one where languages don’t allow any relative clauses 
at all. It is easy to see why this happens: language is simply adapting to the complexity of process-
ing relative clauses. The most adapted languages are those that avoid the problem of relative 
clause processing by rendering them ungrammatical.
Kirby (1997) shows that this is a general problem with any explanation for hierarchical universals 
that appeals to an asymmetry in processing difficulty. The solution, verified by the simulation 
model, is to seek a competing functional motivation favouring the structure in question. Interestingly, 
this competing motivation need not be asymmetrical with respect to the different types on the hi-
erarchy. So, all that is needed to derive the observed distribution of language types in the simula-
tion is a general speaker-driven least-effort principle that favours relative clauses of all types 
equally, for example because they avoid the need for circumlocution. With this pressure acting on 
speakers (and some assumptions about how the relative strengths of pressures may vary over 
time) the end result of the simulation is a distribution of languages that obeys the Keenan and 
Comrie hierarchy. All the language types at the start of the simulation that do not correspond to 
those found in the world today disappear.
What these results demonstrate is that languages can adapt to competing needs of speakers and 
hearers as they influence the bottleneck on linguistic transmission. The hierarchy is not built-in di-
rectly as a set of constraints on possible languages – nor do the agents in any way try and optimise 
the language they have. The universal emerges as a population-level effect from processing pres-
sures acting on individuals influencing the transmission of language through iterated learning.
Compositionality and morphological regularity
Whereas the early iterated learning models looked at specific language universals of the sort un-
covered by typological surveys, with steadily increasing computing power and interest in the evo-
lution of language there has been a desire among many researchers to simulate the emergence of 
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5 Although this explanation appeals to parsing preferences that are arguably innately given, it appears to be 
of a rather different type than the Chomskyan style of explanation from innate language acquisition con-
straints outlined earlier. Indeed the problem of linkage referred to here is essentially the one that pervades 
much functional explanation of typological generalisations. Nevertheless, as we shall see, exactly the same 
linkage problem exists for explanations appealing to acquisition constraints/biases, and the solution to the 
problem is the same as well.
language out of a pre-existing a-lingual state. For example, could some of the fundamental features 
of syntax be shown to evolve from a largely non-syntactic protolanguage6 solely through cultural 
processes?
A particularly fundamental structural feature of language that sets it apart from almost all other 
communication systems in nature is compositionality. It is regular compositionality in the mapping 
between signals and meanings that, when recursively applied, gives language its completely open-
ended expressivity. Drawing on a variety of evidence, Wray (1998) proposes an earlier stage in the 
evolution of language where signals and meanings are not related compositionally, but rather 
whole signals correspond to whole meanings. This holistic protolanguage is in many ways closer to 
the communication systems of non-human primates, which are based on a fixed repertoire of ex-
pressions lacking generalisable internal structure.
The puzzle is what drives the transition from a holistic stage in language to a more syntactic sys-
tem of communication. Why and how does compositionality emerge? Can the principle of linguis-
tic adaptation help?
If we think about the difference between holistic and compositional mappings from the point of 
view of the transmission of language, it becomes obvious that the principle of linguistic adaptation 
does indeed predict that compositionality will emerge in most cases. Assuming that there is a 
larger range of meanings that an individual language learner could  be exposed to in their lifetime 
than the range of meanings that they actually are exposed to, then there is a bottleneck on linguistic 
transmission because a learner will never see the entire language. This means that a holistic ex-
pression for some meaning will only ever be learned if that exact expression is observed by a 
learner. On the other hand, in a compositional language, a sub-expression (e.g. a word or mor-
pheme) corresponding to a sub-part of a meaning has a much greater opportunity to be learned 
since evidence for it can be seen by a learner whenever any meaning in which it is involved is ex-
pressed. Hence, generalisable linguistic structure is better able to fit through the bottleneck on lin-
guistic transmission. Jim Hurford puts it succinctly in the title to his article: “social transmission 
favours linguistic generalisation” (Hurford 2000).
Kirby (2001) demonstrates the process at work in a computational simulation. Agents in this 
model acquire languages from observations of strings of characters being paired with a finite set of 
very simple structured meanings. Meanings are essentially pairs of features, each of which can 
take a range of values. The initial expressions in the simulation are random strings of characters 
paired with whole meanings. In other words, the initial language is holistic because there is no 
regularity in the mapping between meanings and signals.
Agents are prompted to produce signals for meanings at random and will do so using their in-
ternalised language if possible, otherwise they will “invent” a random novel string of characters if 
necessary. Learners store signal-meaning pairs that they hear in a list, but will also search for any 
generalisations they can make over the set of pairs that they store. Of course, given a purely holis-
tic language there are no generalisations that can be made, so the language remains holistic.
What happens in such a model?  It turns out that it depends critically on how much data learners 
see in their lifetime. As predicted, this learning bottleneck drives the cultural evolution of language 
as it is transmitted from generation to generation in the iterated learning model. When learners see 
large amounts of data, then the language typically is acquired perfectly each generation and there-
fore does not change. In this case, a completely holistic protolanguage is stable. However, if the 
number of meaning-signal pairs each learner is exposed to is reduced then the language becomes 
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6 We use protolanguage here in its evolutionary sense (e.g. Bickerton, 1990; Wray, 1998) to mean an evolution-
arily prior form of language without all the hallmarks of modern human language.
rather unstable. This is simply because agents will be called upon to produce signals for meanings 
they have never encountered in their input. Because the language is holistic, their only option is to 
produce a novel random string. The particular meanings that are subject to this random innovation 
differ each generation in the simulation (because meanings are picked at random for agents to 
produce). The upshot of this is that the language can change from generation to generation.
If this were all that happened, it would not be a very interesting model. However, something 
rather striking occurs when there is a learning bottleneck such as this one: the initially unstable 
language transforms over time into one that is stable despite, or rather because of, the limited input 
to learners. This new stable language is compositional. Each feature ends up being expressed by 
some sub-part of the signal. So, for example, a complete meaning might be encoded by using a 
“morpheme” corresponding to the value of the first feature attached to a “morpheme” correspond-
ing to the value of the second feature.
This compositional coding system emerges piecemeal (but surprisingly rapidly) in this simula-
tion as speakers’ purely random and holistic innovations are incorrectly over-generalised by learn-
ers. The crucial point that arises from the iterated learning model is that these mistaken over-
generalisations are then correctly picked-up by learners in the next generation. Because generalisa-
tions are better able to get through the learning bottleneck, this process snowballs and the inevita-
ble end-result is the emergence of rampant compositionality.
It is important to realise that this result is not simply an artefact of particular features of this one 
simulation. As noted in the introduction to this section, the same basic behaviour can be seen in 
simulation models with radically different assumptions and architectures. Furthermore, this type 
of model can not only provide an explanation for the origins of compositional regularity, but also 
explain the cases where it does not occur. Whilst most simulation models make the simplifying as-
sumption that all meanings were equally frequent, Kirby (2001) implemented a non-uniform fre-
quency distribution in his model so that some combinations of feature-values were more likely to 
be expressed by speakers than others.
Figure 4: Simulation result showing a partially regular paradigm. Meanings involve two components, 
“a” and “b”. Frequency of these combinations increases to the upper left of the table. The signals are 
combinations of letters and exhibit regular compositional structure except for the most frequent mean-
ings. (Taken from Kirby 2001)
In this case, only infrequent meanings end up being expressed compositionally. Highly frequent 
meanings tended to remain with irregular holistic forms (see figure 4). This makes sense from the 
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the language in an ILM with pressures for short strings. In addition to coverage, communicative success and size of grammar mean string
length of utterances is also plotted.
Just as in the previous simulation, a clearly regular encoding
has evolved. This is not what we were looking for, however.
There is still no irregularity in this language. In later genera-
tions, some irregularity does emerge (shown in bold in this ex-
ample from generation 763).
These irregulars are not stable, however. They typically
only last one or two generations, being rapidly reregularized
by learners. So, although the performance pressures clearly
influence the evolution of the system (in that the string length
is much reduced), realistic irregulars have not emerged.
D. Nonuniform Frequency Distributions
What else might be needed to model both the emergence
of structure-preserving regularity and stable irregularity in lan-
guages? A clear indication of what is missing from the ILMs
presented so far is given if we look at where in real languages
irregulars appear most stable. For example, here are some of the
verbs in English that have an irregular past tense: be, have, do,
say, make, go, take, come, see, get, .
Strikingly, these verbs are also the ten most frequent verbs
in English usage [16]. In fact, it is recognized by linguists that
irregularity (i.e., noncompositionality) correlates closely with
frequency in natural language [17]. The frequency with which
meanings need to be expressed in the ILM (and, hence, indi-
rectly the frequency of use of particular strings) is uniform. In
contrast, the frequency of use of words in natural languages ap-
proximates a Zipfian distribution [18]; that is, the frequency of
use of a particular word is inversely proportional to its frequency
rank. While w cannot infer h freque cy d stribution f pa -
ticular meanings in real languages from this directly, it strongly
suggests that a uniform distribution is an unrealistic idealization.
Conseque t y, the si u ation in the previous s ction is
rerun with a nonuniform distribution over meanings (shown
in Fig. 3) based on a Zipfian surface. This means that when,
in the ILM, meanings are chosen at random for the adult
agent to produce strings, the probability of picking a particular
meaning is weighted so that the frequency of us of meanings
approximates the function shown in Fig. 3.
The results of a run with this distribution of meanings is
shown in Fig. 4. It is noticeable that the system appears far
less stable than others, suggesting that the process of language
ha ge is ongoing throughout the simulation (as it is i real lan-
guage history). The most important result, however, can be seen
by looking at a snapshot of the language taken at one point in
time in the imula ion (generation 256).
As before, there are some irregular forms (shown in bold), but
in contrastwith the previous result, they are highly stable. For ex-
ample, this particular cluster of irregulars appeared in generation
127 and lasts until generation 464, at which point is regular-
ized to . Indeed, the irregular appears constant throughout all
1000 generations of the simulation. Furthermore, just as in the
real case, the irregular forms are all highly frequent. It is also in-
teresting to note that length appears to correlate inversely with
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point of view of the principle of linguistic adaptation. If a meaning crops up with high frequency, 
then information about how that meaning is expressed is reliably provided to the learners. There is 
no pressure in this case for it to be regularised and become compositional. This result is suggestive 
in the light of the well-known relationship between frequency and regularity in the morphology of 
real languages. For example, the top ten verbs in English by frequency all have irregular past-
tenses (Francis & Kucera, 1982).
The adaptation of meanings through iterated learning
Both of the previous examples show how the form of language may adapt through a process of cul-
tural evolution. In the second example, the structure of strings in the language end up largely mir-
roring the pre-existing structure of the meanings in the model. In these simulations, the meaning 
structure is defined and fixed by the experimenter, leading some researchers to wonder if more 
flexible meanings can be modelled in simulation (e.g, Steels et al, 2002; A. Smith, 2005; Vogt, 2005).
Indeed, in a simple idealised computational model, Kirby (2007) suggests that semantics as well 
as syntax might adapt through a process of cultural evolution under pressure from a bottleneck on 
transmission. To model this, a distinction is made between the meanings that the agents associate 
with signals on the one hand, and their actual communicative goals on the other. So, for example, I 
as a speaker may wish to draw the attention of a hearer to a particular person in a room. I might 
choose to do this in a number of ways: from describing them in every detail, through simply not-
ing their distinctive features, to referring to them by name. In the computational model, each of 
these correspond to different “meanings” associated with the object of reference. In some sense, it 
is up to the speaker to choose which meaning they wish to convey, which in turn will affect the ac-
tual signal produced. Note that, at one extreme this corresponds to a holistic system of communi-
cation – in their simplest form, proper names are holistic. At the other extreme, we might imagine a 
deeply compositional (but highly inefficient!) form of communication where every discernible as-
pect of the object of reference is explicitly expressed.
For brevity, we will omit the details of the model here, but the key is that although agents are 
able to conceptualise every communicative goal in a large number of different ways, correspond-
ing to different meanings, they are only able to express those meanings if they have previously en-
countered similar expressions in their training data. More precisely, they are able to express a tar-
get meaning if they have previously heard a set of meanings within which all aspects of the target 
meaning appear at least once. To put it another way, just as in the previous model, compositional-
ity allows the learners to recombine sub-parts of other expressions to form novel ones as long as 
there is sufficient evidence in the input.
Agents are randomly given a particular communicative goal and a “context” of a number of 
other randomly chosen irrelevant goals. They then try and find a meaning corresponding to their 
communicative goal for which a suitable expression can be generated. If more than one meaning is 
possible, then agents pick one which best discriminates the target of communication from the con-
text. If no meanings are possible, then as in the previous model, agents invent a new expression.
The result of these modifications to the previous iterated learning models is that the kinds of 
meanings that agents use evolves culturally, rather than simply the signals that they associate with 
meanings. So far the analysis of the model is far from complete, but what is clear is that the lan-
guage once again shows evidence of adaptation. Where there is pressure from the learning bottle-
neck, meanings are preferred which allow for the most generalisable forms of compositional lan-
guage.
There are a number of flaws in this model, unfortunately. For example, although the use of mean-
ings can change over time the set of all possible meanings must still be provided somehow by the 
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experimenter. Work by robotics and artificial life researchers looking at the origins of communica-
tion may eventually provide the best way out of this issue by grounding communication in the real 
world (e.g. Steels, 2003) or some model of ecological relevance (e.g. Cangelosi et al, 2002). How-
ever, the important point here is to show that principle of linguistic adaptation may potentially 
have a very wide remit in helping explain many aspects of linguistic structure.7
5. A mathematical model: from weak innateness to strong universals
The computational models reviewed briefly in the previous section lend credence to the notion that 
language is an adaptive system in its own right. Features of the bottleneck on linguistic transmis-
sion end up influencing the structure of language as it adapts through a process of cultural evolu-
tion to the challenge of being repeatedly learned by generations of agents.
It is worth reviewing at this point the relevance of linguistic adaptation to the nativist argument 
outlined in section 2. We highlighted the importance of tackling the problem of linkage when con-
sidering nativist explanations. We proposed that cultural evolution is the mechanism that links 
properties of an individual’s language learning machinery with universal features of linguistic 
structure. If the result of cultural evolution is a straightforward expression of innate biases in cross-
linguistic distribution (i.e. if Universal Grammar gets expressed directly as language universals), 
then there is no particular problem with the orthodox evolutionary view. However, another possi-
bility is that the contribution of cultural evolution is more significant – that it distorts or transforms 
the innate biases in such a way that their explanatory significance is reduced.
It certainly seems likely that the latter is true given the results of the computational models. For 
example, it is clear that features such as the amount of training data and the frequency of meanings 
have significant (and even determining) influence on fundamental features of the structure of the 
languages that emerge. That said, there are problems with the simulation models as they stand. 
Most crucially, it is very difficult to say for any given computational model exactly what the con-
tribution of innate biases actually is, or even what those biases are in the model. The fact that simi-
lar results are achieved with hugely different architectures suggest that whatever prior biases the 
models have (and they surely have some since bias-free learning is impossible) their details might 
not have a strong bearing on the outcome. It would nevertheless be nice if we could know exactly 
what the relationship between innateness and universals is in general and it is hard to see how this 
kind of simulation model is going to be able to do that.
To tackle this question, we can use a general model of learning which makes prior bias explicit 
and embed this in a mathematical idealisation of the iterated learning model (Kirby, Dowman & 
Griffiths, 2007, building on Griffiths & Kalish, 2005). This model treats learning as a process of se-
lecting the best hypothesis (i.e. grammar) given a set of data (i.e. utterances) and a prior bias to-
wards some hypotheses over others (i.e. a model of innateness). Bayes’ law provides us with a neat 
mathematical characterisation of how these interact. We can use it to calculate the probability of a 
hypothesis given some data (which is what a learner would ideally like to know) from the prob-
ability of the data given that hypothesis (which can be estimated if we know how utterances are 
produced) and the prior probability of that hypothesis independent of any data seen (which is the 
innate contribution of the learner’s machinery):
p(h|d) ! p(d|h) p(h)
where h is the hypothesis under question and d is the set of data heard by the learner.
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7  The brief overview given here is far from exhaustive in this regard too. For example, work by Oudeyer 
(2006) demonstrates how similar ideas can explain the origins of the phonemic code.
If we assume that learners pick the best hypothesis they can – the one that maximises p(h|d) – 
then we can in principle construct a complete view of the dynamics of iterated learning for any 
model of hypothesis space, innate contribution and production model. We simply calculate for any 
pair of hypotheses (i.e. languages), hi and hj, the probability that a speaker with hypothesis hi will 
produce data that a learner will infer has actually been produced by hj.
This set of probabilities defines a transition matrix over languages (c.f. the Q-matrix of Nowak et 
al, 2002) showing how languages will change over time as they are repeatedly used and acquired. 
It turns out that there are straightforward mathematical techniques for transforming such a matrix 
into a probability distribution over languages corresponding to the predicted cross-linguistic dis-
tribution as an outcome of iterated learning.8
What this set of mathematical tools gives us is a way of plugging-in different assumptions about 
innateness and seeing exactly how they result in language universals. Kirby, Dowman & Griffiths 
(2007) use this to test whether the strength of innate biases is reflected in the resulting language 
universals. For example, are strong innate constraints required to explain big asymmetries in the 
distribution of language types? Equally, can the nature of innate biases be inferred straightfor-
wardly from observed language universals?
Firstly, the mathematical results back-up the computational models in showing that languages 
adapt to the nature of the transmission bottleneck. Frequency of meanings and the number of ex-
amples learners are exposed to fundamentally shape the language universals that emerge. This in 
itself acts to obscure the influence of the prior bias (see, for example, figure 5 which confirms that 
frequent meaning are far more likely to be irregular despite a prior bias with only a slight and 
equal preference for regularity across the board).
A more striking result of this model, however, is that for a wide range of values, the actual 
strength of the prior bias makes absolutely no difference to the universal distribution that emerges. 
Although the nature of the prior bias is clearly important, the degree to which any innate prefer-
ences are reflected in the languages that emerge is dependent on such things as the number of ex-
amples seen rather than the strength of those innate preferences themselves.  
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8 This distribution is called the stationary distribution and is the limiting distribution of the process of linguis-
tic transmission (given some plausible assumptions about the nature of the transition matrix). The distribu-
tion is stationary in the sense that the probabilities of any particular language being found do not change, but 
the particular languages in a population at any point in time may. It can be thought of informally as the time 
average of languages after the dynamics of iterated learning have settled down. The stationary distribution 
gives us a way of thinking about the differences between the study of language change and the study of (cul-
tural) language evolution mentioned in section 3. The former looks at how languages move within the sta-
tionary distribution. The latter looks at how the stationary distribution itself is formed.
Figure 5: The effect of cultural transmission on an innate bias. The graph shows the probability of a 
meanings in an abstract model of a language being irregular across meanings with decreasing fre-
quency. The top line shows the expectation of irregularity encoded in the learners’ prior learning bias. 
The lower line shows the actual probability of irregularity that emerges through cultural evolution. 
(See, Kirby, Dowman & Griffiths, 2007, for more details.)
6. An experimental model: cumulative adaptation without intention
As we have seen, the results from a wide range of formal models lend credence to the principle of 
linguistic adaptation. Language appears to spontaneously adapt to pressures affecting its own sur-
vival through cultural transmission. Of course, there has been some scepticism of the validity of 
modelling results applied to the evolution of language. For example, Bickerton (2007) complains: 
“Powerful and potentially interesting though this approach is, its failure to incorporate 
more realistic conditions (perhaps because these would be more difficult to simulate) 
sharply reduces any contribution it might make towards unravelling language evolu-
tion. So far, it is a classic case of looking for your car-keys where the street-lamps are.” 
(Bickerton, 2007:522)
A pressing question is therefore, can this kind of cultural adaptation be observed in real human 
subjects rather than simulated agents?
Previous experimental work has looked at the emergence of novel systems of communication in 
groups of experimental subjects. For example, in experiments reminiscent of the board game Pic-
tionary (Healey et al, 2002; Fay et al, 2004) show how subjects forced to communicate graphically 
(and disallowed from writing) can converge on a way of communicating meanings using graphical 
signals. A particularly fascinating result from this work is an observed transition from the use of 
icons to communicate in initial stages to a more symbolic mode of communication once shared 
conventions have been set up. In another experiment, Galantucci (2005) demonstrated that pairs of 
subjects could converge on a shared symbol system when trying to solve a cooperative computer 
Obtaining general results for the consequences of increasing r is
complicated, but if we place some constraints on the structure of
languages we can still determine the stationary distribution
analytically. Here, we constrain our languages such that P(d!h)
is either constant or zero across all hypotheses h for all data d.
This is not an overly restrictive constraint; for example, it is
satisfied by the set of deterministic languages, with a unique
signal for each meaning and an arbitrary distribution over
meanings. With a s t of languages that satisfies th s constraint,
t probability that a particular hypothesis h will be produced by
iterated learning is proportional to P(h)r (see Methods for proof).
The i plications of this are clear: languages will be systemati-
cally overrepresented with respect to their prior probabilities for
values of r ! 1. That is, weak biases will produce strong univ rsals
if learners choose hypotheses in a fa hi n that disproportio ately
favors hypotheses with higher p sterior probabilities.
Conclusion
Our analyses demonstrate that, by mediating between innate bias
and resulting behavior, culture may profoundly influence the
evolutionary process. We have shown that the strength of bias can
be completely obscured by iterated learning. Genes may code for
the strength of a learning bias, but fitness (and hence selection of
those genes) is determined by the extended phenotype: in this case,
the properties of languages that emerge in populations. Genes
controlling strength of bias could therefore be shielded from
selection, so culture may introduce neutrality to the fitness land-
scape of learners. This has potentially far reaching consequences.
For example, if strong learning biases must be maintained against
mutation pressure (28), the introduction of cultural transmission
may lead to a weakening of these innate biases.
The implications of our results are not restricted to human
language. They have relevance to any behavior that is passed
between generations through learning. For example, some bird
species produce songs that exhibit particular structural universals,
but they have nevertheless been shown to be capable of learning
artificially constructed songs that violate these universal constraints
(29). This is exactly the sort of result we would predict if a weak
learning bias is being amplified by cultural transmission through
iterated learning.
Language is therefore the result of nontrivial interactions
between three complex adaptive systems: learning, culture, and
evolution. As such, it is an extremely unusual natural phenom-
enon. Taking the role of culture into account provides alterna-
tive explanations for phenomena that might otherwise require an
explanation in terms of innate biases or biological evolution.
Ultimately, if we are to understand why language has the
universal structural properties that it does, we need to consider
how learning impacts on cultural transmission, and how this
affects the evolutionary trajectory of learners.
Methods
Meaning-Class Mapping Model. In this model, we assume that a
language consists of a mapping from a set of n meanings to a set
of k classes. The data observed (and produced) by each learner
consist of m pairs of meanings and classes. The probability of the
set of meaning-class pairs d being produced given that a learner




where x is a meaning and y is a class that is produced in response
o that meaning. This equation assumes that the class produced
in response to each meaning is independent of the other
meanings for which that learner has produced classes. In the
initial study (Fig. 3), P(x) is equal for each x. Noise in the
linguistic transmission process is modeled by incorporating a
parameter " that corresponds to the probability that a different
class to the correct one will be chosen for each production. The
probability of producing a particular class in response to a given
meaning if a learner speaks language h is therefore
P"y!x, h# ! #1 # " if y is the class corresponding to x in h"
k # 1
otherwise. [4]
The prior probability assigned to each language, h, is
P"h# !
&"k$#
&"$#k&"n % k$# "
j'1
k
&"nk % $#, [5]
where nj is the number of meanings expressed using class j. &(x)
is the generalized factorial function, with &(x) ' (x-1)! when x is
an integer. $ is a parameter that controls the strength of the
prior, with low values of $ creating a strong prior bias in favor
of regularity, and high values creating a relatively flat prior, in
which the probability assigned to the most regular languages is
only slightly greater than that assigned to the most irregular. This
prior is a special case of the Dirichlet-multinomial distribution
(30). Its use means that the Bayesian inference mechanism can
be seen as a form of minimum description length (31). This is
because the probability assigned to each language corresponds
to the amount of information needed to encode it in a minimally
redundant form if information theory (32) is used to relate
probability to entropy. In the cases considered in this paper,
there was a language with each possible mapping of meanings to
classes, given the number of meanings and classes available.
Proof of Weak Biases Producing Strong Universals. We now allow h
and d to correspond to any form of language, not just meaning-
class mappings, so long as the Markov chain on h is ergodic. By
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Fig. 4. The emergence of an adaptive irregularity/frequency interaction.
Cultural transmission results in languages where the probability of a meaning
bei g irregul r (i.e., not being assigned the majority class) is correlated ith
its frequency; this is despite the fact that learners in this model have a prior
expectation that all meanings are equally likely to be irregular. This result
mirrors what is found in real languages and has the hallmarks of an adapta-
tion. This graph shows the probability of each meaning not being in a majority
class, and the frequency of each meaning is inversely proportional to its rank.
It was derived through simulation over a million iterations because the more
complex languages used in this simulation made calculation of the whole
transition matrix infeasible.
5244 ! www.pnas.org$cgi$doi$10.1073$pnas.0608222104 Kirby et al.
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game with only a graphical means of communication. Selten & Warglien (2007) demonstrate a 
similar process in a non-graphical paradigm.
These experiments focus on the role of interactive feedback in the creation of shared systems of 
communication. Participants attempt to construct a signalling system and modify it in response to 
feedback in the form of behaviour or further signalling by the other participant in the exchange. 
The systems that emerge are a product of a combination of deliberate design and interactive nego-
ciation between interlocutors.
But how good is this as a model of the emergence of linguistic structure?  While it cannot be de-
nied that humans are intentional agents who have the potential to design and construct communi-
cation systems – indeed these experiments demonstrate this admirably – it remains arguable that 
the universal structural properties of human languages are the result of such intentional design.
Keller (1994), for example, argues at length that much of human language is best seen as a result 
of an “invisible hand” process, echoing Smith’s (1776) use of the term as a metaphor of the way 
individuals influence market economics. Keller’s point is that language change, although being the 
result of actions of intentional agents, is not the goal of those agents’ intentions. To put it baldly, 
the shift from OV to VO order in the history of English arose from the actions of speakers of the 
language and may ultimately have a functional motivation (Hawkins, 1994), but it was surely not 
the result of individuals deciding to modify the language in such a way to improve its parsing effi-
ciency.
This kind of argument can be applied more broadly to cultural evolution. Many products of hu-
man behaviour are the result of intentional design, but some are non-intended consequences of 
many individuals’ actions. It is possible that these non-intended consequences may nevertheless be 
adaptive – they may show the appearance of design without actually having a designer. The paral-
lels here with biological evolution, where apparent design results not from an intentional Creator, 
but from the non-local consequence of local selection, has led some to propose studying cultural 
evolution in similar terms (e.g., Aunger, 2001).
Despite huge interest in these theories of cultural evolution, and their relevance to language evo-
lution, there has been as far as we know no previous experimental validation that culturally 
transmitted behaviour can actually adapt without intentional design. Cornish (2006) and Kirby, 
Cornish & Smith (2008) set out to rectify this by setting up an analog of the computational models 
of iterated learning using human subjects rather than simulated agents.
These experiments combine two experimental paradigms: diffusion chain studies and artificial 
language learning. The former have previously been used among other things (e.g., Mesoudi et al 
2006; Bartlett, 1932; Kalish et al, 2007) to look at whether chimpanzees are able to culturally trans-
mit information about how to open a puzzle box (Horner at al, 2006). A chain of experimental sub-
jects is set up in which each one observes the performance of the previous subject in the experi-
ment and then in turn produces behaviour that the next subject is able to observe. In this way, the 
task that a subject faces is in some sense outwith the experimenters control (excepting the initial 
participant in the experiment) because it is ultimately determined by the previous participants’ be-
haviours. The (perhaps surprising) result is that cultural transmission in chimpanzee populations 
has high fidelity – if a diffusion chain of chimpanzees is initialized with box opening behaviour A 
then that behaviour will be faithfully transmitted across a number of generations, without a switch 
to the equally functional opening behaviour B.
Artificial language learning experiments, on the other hand, examine the performance of indi-
viduals at learning a particular hand-constructed artificial language (e.g., Gomez & Gerken, 2000) 
with a goal of determining human language learning biases. We can think of this paradigm as mir-
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roring the behaviour of one individual agent in the iterated learning simulations, whereas the dif-
fusion chain experiments are akin to the population model where behaviours are repeatedly 
transmitted from “adults” to “children”.
The experiment
Subjects in our experiment are treated as if they were participating in a standard artificial language 
learning task. They are told they are going to be exposed to an “alien” language that they must try 
and learn. The experiment starts with a random, unstructured, holistic language which is pre-
sented to the first subject. After training on this language, the subject is tested and their output re-
corded. The innovation is the embedding of this task within a diffusion chain: the output of the 
first experimental subject forms the language that the second subject in the experiment will be 
trained on, and so on. In this way, we can track how the initially random language changes as it is 
repeatedly learned and produced by “generations” of participants in the experiment. Crucially, 
subjects are not aware of the cultural nature of the experiment. They are simply asked to give us 
back as best they can the language that we have presented to them. In other words, there is no 
sense that participants in the experiment are trying to improve the language in any way, for exam-
ple to score well in some collaborative game.
The hypothesis being tested is that there will be cumulative cultural adaptation of the language 
without intentional design by participants. Accordingly, we expect two things to happen in ex-
periments such as this one: 
• the language should become easier to learn; 
• and the language should become structured. 
If this happens, then insofar as we can say that this was not the result of intentional design on the 
part of the participants in the experiment, the hypothesis will have been confirmed.
In order to make this kind of iterated learning experiment work, we need to have some way of 
eliciting language data from subjects. We cannot, for example, simply test subjects recall of strings 
in the input language through a forced-choice task. This is because we need to generate training 
data for the next participant. To get round this problem, we trained subjects on stimuli that were a 
combination of strings of written syllables and simple schematic pictures (corresponding to signals 
and meanings respectively). In the testing phase, subjects were asked to produce the correct string 
of syllables corresponding to each picture in turn, thus providing us with a new training set for the 
next generation.
Each picture/meaning in the experiment is a coloured shape moving in one of three ways 
(bouncing, spiralling or sliding). There are three possible shapes (square, circle or triangle) and 
three colours (red, blue or black), yielding 27 different meanings. The original language is con-
structed by randomly concatenating, without spaces, 2 to 4 CV syllables from a set of a possible 9. 
For example, in the original language, a red bouncing square might be labelled “kihemiwi”. Al-
though the initial language has these constraints, subjects are free to type any combination of char-
acters they wish in their output at test.
At each generation (i.e., for each participant in the experiment), the input language is divided 
randomly into a SEEN and and UNSEEN set. Participants are trained a number of times on the 
SEEN set by being presented with each picture and string in turn on a computer screen. They are 
then tested on the entire SEEN + UNSEEN set of 27 pictures in order that we can gather a complete 
language. This new language is then divided (randomly again) into SEEN and UNSEEN sets for 
the next participant (see Cornish, 2006, for more details).
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Results
The complete results and analysis of this experiment are given in Cornish (2006), but we give a 
brief summary here. In all cases our hypothesis of cumulative adaptation is confirmed.
Firstly, to see if learnability increases, we measured the difference in the strings produced by a 
subject at generation n with a subject at generation n-1. In the initial stages, the difference was ex-
tremely high. This is not at all surprising. After all, we are not only presenting subjects with a ran-
dom set of strings, but we are asking them to respond with strings for pictures that they have 
never previously seen. For these unseen examples and the initial random language at least it is im-
possible to get these right (except by an overwhelming fluke!). Remarkably, however, as the ex-
periment progressed, later generations found it increasingly easy to get strings correct, or near cor-
rect. In fact, in some cases after 7 or 8 generations had passed, subjects were getting every string 
correct even those for pictures they had never seen in the training data. In other words, the lan-
guage evolves culturally to become more learnable.
How does it achieve this feat?  Recall we predict that adaptation of the language should lead to 
structure evolving. This is indeed what happens, but the type of structure depends on how we di-
vide up the data each generation into the SEEN and UNSEEN sets.
In our first experiment, the language was divided evenly into SEEN and UNSEEN, with 14 and 
13 pictures in each respectively. The result was quite surprising given previous computational 
models, but makes a lot of sense in retrospect. The language adapts to be learnable primarily by 
reducing the number of distinct words. To put it another way, strings become ambiguous with re-
spect to the pictures. The initial random language has 27 distinct words in it (one for each picture), 
but at the end of the experiment (which ran for 10 generations) the language only has 5 words. 
This alone does not capture everything that is going on, however, otherwise subjects would still 
not be able to get all UNSEEN pictures 100% correct as they do for the last three generations in the 
experiment. To do this, there must be some structure in the mapping from meanings to signals.
A statistical analysis of the language at each stage confirms that this structure exists. Basically, 
words end up being used for sets of pictures that tend to share features in common. The final lan-
guage (which is stable for three generations) shows this most clearly:
• miniku is used for all bouncing circles
• tupin is used for all bouncing triangles
• tupim is used for all bouncing squares
• poi is used for anything that spirals
• tuge is used for anything that slides
What has happened is that word-picture pairs have been generalised in such a way that the lan-
guage can pass through the learning bottleneck. Even if subjects do not see half of the pictures, 
they can nevertheless be reliably named.
This is not the kind of result familiar from the computational models reported earlier – structure 
in the signals themselves does not emerge. What seems to be missing here is any pressure on the 
language to be expressive. Languages with fewer words are clearly more learnable, so adaptation to 
learnability inevitably reduces the expressive power of the language by introducing what is essen-
tially rampant polysemy and a reduction in the discriminative power of the language. Once the 
number of words is low enough no further adaptation is necessary since the language passes easily 
through the learning bottleneck. 
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For our second experiment, we made a minimal change to the procedure to try and reduce the 
amount of polysemy that participants (unwittingly) introduce. To do this, we moved any duplicate 
words from the SEEN set into the UNSEEN set before training each participant. So, if a particular 
subject had introduced polysemy by using the same word for more than one picture, only one of 
those word-picture pairs would be provided as training for the next subject.
The result of this small modification is dramatic. Although subjects find the task much harder 
and perfect transmission is not achieved, the learnability of the language nevertheless increases. 
However, the type of structure that emerges to make the language learnable is quite different. The 
strings in the language start to gain internal structure and in some cases clear compositionality 
emerges with aspects of the meaning being expressed as regular prefixes or suffixes. So, for exam-
ple, in one of the languages that emerges, a black bouncing circle is named “winekuki” with the 
prefix “wi-” being largely consistently used to refer to black things, and the suffix “-kuki” being 
across the board to refer to anything bouncing. In this particular language, the shape is encoded by 
a complex set of semi-regularities governing the middle syllable and changes to the prefix (see 
Cornish, 2006, for the complete set of languages in the experiments).
It is important to reiterate that participants in this experiment are not deliberately constructing a 
structured system for encoding meanings (as they are in an experiment such as Selten & Warglien, 
2007). They are attempting as best they can to give us back the language that they were exposed to, 
idiosyncrasies and all. In fact, some subjects reported that they were not even aware that they were 
being exposed during the test phase to pictures that they had not seen in training. In addition, the 
adaptation that occurs is not instantaneous, but gradual and cumulative. The increase in the 
learnability of the language tends to proceed by small amounts each generation.
This is truly an invisible hand process. The linguistic structure that emerges, which enables the 
subjects to accurately report the labels for pictures they have never seen, appears to be designed 
for that purpose, and yet there is no intentional designer. Just as in the computational and mathe-
matical models, the mere fact that language must be passed through a transmission bottleneck 
causes it to adapt.
7. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have put forward the view that to explain the universal structural properties of 
language we need to look at language as a complex adaptive system – one in which biologically 
evolved innate biases on individual learning can be seen as challenges to which a culturally evolv-
ing language must adapt. Computational, mathematical and experimental models demonstrate 
that the process of linguistic evolution on a cultural time-scale is one that has significant explana-
tory power. 
This growing body of work points to a number of conclusions of relevance to linguistics and the 
study of cultural evolution more broadly:
• biological evolution by natural selection is not the only explanation for adaptive structure in 
language;
• statistically significant cross-linguistic universals do not necessarily imply strong innate con-
straints;
• the burden of explaining the constraints on linguistic variation is lifted from a putative bio-
logically evolved innate Universal Grammar;
• the structure of the human language faculty cannot be straightforwardly inferred from the ob-
served structure of human language;
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• the appearance of design in human behaviour, including language, does not necessarily re-
quire a designer if it is transmitted culturally.
In addition, we hope that we have made a case for attempting to model cultural evolution of lan-
guage either in simulation or in an experimental setting. For too long explanatory formal frame-
works for language structure have focussed on the individual and assumed that population effects 
are unimportant. It is now possible to move beyond these kinds of idealisations and explicitly ex-
amine what happens when populations of individuals interact. Work in this area is still in its in-
fancy, but we believe it has the potential to improve our fundamental understanding of why lan-
guage is structured the way it is.
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Introduction
The position paper in this issue (Beckner et al.) sets out a powerful motivating
picture of language as a complex adaptive system. It presents us with a way
of thinking not only about the dynamics of language as we know it now but
also the emergence of language in the first place. More specifically, in this
article, we suggest that the very fact that language persists through multiple
repeated instances of usage can explain the origins of key structural properties
that are universally present in language. Because of this, taking a complex
adaptive systems perspective on language lifts the burden of explanation for
these properties from a putative richly structured domain-specific substrate,
of the sort assumed by much of generative linguistics (e.g., Chomsky, 1965).
Ultimately, this alters our view of what biological evolution must provide in
order to get language off the ground.
Much of the work over the past 20 years or so in modeling the evolution
of language has taken this complex adaptive systems perspective (see, e.g.,
Brighton, Smith, & Kirby, 2005; Kirby, 2002b; Steels, 2003, for review). One
particular strand of work has focused on the adaptation of language through
a repeated cycle of learning and use within and across generations, where
adaptation is taken to mean a process of optimization or fitting of the structure
of language to the mechanisms of transmission (Kirby, 1999).1
A particular subset of models have looked extensively at the impact of re-
peated learning on the process of emergence. They investigate how a form of
cultural evolution known as iterated learning affects the structure of language
(e.g., Batali, 1998; Brighton, 2002; Griffiths & Kalish, 2007; Hurford, 2000;
Kirby, 1999; Kirby, Dowman, & Griffiths, 2007; Kirby & Hurford, 2002; A.
Smith, 2005; K. Smith, 2002; Vogt, 2005; Zuidema, 2003). In these models,
each agent (i.e., simulated individual) must acquire a set of (initially random)
mappings between meanings and signals by observing the behavior of agents
in the previous generation. Once this mapping is acquired, the learner becomes
a teacher, and the process repeats. Crucially there is a bottleneck in the trans-
mission process that puts pressure on the system to be generalizable (Deacon,
1997). This bottleneck models the data-sparsity present in real language ac-
quisition and is typically enforced in the simulations by the learner only being
exposed to signals for a subset of the total meanings during training.
Overall, two consistent conclusions have been drawn from this computa-
tional research: Over time, iterated learning ensures languages evolve to (a)
become easier to learn and (b) become more structured. These two facts are
not unrelated: One of the ways in which a language can evolve to become more
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learnable is by becoming structured. This is because there are only two ways
to survive the transmission bottleneck: be heard (and remembered) by the next
generation or be easily inferable from what is heard. This latter solution can
only occur when there is some kind of regularity to be exploited in the system.
The exact form this regularity takes can vary, which is something we explore
later.
The regularity that emerges gradually in the computational simulations jus-
tifies our use of the term “adaptive” in this case. This is because the kinds of
linguistic structures that evolve show the hallmarks of apparent design. For
example, in some models (e.g., Batali, 2002; Kirby, 2002a), recursive compo-
sitional syntax evolves that clearly enables the simulated agents to successfully
convey meanings in an open-ended way. This kind of adaptive structure in
language might lead researchers to conclude that it must reflect innate con-
straints that are the result of biological evolution by natural selection (e.g.,
Pinker & Bloom, 1990). However, this conclusion is not justified. In most of
these models, there is no biological evolution. Indeed, individuals are essen-
tially clones throughout. Rather, the adaptation arises purely from the iterated
learning process itself. Language transmission is a complex adaptive system.
Recently, we developed a method for studying this process of adaptive evo-
lution in the laboratory, extending experimental studies of iterated learning in
the nonlinguistic domain by Griffiths and Kalish (2007) and Kalish, Griffiths,
and Lewandowsky (2007). By combining two experimental techniques—
artificial language learning (e.g., Esper, 1925, 1966; Fitch & Hauser, 2004;
Gómez & Gerkin, 2000; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) and diffusion chains
(e.g., Bangerter, 2000; Bartlett, 1932; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006;
Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006; Whiten, Horner, & de Waal, 2005)—we
were able to track the evolution of a miniature language over “generations” of
experimental participants from an initially random, unstructured state, to one
showing clear evidence of adaptive structure (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008).2
In this article, we provide a new analysis of the results of this study to examine
in more detail the way structure emerges as a result of competition between
linguistic variants.
Human Iterated Learning: An Overview
Before we move onto the details of the studies, it is necessary to familiarize
ourselves with the general methodology and key parameters of the experiments
that follow. A participant is trained on an “alien” language consisting of a set
of meanings (usually presented as pictures) paired with signals (a string of
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letters, or possibly sounds) drawn from a finite set. After being trained on some
proportion of these meanings, the participant is then presented with a series of
meanings without signals and asked to provide the correct description in the
alien language. These meanings and signals are recorded and become the new
set of training pairs for the next participant, who forms the next “generation”
of the chain. This procedure is repeated until the chain is complete (i.e., until
the desired number of generations has been reached).
Participants involved in the study are only asked to learn the language as best
they can: They are not told anything about the iterated nature of the study or that
their responses will be given to future participants. During each training round,
participants are shown a picture drawn at random from the set of meanings,
and below it, a string of letters that they are told represents how the alien would
describe that picture in its own language. Training occurs via a computer, and
each exposure is timed to ensure no training item (meaning-signal pair) is seen
for longer than any other and continues until all training items have been seen.
During the final test, the participant is shown each picture in the language
once, one after another, and asked to type in the missing descriptions. These
responses are then randomly sampled from to generate the new training items
for the next generation.
Clearly, this experimental setup represents a highly simplified idealization
of the real process of linguistic transmission. In particular, the population model
is the simplest that we could construct (in line with the other diffusion chain
experiments mentioned previously). Three parameters characterize possible
population models: direction of transmission (vertical or horizontal), the size
of the population, and who learns from whom (network structure). For the rest
of this article we focus on just one scenario: vertical transmission, involving
10 people, with each person learning from just 1 other person. However, it
is important to remember that there are many other scenarios that could be
explored within this framework.
Learnability, Expressivity, and Adaptation
As stated in the introduction, the main finding to have emerged over the past
decade or so of research into this area is that languages themselves adapt to
be better learnable and transmissible by us over time (see, e.g., Christiansen &
Chater, 2008, for a review). However, it should be recognized that this pressure
toward greater learnability must be tempered somewhat in order for structure
to emerge. The reason for this is simple: The most easily learnable language
might be one in which there is one word for everything (or possibly, no words
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at all). It is only when we also have a pressure for expressivity, for meanings
to actually be distinguished from one another, that we are likely to see the
emergence of structure.
The first application of this new experimental methodology set about inves-
tigating this tension between expressivity and learnability (Kirby et al., 2008).
In this study, the meaning space consisted of 27 pictures showing a scene
that varied along three features and three values: color of object (blue, black,
red), shape of object (circle, triangle, square), and a dotted line indicating the
movement of object (bouncing, spiralling, moving horizontally). Two different
experimental conditions were explored, with four chains of 10 people in each.
In one condition there was a “hidden” pressure for each of the meanings in
the meaning space to be expressed uniquely: Participants’ input was filtered in
such a way as to ensure they never perceived different meanings with the same
signal. In the other, there was no such pressure. Participants could not be aware
of the experimental condition in which they were included.
The chains in each condition both began with random initial languages,
and a transmission bottleneck was imposed by exposing each generation with
just half (14) of the meaning-signal pairs during training (the particular mean-
ings that they would be exposed to were chosen randomly each generation).
Example (1) shows a sample of the initial randomly generated language in one
of the chains to illustrate what is meant by the claim that they are unstructured
with respect to their meanings.3 In spite of the fact that these meanings in
the world are similar (triangles of every color that either move horizontally or
in a spiral), the signals used to describe them are all idiosyncratic, with no
consistently repeating subparts.
(1) a. kapihu b. luki
“black triangle horizontal” “black triangle spiral”
c. humo d. namola
“blue triangle horizontal” “blue triangle spiral”
e. lahupiki f. lumoka
“red triangle horizontal” “red triangle spiral”
After training, participants were tested on all 27 meanings, and it is from
this output set that the new training set is sampled for the participant in the next
generation.
The main findings can be summarized as follows (see Kirby et al., 2008, for
more details). First, by looking at the learning errors made between adjacent
generations, it was shown that the languages in both conditions were being
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acquired significantly more faithfully toward the end of the chains than they
were at the beginning. Second, this increase in learnability over time occurred
as a result of the languages becoming more structured over time.
What is interesting about this last fact, however, is that the way in which
the languages were structured differed markedly between the two experimental
conditions. In the first condition, for which there was no filtering of the partic-
ipants’ input, systems emerged that were characterized by underspecification.
This involved a reduction in the total number of distinct signals, introducing
ambiguity with respect to the meanings. However, this ambiguity was not com-
plete, as it did not affect all meaning dimensions. In one chain for instance, a
system emerged [of which a sample is reproduced as Example (2)] whereby
everything that moved horizontally was called tuge, everything that moved in a
spiral was named poi, and there was a three-way distinction of bouncing items
dependent on shape: for bouncing squares, tupim for bouncing triangles, tupin,
and for bouncing circles, miniku. This system proved to be highly adaptive
in the sense that, once it emerged, it was stable and faithfully acquired by
subsequent generations without error.4
(2) a. tuge b. poi
“black triangle horizontal” “black triangle spiral”
c. tuge d. poi
“blue triangle horizontal” “blue triangle spiral”
e. tuge f. poi
“red triangle horizontal” “red triangle spiral”
As Kirby et al. (2008) pointed out, underspecification is not an unusual fea-
ture of human languages, but taken to extremes, it would lead to an inexpressive
and communicatively disfunctional language (albeit one that would be easy to
learn). The second experimental condition, whereby items were removed from
a participant’s input if they should lead to the same string being assigned to
more than one meaning, was designed to introduce a hidden pressure against
underspecification. With this modification in place, the systems that emerged
appear much closer to what we might expect a communicatively useful system
to look like. These systems were characterized by compositionality, whereby
the meaning of a given string could be inferred by the meaning of subparts of
that string (morphemes) and the way they are put together. Example (3) again
shows a sample of this.5
(3) a. nekeki b. nekipilu
“black triangle horizontal” “black triangle spiral”
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c. lakeki d. lakipilu
“blue triangle horizontal” “blue triangle spiral”
e. raheki f. rahopilu
“red triangle horizontal” “red triangle spiral”
These results are very exciting, as they experimentally verify the main findings
to have emerged from computational models of iterated learning for the first
time: that languages adapt purely by virtue of transmission through iterated
learning. Moreover, the kind of adaptation is determined, in part, by constraints
placed on the transmission of the languages about which participants could
not be aware. However, although it has been shown that the languages in these
experiments do adapt, it has not yet been established how they adapt. It is to
this question that we now turn.
The Evolution of Signals During Iterated Learning
In this subsection we will focus on the utterances, leaving aside the meanings
for the moment, and construct phylogenies demonstrating the evolution of
linguistic forms over iterations. We used one of the languages [part of which
was reproduced in Example (2)], taken from Kirby et al. (2008) to construct the
coalescent tree shown in Figure 1. These trees are a standard way to represent
phylogenetic descent in evolutionary biology (Barton, 2007; Hein, Schierup, &
Wiuf, 2005), although here we have amended them to also include frequency
information in brackets. Bold lines show perfect replication of an utterance,
whereas other lines show possible relationships of descent between utterances
across generations.
As we can see in Figure 1, the number of different utterances decreases
over time as we start to observe perfect replication of select utterances, along
with a general tendency for utterances to become shorter. In the early history of
this language, the process of transmission is principally one of generating new
recombinations of signal substrings. We observe only one instance of replication
of a whole utterance but many replications of parts of the utterances, such as
unigrams or bigrams, and even larger n-grams. For example, the introduction
of the form miniku in generation 2 could be the result of a blend between miniki
and miweniku.6 There is still much variation in the language at this point. In the
final generations, however, the frequencies of the few remaining units stabilize
around multiples of 3, suggesting adaptation to a meaning space containing
three dimensions.
In the case of the language in Figure 1, given the nondecomposable utter-
ances that survived into the final stable system, it was appropriate to analyze
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Figure 1 Coalescent tree showing lineages of signals for all 27 items over generations
of one of the languages obtained by Kirby et al. (2008) exhibiting systematic underspec-
ification. Columns correspond to generations; horizontal bold lines indicate the perfect
replication of the whole signal; all other lines indicate some of the possible relationships
of descent between signals that share some features. Numbers shown in brackets indi-
cate the frequency with which variants were produced at each generation. The number
of variant types decreases over time, although the number of tokens remains fixed at
27 throughout. Among these surviving variants there are clear relationships of descent,
sometimes with modification. The frequency information is suggestive of the fact that
signal variants may be adapting to express a meaning space composed of multiples
of 3.
replication at the level of the whole utterance. However, in a compositional
system, the meaning of a complex utterance is a function of the meanings of
the elements of the utterance and the way they are arranged. The tree in Figure 1
illustrates adaptation of the whole signals to the structure of the meaning space;
in a compositional language, we expect the same phenomena to occur but this
time at the level of signal elements. We will now quantify compositionality
using a different language (part of which is shown in Example (3)] from Kirby
et al. (2008).
First, we need to segment the signals into element units. To do this, we first
examined the language of the final participant in the chain to find the most
parsimonious segmentation of the strings into elements that corresponded to
aspects of the meanings (e.g., “the signal endings reliably encode motion”
or “signal-initial ‘la’ consistently encodes colour blue”). This resulted in each
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Figure 2 Coalescent tree showing lineages of signal ending variants for all 27 items
over 10 generations of one of the languages obtained by Kirby et al. (2008), referred
to in (3). Numbers shown in brackets indicate the frequency with which variants were
produced at each generation. The number of variant types decreases over time, although
the number of tokens remains fixed at 27 throughout. Among these surviving variants
there are clear relationships of descent, sometimes with modification. The frequency
information is suggestive of the fact that signal variants may be adapting to express a
meaning space consisting of three meaning elements (see generations 4, 9, and 10).
string being divided into three substrings, and this segmentation pattern was car-
ried back to all previous generations in order to allow for a consistent analysis.
Figure 2 shows the coalescent tree for the word-final signal element (although
similar trees can be constructed for both initial and middle positions also).
As earlier, we observe a marked reduction in the number of variants over
time, as just a few become selected to be reused more often. Furthermore, we
can see that the variants that appear at each generation are not random; we
can trace the genealogy of the surviving variants back in time. Even over this
minute timescale, many of the changes observed appear to follow paths that
are well attested in cases of natural language change, such as single segment
replacements (nepi ! napi; pilu ! pilo), reductions (hona ! na, neki ! ki,
pilu ! plu), metathesis (neki ! nike), and blends (humo & huna ! homa &
hona; na & ki ! neki).
It is significant to notice that at generation 4 we have three variants (na,
neki, pilu), each with a frequency of 9 and that for the final two generations, this
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pattern repeats (now for variants ki, plo, pilu) broken only by a single instance
of na. This, again, suggests that these lineages are adapting to a three-element
meaning space. Obviously, we know that this is indeed the case; the interesting
thing is that the signals alone suggest it. In the next subsection, we show how we
can precisely quantify regularities in the mappings between signal and meaning
elements in order to objectively confirm this.
Quantifying the Emergence of Compositionality
We now have an analysis of all the languages in terms of the following: signal
segments—in this case, the word beginning, middle, or end; signal segment
variants—actual tokens residing in a segment position, such as pilu or ki.
Similarly, we can define the following: meaning elements—aspects of meaning,
such as motion, shape, and color; meaning element variants—actual instances
of a meaning element, for instance, “blue,” or “circle,” or “bounce.”
Kirby et al. (2008) quantified the emergence of structure using a pair-
wise distance correlation (Shillcock, Kirby, McDonald, & Brew, 2001). This
measures the extent to which similar meanings are expressed using similar
forms—or more precisely, whether there is a correlation between the structure
of the meaning and signal spaces. Although this is valuable in showing that
structure emerges, it does not allow us to track the evolution of the compo-
sitional structure of the languages directly: As a measurement, the pairwise
distance correlation is very general and cannot distinguish between composi-
tionality and other kinds of structures (such as underspecification). Here, we
apply a new method of analysis to one of the chains7 reported in Kirby et al.
(2008) to tackle this problem. We use RegMap (Tamariz & Smith, 2008), an
information-theoretic metric that combines the conditional entropy of mean-
ings given signals and of signals given meanings and normalizes the result to
make it comparable across systems of different sizes. Informally, what RegMap
(short for regularity of the mappings) does is return the degree of confidence
that a signal element consistently predicts a meaning element (for instance,
the degree to which we can be sure that the beginning of the signal encodes
color).
More formally, H(X | Y ), the conditional entropy, is the Shannon entropy
(Shannon, 1948) but replacing p(x) with p(x | y). The RegMap for a meaning
element (M) and a signal segment (S) is given by
RegMap =
!"
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H(S | M) is the conditional entropy of the signal segment given the meaning
feature, or the uncertainty about the meaning when we know the segment. This
relates to comprehension. For example, for shape and first signal segment,
H(S | M) quantifies how uncertain we are on average about what shape an
object is if we hear the first segment of its corresponding signal. H(M | S) is
the conditional entropy of the meaning feature given the signal segment, or
the uncertainty about the segment when we know the meaning. This relates
to production. Still, in the case of shape and first signal segment, H(M | S)
quantifies how uncertain we are, on average, about what first segment to produce
if we know the shape of an object. The logs of nm and ns normalize the values
between 0 and 1; nm is the number of different meaning values (e.g., triangle,
circle, square for shape); ns is the number of different segment variants in the
relevant segment position. Subtracting the conditional entropies from Equation
1 returns levels of confidence instead of uncertainty.
Figure 3 shows the RegMap values for all combinations of signal and mean-
ing elements both with and without a bottleneck for the 10 generations. The
“input” data shown in Figure 3 (upper) reflects the extent to which signals pre-
dict meanings in the subset of the language (taken from the previous generation)
that was actually transmitted to the current generation, after the bottleneck was
applied. The “output” data shown in Figure 3 (lower) is obtained from the com-
plete languages that participants actually produced at a given generation, before
the bottleneck was applied. The significance of the obtained RegMaps was es-
tablished with a Monte Carlo analysis involving 10,000 randomizations of the
correspondences between meanings and signals and are shown as boxplots.
Focusing first on the bottom graphs of Figure 3, obtained from the partic-
ipants’ output languages, we see that, starting from values indistinguishable
from random at generation 1, RegMap becomes massively increased to highly
statistically significant levels; specifically, by the third generation, motion is
consistently encoded by the final signal segment; by the fourth generation,
color is encoded by the initial segment, and by the ninth generation, shape is
encoded by the middle segment (all p < .001).
Second, a comparison of the input (upper) and output (lower) results in
Figure 3 reveals the effect of the bottleneck. The RegMap values are, in the
majority of cases, amplified by the bottleneck (the absolute value of RegMap
increases). Moreover, the lower the input RegMap, the more likely it is to be
amplified by the bottleneck. How is this happening? The answer is potentially
counterintuitive; randomly occurring patterns are more likely to be perceived
the smaller the system is. At least in the early generations, a subset drawn from
a language is more likely to accidentally contain more regular patterns than the
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Figure 3 Regularity of the associations between signal and meaning elements, mea-
sured as RegMap, changes over time in the direction of maximizing compositionality,
whereby signal elements are consistently associated with distinct meaning elements.
The continuous colored lines represent RegMap values obtained with all nine segment-
meaning feature pairs in the 10 generations of a language family from the study by
Kirby et al. (2008), referred to in Example (3). The boxplots show the distributions of
values obtained with 10,000 randomized languages. The upper graphs show RegMap
values from the subset of language (taken from the previous generation) that was actu-
ally transmitted to the current generation, after the “bottleneck” was applied. The lower
graphs show RegMap values obtained from the complete languages that participants
actually produced at a given generation, before the bottleneck was applied.
entire language. Implicit in this, and by the same token, a given subset will also
tend to contain less counterevidence against such patterns. This explains why
we observe such a dramatic difference between the ranges shown in the boxplots
in the upper and lower graphs in Figure 3. The large range of RegMap values in
the input languages directly reflects the fact that participants are sensitive to this
reduced number of observations when they are inferring the mappings between
meanings and signals. Together, this accounts for the structure-generating effect
of the bottleneck on language: The input to each generation is only a fraction of
(and therefore tends to be more systematic than) the total output of the previous
generation.
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Third, the graphs show cases of competition between meanings all vying to
be expressed by the same signal element. For example, motion and shape are
both equally encoded in the final signal segment in the input to generation 3, but
generation 3 resolves this conflict by ignoring one of the associations (shape)
and amplifying the other (motion) to a significance level of p < .01. Conversely,
we also see cases of competition between signals vying to express the same
meaning: In the input of generation 5, color is equally encoded in the initial
and middle signal segments (similar absolute values and levels of significance);
in this case, the conflict is resolved by massively amplifying the association
with the initial segment to a significance level of p < .001 and reducing the
association with the middle one. These processes are adequately explained by
the standard evolutionary mechanisms of variation, replication, and selection
applied to the mappings between signals and meanings elements. Selection, in
this case, can be hypothesized to be guided by perceptual and attentional biases
such as higher salience of certain signal and meaning elements over others.
Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of these biases is outside the scope of the
present work.
Summary
Kirby et al. (2008) found that the languages that emerge through a repeated cycle
of learning and production in a laboratory setting show evidence of adaptation
to the bottleneck placed on their transmission. Making even minor changes
to the way in which language is culturally transmitted can produce radically
different types of structures. Given only a bottleneck on transmission preventing
a proportion of the language from being seen by the next generation, language
can adapt in such a way that ensures that it is stably transmitted to future
generations. However, this occurs at the expense of being able to uniquely refer
to every meaning. When they introduced the additional pressure of having to
use a unique signal for each meaning, the language once again adapted to cope
with these new transmission constraints, this time by becoming compositional.
Having a compositional system ensures that both signals and meanings survive
the bottleneck.
Because the participants could not know which condition they were in, it is
impossible that the resulting languages were intentionally designed as adaptive
solutions to the transmission bottleneck. Rather, the best explanation for the
result is that in these experiments, just as in the computational models, linguistic
adaptation is an inevitable consequence of the transmission of linguistic variants
under particular constraints on replication. The result is apparent design, but
without an intentional designer.
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Whereas Kirby et al. (2008) analyzed their results at the level of whole
signals and whole meanings, in this subsection we have developed new tech-
niques to analyze the same results in terms of the component parts of linguistic
signals. An analysis of how signal variants and their frequencies change over
time showed relationships of descent with modification among them. It also
suggested that signal variants are adapting to the structure of the meaning space.
This intuition was verified by the application of RegMap, a tool designed to
objectively measure compositionality. Using this method, we showed that indi-
vidual signal elements come to encode individual meaning elements, whereas
the whole system evolves to avoid ambiguity (i.e., more than one meaning
being encoded in the same signal element or vice versa). Moreover, we were
able to more precisely describe the role of the bottleneck in bringing about
compositionality: The smaller subsets sampled as inputs to the next generation
may locally contain more systematicity than the entire language. Iterating this
learning process using these smaller samples therefore provides a platform that
allows systematic patterns to be noticed, remembered, and replicated prefer-
entially, thereby allowing them to gradually accumulate in the language as a
whole.
It seems clear from all of this that, first, cultural transmission alone is
capable of explaining the emergence of languages that exhibit that appearance
of design and, second, experimental studies of the iterated learning of artificial
languages are a potentially useful methodological tool for those interested in
studying cultural evolution.
Conclusion
This article has extended previous work on iterated language learning exper-
iments by showing, using data obtained from an earlier study, exactly how
compositional structure emerges over time as a result of cultural transmission.
Using a recently developed analytical technique that calculates the regularity of
mapping between signal and meaning elements (Tamariz & Smith, 2008), we
were able to precisely quantify changes in the language’s ability to systemati-
cally encode such associations between meaning and signal components. From
this we were able to explain the amplification effect the bottleneck seems to
have on systematicity in language, arguing that the sampling of smaller subsets
of the language for training input to the next generation tends to make weaker
patterns that are not visible at the level of the entire language appear stronger
locally.
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One obvious criticism of the experimental work described here is that it
necessarily involves participants who already speak a language. As such, can
it tell us anything about the original evolution of language, as we are claim-
ing? The sceptical position might be that we are simply seeing the evolution
of structure that reflects the native language of the participants as opposed to
any adaptive logic of the iterated learning process itself. This criticism faces a
number of problems, however. Most importantly, the experimental results are
backed up by the computational simulations and mathematical models surveyed
in the introduction. In these models we can be sure that there is no influence
of prior language, as the models have none initially. Furthermore, the structure
that arises depends on aspects of the transmission bottleneck that are hidden
from our participants (given our two experimental conditions) and the particular
properties of the language appear more dramatically shaped by these than any
similarity to the language of the participants. The most parsimonious explana-
tion, then, is that we are seeing adaptation to the transmission bottleneck rather
than an emerging simple first language influence. However, a more subtle point
can be made: We fully expect that language evolution through iterated learning
will involve adaptation to all aspects of the transmission bottleneck, and this
will include the biases of language learners. In our experiment, participants
bring to bear a mixture of biologically basic biases and those that arise from
their acquired cultural heritage. We can see no principled way to separate these
out. This means that our experiments should not be taken to be a “discovery
procedure” for uncovering our evolutionary ancient learning biases but rather
as a tool for understanding the fundamental adaptive dynamics of the cultural
transmission of language by iterated learning.
We started this article by noting that a complex adaptive systems perspective
shifts the burden of explanation away from a richly structured domain-specific
innate substrate for language in our species. Although we have talked a great
deal about linguistic structure as an adaptation, this is adaptation by the lan-
guage itself rather than biological evolution of the faculty of language. The
relevant explanatory mechanisms relate to cultural as opposed to natural se-
lection. However, of course, this does not mean that biology is irrelevant to the
evolution of language.
Rather than seeking evolutionary explanations for innate constraints that
determine language structure, the work presented in this article strongly sug-
gests a different approach. The iterated learning models on which we base our
experiments start with agents who can (a) learn complex signals and (b) infer
complex meanings. Humans belong to an unusual set of species, called the
“vocal learners” (Jarvis, 2004), that can learn sequential signals (others include
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most notably the songbirds). We are also unusually adept in inferring intention-
ality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). By taking into account
the power of language as a complex adaptive system to generate structure itself,
future work on the biological evolution of language in our species should focus
on how we came to have these two crucial preadaptations for language. Without
the combination of vocal learning and meaning inference, iterated learning of
the sort we are studying would not be possible at all (Okanoya, 2002). Once
they are in place, on the other hand, the emergence of structure is inevitable.
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Notes
1 Underlying this work is a typically unstated assumption that modern languages are
already optimized for transmission (i.e., all extant languages are both learnable by
children and meet the expressive needs of their users); thus, further change is driven
not so much by inherent properties of linguistic variants but rather sociolinguistic
factors (e.g., Croft, 2000). However, when looking at the origins of language, we
necessarily need to consider a different state of affairs, one in which language has
not yet reached equilibrium and the inherent structural properties of linguistic
variants are relevant. A related point is the likelihood that intergenerational
transmission is less important in ongoing language change than it is in language
emergence. Where social status, for example, is the primary driving force behind
selection of variants, the impact of learners’ innovations is likely to be lower than
where those innovations actually make language transmissible at all.
2 There are other experimental approaches to the origins of language, such as
Galantucci (2005) and Selten and Warglien (2007), but note that these rely on
participants intentionally and consciously designing a communicative system. Our
interest is in whether the adaptive structure of language can arise without intentional
design.
3 The glosses here are given as English words; recall that in the experiment, visual
stimuli were used. This example is taken from Chain 3 in Experiment 2 in the study
by Kirby et al. (2008).
4 This is not a trivial result considering the rather narrow bottleneck applied during
training meant that each generation was being trained on a (different) random subset
of half of the total language.
5 Taken from generation 9, chain 3, experiment 2 in the study by Kirby et al. (2008).
Note that whereas color and motion are consistently expressed (ne for black, la for
blue, ra for red, ki for horizontal, and pilu for spiral), shape is more haphazardly
encoded (ke when blue/black and horizontal, ki when blue/black and spiral, he when
red and horizontal, and ho when red and spiral).
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6 It is perhaps interesting to note that the investigation of this type of phenomenon,
historically referred to as analogical change, was what prompted the very first
application of this methodology by Esper in 1925.
7 Specifically, we examine chain 3 in experiment 2, but similar results can be obtained
wherever compositionality clearly emerges.
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Investigating how cultural transmission leads 
to the appearance of design without a designer 
in human communication systems
Hannah Cornish
University of Edinburgh
Recent work on the emergence and evolution of human communication has 
focused on getting novel systems to evolve from scratch in the laboratory. Many 
of these studies have adopted an interactive construction approach, whereby 
pairs of participants repeatedly interact with one another to gradually develop 
their own communication system whilst engaged in some shared task. !is paper 
describes four recent studies that take a di"erent approach, showing how adaptive 
structure can emerge purely as a result of cultural transmission through single 
chains of learners. By removing elements of interactive communication and 
focusing only on the way in which language is repeatedly acquired by learners, 
we hope to gain a better understanding of how useful structural properties of 
language could have emerged without being intentionally designed or innovated.
Keywords: iterated learning, cultural evolution, language emergence,  
linguistic transmission
 Introduction
!ere has recently been renewed interest in studying the emergence and evolution 
of human communication systems experimentally (e.g. Galantucci, 2005; Garrod 
et al., 2007; Healey et al., 2007; Scott-Phillips et al., 2009; Selten & Warglien, 2007; 
Kirby et al., 2008a). !ese studies di"er from the many experiments investigating 
human communication that went before (e.g. Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & 
Doherty, 1994; Christiansen, 2000; Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Hudson-Kam & 
Newport, 2005; Wonnacott & Newport, 2005) by the emphasis placed on explor-
ing the emergence of novel systems.1 In other words, these experiments do not 
start with a system (either natural or designed by the experimenter) in place 
initially, but lets one evolve over the course of the experiment. !is provides us 
with a direct route into understanding how such systems become established 
(Galantucci, 2005).
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Prior to this, researchers intent on understanding the complicated processes 
giving rise to systems of human communication were to some extent limited by a 
lack of data. !e simple fact is that natural languages do not emerge every day, and 
neither do they emerge overnight. !is le" two options: (1) exploring the few docu-
mented cases of large-scale natural language emergence, involving sign-languages 
(Senghas & Coppola, 2001; Sandler et al., 2005), and home-sign (Goldin-Meadow & 
Mylander, 1983) that are available, or (2) exploring the phenomenon more 
abstractly in computational simulations (Batali, 1998; de Boer, 2001; Kirby, 2001; 
Steels, 2003; Brighton et al., 2005; Oudeyer, 2005; Vogt, 2005) or mathematical 
models (Gri#ths & Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2007).
It is clear that an experimental approach o$ers certain advantages over study-
ing these phenomena indirectly via the use of computational/mathematical models, 
or via naturalistic observation (such as greater experimental manipulation, con-
trol, and replicability of results, etc.). Most of these newer experiments looking at 
the emergence of novel systems share the property of revolving around some kind 
of communication game. Participants (typically dyads) are given some shared 
goal or joint task that requires them to co-ordinate their actions in some way. !e 
only way in which to do this is to interactively construct a communication system 
together, using whatever medium is provided.
For instance, in Selten & Warglien (2007), pairs of participants are given a 
repertoire of available symbols, each with di$erent sending costs, and instructed 
to converge upon a set of economical signals to identify di$erent pictures. In 
Galantucci (2005), pairs of participants must coordinate their actions in a 2D  
game-world by communicating with one another using a novel graphical medium, 
which prevents the use of common symbols or pictorial representations, forc-
ing them to develop a new system of their own. In Healey et al. (2007), pairs of 
participants (and later on, interacting groups) collaborate together using a vir-
tual whiteboard, drawing images to identify di$erent pieces of music. Similarly,  
Garrod et al. (2007) encourage participants to depict various concepts (such as  
commonly known people, places, objects, and more abstract concepts such as ‘pov-
erty’) using images in such a way that a fellow participant could identify them. In 
a slightly di$erent twist, Scott-Phillips et al. (2009) have an experimental set-up in 
which they do not even provide a dedicated channel for communication to take place 
in: given a task which requires two players to coordinate their actions, the only solu-
tion is to create one by using their movements in the game environment as signals.
!e fact that convergence does not come easily to participants in these exper-
iments (most fail to agree on a system, and fewer still go on to develop one with 
structure) highlights the fact that the underlying processes responsible are not 
trivial. !is is perhaps surprising given that we assume participants could easily 
invent a workable system on their own. In fact, Scott-Phillips et al. (2009) %nd that 
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reported reasons for failure o!en centre around an inability to convey a system 
to their partner rather than an inability to individually construct one in the "rst 
place. Conversely, Selten & Warglien (2007) showed that the chances of develop-
ing a successful system are massively increased when one player "nds a way to take 
control and impose their invented system upon the other. #is raises the interesting 
question of what kind of design process we think is responsible for the emergence 
of structure in natural language – is it one which is wholly reliant on the ingenuity 
and design skills of its users, or is there some other force at work?
#is paper argues that although humans are extremely adept at constructing 
novel communication systems, many linguistic changes are not ‘designed’ by indi-
viduals in that manner. Rather, much of the structure present in human language 
is indicative of apparent design without a designer. With that in mind, a di$erent 
experimental methodology is o$ered – one which explains the emergence of lin-
guistic structure as a result of cultural transmission, or iterated learning by multiple 
individuals.2 #e historical origins and theoretical viewpoints underpinning this 
approach are elaborated upon, and some recent experimental results obtained using 
this method are discussed. It shows that even in the absence of a communicative 
context, structural properties that are useful for communication can arise uninten-
tionally. Finally, some directions for future research in this area are outlined.
 Design without a designer
For centuries philosophers and linguists have debated the origins of linguistic 
structure and change in language. One of the central mysteries involves identify-
ing the source of those changes and innovations that lead to increasing structure. 
#e intuitive answer is of course us, the speakers of language. Yet whilst languages 
change and evolve as a result of di$erential patterns of usage among speakers, 
they do not do so as a result of any intentional design on an individuals’ part. As 
Keller (1994) points out, we cannot analyse a historical change like the shi! in 
word ordering from Object-Verb to Verb-Object in Middle English, and come to 
the conclusion that it is an instance of human design. He refers to events like this 
as ‘phenomena of the third kind’ – grouping together things that are neither man-
made nor entirely natural, but which are instead “the result of human actions 
but not the goal of their intentions” (p. 56). He argues that we need to invoke 
an ‘invisible-hand’ explanation for language, adopting the metaphor proposed by 
the economist and philosopher Adam Smith to explain how locally self-serving 
actions of individual investors can unexpectedly lead to group-level prosperity. 
If this thesis is correct, it is only through developing an understanding of how 
apparent design emerges without a designer that we can hope to discover the origins 
of linguistic structure.
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For Keller, who views language change as a special instance of sociocultural 
change, explaining this property of language means seeing it as a product of cul-
tural evolution. It is obvious that language and culture are linked, but what does 
it mean to claim that language is a product of cultural evolution? Although ideas 
concerning cultural evolution have been around for as long as biological evolution, 
signi!cantly less progress has been made in the former than the latter (Mesoudi 
et al., 2006). Whilst there is a good understanding of the origins and operations of 
many of the cognitive mechanisms underlying language that came about as a result 
of biological changes a"ecting our phylogeny, less is understood about the dynamics 
arising from language being culturally transmitted between individuals.
#is is not a problem with our understanding of language in particular; but 
appears endemic to any culturally transmitted behaviour. Furthermore, it is not the 
case that every instance of cultural evolution requires an invisible hand explanation. If 
we look outwith human communication, we !nd many examples of culturally trans-
mitted behaviours, such as tool-making and the kinds of incremental innovations 
we !nd in technological developments (Basalla, 1988; Petroski, 1992; Ziman, 2000), 
do seem to be directed and guided by human intentions, albeit that o$entimes the 
‘inventors’ themselves cannot anticipate the eventual usage of the object to which 
they contribute some design feature. For some commentators (e.g. Hallpike, 1986; 
Pinker, 1997; Benton, 2000; Bryant, 2004), this intentional aspect is precisely what 
causes analogies between natural selection and cultural evolution to breakdown 
completely (Mesoudi, 2008). Yet instead of perceiving this as an either-or debate 
(cultural evolution either proceeds via intelligent human design or some ‘blind’ 
evolutionary process) Dennett & McKay (2006) encourage us to think of cultural 
change as “a continuum from intelligent, mindful evolution through to oblivious, 
mindless evolution.” (italics original). #ey go on to claim that:
“in cultural evolution...there are undeniable cases of cultural features that evolve 
by Darwinian processes without any need to invoke authors, designers, or other 
intelligent creators. Most obviously, languages – words and pronunciation and 
grammatical features – evolve without any need for grammarians, deliberate 
coiners, or other foresighted guardians of these cultural items.” (p. 353).
So this brings us back to our central question – if some aspects of linguistic structure 
are led by this ‘invisible-hand’, is it possible to capture this phenomenon and inves-
tigate it in the laboratory? It could be argued that, in a sense, we have already seen 
the invisible-hand at work in some of the interactive construction studies discussed 
in the introduction.3 #is is complicated however, by the fact that there are many 
other processes at work which could arguably play a more signi!cant role in the 
eventual emergence of structure.4 Isolating exactly which elements arose through 
intentional design, and which through these more subtle and hidden forces may 
prove to be impossible in any experiment involving human participants. However, 
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if we wish to learn the extent to which useful structure can arise in the absence 
of any intention to create it, we could do worse than to start with a theory of how 
such a blind mechanistic process might occur in the !rst place.
 Iterated language learning
Almost everyone will agree that cultural evolution involves individuals within 
a group engaging in some kind of social learning with one another. One of the 
simplest and most general models of this kind of process is known as iterated 
learning (Kirby & Hurford, 2002). Put simply, iterated learning refers to the pro-
cess whereby someone learns a behaviour by observing someone else performing 
that behaviour. Crucially, the person being observed must also have acquired 
that behaviour in the same way. "is process is most commonly conceived of as a 
linear (vertical) transmission chain, with the output from each person’s learning 
becoming the input for the next ‘generation’, although other population structures 
involving horizontal transmission are possible (see Mesoudi & Whiten (2008) 
for a review of experiments exploring di#erent types of transmission chains in a 
non-linguistic setting).
Over the past decade or so, this iterated learning model has provided a frame-
work for understanding cultural evolution in general, and language evolution in 
particular. "e majority of this work has been undertaken using computational and 
mathematical models (e.g. see both Brighton et al. (2005), Kirby et al. (2008b), and 
references within) to explore what e#ect cultural transmission has on the structure 
of language. In spite of the many variations in the di#erent models, two robust 
!ndings appear to hold whenever iterated language learning is at work. Firstly, 
languages become easier to learn over time, and secondly, they do so by becoming 
more structured. In other words, languages are adapting. To understand why this 
is the case, we need to look at iterated language learning in more detail.
Most simulations begin with a small population of agents with no initial language. 
For instance, in Kirby (2001), there are only two agents in the model at any one 
time – an adult ‘speaker’ and a child ‘learner’. Learners acquire a set of mappings 
between strings of characters (signals) and pairs of features taking di#erent values 
(meanings) by observing the signal-meaning pairs produced by adults. Initially, as 
there is no language in place, the !rst adult generates random, unstructured (or 
holistic) signals when prompted with a meaning. "ese are heard by the learner, 
who uses this data to induce its own representation of the system, before becoming 
the adult. At this point, a new learner appears, and the process repeats.
Learners induce their representations by storing the signal-meanings in a list, 
and then searching for possible generalisations over that data. Crucially, learners 
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are only being trained on a sub-set of the total number of meanings in the lan-
guage. We can think of this as a kind of bottleneck on transmission, one which 
mimics an aspect of the so-called ‘poverty of the stimulus’ that we know applies 
to real language acquisition (Smith, 2003). Namely, how we acquire an in!nite 
language system on the basis of exposure to just a limited sub-set of the data. With 
this in mind, we will term this kind of transmission constraint a data bottleneck.
It transpires that this data bottleneck is of vital importance in explaining what 
happens to the languages over time. If this bottleneck is very wide (i.e. if learners 
are exposed to all, or nearly all, of the total meanings in the language) the lan-
guages do not change from their original random forms. On the other hand, if 
this bottleneck is very narrow (i.e. learners are exposed to just a few meanings) 
the languages become highly unstable. In the !rst case, signal-meaning pairs are 
just being memorised and passed along. In the second case, as only a few meaning-
signal pairs are being transmitted between adjacent generations, each learner is 
forced to reinvent huge swathes of the system anew each time and the language 
cannot stabilise. Neither of these situations resemble a good model of linguistic 
transmission as we know it. However, if the bottleneck is neither too narrow nor 
too wide, something interesting starts to happen. "e languages that were initially 
unstructured become compositional – the signals get decomposed into smaller 
units representing di#erent aspects of the meanings, then recombined in some 
principled way to signify the meaning as a whole.
"e emergence of compositionality is an adaptive response to the pressure of 
being transmitted through the data bottleneck. If meanings are encoded compo-
sitionally, they are far more likely to ‘survive’ transmission and be acquired by the 
next generation than if they are encoded holistically. "is is because they can be 
reconstructed on the basis of fewer examples – they are more generalisable. It is 
not essential to see each and every meaning-signal pair to know what the signals 
are, we can reliably infer them based on the structure in the pairs we do see.
"e presence of the data bottleneck triggers the principle of linguistic adap-
tation. This principle applies whenever language learners encounter imperfect 
information about the system they are trying to acquire. In such instances, cultural 
transmission becomes an adaptive process, causing languages to emerge that are 
seemingly optimised to the problem of being transmitted from person to person 
(Kirby et al., 2008b, pp. 89). It goes without saying that the adaptive solutions seen 
in the models do not come from intentional acts by agents. Put simply, agents are 
not equipped with reasoning or planning abilities, nor do they have the teleologi-
cal goal of creating an ‘optimal’ language programmed into them. Many do not 
even have language-speci!c learning mechanisms. Yet in spite of this, spontaneous 
order emerges. Iterated language learning therefore seems a likely starting point 
for exploring the unintentional emergence of linguistic structure.




Inspired by the early work of Esper (1925), who explored analogical change by using 
miniature languages, and more recently the work of Gri!ths et al. (2008), who suc-
cessfully turned a model of iterated learning in a non-linguistic domain into an 
experiment, work was undertaken to establish whether or not humans act in the 
same way as the simulated agents, by constructing an experimental version of iter-
ated language learning (Kirby et al., 2008a). "e results of this study are reviewed 
later, but the remainder of this section explores the framework used in more detail.
"e general method involves each participant learning a small arti#cial (‘alien’) 
language composed of a #nite set of meanings (pictures) that are paired with signals 
(strings of letters, or possibly sounds). Once a participant has acquired this 
language, they are tested and their answers used to provide the training input to 
the next participant, who forms another ‘generation’ in the chain. "is process 
repeats until the desired number of generations is reached. "roughout, partici-
pants are asked only to reproduce the language as accurately as they can; the 
source of their training data is not revealed, and they have no way of knowing the 
experiment is investigating emergence.
"ere are three distinct phases involved: training, testing, and transmission. 
During the training phase, participants are shown a picture from the set, alongside 
the signal string it is paired with, and informed that this is the way in which the alien 
would describe that image in its own language. "e task is to learn the descriptions 
associated with each image to the best of their abilities. Training occurs via a com-
puter program, which randomises the order in which each signal-meaning pair is 
presented, ensures all training items are seen, and controls the length of time each 
training item is shown for. "e key variables to consider here are the amount of 
training each participant receives (i.e. the number of passes over the data they are 
given), whether this training occurs in one continuous session or in blocks, and 
whether training blocks are structured in some way or randomised.
Once training is complete, we move onto the testing phase, where participants 
are shown each picture in turn and instructed to supply the missing description. 
"e #nal test can be preceded by a series of practice tests in between training 
blocks, which introduces the possibility of feedback being provided to facilitate 
learning. "is option is le$ unexplored for now, but is a potential avenue for future 
work. "e #nal responses from the testing phase are then used to generate a new 
set of training stimuli for the next generation during the transmission phase. It 
is during this #nal stage, which happens ‘o%ine’ a$er the participant has le$, that 
some of the most interesting parameters can be explored, including the transmission 
bottleneck. One of the advantages of the iterated language learning methodology is 
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that it allows us to test very speci!c hypotheses about what occurs during language 
transmission by giving us complete control over what gets passed on. It is this 
aspect that a"ords iterated language learning more simulation-like qualities than 
is typical in non-iterated arti!cial language experiments.
For instance, if we wished to test the hypothesis that a preference for shorter 
strings led to compositional structure, during the transmission phase we could 
arti!cially select only those strings that met some (possibly dynamic) string-
length threshold and ensure that only these items were propagated to the next 
generation.5 By examining the resulting languages that arise from this process of 
arti!cial selection we can determine whether this hypothesis is valid. In this case 
we are running the procedure like a simulation. We build in a condition to see 
what the future outcome is, and can then re!ne our intuitions as a result. Alter-
natively, if we wish to test the hypothesis that human learners actually have a bias 
towards producing shorter strings, we can just run the experiment without any 
such manipulations and examine the average length of strings at the end of the 
chain. In this case, we are using the methodology to experimentally test whether 
such a bias currently exists or not. Both strategies can be useful depending on the 
questions one wants to answer.
#ese are not the only considerations that need to be kept in mind. One 
obvious factor we have yet to mention is how we begin this process. It is clear that 
the !rst participant needs a language to learn. #ere are several manipulations we 
can make here, which are again dependent on the kinds of questions we are inter-
ested in. For instance, if we wish to know whether a particular structural system 
can be stably transmitted, then we should give that system to the !rst participant 
and monitor whether it changes as a result of iterated learning. If however, we 
are interested in learning something about how linguistic structure emerges, 
we cannot initialise the chains with a fully structured system. Instead, we can 
use randomly generated signals. A simple method for constructing these is by 
concatenating CV syllables (drawn from a large but !nite set) to form longer 
strings. #is produces a set of signal strings, which whilst containing some regu-
larities (owing to the fact that they are constructed from a !nite syllable set) is 
still highly unstructured with regards to the meanings.
Further consideration must be paid to the design of the meaning-space – 
or rather, the stimuli we use to depict them. Meaning-spaces themselves can be 
structured or unstructured, re$ecting regularities and co-occurrences in the real 
world, or a controlled and simpli!ed world of our choosing. In all of the studies dis-
cussed later, the pictures come from a small and highly structured meaning space 
consisting of three di"erent dimensions (motion,6 colour and shape), each of which 
contains three di"erent variables (e.g. bouncing, straight and spiraling; black, blue 
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and red; circle, square and triangle). !is 3 " 3 " 3 design yields a total of 27 di#erent 
possible combinations.
Attention also needs to be given to how we analyse the data from the study. 
In simulations, modelers have free access to the grammars formed by the agents 
over the course of the run, making descriptions and comparisons of the systems 
at di#erent stages of their evolution relatively straightforward. Obviously this is not 
possible with human participants, and so alternatives must be found. At least two 
di#erent types of measurement are required. Firstly, a method of analysing the sim-
ilarity of languages across generations, and secondly a method of analysing the 
structural properties of languages within generations.
In order to calculate whether or not the languages are becoming easier to learn 
over time, there needs to be some measure of transmission error that compares 
adjacent generations and shows how much deviation there is between the two. If 
error is low, we infer the languages are being easily acquired. One way to do this is 
to calculate the mean edit distances of corresponding strings in each generation – 
that is, the number of substitutions, replacements and deletions required to turn 
string a into string a’ (Levenshtein, 1966). For instance, if we wanted to assess the 
similarity between the strings ‘wogi’ and ‘wong’ we could calculate the amount 
of e#ort it would take to turn one into the other. In this case, we would need one 
insertion (n) and one deletion (i), giving an edit distance of 2. !is $gure can be 
normalised for string length, and then calculated for a whole language, producing 
a single number between 0 and 1 re%ecting the degree of change between it and 
its predecessor.
!e within generations measure is more complicated and needs to quantify 
the amount of structure within the language at each point in time. One way to do 
this is to use the pairwise distance correlation,7 which calculates the extent to which 
similar signal-strings are used to express similar meanings. Just as we use edit 
distance to measure di#erences between signals, the same technique can be used 
for meanings. So whilst a ‘red bouncing square’ and a ‘blue bouncing square’ have 
an edit distance of 1, a ‘black spiraling circle’ and a ‘blue horizontal triangle’ have 
a distance of 3. !e idea is that if the mappings between signals and meanings is 
structure-preserving (as would be the case, for instance, if the language was com-
positional), we should see a large positive correlation between these two sets of 
distances. If the mappings between the two are largely idiosyncratic (as would be 
the case for the initial unstructured languages), we would expect no correlation 
between the two distances. In order to establish whether the correlation is sig-
ni$cant, and to compare our results across di#erent languages, we must compute 
the z-score for the veridical correlation, and compare it to a large Monte Carlo 
sample of the same string data with a randomised alignment of meanings. !is 
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allows us to check whether we could have observed the mapping as a result of a 
random assignment of our meanings with those particular signals or not. A full 
description of both PDC and the transmission error outlined above can be found 
in Kirby et al. (2008a).
 Recent studies
!is section explores some recent studies illustrating the way in which the experiments 
work, and how some of the parameters interact with one another in interesting ways. 
!ese studies have been selected to demonstrate the kinds of empirical questions the 
methodology can address, with each one focusing in greater detail on the notion 
of the transmission bottleneck. !ere have been few attempts to rigorously de"ne 
this concept in the literature, despite the fact that it is pressure to adapt to the 
constraints imposed on transmission that is the source of emergent structure in 
the model. !e fact that it is ‘constraints’ plural should also not be forgotten. !ere 
are many potential bottlenecks on language transmission, o#en working simulta-
neously and not always in the same direction (Kirby, 2001; Hurford, 2002). !is 
raises some interesting questions: are all constraints on transmission alike, and can 
we usefully study them in the laboratory?
!e "rst experiment implements a data bottleneck of the kind mentioned 
previously, and attempts to replicate the computational "ndings concerning learn-
ability and structure. !is is contrasted with a second experiment showing similar 
results can be obtained by relying solely on the natural memory constraints of our 
learners. !e third experiment explores what happens when we apply arti"cial 
selection for languages capable of expressing a larger proportion of the meaning-
space. !e fourth and "nal experiment extends the third by attempting to increase 
the early transmission "delity by doubling the training. It will be seen that in all 
four cases the languages adapt over time to become more learnable and structured, 
o#en in interesting and unexpected ways.
 !e data bottleneck
!e "rst experiment can be found in full in Kirby et al., (2008a). !ey attempted 
to replicate the computational "nding that iterated learning leads to adaptation. 
!e initial languages were randomly generated and used the same structured 
3 $ 3 $ 3 meaning-space described earlier. In addition, a bottleneck was placed on 
the amount of data each participant was trained on. Instead of having full access 
to all 27 meaning-signal during training, each participant was trained on exactly 
© 2010. John Benjamins Publishing Company
All rights reserved
 Hannah Cornish
14 of them, selected at random during the transmission phase at each generation. 
!ere were three blocks of training, during which each item was seen twice, for 
six seconds. 40 participants were recruited and o"ered £5 to take part. !ey were 
randomly assigned to one of four di"erent language chains, each of which ran for 
ten generations.
!e transmission error and structure scores are reproduced here in Figure 1. 
From these it is possible to con#rm both predictions: the languages are adapting 
to become signi#cantly more learnable and structured over time (as shown by a 
mean decrease in transmission error between #rst and #nal generations of 0.638, 
SD = 0.147; t(3) = 8.656; P < 0.002, and a mean increase in structure of 5.578, 
SD = 2.968, t(3) = 3.7575, P < 0.02).



























Figure 1. Graphs showing the normalised error (le$) and pairwise distance correlation 
(right) scores by generation, of four transmission chains when a data bottleneck was  
present. !ese results show that the systems are all evolving to become more learnable 
and more structured over time. Points above the dotted line in Fig 1 (right) represent  
signi#cant structural regularities between signal-meaning mappings. Re-drawn from 
Kirby et al. (2008a) with permission
When analysing the languages qualitatively, Kirby et al. (2008a) made an 
interesting discovery. Whilst the languages that arose in this condition in the com-
putational models were all compositional in structure, the languages in the experi-
mental version were not. Instead, every chain showed a massive decrease in the 
number of distinct strings being used, introducing widespread underspeci#cation. 
Reduction in the number of words to remember could not account for the low 
error values alone. To get any #gure below 50% there must be inter-generational 
© 2010. John Benjamins Publishing Company
All rights reserved
 Designer in human communication systems 
agreement on those items that were not seen during training, and this could only 
happen if the signals were structured. Table 1 shows the language from the chain 
with the highest score8 at generation 10. From this we can see that although certain 
meanings are now underspeci!ed, there is still a systematic relationship between 
meanings and signals. For instance, all horizontally moving shapes are called ‘tuge’, 
regardless of shape or colour.
Table 1. Table showing the language with the highest structure score at generation 10 in 
the data bottleneck condition. Signals are located in cells corresponding to their meaning 
features. Columns align with colours, whilst motion and shape features inhabit rows. "is 
particular language exhibits systematic underspeci!cation, which is a successful strategy 
enabling learners to reproduce the whole language from just a fragment. Re-drawn from 
Kirby et al. (2008a) with permission
black blue red
miniku miniku miniku circle
bounce tupim tupim tupim square
tupin tupin tupin triangle
tuge tuge tuge circle
horizontal tuge tuge tuge square
tuge tuge tuge triangle
poi poi poi circle
spiral poi poi poi square
poi poi poi triangle
Clearly this is a somewhat unexpected result. Nevertheless, it tells us two impor-
tant things: (1) the dynamics of cultural transmission certainly give rise to adaptive 
structure in a laboratory setting, and (2) something more than a pressure for easy 
transmission must be required to explain the emergence of compositionality. "is 
second idea will be explored later, but before that we should discuss the data bottle-
neck in more detail. "e data bottleneck works by forcing perceived structural pat-
terns in previously encountered stimuli to be generalised to novel stimuli. Even if 
these perceived patterns occurred only through chance sampling of the data, the 
data bottleneck works to massively amplify their e#ect throughout the whole lan-
guage (Cornish et al., submitted). What was previously just an inference of structure 
before learning, is now a bona !de instance of it a$er learning. "is is particularly 
the case in earlier generations when there is more variation in the system.
"e next experiment explores what happens when we remove the data bottleneck 
completely.
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 !e memory bottleneck
!e idea of removing the data bottleneck may seem strange given the computa-
tional "ndings. For instance, Smith (2003) clearly shows that running an iterated 
learning model with no data bottleneck results in no cultural evolution taking place 
at all. Yet there is an important di#erence between idealised computational agents 
and human participants: the agents in many of these models are perfect learn-
ers. !ey memorise meaning-signal pairs $awlessly. Given the fact that human 
memory is not this reliable, it might be worth investigating whether this ‘memory 
bottleneck’ could play a role on the emergence of linguistic structure.
!is memory bottleneck was also at work during Kirby et al.’s (2008a) study. 
A problem arises in that there is a potential confound between the two types of 
bottleneck. According to the principle of linguistic adaptation discussed earlier, 
cultural transmission only becomes adaptive when the learner is presented with 
imperfect information. In order to assess what, if anything, imperfect learning has 
contributed to the overall result in the earlier study, it is necessary to "rst remove 
this confound by eradicating the e#ect of the imperfect data. With that in mind the 
experiment was re-run, this time with participants given full access to all 27 mean-
ings during training. !e training and testing phases were held proportional to the 
previous experiment; although there were more training items, each was seen the 
same number of times and for the same duration as before.
!e results of this experiment are shown in Figure 2. As before, the transmis-
sion error signi"cantly decreases over the course of the experiment indicating that 
the language is becoming easier to learn (mean decrease of 0.446, SD = 0.193, 
t(3) = 4.628, p < 0.009). Interestingly, comparing the initial error values with those 
in the data bottleneck condition in Figure 1 we "nd that there is no signi"cant 
di#erence between the two. !is suggests that removing the data bottleneck has 
not made the task any easier or harder for the participants. Looking at the struc-
ture scores, we also "nd that they signi"cantly increase over time as well (mean 
increase of 7.396, SD = 1.629, t(3) = 9.079, p < 0.001).
In fact, if we compare Figures 1 and 2 there do not appear to be any real dif-
ferences in development patterns of the languages at all.9 !is is in fact surprising, 
as we might expect that once some structure had emerged in the systems, having 
full access to the data may actually facilitate acquisition and lead to more overall 
stability. !is is inferred on the basis that it is easier to detect structural regulari-
ties when provided with more evidence than it is with less. !e fact that we only 
have four chains means that we cannot rule out the possibility that we have just 
been unlucky not to observe more stability in this instance. However, it could also 
be the case that there are features within the language itself which prevents such 
stability emerging.
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Figure 2. Graphs showing the normalised error (le!) and pairwise distance correlation 
(right) scores by generation, of four transmission chains when no data bottleneck was 
present. "ese results show that imperfect learning of data achieves the same result as  
exposure to novel stimuli. "e systems are all evolving to become more learnable and 
more structured over time. Points above the dotted line in Fig 2 (right) represent  
signi#cant structural regularities between signal-meaning mappings
We can analyse the languages qualitatively to get a better impression of what 
is going on. Table 2 shows the language from the chain with the highest struc-
ture score at generation 9. We can see that this language also exhibits systematic 
underspeci#cation. Unlike the previous example however, there appears to be 
tentative evidence for some internal structure – that is, some of the signals begin 
to look like they are decomposable into sub-units. For instance, signals used 
for spiraling objects can be broken up into a pre#x (wag-, nuak- or wagin-) 
which represents the shape, and a su$x (-ini) which we could gloss as mean-
ing ‘spiraling’. However, these pre#xes only seem to apply locally. "ey are not 
used elsewhere.
"ere also seem to be several irregulars present – for instance, ‘mucapo’ and 
‘nukapo’. Examining the generations immediately before and a!er, it is apparent that 
these forms have persisted a while, but are not stably associated with speci#c mean-
ings. To borrow an analogy from phonology, they seem to be in free variation. It seems 
that these alternating variants do disappear eventually, but only gradually. "eir pres-
ence could explain why we do not see as much stability here as in the data bottleneck 
condition however: having full access to the data allows irregulars to survive, but com-
plicates the acquisition process by making it necessary to memorise these exceptions 
on a case by case bases.
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Table 2. Table showing the language with the highest structure score at generation 9 
in the no data bottleneck condition. Signals are located in cells corresponding to their 
meaning features. Columns align with colours, whilst motion and shape features inhabit 
rows. !is language also exhibits systematic underspeci"cation, although there appear to 
be signs of internal structure indicating shape and motion amongst spiraling objects, and 
irregulars (e.g. ‘mucapo’ and ‘nukapo’)
black blue red
nucapo nucapo nucapo circle
bounce nucapo mucapo mucapo square
nucapo nukapo mucapo triangle
hapo hapo hapo circle
horizontal hapo hapo hapo square
hapo hapo hapo triangle
wagini wagini wagini circle
spiral nuakini nuakini nuakini square
waginini waginini waginini triangle
!e results of these two experiments show us two important things. Firstly, 
adaptive systems that could be used for communication can emerge in an experi-
mental setting, without a designer. It is worth stressing this point again – the par-
ticipants involved are not ‘solving’ these transmission ‘problems’. In fact, they are 
not even aware that there are transmission problems. Secondly, the results of our 
second experiment extend previous work by showing that the presence of a data 
bottleneck is not essential for cultural transmission to become adaptive. Instead, 
the key is imperfect information. !e source of that imperfect information (lack of 
exposure to data, human memory limitations) appears irrelevant.
Next we move onto exploring a topic that was hinted at earlier – the emer-
gence of compositionality.
 Another kind of bottleneck: Forcing expressivity
One of the reasons why underspeci"cation is so prevalent in the previous experiments 
is that the presence of homonyms creates a snowball e#ect: once one appears in 
the system it sends a strong signal to later learners, encouraging more to emerge. 
Given the fact that the only bottlenecks we have explored so far demand nothing 
more than the system be learnable, it could well be the case that this represents the 
ideal solution for the language; a$er all, the most learnable system is one in which 
there is just one name for everything.10 However, what would happen if the task 
were to change slightly, requiring that the language not only be learnable, but also 
expressive (i.e. be capable of uniquely expressing more of the meanings)?
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In the simulation literature, expressivity is enforced as a matter of course. 
Although never explicitly addressed or discussed as a type of bottleneck, every 
model has an expressivity requirement built into it somewhere. In most cases it is 
implicit in the learning or production mechanisms of the agents, built in to model 
the known one-to-one mapping bias humans possess (Smith, 2003). Fortunately 
however, this means there are well-understood techniques for enforcing expressiv-
ity that can be borrowed from the models. !e simplest of these involves "ltering 
out repeated instances of the same signal being attached to multiple meanings. !e 
"rst novel signal-meaning pair produced by generation n-1 is propagated into the 
training input to generation n. !erea#er any repeats of those signals are removed. 
!is ensures that the input to generation n only ever contains one-to-one mappings 
between signals and meanings.
Kirby et al. (2008a) ran an iterated language learning experiment using just 
such a "ltering method. As before they used four randomly generated languages to  
initialise four distinct chains. Once the results of the "nal test were collected, 14 new 
items were sampled at random for the next generation to train upon and homonyms 
were removed. !e error and structure scores are reproduced in Figure 3. !ese show 
that once again, the language is adapting to become signi"cantly more learnable 
(shown by a mean decrease in transmission error between "rst and "nal generations 
of 0.427, SD = 0.106; t(3) = 8.0557; P < 0.002), and more highly structured over time 
(shown by a mean increase in structure of 6.805, SD = 5.390, t(3) = 2.525, P < 0.05).



























Figure 3. Graphs showing the normalised error (le#) and pairwise distance  
correlation (right) scores by generation, of four transmission chains when both a data 
bottleneck and a homonym "lter was present. !ese results show that despite the  
blocking of underspeci"cation, structure is still emerging leading to the language to  
become increasingly learnable. Points above the dotted line in Fig 3 (right) represent  
signi"cant structural regularities between signal-meaning mappings. Re-drawn from  
Kirby et al. (2008a) with permission
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Table 3 shows the language with the highest structure score at generation 9. 
From this it appears we have found a compositional system at last. Although not 
perfectly regular, each signal seems to be composed of three morphemes, each 
corresponding to a di!erent feature of meaning. For instance, the "rst letter 
corresponds to colour, and there are regular su#xes indicating motion. Shape 
is the most irregular, and seems to be encoded by remaining letters. It should 
be noted that the occurrence of this degree of compositionality is both rare and 
$eeting – it features in just two of the four chains, and does not appear to be 
stable.11 Nevertheless, the fact that it emerges at all is encouraging, and also 
serves to drive home the point once and for all that the appearance of struc-
ture in these studies is an invisible-hand process. As Kirby et al. (2008a) are at 
pains to point out, as far as participants are concerned, the "ltering bottleneck 
is an invisible modi"cation. %e individuals involved would have had no way 
of knowing which condition they were in, and yet the kind of languages they 
produced di!ered radically.
Table 3. Table showing the language with the highest structure score at generation 9 in 
the "ltering condition. Signals are located in cells corresponding to their meaning features. 
Columns align with colours, whilst motion and shape features inhabit rows. %is particular 
language exhibits signs of compositionality, with signals being composed of three morphemes 
representing colour, shape and motion respectively. Of these, only colour and motion are con-
sistent. Note also the presence of an irregular, ‘renana’. Re-drawn from Kirby et al. (2008a) 
with permission
black blue red
nehoplo lahoplo rehoplo circle
bounce nereplo laneplo replo square
nekiplo lakiplo rahoplo triangle
neheki lahoki reneki circle
horizontal nereki lereki renana square
nekeki lakeki raheki triangle
nehopilu lahopilu repilu circle
spiral nepilu lanepilu repilu square
nekipilu lakipilu rahopilu triangle
Perhaps one of the reasons why compositionality does not stabilise a&er it 
emerges is due to the comparatively extreme learning conditions imposed upon 
participants. We can see by looking at the transmission error levels obtained by the 
"rst generation in all three studies so far that participants are struggling to accurately 
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learn the items they are trained on. In most cases they are only learning between 
20–35 per cent of all meaning-signal pairs, translating to a 40–70 per cent accuracy 
on seen items. !is is hardly surprising given that they see each item only six 
times in total. !is begs the question of how important early transmission "delity 
is. Would increasing the amount of exposure to each training item lead to a more 
stable compositional language? !is is the question posed in our "nal study.
 Increasing early transmission "delity
!is study followed the same outline of the "ltering condition, but with one slight 
alteration; each training item appeared twice as o#en. !e main aim of this double 
training condition was to see whether or not a compositional system could be sta-
bly transmitted once it emerged. Figure 4 shows the error and structure scores of 
the resulting chains. As we would expect, transmission error and structure are both 
signi"cant (mean decrease in error of 0.35, SD = 0.063; t(3) = 11.079, p < 0.0008 
and mean increase in structure of 9.83, SD = 2.639; t(3) = 7.449, p < 0.003). Again, 
as we would expect, comparing Figures 3 and 4 the transmission error scores of 
the "rst generation are much lower in the double training condition. Furthermore, 
it appears at least one of the chains results in a language that remains relatively 
stable for at least "ve generations.



























Figure 4. Graphs showing the normalised error (le#) and pairwise distance correlation 
(right) scores by generation, of four transmission chains in the double training condition. 
!ese results show that once more the systems are adapting to become more learnable 
and more structured over time. Periods of high stability were also observed. Points  
above the dotted line in Fig 4 (right) represent signi"cant structural regularities between 
signal-meaning mappings
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Table 4 shows the structure of this stable chain, taken at the mid-point in 
generation 7. Interestingly enough, this system seems to combine clear elements 
of a compositional and an underspeci!ed system. Each signal is composed of 
two parts – a pre!x describing the colour, and a su"x describing the motion 
(black objects are referenced by a null morpheme). How is this possible, when 
the languages are still being !ltered for homonyms? #e answer is deceptive. 
As long as homonyms are evenly distributed throughout the language, and as 
long as there is a very small amount of compositionality allowing the chance to 
reconstruct a form if it is unlucky enough to not be selected for transmission, 
the !ltering process can be easily bypassed. In this case, the language has per-
fectly adapted to !nd this delicate equilibrium, resulting in an unexpected but 
highly elegant solution.
Table 4. Table showing a stable language, taken at generation 7 in the double training 
condition. Signals are located in cells corresponding to their meaning features. Col-
umns align with colours, whilst motion and shape features inhabit rows. #is particular 
language exhibits properties of both systematically underspeci!ed systems and compo-
sitional ones. Colours and motions are signi!ed using distinct morphemes – although 
black objects are signi!ed with a null morpheme – whilst the shape dimension remains 
underspeci!ed. #is system appears in spite of !ltering to remove homonyms
black blue red
gahili pagahili megahili circle
bounce gahili pagahili megahili square
gahili pagahili megahili triangle
linu palinu melinu circle
horizontal linu palinu melinu square
linu palinu melinu triangle
wenu pawenu mewenu circle
spiral wenu pawenu mewenu square
wenu pawenu mewenu triangle
As if that were not impressive enough, the same solution was found again, 
only this time it emerged in a chain that was previously fully compositional. #e 
two instances are shown in Tables 5 and 6, and refer to the chain with the highest 
structure in generation 4. As ever we cannot make any strong claims about the 
emergence of a particular structure given that we only have four data points as 
a baseline, but this is suggestive of the fact that fully compositional systems are 
perhaps still too di"cult to maintain even with extra training. Further study is 
required here to fully assess the di"culty of the task.
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Table 5. Table showing the language with the highest structure at generation 4 in the 
double training condition. Signals are located in cells corresponding to their meaning 
features. Columns align with colours, whilst motion and shape features inhabit rows. !is 
language is fully compositional, with each meaning feature being consistently encoded 
using a distinct morpheme
black blue red
wakeki hunkeki pokeki circle
bounce wakiki hunkiki pokiki square
wanikuko hunikuko ponikuko triangle
wakemo hunkemo pokemo circle
horizontal wakimo hunkimo pokimo square
waknimo hunimo ponimo triangle
wakekuko hunkekuko pokekuko circle
spiral wakikuko hunkikuko pokikuko square
wanikuki hunikuki ponikuki triangle
Table 6. Table showing the same language as Table 5 at generation 10. Signals are located 
in cells corresponding to their meaning features. Columns align with colours, whilst 
motion and shape features inhabit rows. !e language that was previously fully compsi-
tional has become mixed – incorporating features of both systematic underspeci"cation 
and compositionality. Colours and motions are signi"ed using distinct morphemes whilst 
the shape dimension remains underspeci"ed
black blue red
wakiko pokiko pokiko circle
bounce wakiko hekiko pokiko square
wakiko hekiko pokiko triangle
wanimo henimo ponimo circle
horizontal wanimo henimo ponimo square
wanimo hekiko ponimo triangle
wahikeko hehikeko pohikeko circle
spiral wahikeko hehikeko pohikeko square
wahikeko hehikeko pohikeko triangle
!is section began by asking a question about whether all constraints on 
transmission were alike, and whether they could be usefully studied in the labo-
ratory. From the data we have seen it appears that the answer to the "rst part is 
no. While it seems that the data and the memory bottlenecks can be function-
ally classi"ed as the same kind of constraint – one which forces languages to be 
learnable – the "ltering bottleneck described in the third experiment appears to 
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play a di!erent kind of role, by forcing the system to also be minimally expres-
sive. "e results of the #nal experiment are harder to interpret, but do suggest 
more work needs to be undertaken to explore the di!erent kinds of adaptations 
that emerge in experiments like these. Certainly it acts as a reminder of the 
many surprising, and o$en unintuitive, ways in which the system can evolve 
during transmission. Given the fact that we are in a position to answer the 
#rst part of our question a$er performing these studies, logic suggests that the 
answer to the second part must be yes. However, we should not feel too content. 
"ere is work to be done.
 Future directions
"is paper has touched upon several di!erent ideas. "e #rst is that structural 
changes and innovations in natural language are typically not the result of inten-
tional actions designed to bring about that goal. It is important to remember this if 
we want to develop a full picture of how linguistic structure emerges. "e second 
idea is a suggestion to help handle the #rst. By taking a cultural evolutionary 
perspective on language, we can develop new methods that allow us to investigate 
the appearance of apparent design without a designer. One such method is the 
iterated language learning framework, which has been recently developed into an 
experimental methodology revolving around the repeated cultural transmission 
of simple ‘alien’ languages through the minds of participants.
Work in this area is still in its infancy. "is paper outlined four recent stud-
ies that looked a little closer at the notion of transmission bottlenecks, but there 
remain many avenues still le$ unexplored. "ese include:
1.  the design of the meaning space: the emerging linguistic structures are obvi-
ously highly dependent on the structure of the meaning spaces that they are 
evolving to express, and as such, having a more realistic model of the world 
is an obvious area for improvement. Some of the groundwork has already 
been covered mathematically in simulations (Kirby, 2007), and to some extent 
explored in robotic agents who evolve their own meaning spaces over time 
(Steels, 2003), but as yet this area still represents ongoing work in our research 
lab and others.
2. di!erent population structures: possible population structures can be de#ned 
by three di!erent parameters – the size of the population, the direction 
of transmission (vertical, horizontal or mixed) and the network structure 
dictating who learns from whom. In this paper we have only examined 
© 2010. John Benjamins Publishing Company
All rights reserved
 Designer in human communication systems 
the simplest population structure imaginable – a single vertically transmitted 
chain – although work expanding this is ongoing.
3.  iterated language learning in children: one obvious extension is to explore this 
process in children, as they have long been implicated in the emergence of lan-
guage. Work in this area would contrast nicely with the recent non-linguistic 
di!usion chain work being undertaken with children (Flynn, 2008).
4. di!erent modalities: another area which could be interesting is to use spoken 
or gestural signals rather than written. Some work has recently been under-
taken exploring the iterated learning of musical tones (Brown & Tamariz, 
submitted) in musicians vs. non-musicians, with scope for extending this 
work further.
"e rise in the number of studies exploring the emergence of human communica-
tion experimentally is deeply encouraging. It is important that this work continues, 
but that in future it focuses on all edges of the cultural evolutionary continuum: 
on the emergence of systems that arise through intentional human design, on sys-
tems that arise unintentionally through vertical and horizontal transmission, and 
systems that arise through combinations of the two.
Notes
 Also implicit in each of these experiments is the notion that much of the character of these 
systems arise from social interactions between individuals, and do not just emerge directly 
from the underlying cognitive systems of those who possess them – hence why there is a need 
to study this aspect of the process in the first place.
 Strictly speaking, we are not witnessing the evolution of communication systems in these 
studies, but the evolution of signs. !is is because there is no actual communication taking 
place between participants; the task is all about learning a system, and not about using it for 
anything. !e distinction is important because, as we will see later, although we find structural 
features emerging that are useful for communication, we sometimes find these systems devel-
oping in ways we would not expect if they were being used communicatively.
 !e author would like to thank both Bruno Galantucci and Simon Garrod for making 
this point clear. While interactions between participants may involve some reasoning and 
purposeful design, the negotiation process is also a complex dynamic system at work. As such, 
it has invisible-hands of its very own; shaping, guiding and prompting structure into being. 
!is idea would help explain why the creation of a successful system is never guaranteed in 
these studies.
 !is is not intended as a criticism of the interactive construction methodology. We should 
be mindful of Dennett & McKay’s continuum of cultural evolution here, and the need to 
explore all lengths of it.
© 2010. John Benjamins Publishing Company
All rights reserved
 Hannah Cornish
 It should be remembered that studying processes of artificial selection (e.g Mendel’s peas, 
the selective breeding programs employed by farmers, etc.) were what led to the breakthroughs 
in understanding how biological evolution worked. One of the points being arguing for here is 
that similar tactics of studying artificial selection in language and other culturally transmitted 
behaviours can lead to similar advances in understanding cultural evolution. !is is consistent 
with the agenda laid out in Mesoudi et al. (2006).
 Motion was represented using a directional arrow, although real movement could be 
achieved using video instead of static images.
 !is is the measure of structure used in Kirby et al. (2008a), although it is not named as 
such. !e main advantage of the PDC method is that it is detects all kinds of structure – not 
just compositionality. However, there are other methods for assessing structure within gen-
erations that may be more suited for analysing the emergence of compositionality, such as 
RegMap (Tamariz & Smith, 2008; Cornish et al., 2009).
 It should be noted that these examples are not always representative of the range of results 
found in each condition and should be treated in the spirit with which they are o"ered – as 
individual case-studies. !e complete data for every study is available on request: hannah@
ling.ed.ac.uk
 It should be noted that the striking peaks in transmission error seen at generation 6 in 
di"erent chains in Figs. 1 and 2 appear coincidental, and simply an unfortunate reminder of 
how fragile single transmission chains are to individual variations in recall ability.
 Obviously this system would not be at all useful for communication.
 In this regard at least, iterated language learning shares similarities with the communica-
tion game experiments described in the Introduction. Whilst compositionality is a ubiquitous 
feature of human language, it emerges rarely in experiments investigating the novel emer-
gence of communication systems.
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